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APHC010672412022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3565]
THURSDAY,THE FIFTH DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
LAND ACQUISITION APPEAL NOS.20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65,
66, 67, 69, 70 & 71 OF 2023
Between:
1. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR(L.A.O), G.N.S.S., NANDYAL.
...APPELLANT
AND
1. MACHALAPURI MABU SAHEB, S/o Dasthagiri, Age 45 years,
Perusomula Village, Sanjamala Mandal, Kurnool District and others.
...RESPONDENTS
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. GP FOR APPEALS (AP)
Counsel for the Respondents:
1. K RATHANGA PANI REDDY
The Court made the following:
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND
&
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
LAND ACQUISITION APPEAL NOS.20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50, 60, 61, 62,
64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70 & 71 OF 2023
COMMON JUDGMENT (per the Hon’ble Sri Justice Battu Devanand):
1.
These Land Acquisition Appeal Suits arise out of the Common Order,
dated 30.11.2021, passed in LAOP.No.2 of 2016 and batch on the file of
Senior Civil Judge, Allagadda (hereinafter referred to as "Reference Court")
whereby the compensation for the land acquired was enhanced from
Rs.45,000/- to Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre for Rainfed Dry Land and Rs.65,000/to Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre for Irrigable Dry Land.
2.
This batch of Appeals arise from the same land acquisition Notification
dated 26.06.2006 for the land of village Perusomula Village, Sanjamala
Mandal, Kurnool District and involved common facts and questions;
therefore, with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties, all these
Appeals have been heard together treating the LAAS No.20 of 2023 as the
leading Appeal.
3.
For the sake of convenience, the parties will be hereinafter referred to
as per their ranking in the Reference Court.
4.
The Government has issued a Notification under Section 4(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') dated
26.06.2006. The Land Acquisition Officer fixed the market value of the lands
at the rate of Rs.45,000/- per Acre for Rainfed Dry Land and for Rs.65,000/per Acre for Irrigable Dry Land vide Award 10/2006-07 dated 19.08.2006.
5.
Dissatisfied with the compensation awarded in Award No.10/2006-07
dated 19.08.2006, passed by the Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter
referred to as ‘LAO’), several land owners submitted references under
Section 18 of the Act. These references were adjudicated by the Common
Order, dated 30.11.2021 in leading LAOP.No.2 of 2016 and batch before the
learned Senior Civil Judge, Allagadda. The Reference Court enhanced the
market value of the acquired land from Rs.45,000/- to Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre
for Rainfed Dry Land and from Rs.65,000/- to Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre for
Irrigable Dry Land.
6.
Briefly stated facts of the present Appeals for referring to matters by the
Special Deputy Collector (L.A.) GNSS, Unit-I, Nandyal, to the Civil Court
under Section 18 of the Act are as follows:
(a) The Special Deputy Collector (LAO), GNSS Unit-I, Nandyal and the
Executive Engineer, GNSS Division No.4, Koilakunta, submitted requisitions
dated 09.06.2006 and 12.06.2006 for the acquisition of 135.60 acres of land
in Perusomula Village, Sanjamala Mandal, Kurnool District, for the
excavation of the GNSS Flood Flow Canal. Under Section 17(4) of the L.A.
Act, urgency was invoked, and the enquiry under Section 5(A) was
dispensed with. The lands were classified as Rainfed Dry Land and Irrigable
Dry Land and the D.N. proposal for 135.60 acres was approved on
12.06.2006. The Section 4(1) notification was published in the Kurnool
District Gazette on 15.06.2006, and the draft declaration was published in
relevant local offices on 21.06.2006 and 22.06.2006.
(b) To determine the market value, the LAO considered sale
transactions from three years before the Notification under Section 18 of the
Act. However, all transactions from the Sub-Registrar, Owk, were discarded.
The market value was fixed at Rs.45,000/- per Acre for Rainfed Dry Land and
Rs.65,000/- per Acre for Irrigable Dry Land. The Claimants, however, were
not satisfied with the assessed market value.
7.
