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2026:MLHC:282-DB
Serial No.01
Supp. List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C). No. 406 of 2025
Date of Decision: 26.03.2026
1.
The East Khasi Hills Wine Dealers
Welfare Association, a registered
Association bearing registration
Number – SR/EKHWTWA – 1028/01 of
2001 having its office at Hotel Poinisuk,
Laitumkhrah. Represented by its
General Secretary, Shri. Earnest Mawrie,
Residing at Lumbatngen, Nongthymmai,
Shillong-793021, Meghalaya.
2.
Shri. Earnest Mawrie,
General Secretary of the East Khasi Hills
Wine Dealers Welfare Association,
Aged about 54 years,
Son of (L) B.N.War,
Resident of Lumbatngen, Nongthymmai,
Shillong-793021, Meghalaya.
…Petitioners
-Versus-
1.
The State of Meghalaya,
Represented by the Additional Chief Secretary,
Excise, Registration, Taxation & Stamps Department,
Govt. of Meghalaya,
Shillong – 793001, Meghalaya.
2.
The Commissioner & Secretary,
Excise, Registration, Taxation & Stamps Department,
Govt. of Meghalaya,
Shillong – 793001, Meghalaya.
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3.
The Under Secretary,
Excise, Registration, Taxation & Stamps Department,
Govt. of Meghalaya,
Shillong – 793001, Meghalaya.
4.
The Commissioner of Excise,
Office of the Commissioner of Excise,
Government of Meghalaya,
Shillong – 793001, Meghalaya.
5.
The Deputy Commissioner of Excise,
Government of Meghalaya,
Shillong – 793001, Meghalaya.
…Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S.Thangkhiew, Judge
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Applicant(s) :
Mr. R.B.Phookan, Adv. with
Mr. S.Sen, Adv.
Mr. M.U.Ahmed, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. A.Kumar, AG with
Ms. S.Laloo, GA.
Ms. D.Mukherjee, Adv.
:
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
2026:MLHC:282-DB
Per. H.S. Thangkhiew, Judge:
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
The petitioner No. 1, a registered Association of Wine Dealers
represented by the petitioner No. 2 are before this Court challenging the
notification dated 12-09-2025 framed under the Meghalaya Excise
(Amendment) Rules, 2024 to introduce the implementation of the Integrated
Excise Management System (IEMS) cum track and trace solution for the
Excise Department . This system involves the affixing of holograms on all
liquor bottles and these bottles will carry a QR Code to monitor the sale and
movement of these bottles through the supply chain i.e. from manufacturer
to Central Bonded Warehouse to Bonded Warehouse and finally the retail
supplier. In this system, all the stake holders are required to register
themselves in the system developed by the respondent authorities, with the
software being provided by the Excise Department, Government of
Meghalaya.
2.
For the implementation of the system, the respondent No. 5 vide letter
dated 13-08-2025, had fixed the cost of IEMS at Rs. 2.40 + GST and the
cost of the hologram with the QR Code fixed at Rs. 1.50 together with an
imposition of additional revenue component at Rs. 0.50. The prices are as
per bottle and the initial cost is incurred by the manufacturer/bottling units/
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Central Bonded Warehouse which is recovered while selling them to the
Bonded warehouse, who in turn recovers the same from the retailers. At the
same time, vide a notification dated 12-09-2025, the maximum percentage
of profit margin for retailers which was originally 20% has been reduced to
15%, even though the introduction of IEMS, has resulted in the increase in
price by 4.40% or approximately 5% per bottle. The grievance of the
petitioners is that though these costs are initially borne by the manufacturers,
Bonded Warehouses etc., the same is ultimately passed on to the retailers
and it has been contended that the said charges lacked proper statutory
backing under sections 21 and 36 of the Meghalaya Excise Act, and were
imposed by an authority not competent to levy such levies. Another
grievance is with the reduction in the maximum percentage of profit margin
from 20% to 15%, which they contend will seriously affect their business.
3.
The issues that arise for consideration therefore, is firstly, whether the
amendment reducing the retailer profit margin constitutes a valid exercise
of its regulatory power, or whether it crosses the line into the realm of
manifest arbitrariness, or unreasonableness. Secondly, the most crucial issue
is whether, a substantive link exists between the implementation of the new
tracking system and the decision to reduce the retailer margin, inasmuch as,
if there be such a link, the same could be considered a disguised, or indirect
method of funding a third-party contract which, transgresses the limits of
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legitimate relations. Thirdly, is the issue as to whether the directive for
retailers to sell at new maximum retail price is reasonable or rational,
considering the fact that necessary hardware and software, were yet to be
put in place to make the system functionally operational at the retail point
of sale.
