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W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Extra-Ordinary Jurisdiction)
---------------------------------------------------------------------S.B.: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH K. AGNIHOTRI, CJ.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary,
Department of Commerce & Industries
Government of Sikkim
Gangtok, East Sikkim.
… Petitioner.
versus
M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.,
A company having its Registered Office at
Tadong, P.O. Tadong & P.S. Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
Through its Managing Director,
Whri Mahabir Prasad Agarwal,
C/o Central Hotel (Beside Old Secretariat),
Opposite Supermarket, Lal Market,
NH 10, Gangtok,
East Sikkim – 737 101.
…
Respondent.
Petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India
---------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance:
Mr. J. B. Pradhan, Additional Advocate General, Mr.
Karma Thinlay, Senior Government Advocate with
Mr. Thinlay Dorjee Bhutia, Government Advocate,
Mr. Santosh Kr. Chettri and Ms. Pollin Rai, Assistant
Government Advocates for the Petitioner.
Mr. Pabitra Pal Chowdhury, Mr. Samir Kumar Ghosh
and Mr. B. K. Gupta, Advocates for the Respondent.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
JUDGMENT
(26.02.2018)
Satish K. Agnihotri, CJ
Invoking
the
extra-ordinary
discretionary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, the instant petition is filed, wherein the Petitioner
seeks to impugn the Award dated 12.06.2015 rendered by the
learned Arbitrator and consequential dismissal Order dated
10.06.2016 passed by the District Judge, East Sikkim at
Gangtok, in application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short, the Act, 1996), on stated
grounds that there was palpable, manifest error causing
miscarriage of justice.
2.
The facts, in brief, relevant for examination and
consideration of the lis involved in this petition, are that the
Respondent was allotted a plot of land measuring an area of
0.56 acres situated at 5th Mile, Tadong, East Sikkim by the
State Government, the Petitioner herein, vide letter bearing
No.730 dated 24.06.1981 under the terms and conditions of
Lease Deed dated 15.02.1989 for a period of thirty years. The
Respondent herein was permitted to make development on the
land by erecting structure to set up an automobile workshop
under the terms of Lease Deed.
On expiry of the period of
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
lease, the lease was not renewed and the State Government,
the Petitioner herein, decided to resume the land back.
Accordingly, it was communicated by letter dated 17.05.2011.
The dispute arose in reference to the arrears of lease rent and
proper
valuation
for
the
development
made
and
the
construction raised thereon. The Respondent herein preferred
a Writ Petition being W.P. (C) No. 23 of 2013, seeking recovery
of reasonable compensation after proper valuation of the
development made thereon.
Learned High Court disposed of
the Writ Petition on 04.12.2013, holding as under: “13. …….. Considering the proviso contained in
Clause 4(2)(xi), the petitioner shall not be compelled
to hand over possession of the land in question and
the buildings unless reasonable compensation as
mutually agreed upon is paid to the petitioner.
14.
The entire exercise of valuation shall be
completed within a period of 30 days from today.
The petitioner shall give all assistance in ensuring
that the order is complied with within the period
stipulated.”
3.
Feeling
dissatisfied,
the
Respondent
herein
preferred a review petition being Review Pet (C) No. 01 of
2014. The said review petition was disposed of on 25.02.2014
in following terms:“…………………….
(i)
On the consent of both the parties, Hon‟ble
Shri Justice A. P. Subba, former Judge of this
Court, is requested to act as the Arbitrator in
terms of arbitration clause 8 of the lease
agreement dated 15-02-1989 to decide the
dispute and differences between them on the
question of valuation of the developments
made on the land by the Petitioner.
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
(ii)
The Learned Arbitrator shall enter into the
reference within a period of thirty days from the
date of his appointment. Within this period, the
parties shall ascertain as to whether Hon‟ble Shri
Justice Subba is willing to act as an Arbitrator.
In the event of his inability, this Court shall be
informed so that necessary order may be
passed.
(iii)
In order to ensure that the interest of the parties
are safeguarded the Learned Arbitrator shall
draw up an inventory of the developments that
have been made by the Petitioner on the lease
hold property by making a visit personally and
take other steps including taking photographs, if
necessary.