In their respective OPs, the Claimants argued that the compensation
granted by the LAO was insufficient, lacking justification and failing to follow
the principles outlined under Section 23 of the Act. They contended that the
LAO did not account for the potential of the acquired lands, comparable
sales, or exercise individual discretion. The Claimants, who depend on the
acquired land for agricultural purposes, also highlighted that they earn
Rs.10,000/- to Rs.15,000/- from Bengal gram cultivation on dry land with
black cotton soil, which the LAO did not consider. Additionally, they pointed
out that the Court has enhanced the compensation of Rs.2,51,600/- for dry
land in OP No.1034/2003, dated 29.12.2008 (Award No.74/2001-02, dated
01.03.2000) and noted that Prism Cement Limited purchased lands nearby at
Rs.3,00,000/- per Acre in 2007-2008. The Claimants thus sought an
enhancement of Rs.10,00,000/- per Acre with all statutory benefits.
8.
Based on the above pleadings, the Reference Court framed the
following points:
(1) Whether the market value fixed by the LAO is proper?
(2) Whether the acquired lands have got any mining
potentiality?
(3) Whether
the claimants
are entitled for enhancement of
the market value fixed by the LAO?
(4) To what relief?
9.
During the common enquiry to substantiate the Claimants’ claim, some
of the Claimants were examined as P.Ws.1 to 6 and got marked Exs.P1 to
P20. On behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer/Referring Officer, no evidence
was adduced but Ex.B1 was marked.
10.
After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both
sides, the Reference Court enhanced the compensation amount from
Rs.45,000/- to Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre for Rainfed dry land and Rs.65,000/- to
Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre for I.D. land. Consequently, awarded 30% solatium on
the enhanced market value fixed as provided under Section 23(2) of the Act;
additional market value @ 12% per annum on such market value from the
date of Sec.4(1) Notification of the Act till the date of Award; also awarded
interest at 12% per annum for one year from the date of taking possession
thereafter at 15% per annum till the date of payment on enhanced market
value and also entitled to interest on additional market value and solatium.
11.
Aggrieved by this common order, the Appellant/Referring Officer filed
the present batch of First Appeals.
12.
Learned Government Pleader for Appeals appearing for the Appellants,
argues that the enhancement of the compensation by the Reference Court
was without basis or evidence; it failed to consider the oral and documentary
evidence presented in the case; it discarded Ex.P.2, dated 04.06.2008 which
is subsequent to the award notification of Ex.B.1 award copy been that the
sales pertaining to 2008 cannot be taken into consideration and whereas the
4(1) notification is 2004 only; it erroneously considered the award
No.10/2006-07 while enhancing the compensation amount towards the land
and also the previous Award No.74/2001-2002 which was decided in
O.P.No.1034/2003, dated 29.12.2008 and that the enhancement made by
the learned Judge was excessive and exorbitant.
13.
The Respondents/Claimants would contend that the Reference Court
passed awards in neighbouring villages in land acquisition proceedings. By
relying on those awards, the respondents assert that the compensation
granted by the Reference Court is reasonable.
14.
Having regard to the pleadings in the Original Petitions, the findings
recorded by the Reference Court and in light of the rival contentions and
submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would
arise for determination:
1) Is the market value of the acquired land determined by the
Reference Court lawful and adequate?
2) Does the Orders of the Reference Court need any interference?
POINTNOs.1 and 2:
15.
It is apparent from the record that the then Land Acquisition Officer
(LAO) acquired the lands to form the Galeru Nagari Sujala Sravanthi Flood
Flow Canal. The LAO issued the 4(1) Notification on 26.06.2006 and the 6(2)
Notification on 31.03.2006 for the acquisition of the lands, as part of Award
No.10/2006-07, dated 19.08.2006, following an enquiry conducted with the
assistance of the Revenue Department and its officials, including the
Tahsildar of Sanjamala and his staff. The Special Deputy Collector and the
Executive Engineer of the GNSS Division No.4, Deputy Inspector of Survey,
Special Surveyor, and Special Deputy Tahsildar visited the acquired land and
determined its market value. Subsequently, the LAO disbursed compensation
to the Claimants. After receiving the compensation, some of the awardees
filed Protest Petitions before the LAO, Galeru Nagari Sujala Sravanthi, Unit-I,
Nandyal, which were subsequently referred to the Court under Section 18 of
the Land Acquisition Act.
16.
As reflected in Ex.B.1, the Award, dated 19.08.2006, the Land
Acquisition Officer classified the acquired lands into two categories: Rainfed
dry land and irrigated dry land with bore wells. As per Ex.B.1, the Award, the
Special Collector noted that the primary crop cultivated on the acquired land
was paddy. The paddy yield was assessed at 20 quintals per Acre, with a
market price of Rs.6,000/- per quintal, resulting in a gross income of
Rs.13,200/- per Acre. After deducting the expenditure, the net value was
estimated to be between Rs.6,000/- and Rs.6,500/- per Acre. By applying the
multiplier '10', the land's value was determined to be between Rs.60,000/and Rs.65,000/- for irrigated dry (I.D.) land. Consequently, the Special
Deputy Collector fixed the market value at Rs.42,000/- to Rs.45,000/- for dry
land.