4.
It has been argued by Mr. R.B.Phookan, the learned counsel for the
petitioners that the impugned reduction in retailer profit margin, is linked to
the deduction of IEMS and is not an independent fiscal policy. It is submitted
that while the retailers’ margin has been reduced to 15%, the Central Bonded
Warehouse continues to receive a maximum 6% commission and Bonded
warehouses 8%, which is discriminatory. It is further submitted, that the
additional charges were imposed without statutory authority under section
21 and 36 of the Meghalaya Excise Act, and that too, by an authority not
competent to levy such fees which renders the entire action ultra vires,
unconstitutional and arbitrary. The learned counsel for the petitioners has
also submitted that section 36 of the Meghalaya Excise Act suffers from
excessive delegation, inasmuch as, it confers unguided and unrestricted
discretion on the Executive to fix profit margins without policy, standards
or safeguards, which has resulted in the impugned notification dated 12-092025, which is arbitrary. The action of the respondents, it is contended, was
without any consideration of rising operational cost, license fees and other
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related business expenses, which have already resulted in the reduction of
the gross profit margin.
5.
It has further been argued that the respondent authorities, do not
possess an unfettered right to formulate and fix the maximum profit margin
without any due consideration of the increase in price rise and cost involved
and the profit necessary for carrying on the business, and as such therefore,
the decision to reduce the maximum profit margin is arbitrary. On another
aspect, it has been submitted that for the implementation of the IEMS
Scheme, two agreements were executed by the Commissioner of Excise with
two entities in terms of an Expression of Interest dated 29-02-2024, and that,
by such agreement, only the private entities have been benefitted under the
IEMS Scheme, and there is no gain to the Government in terms of the
introduction of the fee/cost of the IEMS application.
6.
The learned counsel, on the question of maintainability, has submitted
that the petitioner is a juristic person duly registered with its objective to
safeguard the interest and rights of its members, and the petition challenging
the validity of the notifications dated 13-08-2025 and 12-09-2025, affects
all retail licensees uniformly. In this context, the learned counsel has relied
upon a full bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of
Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar & Ors. vs. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti,
Bharthana & Anr. reported in AIR 1984 All 46, wherein he submits at para
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50 thereof, it has been held that a similar petition under Article 226 by
multiple petitioners is maintainable where the right to relief arises from the
same act on transaction and involves a common question of law or fact.
Learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment of Council for Leather
Exports vs. All India Small Scale Tanners and Exporters Association &
Anr. reported in 1996 SCC Online Mad 1237, wherein a Division Bench of
the Madras High Court held that, an association enforcing its members
collective right to trade and challenging a levy under Article 265 of the
Constitution is enforcing a public constitutional right. Learned counsel has
also cited further decisions which are given hereinbelow on this same point.
7.
i.
Amaravati Rajadhani Sameekarana Raithu
Samakya and Another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh,
2023 SCC OnLine AP 3832.
ii.
Director of School Education & Ors. vs. M.
Velayutham and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad
3643.
iii.
A.P. Wine Dealers Association & Ors. vs. Deputy
Director of Income-Tax (Investigation), 2005 SCC
OnLine AP 1128.
The learned counsel has then taken this Court through key definitions
contained in the Assam Excise Act, 1910, as adapted by the State of
Meghalaya, and has referred to section 21 and section 36 thereof, of which
section 21 is the charging section for levying duty, and section 36 which
grants the power to make rules. It is submitted that, under these provisions,
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vide notification dated 25-01-2025, the IEMS was introduced by inserting
Rule 378 into the Meghalaya Excise Rules, with Rule 378 (8) providing that
all types of licenses, renewals and all other excise functionalities be carried
through the IEMS cum Track and Trace Solution from the date of
implementation. It is then argued that with regard to the implementation of
the IEMS, there is operational confusion, inasmuch as, while the amending
rules were notified on 25-01-2025, Rule 378 (8) mandates the operation of
the system from the date of implementation, which however, are belied by
the fact that executive letters were issued on 21-08-2025 and 22-08-2025,
instructing stake holders to log in with the warning that licenses would cease
to function once IEMS goes live, which clearly indicated that the system is
not yet operational.
