Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
(1 of 16)
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
[CFA-1315/2024]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Civil First Appeal No. 1315/2024
CNR: RJHC020991562024 | URN: CFA / 2004U / 2024
The Rajasthan State Co-operative Bank Limited, Head Office, Dc1, Opposite Nehru Balodyan, Tonk Road, Jaipur-302015
----Appellant
Versus
DZ Card (India) Private Limited, Corporate Office And Works At
23-24, EHTP Sector-34, Gurgaon, Haryana- 122001
----Respondent
Connected With
D.B. Civil First Appeal No. 505/2019
CNR: RJHC020472572019 | URN: CFA / 765U / 2019
Babylonian Technology India Pvt. Ltd., Through Its Director Shri
Jaideep Keswani, E-24/5, Shastri Park, Delhi 110053.
----Appellant
Versus
1.
The Rajasthan State Co-Operative Bank Limited, Through
Managing Director Dc-1, Infront Of Nehru Bal Udhyan,
Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj.).
2.
Vinod Kumar Mishra, Sr. Manager/analyst, The Rajasthan
State Co-Operative Bank Limited, Dc-1, Infront Of Nehru
Bal Udhyan, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj.).
----Respondents
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Satish Chandra Mittal
Mr. Rajendra Pd. Gautam (In DBCFA
No. 1315/2024)
Mr. Ram Manhohar Sharma
Mr. Mohit Byadwal (In DBCFA No.
505/2019)
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Sarvesh Jain (In DBCFA No.
1315/2024)
Mr. Pratap Singh Arya
Mr. Akshay Dutt Sharma (In DBCFA
No. 505/2019)
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(2 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUROOP SINGHI
Order
Reportable
14/10/2026
Per: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anuroop Singhi
1.
D.B. Civil First Appeal No. 1315/2024 has been preferred by
the appellant – Rajasthan State Co-operative Bank Limited
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Appellant– Bank’), against the
judgment and decree dated 20.09.2024 passed by the learned
Commercial Court No. 3, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, Jaipur, in Civil Suit
No. 15/2022, whereby the suit instituted by DZ Card (India)
Private Limited – respondent plaintiff, has been decreed in its
favour and the appellant-Bank was directed to pay a sum of Rs.
75,52,960.33/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum
with effect from 29.02.2020 till its realization.
The other connected appeal, being D.B. Civil First Appeal No.
505/2019, has been preferred by Babylonian Technology India
Private Limited – appellant plaintiff, against the judgment dated
02.05.2019 passed by the learned Commercial Court No. 3, Jaipur,
in Civil Suit No. 32/2018, whereby its suit for recovery along with
interest and expenses has been dismissed.
2.
The dispute in both the suits was with respect to the
recovery of the amount emanating from transactions relating to
the supply of printed materials including Rupay Card, KCC Card,
Welcome kits and other associated stationery to the appellantbank. While the suit filed by DZ Card (India) Pvt. Ltd. was
decreed, aggrieved by which appeal has been filed by appellantBank, the suit filed by Babylonian Technology India Private Limited
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(3 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
was dismissed, which has been challenged by it in the connected
appeal. Thus, the two appeals are interconnected, involving
disputes arising out of the underlying commercial transactions
with the appellant-Bank and are being considered in light of the
settlement subsequently arrived at between the parties.
3.
During the pendency of the appeals, the parties expressed
their desire to explore the possibility of an amicable resolution of
their disputes through mediation. Accordingly, considering the
provisions of Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’), vide order dated 04.08.2025, a
worthy Mediator was appointed to facilitate settlement between
the parties.
4.
Pursuant thereto, the parties participated in the mediation
proceedings and amicably resolved their disputes. The Mediator
has submitted the mediation report along with the settlement
dated 09.09.2025, recording that the parties have settled the
matter on the terms mutually agreed upon by them.
5.
In view of the aforesaid settlement, taking note of the object
and intent of the provisions of Section 89 of CPC read with Section
65-B of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1961’), a joint request has
been made by learned counsel appearing for the appellants
seeking refund of the Court Fees paid by them in the present
appeals.
6.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
7.
Before proceeding to consider the joint request made on
behalf of the appellants, it would be apposite to refer to the
relevant statutory provisions governing settlement of disputes
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(4 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and refund of
Court Fees, which are as follows:i. Section 89 of CPC reads as under:
“89. Settlement of disputes outside the Court
(1) Where it appears to the Court that there exist
elements of a settlement which may be acceptable
to the parties, the Court shall formulate the terms
of settlement and give them to the parties for their
observations and after receiving the observations
of the parties, the Court may reformulate the
terms of a possible settlement and refer the same
for(a) arbitration;
(b) conciliation;
(c) judicial settlement
through Lok Adalat; or
including
settlement
(d) mediation.
