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Serial Nos.01 & 02
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP (C) No.229/2021 with
MC(WPC)No.41/2022
Cont.Cas(C)No.13/2023
Date of Order: 20.07.2023
The Shillong Recreation Ground
Trust & ors
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & ors
State of Meghalaya
Coram:
Vs.
J.M. Pariat & anr
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Appearance in WP (C) No.229/2021:
For the Petitioners
: Mr. D.K. Mishra, Sr.Adv with
Mr. P. Nongbri, Adv
For the Respondents
: Mrs. N.G. Shylla, Sr.GA with
Mrs. S. Laloo, GA
Ms. S. Shyam, GA
Mr. S. Panthi, Adv
Appearance in Cont.Cas(C)No.13/2023:
For the Petitioner
: Mrs. N.G. Shylla, Sr.GA with
Mrs. S. Laloo, GA
Ms. S. Shyam, GA
For the Respondents
: Mr. D.K. Mishra, Sr.Adv with
Mr. P. Nongbri, Adv
i) Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (Oral)
This writ petition has, quite unfortunately, remained pending
for nearly two years without any basis whatsoever. However, since the
merits of the matter may have previously been gone into and there is also
a contempt application which has been filed, an indication was given by
this Court in the order of June 9, 2023 that this was not an appropriate
challenge to be entertained in respect of a show-cause notice under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
2.
Indeed, the third paragraph of the order dated June 9, 2023
provided as follows:
“Ordinarily, the writ court exercises self-restraint in not
entertaining a challenge to a show-cause notice since the mere
issuance of a show-cause notice does not cause any prejudice
to the recipient of the notice; the noticee is simply required to
respond to the notice. Since all material facts indicated in the
present proceedings can be disclosed in response to the notice,
it is unlikely that this challenge will be permitted to continue.”
3.
On behalf of the writ petitioners three principal grounds have
been taken after establishing the fundamental premise that it is not as if a
writ petition would never be maintainable against a show-cause notice
but only that a writ court exercises self-restraint in some cases in not
jumping the gun and requiring the noticee to show cause and for the
initial determination to be completed before the relevant authority.
4.
The first ground which is urged is that the impugned notice
dated July 9, 2021 is without jurisdiction. By such notice, the
Commissioner and Secretary to the State government in its Revenue and
Disaster Management Department invoked the authority under Article
296 of the Constitution to claim that the land and property as described
in the schedule thereto had fallen vacant since the death of its erstwhile
owner on June 16, 1904 and “for want of lawful owner ... vested with the
State of Meghalaya by operation of Article 296 of the Constitution of
India.” The public notice permitted, in its second paragraph, any person
having any claim over the schedule properties “to file appropriate
application with documentary evidence” before the relevant executive
functionary.
5.
According to the writ petitioners, since the death of the
erstwhile owner is indicated in the impugned notice itself to be in the
year 1904, Article 296 of the Constitution would have no applicability
since such provision could not have had retrospective effect. In such
regard, provisions of the Government of India Act, 1853, the
Government of India Act, 1858, the Government of India Act, 1915 and,
finally, the Government of India Act, 1935 are placed.
6.
The second ground raised is that there are several civil suits
pending to which the writ petitioners are parties and the issue as to the
title to the properties covered by the schedule to the impugned notice is
pending. An ancillary ground is raised that a department of the State has
obtained lease of the schedule property from the petitioners and, as such,
the State is estopped from questioning the title of the lessors.
7.
The final ground which is canvassed is that since the notice has
been issued by an executive functionary, who possesses no jurisdiction
to adjudicate on title, in view of the principle enunciated in the judgment
reported at (2017) 16 SCC 418 (Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust v.
Collector, Haridwar), the impugned notice should be found to be
completely without jurisdiction and a meaningless exercise.
8.
For a start, even for this petition to have been entertained, a
prima facie view as to the title of the petitioners would have to be taken
for the petitioners to be found to possess the locus standi to be aggrieved
by the impugned notice and entitled to challenge the same. Secondly, as
to whether the pending suits cover the properties indicated in the
schedule to the impugned notice, it would be a question of fact and the
writ court in exercise of its authority under Article 226 of the
Constitution would not be easily minded to enter into disputed questions
of facts. More importantly, all that the notice requires is for any person
having any claim to the schedule properties to assert and indicate the
nature of the claim.