(iv)
Upon drawing up such inventory and collecting
necessary
evidence,
the
Petitioner
shall
handover possession of the leasehold land to the
Respondent-Department as undertaken by him.
(v)
The Learned Arbitrator shall ensure that the
entire proceeding is completed and the award
passed within a period of six months from the
date of his entering upon the reference.
(vi)
The order of appointment of the Arbitrator is
being passed in view of the consent expressed
by both the parties and is, therefore,
independent of the provisions of Section 11(6) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
However, the proceedings of the arbitration shall
be governed by the procedure prescribed under
that Act.
The cost of the arbitration shall be borne by the
parties.”
4.
In pursuance thereof, Shri Justice A. P. Subba,
former Judge of this Court initiated the arbitration proceedings
on reference made hereinabove. The learned Arbitrator passed
the arbitration Award on 12.06.2015, granting a sum of
Rs.3,34,43,444.00 (Rupees Three crore Thirty Four lakhs Forty
Three thousand Four hundred and Forty Four) in favour of the
Respondent
Company,
deducting
the
amount
of
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
Rs.71,87,891.00 already paid earlier to the Respondent, with
pendent lite and future interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
The dispute does not rest therein.
5.
Initially, an application under Section 34 the Act,
1996 was filed before the High Court on 27.11.2015, which, it
appears, was withdrawn and filed before the Court of the
District Judge, East Sikkim at Gangtok, on 04.12.2015, seeking
setting aside the Award preferred by the State Government in
Arbitration Case No.01 of 2015, along with an application for
condonation of delay under provision of Section 34(3) of the
Act, 1996. The Learned District Judge, holding that Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the provisions of
limitation enshrined under Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996,
dismissed the application on the ground of being barred by
limitation, on 10.06.21016.
6.
Feeling further aggrieved and dissatisfied, the State
Government, Petitioner herein, preferred further an appeal
under Section 37 of the Act, 1996, in Arb. A. No.01 of 2016 on
13.09.2016, questioning the legality and validity of the Order
dated 10.06.2016 passed by the learned District Judge, East
Sikkim at Gangtok. Subsequently, the appeal was withdrawn
by the State Government, Petitioner herein, on 13.12.2016,
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
with liberty to take recourse to an appropriate forum, if so
advised.
Thus,
7.
this
petition
under
Article
of
the
Constitution of India, seeking quashing of the Award dated
12.06.2015
and
consequential
dismissal
Order
dated
10.06.2016 passed by the District Judge, East Sikkim at
Gangtok, in Section 34 application preferred against the
Award.
Mr. J. B. Pradhan, learned Additional Advocate
8.
General appearing for the State Government, the Petitioner
herein, challenges the Award as well as the consequential
dismissal Order of the District Judge on the ground that the
Award
as
well
the
consequential
dismissal
Order
dated
10.06.2016 was manifestly improper, incorrect and based on
the erroneous appreciation and wrong interpretation of the
legal aspect.
Mr. Pradhan would further contend that the
Arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction by not confining the
dispute to the terms of lease dated 15.02.1989. The Arbitrator
has
examined
the
compensation,
not
the
reasonable
compensation as prescribed under the Lease Deed and also has
not considered clause 4(2)(ix) of the Lease Deed which
provides that the Lessee shall not erect any building or make
any alteration or addition to such building on the plot without
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
sanction and permission in writing of the Lessor or other
authority
approved
by
the
Lessor,
while
assessing
the
compensation for development made and construction raised
on the plot; thus, exceeded his jurisdiction.
It is also
contended that the District Judge, East Sikkim at Gangtok, has
also failed to examine the application under Section 34 of the
Act, 1996 made by the State Government, Petitioner herein in
its
proper
perspective.
It
is
further
submitted
that
consideration of the entitlement of the claimant-company for
compensation, but not the reasonable compensation, was
beyond jurisdiction and terms of reference of the arbitration
proceedings and as such, it was a case of palpable, gross,
apparent error of law and facts. It is further contended that in
such fact situation, this Court is fully competent to exercise its
extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India to correct the error of law and facts.