(2) Where a dispute has been referred(a) for arbitration or conciliation, the provisions
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26
of 1996) shall apply as if the proceedings for
arbitration or conciliation were referred for
settlement under the provisions of that Act;
(b) to Lok Adalat, the Court shall refer the same
to the Lok Adalat in accordance with the
provisions of sub-section (1) of section 20 of the
Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 (39 of 1987)
and all other provisions of that Act shall apply in
respect of the dispute so referred to the Lok
Adalat;
(c) for judicial settlement, the Court shall refer
the same to a suitable institution or person and
such institution or person shall be deemed to be
a Lok Adalat and all the provisions of the Legal
Services Authority Act, 1987 (39 of 1987) shall
apply as if the dispute were referred to a Lok
Adalat under the provisions of that Act;
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(5 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
(d) for mediation, the Court shall effect a
compromise between the parties and shall follow
such procedure as may be prescribed.]”
ii.Section 65-B of the Act of 1961, reads as under:“65-B. Refund of fees- Where the Court refers the
parties to a suit to any one of the mode of
settlement of dispute referred to in Section 89 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act No.
5 of 1908) and the matter is settled by one of the
modes provided under section 89 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the plaintiff shall be entitled to a
certificate from the Court authorising him to
receive back from the Collector, the full amount of
the fee paid in respect of such plaint.]”
iii. Section 16 of the Court Fees Act of 1870 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Act of 1870’), reads as under:“16. Refund of fee-Where the Court refers the
parties to the suit to any one of the mode of
settlement of dispute referred to in section 89 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the
plaintiff shall be entitled to a certificate from the
Court authorising him to receive back from the
Collector, the full amount of the fee paid in respect
of such plaint.”
8.
A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions reveals the
legislative intent to encourage amicable settlement of disputes
through
alternative
dispute
resolution
mechanisms
and
to
incentivise parties to resolve their disputes without necessitating
further adjudication by the Court.
9.
Section 89 of CPC was inserted by the Code of Civil
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999, with effect from 01.07.2002,
with a view to facilitate settlement of disputes outside the
conventional adjudicatory process and thereby alleviate the
burden of pending litigation upon the Courts.
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(6 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
Section 16 of the Act of 1870 was inserted with effect from
the same date to provide for refund of Court Fees in the
circumstances contemplated therein.
In the State of Rajasthan, the corresponding provision, viz.,
Section 65-B was inserted in the Act of 1961 in the year 2009,
with the same underlying object of encouraging settlement and
facilitating the refund of Court Fees upon such settlement.
The aforesaid provisions, therefore, embody a legislative
policy which not only encourages amicable resolution of disputes
but also seeks to provide a tangible incentive to litigants who
choose settlement over protracted litigation, thereby conserving
valuable judicial time and resources.
10. The scope and object of the aforesaid provisions came to be
considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in High Court of
Judicature at Madras v. M.C. Subramaniam & Ors reported in
(2021) 3 SCC 560 wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while
referring to a judgment passed by the Delhi High Court in J.K.
Forgings v. Essar Construction (India) Ltd., 2009 SCC
OnLine Del 3134 observed that Section 89 of CPC and the
corresponding provisions for refund of Court Fees must receive a
liberal and purposive interpretation, consistent with their beneficial
object. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read as under :“13. The provisions of Section 89 CPC must be
understood in the backdrop of the longstanding
proliferation of litigation in the civil courts, which has
placed undue burden on the judicial system, forcing
speedy justice to become a casualty. As the Law
Commission has observed in its 238th Report on
Amendment of Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 and Allied Provisions, Section 89 has now made it
incumbent on civil courts to strive towards diverting civil
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(7 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
disputes towards alternative dispute resolution processes,
and encourage their settlement outside of court (Para
2.3). These observations make the object and purpose of
Section 89 crystal clear — to facilitate private
settlements, and enable lightening of the overcrowded
docket of the Indian judiciary. This purpose, being
sacrosanct and imperative for the effecting of timely
justice in Indian courts, also informs Section 69-A of the
1955 Act, which further encourages settlements by
providing for refund of court fee. This overarching and
beneficent object and purpose of the two provisions must,
therefore, inform this Court's interpretation thereof.
…
19. Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 is in pari
materia with Section 69-A of the 1955 Act, and hence the
abovestated principles are equally applicable to the
present case.