8.
The learned counsel then submits that the reduction of the
commission from 20% to 15% while keeping retail prices constant, is an
indirect enhancement of excise revenue which is extracted from the retailers
without proper legal sanction which is a colourable exercise of power. This
Court, it is contended, by judgment and order passed in the case of
International Spirits and Wines Association of India vs. State of
Meghalaya & Ors, 2025 SCC Online Megh 986, had directed the State to
fairly and reasonably fix the commission and had impliedly mandated a
process of consultation with stake holders, which however, was not adhered
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to and imposition of the reduction of commission was unilateral without
affording any hearing or consultation.
9.
It is lastly submitted that though there is no fundamental right
attached on trade of liquor, but since the retailers have been granted licenses
and running their business, they are entitled to the benefit of Article 14 and
19, and cannot be subjected to any arbitrariness and discrimination.
10.
On behalf of the State respondents, the learned Advocate General has
submitted that the challenge made is wholly misconceived and untenable in
law, apart from the lack of locus standi of the petitioner association. It is
submitted that the writ petition itself is not maintainable, inasmuch as, the
petitioner association is not independently impacted by the impugned
communication, and that, an association can espouse the cause of its
members only where the members are identifiable and there exists a clear
authorisation binding them to the result of litigation. As such, it is contended,
it cannot be deemed that the interest of all the wine dealers in East Khasi
Hills District, Meghalaya, are being duly and adequately represented by the
petitioner association. In this context, reliance has been placed on the
following judgments:
i.
Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar vs. Krishi Utpadan
Mandi Samiti Bharthana & Anr. 1983 SCC OnLine
All 638, (para 8-13, 18 and 50).
2026:MLHC:282-DB
11.
ii.
Indian Sugar Mills Association vs. Secretary to
Government, 1950 SCC OnLine All 186.
iii.
Swakshtagrahi Sangh, Janpad Panchayat Niwas vs.
Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine MP 5420, (para
7 and 8).
iv.
Meghalaya Wine Dealers Association & Anr. vs.
State of Meghalaya (2010) 5 GLR 332.
The learned Advocate General has then submitted that there is no
inherent, fundamental or vested right to trade in intoxicants, such as liquor
and all rights in relation thereto, which includes the manufacture, storage,
sale, possession, import and export, are vested in the State, and as such, trade
in liquor is not treated as a right, but as a privilege conferred by the State,
subject entirely to State regulation in public interest considering its
inherently harmful nature. It is also contended that, even assuming without
admitting, that Article 19 is available to liquor retailers, the right to trade
however, is always subject to reasonable restrictions on business in public
interest under Article 19 of the Constitution. It is then reiterated that the
petitioners cannot invoke Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution to challenge
a regulatory measure concerning liquor trade which is a privilege granted by
the State and not a matter of right. Reference has been made to the following
judgments in support of this submission:
i.
Har Shankar vs. Excise & Taxation Commissioner,
(1975) 1 SCC 737, para 53.
2026:MLHC:282-DB
12.
ii.
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka,
(1995) 1 SCC 574, para 60.
iii.
State of Andhra Pradesh vs. McDowell & Co.,
(1996) 3 SCC 709.
iv.
International Spirits and Wines Association of
India vs. State of Haryana, (2019) 20 SCC 294.
The learned Advocate General further submits that the impugned
notifications are legitimate exercises of regulatory powers vested in the State
in formulating economic policy, where the scope for judicial review is
extremely narrow. The introduction of the IEMS with QR Code base, it is
submitted, is a policy decision aimed at tracking and tracing liquor bottles
to ensure transparency, prevent pilferage and secure State revenue, and that,
the costs associated with this system was intended to be borne by the
manufacturers and added to the cost price as per Rule 378 (9). With regard
to the recalibration of maximum profit margins vide the notification dated
12-09-2025, whereby the retail margin was reduced for the retailers from
20% to 15%, it has been submitted that the same is a holistic measure for
fair pricing across the supply chain and is very much in consonance with the
judgment of this Court, which had upheld the Central Bonded Warehouse
system and had directed the State to fix margin. The State having invoked
the doctrine of wide latitude in economic policy, it is submitted, a mere
diminution of income or profit margin is not a ground to challenge the
State’s policy, and that such policy decisions are not amenable to judicial
2026:MLHC:282-DB
review. In support of this stand, the learned Advocate General has relied on
the following decisions:
13.
i.