9.
Referring Rohtas Industries Ltd. and Another
vs. Rohtas Industries Staff Union and Others 1, it is urged
by Mr. Pradhan that an award can be upset if an apparent error
of law stains its face, in a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
To bolster his submission, learned Additional
Advocate General further refers and relies on Miss Maneck
(1976) 2 SCC 82
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
Gustedji
Burjarji
vs.
Sarafazali
Nawabali
Mirza2,
Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks,
Mumbai and Others3 and Surya Devi Rai vs. Ram Chander
Rai and Others4.
10.
Contrasting, Mr. Pabitra Pal Chowdhury, learned
Counsel appearing for the Respondent, would submit that the
Award is perfect and legally sound and as such, this petition
deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable on the sole
ground that the Petitioner has availed and failed in efficacious
statutory remedy by preferring an application under Section 34
of the Act, 1996 before the Court of District Judge and further
an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 before this Court.
The State Government, Petitioner herein, has exhausted its
remedy, raising ground of alleged error in law and facts. Mr.
Chowdhury would further contend that the Arbitrator was
appointed by consent Order dated 25.02.2014 rendered in
Review Pet. (C) No.01 of 2014, wherein it was clearly directed
that the Arbitrator was to decide the dispute and differences
between
them
on
the
question
of
valuation
of
the
developments made on the land by the Petitioner, i.e. the
Respondent herein. The allegation of making developments or
erecting structure without permission of the authorities is not
(1977) 1 SCC 227
(1998) 8 SCC 1
(2003) 6 SCC 675
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
an issue in this petition, but the issue before the Arbitrator was
how much reasonable compensation, the Respondent herein,
was entitled to for the developments made on the plot or
structure
erected
thereon.
The
learned
Arbitrator
has
carefully, legally examined the issue and came to a proper
conclusion by assessing the compensation and awarding the
same.
11.
Referring to a passage in Surya Devi Rai (supra),
it was contended that the High Court would not assign to itself
the role of an appellate court and step into re-appreciating or
evaluating the evidence and substitute its own findings in place
of those arrived at by the inferior court in the exercise of
certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
12.
Heard learned Counsel for the parties, examined the
pleadings and documents appended thereto carefully.
13.
On studied examination, it is apposite to examine
the ambit and scope of extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the facts of the case,
the Petitioner-State has preferred an application under Section
34 of the Act, 1996 to set aside the Award impugned herein,
which was dismissed being barred by limitation. Thereafter, an
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
appeal preferred under Section 37 of the Act, 1996, was
withdrawn. This Court, on consideration, framed the following
question of law in this petition:“Whether the High Court is competent to exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, when the alternate statutory
remedy as provided is availed by the party, however,
belatedly and the case could not be considered on
merit, as pleaded by the petitioner?”
14.
Indisputably, this Court has discretionary extra-
ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to correct the manifest,
palpable error of law or facts which stare on the face of it.
15.
The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in G.
Veerappa Pillai vs. Raman and Raman Ltd.5, examining the
ambit and scope of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, held as under:“
20.
Such writs as are referred to in Art. 226
are obviously intended to enable the High Court to
issue them in grave cases where the subordinate
tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without
jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the
principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a
jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error
apparent on the face of the record, and such act,
omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest
injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may
be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to
enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of
appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the
decisions impugned and decide what is the proper
view to be taken or the order to be made.”
AIR 1952 SC 192
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
16.
Again, in T. C. Basappa
vs. T. Nagappa and
another6, the Supreme Court, while examining a petition
preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution wherein
decision of the election tribunal was under challenge, held as
under:“
7.
One of the fundamental principles in
regard to the issuing of a writ of „certiorari‟, is, that
the writ can be availed of only to remove or
adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts.
The
expression “judicial acts” includes the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions by administrative bodies or
other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such
functions and is used in contrast with what are
purely ministerial acts. Atkin L. J. thus summed up
the law on the point in – „Rex v. Electricity
Commissioners‟, 1924-1 KB 171 at p. 205 (C) :
“Whenever any body or persons having legal
authority to determine questions affecting the
rights of subjects and having the duty to act
judicially act in excess of their legal authority
they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction
of the King‟s Bench Division exercised in these
writs.”