17.
The Reference Court correctly observed that the LAO failed to provide
a clear basis for assessing the yield from irrigated dry (I.D.) lands and the
associated expenditure. The LAO did not gather relevant information from the
Agricultural Officer or the Market Committee. In the absence of such critical
data, the Reference Court concluded that the market value fixed by the LAO
was improper and inadequate.
18.
Before the Reference Court, the Claimants strongly asserted that the
acquired lands contained deposits of Kadapa slabs and limestone, but the
LAO improperly classified these lands as dry lands. The Reference Court,
after considering the arguments, rejected this contention, providing detailed
reasons for its decision.
19.
In the Ex.B.1 Award proceedings, the LAO did not mention that the
acquired lands contained Kadapa slabs and limestone. Had such deposits
been present on the Claimants' lands, the LAO would undoubtedly have
acknowledged them in the Award. The Reference Court also referenced the
testimony of PW.1, who stated that the lands were agricultural and some
were equipped with bore wells. However, no evidence was presented to
demonstrate that agricultural cultivation could still be carried out on lands
containing deposits of Kadapa slabs and limestone.
20.
The 1st Claimant in OPNo.2 of 2016, as PW.1, testified that the
acquired lands are black cotton soil suitable for cultivating various
commercial crops. He further claimed that the lands contain minerals such as
Kadapa slabs and limestone. However, the claim statement explicitly stated
that all the acquired lands were classified as dry lands with black cotton soil
and that the Claimants depended solely on these agricultural lands for their
livelihood. The Claimants also mentioned growing Bengal gram on the
acquired lands, but the claim statement did not mention Kadapa slabs or
limestone deposits. The claimants also testified that although the lands
acquired by the LAO under this Award were being cultivated as agricultural
lands, they also contained minerals.
21.
The learned counsel for the Claimants argues that the mere omission
to mention the presence of mineral deposits in the acquired lands should not
be a reason to reject the Claimants' contention. He contends that this
omission cannot be treated as a fatal flaw akin to a defect in a plant.
22.
In this regard, learned counsel for the Respondents relied on the
decision in Rajamani V. Collector, Raipur1 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that:
4 ...................... It is settled law that the statement under Section 19 in terms
of the objection under Section 18 of the Act is not treated as a plaint. Upon
Service of the notice on the claimant or interested person, he is treated to be
a plaintiff and Land Acquisition Collector to be a defendant for the purpose of
conducting the proceedings as envisaged under Section 22 of the Act. They
are entitled to be represented by counsel. On receipt of the application, it is
the duty of the claimant. The burden is always upon him, who seeks higher
(1996) 5 SCC 701
compensation to adduce evidence and prove in the Court that the
compensation awarded by the Collector was inadequate and that the
acquired lands were possessed of higher value for the Award of the
compensation to be just and adequate compensation. The Land Acquisition
Officer is to rebut the evidence the claimant/interested person adduced. The
burden is always on the claimant. Ultimately, it is the duty and power of the
Court to determine just and adequate compensation on relevant facts and
law sitting in the armchair of a prudent purchaser in an open market.
……………….
23.
In civil cases, the preponderance of probability constitutes a sufficient
ground for decision if the facts and circumstances are such that no
reasonable man would draw a particular inference from them or if the degree
of probability in the case is such that as to include any hypothesis besides
the one to be proved then the party who relies on a particular theory cannot
be said to have discharged the onus of proof of establishing that theory. But,
if the evidence strongly preponders in favour of any of the two theories set
up, the Court is entitled to act on it. Trite, the proposition of law is that
witnesses might lie, but the circumstances would not do so.
24.
In R. Puthunainar Alhithan V. P.H. Pandian2, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that an inference from the proved facts must be so probable that if
the Court believes, from the proved facts, that the facts do exist, it must be
held that the fact has been proved. The inference of proof of that fact could
be drawn from the given objective, direct or circumstantial.
25.