…
21. The Delhi High Court has also taken a similar view in
J.K. Forgings v. Essar Construction (India) Ltd. [J.K.
Forgings v. Essar Construction (India) Ltd., 2009 SCC
OnLine Del 3134 : (2009) 113 DRJ 612] : (SCC OnLine
Del paras 11-12, 14 & 17-19)
“11. The laudable object sought to be achieved
by inserting and amending these sections seems
to be speedy disposal. The policy behind the
statute is to reduce the number of cases by
settlement. Section 89 CPC and Section 16 of the
Court Fees Act are welcome step in that
direction, as the number of cases has increased,
it is the duty of court to encourage settlement.
In present scenario of huge pendency of
cases in the courts a purposive and
progressive
interpretation
is
the
requirement of present hour. The intention of
the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from
the object and the words used in the material
provisions. The statute must be interpreted in
their plain grammatical meaning.
12. It is very clear that the legislative intent
of Section 16 of the Court Fees Act was made
broad enough to take cognizance of all
situations in which parties arrive at a
settlement irrespective of the stage of the
proceedings. It is also obvious that the
purpose of making this provision was in
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(8 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
order to provide some sort of incentive to
the party who has approached the court to
resolve the dispute amicably and obtain a
full refund of the court fees. Having regard to
this position, the present application will have to
be allowed.
***
14. This is not a case where parties to the suit
after long drawn trial have come to the court for
settlement. Had it been the case of long drawn
trial non-refund of court fees could have been
justified but in such like cases courts' endeavour
should be to encourage the parties and court fees
attached with the plaint should be refunded as an
incentive to them.
***
17. Settlement of dispute only through any of the
mode prescribed under Section 89 CPC is not sine
qua non of Section 89 CPC rather it prescribes few
methods through which settlement can be
reached, sine qua non for applicability of
Section 89 is settlement between the parties
outside the court without the intervention of
the courts.
18. It is also not the requirement of the section
that court must always refer the parties to Dispute
Resolution Forum. If parties have arrived at
out-of-court
settlement
it
should
be
welcomed subject to principles of equity.
19. The Court Fees Act is a taxing statute and has
to be construed strictly and benefit of any
ambiguity if any has to go in favour of the party
and not to the State.”
(emphasis supplied)
…
24. Admittedly, there may be situations wherein the
parties have after the course of a long-drawn trial, or
multiple frivolous litigations, approached the Court
seeking refund of court fees in the guise of having settled
their disputes. In such cases, the Court may, having
regard to the previous conduct of the parties and the
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(9 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
principles of equity, refuse to grant relief under the
relevant rules pertaining to court fees. However, we do
not find the present case as being of such nature.
…
26. Thus, in our view, the High Court was correct in
holding that Section 89 CPC and Section 69-A of the 1955
Act be interpreted liberally. In view of this broad
purposive construction, we affirm the High Court's
conclusion, and hold that Section 89 CPC shall cover, and
the benefit of Section 69-A of the 1955 Act shall also
extend to all methods of out-of-court dispute settlement
between parties that the Court subsequently finds to have
been legally arrived at. This would, thus, cover the
present controversy, wherein a private settlement was
arrived at, and a memo to withdraw the appeal was filed
before the High Court. In such a case as well, the
appellant i.e. Respondent 1 herein would be entitled to
refund of court fee.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid judgment,
further affirmed that the entitlement to a refund of Court Fees is
not confined to cases where the dispute has been settled through
the intervention of the Court or by resorting to any of the modes
of settlement envisaged under Section 89 of CPC. A lawful
settlement arrived at between the parties through any mode of
amicable resolution outside the Court may equally qualify the
parties for consideration for the purpose of refund of Court Fees,
subject to the Court being satisfied as to the legality and validity
of such outside Court settlement.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court also cautioned that there may be
instances where after undergoing a long-drawn trial or engaging in
multiple frivolous litigations, parties approach the Court seeking
refund of Court Fees under the guise of having settled their
disputes. In such cases, the Court, having regard to the previous
conduct of the parties and the principles of equity, may decline to
grant such relief. Thus, the entitlement to refund is to be
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(10 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
examined in the context of the facts and circumstances of each
case, having due regard to the bona fides of the settlement and
the conduct of the parties.