Swiss Ribbons Private Ltd. vs. Union of India,
(2019) 4 SCC 17 (paras 17-23 and 120).
ii.
State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4 SCC 566,
(para 34).
iii.
T. B. Ibrahim, Proprietor, Bus Stand, Tanjore vs.
Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, (1952) 2
SCC 590.
iv.
Small Scale Industrial Manufactures Association
(Regd.) vs. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC
246.
It is then argued that the Meghalaya Excise Act, particularly sections
21 and 36, empowers the State Government to frame appropriate rules to
regulate manufacture, distribution, sale and pricing of liquor in the State and
the fixation of MRP and profit margins is an integral part of such regulatory
control. Entry 8 of List II (State List), it is submitted, which provides for
production, manufacture, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquor falls
within the domain of the State legislature, and as such, it is well within the
State’s competence to revise, rationalise or reduce the profit margin in
furtherance of public interest and revenue consideration. The petitioners, it
is contended, having voluntarily entered into a regulated trade are bound by
the terms, conditions and regulatory changes imposed by the State from time
to time, and as such, the ground taken by the petitioners of no opportunity
2026:MLHC:282-DB
being granted before the impugned notification was issued, is misconceived
as in such matters, the principles of natural justice are not attracted. It is then
asserted that there is a strong presumption of constitutionality and validity
in favour of the impugned notifications which are subordinate legislations
under the Meghalaya Excise Act and the impugned actions are squarely
covered by the rule making powers under sections 21 and 36 thereof. The
notifications, it is submitted, are intra vires the Act and are neither arbitrary,
unreasonable nor discriminatory, and the changes apply to all stake holders
in the supply chain, and the said policy cannot be struck down merely
because it leads to certain additional cost on anyone in the supply chain. The
following judgments have been relied upon in this regard:
14.
i.
Mahant Moti Das vs. S.P. Sahi 1959 Supp (2) SCR
563.
ii.
M.L. Kamra vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.,
(1992) 2 SCC 36.
The learned Advocate General has then submitted that the petition is
premature, as the sole grievance of the petitioner is a speculated
apprehension that forthcoming policy measures may lead to increase in the
MRP of IMFL brands thereby affecting profit margin. The rationalisation of
margins, it is submitted, applies uniformly and Bonded Warehouses who
enjoyed a minimum margin of 8% earlier, the said margin has now been
capped at a maximum of 8% which reflects standardisation and regulatory
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balancing, not arbitrariness or discrimination. Further, it is submitted the
writ petition contains no material particulars or data to establish actual loss
of profit, and the plea of reduced margin is based on conjectures and
surmises. It is further submitted that the petition also suffers from nonjoinder of necessary parties as the successful bidders for implementing the
IEMS, with whom contracts have been drawn up and signed, have not been
arrayed as party respondents in the instant writ petition, though they are
vitally interested parties. The learned Advocate General then concludes by
submitting that equality cannot be claimed amongst unequals, as liquor
retailers are not similarly situated to Bonded Warehouses or Central
Warehouses, which operate on lower margins and further, no relief can be
afforded to the petitioner, nor stay of recovery of a levy be granted which
can be only done under exceptional circumstances. In this context, the
judgment in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise Chandan
Nagar, West Bengal vs. Dunlop India Limited & Ors. reported in (1985) 1
SCC 260 has been relied upon. It is finally submitted that no case has been
made out for any interference and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
15.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, and from the
available facts and materials, what first strikes this Court is the sequential
action taken by the respondents, which show that the introduction of the
IEMS along with other charges was closely followed by a reduction of the
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retailer profit margin from 20% to 15%, which suggest that the reduction in
retail profit, is related to the implementation of the new policy rather than
the same being an independent policy. This observation is further fortified
by the fact that the financial impact of the new system has fallen mainly on
retailers who are required to bear the additional cost linked to the IEMS,
while at the same time, being made to face reduced profit margins, unlike
the Central Bonded Warehouse and Bonded Warehouse, whose rates though
termed maximum have continued at 8 and 6% respectively. However, as
there has been a challenge made to the maintainability of the writ petition,
before deliberating on the main issue, this Court will first examine the
question of maintainability raised by the respondents.
16.
The respondents, as seen earlier, have relied upon a series of decisions
to advance the contention that the instant writ petition is not maintainable.