The learned counsel for the Claimants argued that, despite their
testimony in chief regarding the presence of minerals on their lands, the
(1996) 3 SCC 624
learned Assistant Government Pleader chosen to cross-examine the
witnesses on that aspect. Consequently, he contends that the unchallenged
testimony should be considered as establishing the Claimants’ case.
26.
In Special Deputy Collector, (L.A.O), Anakapalli V. Padala Venkata
Ramana 3 , the Division Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra
Pradesh held that:
7. It is relevant to mention that in all the claim statements filed before the
reference Court, it was stated that compensation at the rate of Rs.2 lakhs per
Acre was claimed before the LAO. The market value, determined under the
impugned Award, is thus much more than what the respondents allegedly
claimed before the LAO, even on their own admission. We are not saying for
a moment that there is a legal bar against awarding more compensation.
However, the admission only indicates that the claimants were content with
receiving compensation of Rs.2 lakhs per Acre (Rs.2,000/- per cent). But,
they laid a speculative claim before the reference Court, which found its
ready acceptance by the Court.
22. The learned Subordinate Judge should have taken elementary care to
scrutinise the oral evidence and evaluate its intrinsic worth instead of
commenting that the Government advocate did not cross-examine PW2 or
that rebuttal evidence was not let in. The claimants themselves did not deem
it fit to claim as much as the Court estimated. The learned Judge should
have thought over twice before unreservedly accepting the interested version
of PW2 and arriving at the yield and income at such a high figure. Even if
there was no cross-examination by the Government Pleader, the Court is not
helpless in eliciting the truth. The Court need not glibly swallow whatever is
stated by the claimant in his own interest without subjecting the evidence to
critical scrutiny and testing the same from the standpoint of common
knowledge and probabilities.
27.
In light of the observations, this Court views that though the claim
statement cannot be treated as a plaint, it cannot be concluded that the
MANU/AP/0163/1999
version put forth by the Claimants in the earlier statement cannot be
considered and must be ignored.
The LAO could have mentioned in the Ex.B.1 Award if there were
28.
deposits of Kadapa slabs and limestone, as seen in other awards. However,
nothing in the Award attributes this omission to the LAO concerning the
deposits of Kadapa slabs and limestone. There appears to be no valid
reason for such an omission by the LAO. Furthermore, the Claimants could
have included this crucial fact in their claim statements. The version
regarding mineral deposits was introduced after noticing compensation
awards in other cases. Consequently, the Reference Court rightly chose not
to consider the Claimants' contentions in this regard. We find no justification
to disregard the observations made by the LAO regarding the nature of the
land.
29.
In M. Narsinga Rao V. State of Andhra Pradesh 4 , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that:
15. The word "proof" needs to be understood in the sense it is defined in the
Evidence Act because proof depends upon the admissibility of evidence. A
fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the
Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a
prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act
upon the supposition that it exists. This is the definition given for the word
"proved" in the Evidence Act. What is required is the production of such
materials on which the Court can reasonably act to reach the supposition that
a fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its
having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a
prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. Fletcher
(2001) 1 SCC 691
Moulton. L.J. in Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Company, Ltd.,
observed this:
"Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical demonstration, because
that is impossible; it must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable
man to come to a particular conclusion."
16. The said observation has stood the test of time and can now be followed
as the standard of proof. In reaching a conclusion, the Court can use the
process of inferences to be drawn from facts produced or proved. Such
inferences are akin to presumptions in law. The law gives absolute discretion
to the Court to presume the existence of any fact that it thinks likely to have
happened. In that process, the Court may have regard to the common course
of natural events, human conduct, and public or private business vis-a-vis the
facts of the particular case. The discretion is envisaged in Section 114 of the
Evidence Act.
30.
For the reasons stated above and based on the observations made, we
are of the opinion that the Reference Court, after a thorough and proper
appreciation of the evidence on record, rightly concluded that the Claimants'
lands could not be classified as dry lands containing deposits of Kadapa
slabs and limestone. The Claimants have failed to produce any revenue
records or other official documents that would substantiate the nature of the
lands as being rich in such mineral deposits. In the absence of such crucial
evidence, the Reference Court's decision stands well-founded. Without
appropriate records or credible proof of the alleged deposits, the Claimants'
assertion regarding the mineral content of their lands cannot be accepted as
valid.
31.
In Bhupal Singh V. State of Haryana5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
specifically considered a similar question of determination of market value
under Section 23 of the Act and held that the fair market value of the
acquired land is required to be determined on the basis of the market rate of
the adjacent lands similarly situated to the acquired lands prevailing on the
date of acquisition or/and prior to acquisition but not subsequent to the date
of acquisition.