The second essential feature of a writ of
„certiorari‟ is that the control which is exercised
through it over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or
bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory
capacity.
In granting a writ of „certiorari‟ the
superior court does not exercise the powers of an
appellate tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the
evidence upon which the determination of the
inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes
the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction
or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own
views for those of the inferior tribunal.
The
offending order or proceeding so to say is put out of
the way as one which should not be used to the
detriment of any person, vide per Lord Cairns in –
„Walsall‟s Overseers v. L. & N. W. Rly. Co.‟, (1879) 4
AC 30 at p. 39 (D).” `
AIR 1954 SC 440
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
17.
Again,
in
Hari
Vishnu
Kamath
vs.
Ahmad
Ishaque and others7, wherein the decision of the election
tribunal was in challenge, the Supreme Court reiterated scope
of proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, as under:“
23.
It may therefore be taken as settled
that a writ of „certiorari‟ could be issued to correct an
error of law. But it is essential that it should be
something more than a mere error; it must be one
which must be manifest on the face of the record.
The real difficulty with reference to this matter,
however, is not so much in the statement of the
principle as in its application to the facts of a
particular case. When does an error cease to be
mere error, and become an error apparent on the
face of the record? Learned Counsel on either side
were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which
the boundary between the two classes of errors
could be demarcated.
……………………………………………………………”
18.
This view was consistently followed and in Rohtas
Industries Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated and
observed as under:“
12.
Should the Court invoke this high
prerogative under Article 226 in the present case?
That depends. We will examine the grounds on
which the High Court has, in the present case,
excised a portion of the award as illegal, keeping in
mind the settled rules governing judicial review of
private arbitrator‟s awards. Suffice it to say, an
award under Section 10A is not only not invulnerable
but more sensitively susceptible to the writ lancet
being a quasi-statutory body‟s decision. Admittedly,
such an award can be upset if an apparent error of
law stains its face. The distinction, in this area,
between a private award and one under Section 10A
is fine, but real. However it makes slight practical
difference in the present case; in other cases it may.
The further grounds for invalidating an award need
not be considered as enough unto the day is the evil
thereof.”
AIR 1955 SC 233
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
19.
In Whirlpool Corporation (supra), the Supreme
Court explained the power to issue prerogative writs under
Article 226 of the Constitution as under:“
14.
The power to issue prerogative writs
under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in
nature and is not limited by any other provision of
the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the
High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of
habeas
corpus,
mandamus,
prohibition,
quo
warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of
the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the
Constitution but also for “any other purpose”.
15.
Under Article 226 of the Constitution,
the High Court, having regard to the facts of the
case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain
a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed
upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if
an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the
High Court would not normally exercise its
jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been
consistently held by this Court not to operate as a
bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where
the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement
of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has
been a violation of the principle of natural justice or
where the order or proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to
cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would
rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of
the constitutional law as they still hold the field.”
20.
In Surya Dev Rai (supra), the Supreme Court
examined the difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, holding, inter alia, as under:“
12.
In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction
the High Court proceeds on an assumption that a
court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter
has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as
rightly. The High Court would not, therefore, for the
purpose of certiorari assign to itself the role of an
appellate court and step into reappreciating or
evaluating the evidence and substitute its own
findings in place of those arrived at by the inferior
court.
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
38.
Such like matters frequently arise
before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions
in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state
the same as hereunder:(1) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999
with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of
Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not
affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the
High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution.
(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the
courts subordinate to the High Court, against
which remedy of revision has been excluded
by the CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are
nevertheless open to challenge in, and
continue to be subject to, certiorari and
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.
(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the
Constitution, is issued for correcting gross
errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate
court is found to have acted (i) without
jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where
there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its
jurisdiction – by overstepping or crossing the
limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant
disregard of law or the rules of procedure or
acting in violation of principles of natural
justice where there is no procedure specified,
and thereby occasioning failure of justice.