11. Section 16 of the Act of 1870 is pari materia to Section 65-B
of the Act of 1961. This Court in below – noted cases, have taken
a view to refund the Court Fees, once the parties have settled
their dispute by way of settlement:i. Umesh Agrawal vs. Rent Tribunal, Jaipur City and
Bhavesh Maroo, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7910/2011
decided on 06.07.2011 (Jaipur Bench) has held as under:
“(6) This Court is of the view that the aforesaid newly
inserted Section 65-B is applicable on the settlement
made outside the court. The Rent Tribunal has committed
a serious error of law in not issuing direction for the
refund of the court fees.
(7)
Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed, the
impugned order dated 10.3.2011 is set aside and the
case is remanded back to the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur
Metropolitan to pass appropriate order in the matter of
refund of court fees as per the aforesaid finding given by
this Court, within a period of fifteen days from the date of
receipt of certified copy of this order.”
ii. Mool Singh vs. Abdul Jabbar, S.B. Civil Writ Petition
No. 11356 of 2011 decided on 28.11.2011 at Principal Seat
Jodhpur has held as under: “After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, I
have perused Section 65-B of the Rajasthan Court Fee
& Suits Valuation Act, 1961 which reads as under :
“65-B. Refund of Fee.-Where the
Court refers the parties to a suit to any
one of the mode of settlement of dispute
referred to in Sec.89 of the code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (Central Act No.5 of
1908) and the matter is settled by one of
the modes provided under Sec.89 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff shall
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(11 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
be entitled to a certificate from the Court
authorising him to receive back from the
Collector, the full amount of the fee paid
in respect of such plaint.”
The provision of above section was taken into
consideration by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
the case of Arvind Deval (supra) and after considering
the provisions of the aforesaid section, passed the
following order :
“4. It is true that Section 65-B ibid
provides for refund of the Court Fee where
the dispute between the parties to the suit
is settled by one of the modes provided
under Section 89 of the Civil Procedure
Code,1908, but then, the said provision
has been incorporated so as to encourage
the amicable settlement between the
parties out of the Court. Therefore,
keeping in view, the spirit of Section 65-B
ibid, in considered opinion of this Court, in
the matters where the dispute is settled
between the parties amicably without
intervention of the Court also the full
amount of court fee paid deserves to be
refunded to the appellant.
5. Accordingly, the applications are
allowed. The appeal is dismissed as
withdrawn. A certificate may be issued to
the appellant authorising him to receive
back from the Collector (Stamp), the full
amount of fee paid in respect of the
present appeal i.e. Rs.22,104/-.”
In my opinion, when the Legislature is, time and
again, making amendment for the purpose of
finalization of litigations and, in this regard,
amendment is also made in the Act of 1961 while
inserting Section 65-B, then, obviously the trial Courts
shall not refuse to return the court fee, in the event of
withdrawal of the suits after compromise and
settlement of the issue finally.”
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(12 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
iii. Mangi Lal Luhar vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. in S.B.
Civil Writ Petition No. 5850 of 2013 decided on 20.03.2018 at
Principal Seat Jodhpur has held as under:
“7. After hearing counsel for the parties as well as
perusing the record of the case alongwith the
precedent law cited at the Bar, this Court is of the
opinion that Section 65-B of the Act of1961 clearly
envisages the refund of the court fee, in the event of a
compromise having arrived at between the parties, and
admittedly, in the present case, the compromise had
happened between the parties.
8. On a bare reading of the aforequoted
precedent law also, it becomes clear that the intention
of the legislature behind incorporating such a provision
in the Act of 1961, was that in case the concerned
parties decide to settle the dispute out of court, then as
an incentive, in lieu of reducing the burden upon the
courts and to encourage the parties to enter into a
compromise, the provision, in the form and shape of
Section 65-B was incorporated in the Act of 1961.
Thus, the learned court below has erred in dismissing
the petitioner’s application on technical ground holding
that it was moved under Section 63(2) of the Act of
1961, instead of Section 65-B and also the compromise
had happened between the parties outside the Court.”
Thus, this Court while considering and in light of the
provisions of Section 65-B of the Act of 1961 has allowed refund
of the Court Fees to the parties. We are in complete agreement
with the findings recorded in Umesh Agrawal (supra), Mool
Singh (supra) and Mangi Lal Luhar (supra), which are in
consonance with the preposition enunciated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in M.C. Subramaniam (supra).
12. Having considered the statutory provisions and the principles
enunciated in the aforesaid judgments, this Court finds that the
underlying object of providing for refund of Court Fees is
connected with the legislative endeavour to promote amicable
(13 of 16)
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
[CFA-1315/2024]
settlement of disputes and to encourage litigants to adopt modes
of
dispute
resolution
outside
the
conventional
process
of
adjudication. The benefit of refund serves as an incentive for
parties to resolve their disputes amicably and in turn, advances
the larger public interest by reducing the burden of pending
litigation, conserving valuable judicial time and resources and
enabling the Courts to devote their attention to disputes requiring
adjudication. The provisions, therefore, deserve to be interpreted
in a manner that advances their beneficial object.