32.
In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Chamanlal Hargovind Das V. S.L.A.O6, Manoj Kumar and others V.
State of Haryana and others7, Union of India V. Dyagala Devamma and
others8, and Bhupal Singh (supra), we have no difficulty to hold that the
market value of the acquired land is required to be determined on the basis
of the market rate of the adjacent land similarly situated to the acquired lands
prevailing on the date of acquisition or/and prior to the acquisition but not
subsequent to the date of acquisition.
33.
In this regard, it is profitable to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Bhag Singh and ORs. V. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.9,
wherein it held that:
15. The question now is whether the determination of market value
subsequent to the notification would be relevant to determining the market
value of the land acquired more than two years earlier. We find that though
appreciation in price can be presumed, the market value cannot be assessed
MANU/SC/0383/2015
MANU/SC/0071/1988
MANU/SC/1349/2017
MANU/SC/0772/2018
MANU/SC/0589/2022
by applying a suitable deduction in the market value of the land acquired by
a subsequent notification. When the later notification is issued, the
development activities have already taken place in view of the earlier two
notifications. Therefore, it is not the percentage of increase in the market
value but the increase due to the development which has taken place on
account of earlier notifications. Therefore, the market value of the land
cannot be based upon the land acquired vide notification dated 11.11.1993,
i.e., more than two years after the notification in question and when other
notifications were intervening on 26.10.1990 and 25.7.1991.
34.
Evidently, in the present case, development activities also occurred
due to the earlier notification. In light of this, we find that the Reference Court
rightly disregarded the Ex.A.2 sale transaction. The sale, being postnotification, was influenced by the subsequent development activities,
making it an unreliable indicator of the land's market value at the time of
acquisition. Therefore, the Reference Court's decision to ignore this
transaction is justified. Furthermore, there is no evidence on record to prove
that the nature of the said land was similar to that of the acquired land. In the
absence of evidence to prove the similarity regarding locality, potentiality, or
the nature of the said land vis-à-vis the subject land, post-sale transactions
cannot be relied upon to determine the market rate of the acquired land.
35.
The learned Government Pleader submitted that the Reference Court
failed to appreciate the previous Award relied upon by the Claimants in the
correct perspective and that the Reference Court should not have enhanced
the compensation at a rate of 10% per annum.
36.
In Land Acquisition Officer-cum-M.R.O. V. Gouramma 10 , the
Division Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
11………..…The potentiality of the land and the increase in price also
depend on the lie of the land, the situation of the land and the demand
for land in that particular area. Generally, as inflation is on the high side,
particularly when the rupee is losing its value, the courts, in the absence
of any guidelines for increase, take into account a 5 to 10 percent
increase every year. Even that 5 to 10 per cent, as we take into
consideration, is the discretion left to the Court taking into account the
potentiality of the land, increasing value of that particular land, strategic
position of the land and the increase in prices of the land covered by
other sale deeds or other statistics that have been brought to the notice
of the Courts concerned. So, in this case, if we take the maximum rate
that the Government can pay for this acquisition for providing house sites
and the increase even if we calculate at the rate of 10 percent increase
every year for 10 year period as the notification is dated August 28, 1989,
at best, we feel reasonable that the increase should be 10 x 10, i.e., 100
per cent, and accordingly, we are granting that 100% than the value that
has been fixed by the Court under Ex.A-2Even in the case on hand, we
want to make it clear that the Award has become final on account of the
judgment of the Court, but still, either the Land Acquisition Officer or the
claimant can prove the rate of increase or decrease based on the sale
deeds that are available and where no other document is available, these
final judgments can be taken into consideration When the other sale
deeds are available those sale deeds also can be taken into
consideration, but the value fixed in these cases can be settled as the
variance will be either on the increase or on the decrease. If some
comparable sale deeds are available, based on the values only, the
market value has to be determined, and it is completely left open to the
discretion of the Officer to decide the reasonable compensation based on
the documents and the awards that have been passed by this Court.
MANU/AP/0226/1993
In Acquainted Realtors LLP and ORs. V. State of Haryana and
37.
Ors11., the Hon’ble Supreme Court referenced the decision in ONGC Ltd.12,
wherein it is observed that:
15. Normally, recourse is taken to the mode of determining the market
value by providing appropriate escalation over the proved market value of
nearby lands in previous years (as evidenced by sale transactions or
acquisitions) where there is no evidence of any contemporaneous sale
transactions or acquisitions of comparable lands in the neighbourhood.