9.
It would be premature, particularly at this stage, to hold that
the notice is without jurisdiction or to presume that the executive
functionary who has issued the notice will embark on an adjudication
pertaining to the title of any property. It is equally possible that upon an
assertion being made by a person and such person demonstrating a prima
facie title, the executive functionary would no longer continue with the
matter and require the title to be decided by a civil court in accordance
with law.
10.
There is no dispute with the proposition that the title to any
property has to be adjudicated by a civil court unless the authority of
such civil court has been taken away by any appropriate law, whether
expressly or by unavoidable necessary implication. That is elementary. It
is equally trite to record that, ordinarily, the highest of executive
functionaries would not possess the jurisdiction to go into any title
dispute as that would involve the receipt and evaluation of evidence and
would fall exclusively within the domain of a civil court.
11.
Ordinarily, when a show-cause notice is assailed, an exalted
test has to be met, just like a challenge to a first information report or an
application for the rejection of a plaint. The impugned notice has to be
demonstrably and palpably bad, or else it would scarcely excite the writ
court and the noticee would be required to respond to the notice and
incorporate all grounds in its response for the same to be considered by
the author of the notice or the appropriate authority concerned. However,
there are exceptions to this rule of self-restraint exercised by a writ court
and, as loosely indicated in the previous order, such exceptions would be
when there is a gross violation of the principles of natural justice or an
ex facie erroneous assumption of jurisdiction or, by the Wednesbury test
or the doctrine of proportionality, when it appears to the meanest mind
that the notice is so grossly unreasonable that no prudent person could
have issued the same.
12.
In the present case, none of the exceptions applies. In any
event, the writ petitioners cannot demonstrate that they would suffer any
prejudice if they respond to the notice and await the outcome of the reply
that they may issue. It will not do for the writ petitioners to claim that
the concerned official has embarked on an adjudication pertaining to title
without even responding to the show-cause notice and without indicating
any modicum of title to the properties in question.
13.
Though it is not necessary to comprehensively answer the issue
raised as to the apparent retrospective operation of Article 296 of the
Constitution or the propriety of the impugned notice on such ground, it
appears that all that the notice seeks to suggest is that as on the date of
the issuance thereof, the State of Meghalaya perceived that there was no
rightful owner of the property. Accordingly, the State of Meghalaya has
invited any person having any right to the schedule properties to assert
such right for the further course of action to be decided thereupon. It
would be presumptuous on the part of the court to either allow a
passerby to challenge the notice without establishing locus standi or
even to presume that the rightful owner, even if he demonstrates a prima
facie right, would have to suffer an adjudication of title before an
executive functionary.
14.
As to the civil suits pending, if, indeed, the schedule properties
are the subject-matter of such suits, it was always open to the writ
petitioners to approach the appropriate civil court for an interlocutory
injunction in respect of the impugned notice. In the writ petitioners not
having adopted such course of action, the submission that the pending
suits cover the schedule properties does not hold any water. Further, as
to whether the writ petitioners had any right or title to grant lease of all
or some of the properties is, again, a disputed question of fact that cannot
be conveniently addressed in this jurisdiction on the basis of affidavit
evidence.
15.
Accordingly, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of
the writ petitioners, the present petition is dismissed with liberty to the
petitioners to respond to the impugned notice within 30 days from date.
In the event the writ petitioners reply to the notice or seek to assert title
in respect of the schedule properties, the matter will be looked into by
the respondents notwithstanding that the response or the reply has been
filed long after the period indicated in the notice has expired. It is also
hoped that following the response of the writ petitioners to the impugned
notice, the appropriate authority will act in accordance with law.
16.
WP (C) No.229 of 2021 is dismissed without prejudice to the
petitioners’ rights to raise all grounds available in accordance with law
in the reply to the show-cause notice or before the appropriate authorities
or any other available forum.
17.
In the event the response is filed within the time permitted, the
appropriate authority will deal with the same with utmost expedition
and, preferably, within six months from the date of receipt of the
response.
18.
MC (WPC) No.41 of 2022 is disposed of.
19.
In view of the above order, the contempt proceedings are
dropped, again, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the
parties.
20.
There will be no order as to costs.
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
20.07.2023
“Lam DR-PS”
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