While it is true that an association generally cannot file a writ petition to
enforce the rights of its individual members, as it is a separate legal entity
and it is well settled law that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article
19, are available only to the citizens of this country i.e. natural persons, in
the context of the present case, the same has to be examined from the stand
point of the nature of the association and the cause that has been espoused
in the instant writ petition. The writ petitioner is a registered body, which
would therefore mean that it is constituted by wine dealers of the district of
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East Khasi Hills, who are members of the association. Any order therefore,
would necessarily bind the members of the association, whether adverse or
favourable. Further, is the consideration that the grievance projected by the
writ petitioner association is not for enforcement of any right against the
State respondents that would come within the meaning of Article 19, but
rather, touches upon the alleged arbitrary action of the respondents in
implementing the IEMS, with the burden of the incidence of cost involved,
saddled on the retailers while leaving the other players in the manufacturing
and distribution chain virtually untouched. No doubt, as held in the case of
Khoday Distilleries (supra), that a citizen has no fundamental right to do
trade or business of liquor, and as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
several other decisions that all rights are vested in the State with regard to
every form of activity in relation to intoxicants i.e., its manufacture, storage,
export, import, sale and possession, in the considered view of this Court,
once this activity is also being allowed to be operated by private players, it
is incumbent upon the State to also ensure that the principles of equality are
observed. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment in
the case of Doongaji and Co. (I) vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. 1991
Supp. (2) SCC 313 where at para 15, it has been held as follows:
“15. It is settled law by several decisions of this Court
that there is no fundamental right to a citizen to carry
on trade or business in liquor. The State under its
regulatory power, has power to prohibit absolutely any
2026:MLHC:282-DB
form of activity in relation to an intoxicant, its
manufacture, possession, import and export. No one
can claim, as against the State, the right to carry on
trade or business in any intoxicants, nor the State be
compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of
manufacture, sale, storage of liquor. Further when the
State has decided to part with such right or privilege to
the others, then State can regulate consistent with the
principles of equality enshrined under Article 14 and
any infraction in this behalf at its pleasure are
arbitrary violating Article 14. Therefore, the exclusive
right or privilege of manufacture, storage, sale, import
and export of the liquor through any agency other than
the State would be subject to rigour of Article 14.
Vide Har Shankar v. Dy. Excise & Taxation
Commissioner [(1975) 1 SCC 737 : (1975) 3 SCR 254]
and State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC 566
: (1987) 1 SCR 1.”
17.
Taking the above noted aspects into consideration, and further,
notwithstanding the fact that the instant writ petition has been preferred by
an association, as there is a common question of law and fact, which equally
affects all the retailers at the end of the distribution line, who though may
not be connected, are nonetheless part of the same eco system, this writ
petition is held to be maintainable. In this context, a Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court on this question, in its decision in the case of Umesh
Chand Vinod Kumar & Ors. vs. Krishi Udpadan Mandi Samiti reported in
AIR 1984 All 46 on the question as to whether an association or persons
registered or unregistered can maintain a petition under Article 226, which
has great persuasive value, had succinctly at Paragraph 50 held as follows:
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“50.
Our answer to the referred questions is as follows:—
Q.1
—
Whether
an
association
of
persons,
registered or unregistered,
can maintain a petition under
Article
of
the
Constitution
for
the
enforcement of the rights of
its members as distinguished
from the enforcement of its
own rights?
A. 1 — The position appears
to be that an association of
persons,
registered
or
unregistered, can file a
petition under Article 226 for
enforcement of the rights of its
members as distinguished
from the enforcement of its
own rights—
(1) In case members of such
an association are themselves
unable to approach the court
by reason of poverty, disability
or socially or economically
disadvantaged position (“little
Indians”).
(2) In case of a public injury
leading to public interest
litigation;
provided
the
association has some concern
deeper than that of a wayfarer
or a busybody, i.e., it has a
special interest in the subjectmatter.
(3)
Where the rules or
regulations of the association
specifically authorise it to take
legal proceedings on behalf of
its members, so that any order
passed by the court in such
proceedings will be binding on
the members.
In other cases an association,
whether
registered
or
unregistered, cannot maintain
a petition under Article 226
for the enforcement or
protection of the rights of its
members, as distinguished
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from the enforcement of its
own rights.
Q. 2 Whether a single writ petition
under Article 226 of the
Constitution is maintainable on
behalf of more than one petitioner,
not connected with each other as
partners or those who have no other
legally subsisting jural relationship
where the questions of law and fact,
involved in the petition, are
common?