The said method is reasonably safe where the relied-on sale transactions/
acquisitions precede the subject acquisition by only a few years, that is,
up to four to five years. Beyond that, it may be unsafe, even if it is related
to neighbouring land. What may be a reliable standard if the gap is only a
few years old may become an unsafe and unreliable standard where the
gap is larger. For example, for determining the market value of land
acquired in 1992, adopting the annual increase method with reference to
a sale or acquisition in 1970 or 1980 may have many pit falls. This is
because, over the course of years, the "rate" of annual increase may itself
undergo drastic change apart from the likelihood of occurrence of varying
periods of stagnation in prices or sudden spurts in prices affecting the
very standard of increase.
The Reference Court relied on Exs.A.7 and A.9 awards to determine
38.
the market value of the property, and we refer to some of its observations to
address the Government Pleader’s contention as follows:
(i)
Ex.A6, a copy of Award No.58/1998-99 dated 01.03.1999, pertains to
the acquisition of lands in Reddipalli village. The LAO set the market value at
Rs.28,000/- per Acre for Category No.1 and Rs.30,000/- per Acre for
Category II, as of the draft notification on 7.7.1993. After referencing this
Court, the market value was enhanced to Rs.50,000/- per Acre in OP
MANU/SC/0248/2021
(2008) 14 SCC 745
250/2000, consolidating both categories into one for dry lands, as per Ex.A9.
The Government appealed against this order in LAAS 1677/2003, but the
Hon'ble High Court upheld the enhancement on 18.11.2006, as shown in
Ex.A8. For example, Ex.B1, the Award classifying the Claimants' lands as BC
soil dry lands and I.D lands with bore wells, indicates that the lands in both
awards are comparable.
(ii)
In Valluri Veerabhadra Rao and Others V. Land Acquisition
Officer13, this Court ruled that a 10% annual increase should be applied to
calculate the market value of lands acquired under a subsequent notification,
provided the lands are similar in fertility, value, and purpose. Applying this to
the time lag between Ex.A7's notification on 7.7.1993 and Ex.B1's Award on
3.4.2006 (12 years, 8 months, and 26 days), the market value increase of
Rs.50,000/- results in Rs.63,694/-. Adding this to the original Rs.50,000/-, the
total market value is Rs.1,13,694/- (rounded to Rs.1,13,000/- for dry land and
Rs.1,33,000/- for irrigated land with bore wells as of the 3-4-2006 notification).
39.
In The Special Deputy Collector V. M. Pedda Subbarayudu (LAAS
No.80 of 2014), the Division Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra
Pradesh held that:
8. It is almost a settled and recognised principle of law to allow 10%
appreciation per year for the value of immovable properties. The lands of
the respondents were acquired 8 years after the land in the same village
was acquired for the purpose of the main canal. Though they were entitled
to 80% appreciation over the market value extracted in Ex.B.2, the
reference Court took the appreciation at 70%. We do not find any basis to
interfere with the order passed by the Court of the Senior Civil Judge,
Nandyal.
40.
After carefully reviewing the precedents cited, we firmly believe that the
Reference Court has appropriately determined the market value in
1993 ALD D.B. page 129
accordance with the judgments rendered by both the Supreme Court and this
Court. The argument put forth by the Government Pleader questioning
increasing the compensation amount by 10% per annum, as per the Awards
under Exs.A.7 and A.9, is not sustainable.
41.
We are of the considered views that the reasoning and basis adopted
by the Reference Court in awarding compensation are sound and
appropriate. We find that the Reference Court approached the matter
correctly, and after thorough consideration, we agree with the Reference
Court’s assessment of the evidence. The findings of the Reference Court are
sound, and no valid grounds have been presented by the Land Acquisition
Officer to alter the compensation amount awarded. Based on the preceding
discussion, we see no reason to depart from the Reference Court’s
perspective. Accordingly, the Points are answered.
42.
As a result, these Appeals fail and are dismissed without costs. The
Decree and Order passed by the Reference Court are affirmed.
43.
There is no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________________
JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND
____________________________
JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
Date: 05.03.2026
PGR
(206)
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND
&
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
LAND ACQUISITION APPEAL NOS.20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50, 60, 61,
62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70 & 71 OF 2023
DATE: 05.03.2026
PGR
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