13. In the present case, the parties, having voluntarily explored
the possibility of settlement, have successfully resolved their
disputes
through
mediation
pursuant
to
the
order
dated
04.08.2025, as recorded in the mediation report and settlement
dated 09.09.2025. Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of both
parties viz. DZ Card (India) Private Limited and Babylonian
Technology India Pvt. Ltd. made an expression of full satisfaction
of their respective claims against the appellant – Bank and admit
that no dues either towards principal amount or interest survive.
Thus, the settlement has brought the controversy forming the
subject matter of the connected appeals to an end without the
necessity of further adjudication on merits, thereby achieving the
very objective sought to be advanced by the aforesaid statutory
provisions.
The settlement has thus, achieved precisely the object
sought to be advanced by the aforesaid statutory provisions,
which is bringing pending litigation to a peaceful and conclusive
end.
(14 of 16)
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
[CFA-1315/2024]
14. It is also pertinent to observe that the success of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms depends, to a considerable extent,
upon the confidence of litigants that their decision to resolve
disputes
amicably
would
receive
due
recognition
and
encouragement from the judicial system. Where parties, despite
having invoked the jurisdiction of the Court, choose to abandon
adversarial
contest
and
arrive
at
a
mutually
acceptable
settlement, such an endeavour ought not to be rendered less
beneficial merely because the dispute was brought before the
Court in the first instance. A contrary approach may inadvertently
discourage litigants from opting for settlement and perpetuate the
very adversarial process that the legislature seeks to minimise.
The grant of refund of Court Fees in cases falling within the ambit
of the applicable statutory provisions, therefore, serves not merely
as a financial benefit to the litigants but also as a meaningful
expression of the judicial commitment to facilitate consensual
resolution of disputes.
15. Consequently, having regard to the amicable settlement
arrived
at
settlement
between
dated
the
parties,
09.09.2025,
the
mediation
recording
full
report
and
satisfaction
of
respective claims of both parties against appellant – Bank after
settlement, and the settled position of law, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the request seeking refund of the court
fee paid by the appellant(s) in both the appeals, deserves to be
allowed in accordance with law.
However, at the same time, request to refund the Court Fees
paid by the parties in the main suit before the Commercial Court is
hereby refused, for the reason, that parties had contested their
(15 of 16)
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
[CFA-1315/2024]
respective claims against appellant – Bank, by undergoing a longdrawn trial in their respective suit before the Commercial Court
and settlement between the parties, at the stage of appeal, has
been arrived at on the basis of the judgment and decree passed
by the Commercial Court, which have been impugned herein in
both appeals.
16. It is a matter of record that in D.B. Civil First Appeal No.
1315/2024 titled as The Rajasthan State Co-operative Bank
Limited versus DZ Card (India) Private Limited, a Court Fee of
Rs.2,69,963/- has been deposited by the appellant, and in D.B.
Civil First Appeal No. 505/2019 titled as Babylonian Technology
India Pvt. Ltd. versus Rajasthan State Co-Operative Bank Limited
and Anr., a Court Fee of Rs.1,87,493/- has been deposited by the
appellant.
17. Thus, while disposing both the appeals in terms of the
mediation
settlement
dated
09.09.2025
and
recording
full
satisfaction of both parties in respect of their respective claims
against appellant – Bank that no dues either towards the principal
amount or the interest remain alive/survive after the settlement,
it is further directed that the appellants, viz., Rajasthan State Cooperative Bank Limited, appellant in D.B. Civil First Appeal No.
1315/2024 would be entitled to refund of Court Fees of Rs.
2,69,963/- and Babylonian Technology India Pvt. Ltd.,
the
appellant in D.B. Civil First Appeal No. 505/2019 would be entitled
to refund of Court Fees of Rs. 1,87,493/-, as respectively paid by
them in the said appeals.
[2026:RJ-JP:42298-DB]
(16 of 16)
[CFA-1315/2024]
18. Accordingly, the Registrar (Judicial) is directed to issue a
Certificate of refund of Court Fees in favour of the appellants, in
accordance with the due procedure.
19. Application(s), if any pending, also stand disposed of.
(ANUROOP SINGHI),J
SA/3-4/PARSHANT
(SUDESH BANSAL),J
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review