(4)
Supervisory
jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution is
exercised for keeping the subordinate courts
within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When
the subordinate Court has assumed a
jurisdiction which it does not have or has
failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does
have or the jurisdiction though available is
being exercised by the Court in a manner not
permitted by law and failure of justice or
grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the
High Court may step in to exercise its
supervisory jurisdiction.
(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is
available to correct mere errors of fact or of
law unless the following requirements are
satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and
apparent on the face of the proceedings such
as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter
disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
grave injustice or gross failure of justice has
occasioned thereby.
(6) A patent error is an error which is
self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or
demonstrated without involving into any
lengthy or complicated argument or a longdrawn process of reasoning. Where two
inferences are reasonably possible and the
subordinate court has chosen to take one view
the error cannot be called gross or patent.
(7) The power to issue a writ of
certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are
to be exercised sparingly and only in
appropriate
cases
where
the
judicial
conscience of the High Court dictates it to act
lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice
should
occasion.
Care,
caution
and
circumspection need to be exercised, when
any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is
sought to be invoked during the pendency of
any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court
and the error though calling for correction is
yet capable of being corrected at the
conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or
revision
preferred
thereagainst
and
entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court
would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early
disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High
Court may feel inclined to intervene where the
error is such, as, if not corrected at that very
moment, may become incapable of correction
at a later stage and refusal to intervene would
result in travesty of justice or where such
refusal itself would result in prolonging of the
lis.
(8) The High Court in exercise of
certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not
covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge
in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or
correct errors in drawing inferences or correct
errors of mere formal or technical character.
(9) In practice, the parameters for
exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari and those calling for exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and
the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High
Courts in India unlike English courts has
almost obliterated the distinction between the
two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court
may annul or set aside the act, order or
proceedings of the subordinate courts but
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
cannot substitute its own decision in place
thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction
the High Court may not only give suitable
directions so as to guide the subordinate court
as to the manner in which it would act or
proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court
may in appropriate cases itself make an order
in supersession or substitution of the order of
the subordinate court as the court should have
made in the facts and circumstances of the
case.”
21.
In L. K. Verma
vs. H.M.T. Ltd. & Anr.8, the
Supreme Court, while examining the provisions of sub-rule (3)
of Rule 14 of the U.P. Factories (Safety Officers) Rules, 1984,
wherein
appeal
was
maintainable
before
the
State
Government, viewed the scope of proceedings under Article
226 of the Constitution in lieu of appeal, held as under:“
20.
The High Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, in a
given case although may not entertain a writ petition
inter alia on the ground of availability of an
alternative remedy, but the said rule cannot be said
to be of universal application. Despite existence of an
alternative remedy, a writ court may exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review inter alia in
cases where the court or the tribunal lacks inherent
jurisdiction or for enforcement of a fundamental right
or if there has been a violation of a principle of
natural justice or where vires of the act is in question.
In the aforementioned circumstances, the alternative
remedy has been held not to operate as a bar. [See
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks,
Mumbai and Others , (1998) 1 SCC 1, Sanjana M. Wig
(Ms.) v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., (2005) 8
SCC 242, State of H.P. and Others v. Gujarat Ambuja
Cement Ltd. and Another (2005) 6 SCC 499].”
22.
Further, the Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam
Shetty and Another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil9, re-
AIR 2006 SC 975
(2010) 8 SCC 329
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
examined the power of jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution and held as
under:-
“
48.
The
jurisdiction
under Article
226 normally is exercised where a party is affected
but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the
High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In
fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in
favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their
fundamental rights or other statutory rights. The
jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High
Court for vindication of its position as the highest
judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where
there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed
ex debito justitiae or as a matter of right. But in
cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction
under Article 227, such exercise is entirely
discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter
of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed
under Article 226, a letters patent appeal or an intracourt Appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is
maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge
of a High Court in exercise of power under Article
227. In almost all the High Courts, rules have been
framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been
framed for exercise of High Court's power
under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise
entirely in the domain of the discretion of High
Court.”
23.
On studied examination of the afore-mentioned
authoritative judicial pronouncements made by the Supreme
Court time to time on the issue of the scope of jurisdiction of
High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the
Constitution, it is manifest that the jurisdiction of the High
Court entertaining a Writ Petition is not affected in spite of
alternative statutory remedies, particularly, wherein it is shown
that the tribunal judicial authority had exercised its power
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
having no jurisdiction or had exercised its jurisdiction without
any legal foundation.
It is for the party invoking extra-
ordinary jurisdiction to demonstrate that there has been (i) a
breach of principles of natural justice; or (ii) procedure
required for decision has not been adopted, or (iii) to seek
enforcement or infringement of violation of fundamental rights;
or (iv) proceedings taken or order passed thereon are wholly
without jurisdiction, or (v) proceeding itself is an abuse of
process of law.
For the afore-stated contingencies, the High Court is
24.
fully competent to exercise its extra-ordinary discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to correct
gross, palpable error of law or facts, to stave off miscarriage of
justice.
Applying the well-settled principle to the facts of the
25.
case, it is established that the learned Arbitrator had entered
into
arbitration
reference
pursuant
to
the
Order
dated
25.02.2014 rendered by the High Court in Review Pet. (C)
No.01 of 2014.
The High Court, on the consent of both the
parties, appointed the Arbitrator in terms of arbitration clause
8 of the Lease Deed to decide the dispute and differences
between
them
on
the
question
of
valuation
of
the
developments made on the land by the Petitioner.
The
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
reference is not circumscribed to any condition, namely, only
those developments which have been made with permission or
approval of the Lessor or its authority. The clause 4(2)(ix) of
the Lease Deed prescribes that the Lessee shall not erect any
building or make any alteration or addition to such building on
the industrial plot without sanction or permission in writing of
the Lessor or its authority. The clause 4(2)(xi) prescribes that
if the lease is not renewed on the termination of the lease
period, reasonable compensation, as mutually agreed upon by
the parties, will be paid to the Lessee by the Lessor on
development of land and construction of buildings. Sub-clause
(2)(ix) and sub-clause (2)(xi), if read together, contemplate
the erection of building or making any alteration or addition to
such building with sanction or permission.
However, if some
developments on the land and construction of building are
made without permission, that does not deprive the Lessee,
the claimant, of the reasonable compensation as agreed upon
between the parties.
26.
The High Court, while examining the Writ Petition as
well as Review Petition, has not restricted the valuation of the
development on the land and for the erection of the building or
alteration done, with permission or sanction of the Lessor only.
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
Be that as it may, on a detailed examination, it may
27.
be a simple error of law or of facts.
However, the pre-
condition for exercising extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution is gross or palpable error on the fact of
it.
It has clearly been held in a catena of decisions that the
high prerogative writ under Article 226 may be issued not to
correct mere error but the error which is manifest, palpable
and gross leading to miscarriage of justice. The Court is not
required to delve deep into the issue on re-appreciation or reexamination of evidence.
28.
In this case, indisputably there is no gross failure of
justice or grave injustice on the basis of alleged jurisdictional
error.
Thus, exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction of High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not warranted.
29.
Further,
the
State
Government,
the
Petitioner
herein, has availed the remedy of Section 34 of the Act, 1996
and also Section 37 of the Act, 1996, by preferring an appeal
against the Order passed by the District Judge, which was
subsequently withdrawn. Needless to state that the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 was enacted with the sole object of
expeditious disposal of the contractual disputes.
The Act
provides for statutory remedies under Section 34 and Section
W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016
The Principal Secretary, Deptt. of C & I, Govt. of Sikkim vs. M/s. Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
37 to seek redressal of grievances, if any, in the Award on the
grounds prescribed therein.
30.
In the case on hand, as aforestated, the Petitioner-
State has already availed the efficacious remedy as provided
under statute.
In such an event also and further the
Petitioner-State has failed to demonstrate that there was any
infringement of fundamental rights or violation of principles of
natural justice or the procedure required for decision was not
adopted or the proceeding was taken and/or order was passed
without any jurisdiction on abuse of process of law, to invoke
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
31.
Resultantly,
the
petition
is
dismissed
as
maintainable.
32.
No order as to costs.
Chief Justice
26.02.2018
pm
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