A.2 A single writ petition
under Article 226 of the
Constitution by more than
one petitioner, not connected
with each other as partners or
any other legally subsisting
jural
relationship,
is
maintainable where the right
to relief arises from the same
act or transaction and there is
a common question of law or
fact or where though the right
of claim does not arise from
the same act or transaction,
the petitioners are jointly
interested in the cause or
causes of action.
Q. 3 In case the answer to question
No. 1 is in the affirmative, whether
only one set of court-fees would be
payable on such petition or each
such individual petitioner has to pay
court-fees separately?
A.3 Where a single writ
petition by an association or
by more than one person is
maintainable, then a single
set of court-fees would be
payable. Else, each petitioner
is liable to pay separate courtfees.
Q. 4 In case answer to question No.
1 is in the negative, whether the
defect of misjoinder of several
petitioners in the writ petition can
be cured by requiring each such
petitioner to pay separate courtfees?
A.4 The technical defect of
misjoinder of petitioners can,
in the discretion of the Court,
be cured by each petitioner
paying separate court-fees.
Q. 5 Whether the petition is
maintainable
for
questioning
similar actions taken by different
Mandi Samitis independently of
A.5 Our answer to this
question
is
in
the
affirmative.”
2026:MLHC:282-DB
each other in cases where the
aggrieved, party seeks relief against
each such Committee on identical
grounds?
18.
Coming to the main issue in question, as observed earlier, the
respondent No 5 vide letter dated 13-08-2025, had fixed the cost of IEMS at
Rs. 2.40 + GST and the cost of hologram with the QR Code fixed at Rs.
1.50, and though the initial cost is incurred by the manufacturer bottling
units, Central Bonded Warehouse, the same is recovered by selling them to
the Bonded Warehouses which in turn, recovers the cost through re-sellers.
19.
The amendment of Rule 372 in exercise of powers under section 36
of the Meghalaya Excise Act, notified on 12-09-2025, reducing the profit
margin to 15% from the existing 20%, and the implementation of the IEMS,
the cost of which is not absorbed by the State or by the other stake holders,
would surely support the contention of the petitioner that the reduction in
profit was to accommodate the cost of the implementation of the IEMS
which was being charged by the entity providing the same, which is a private
player. The exclusion of the other stake holders in the supply chain from
being saddled with any part of the cost, or their profit margin being reduced,
also weighs heavy in the mind of the Court as to the reasonableness in the
action of the State respondents, in arriving at their policy decision and the
resultant amendments to the Act.
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20.
The other issue raised by the petitioner that though the IEMS Scheme
is yet to be implemented, the State Government has approved the cost cards
for certain brands and the new rates have been forwarded to the
manufacturers/distilleries, who have to introduce a new price of the fresh
stock with the QR Code, leaving the retailers with no other choice but of
lifting the fresh stock with the QR Code with a new price, this aspect in the
considered view of the Court also requires proper re-examination. This
observation is being made in view of the fact that it is undisputed that the
IEMS Scheme is yet to go live, especially with the requisite
software/hardware yet to be put in place and available to the stake holders
which therefore, if not corrected, is leading to the extra cost being recovered
from the customer, and at the same time, resulting in the reduction to 15%
profit of the retailers.
21.
The Court, in the case of International Spirits and Wines Association
of India vs. State of Meghalaya (supra), on the question of the commission
allowed to the Central Bonded Warehouse, had directed as follows:
• The state government is to strictly monitor the business
carried out by the central bonded warehouse with the other
bonded warehouses and with the manufacturers, distillers
and suppliers.
• By an administrative order the State shall fairly and
reasonably fix the commission to be charged by the Central
Bonded Warehouse.
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• It required, this extra amount of commission is to be first
absorbed by the government by reducing its taxes on a bottle
of liquor and thereafter consider enhancing the price of a
bottle, if required reasonably, so that the enhancement in
price is minimal and does not affect the commission earned
by the bonded warehouses or the market demand.
• The government is to closely monitor the activities of the
Central Bonded Warehouse in relation to each of the other
bonded warehouses so that the stock and description of liquor
made available by Central Bonded Warehouse to each of the
bonded warehouses is more or less the same as it was before
the introduction of the impugned rule.
• The government shall ensure that the Central Bonded
Warehouse does not discriminate between the bonded
warehouses and carries on its business in a fair and
transparent manner.
• If the government receives any complaint from any interested
person with regard to procurement, supply and distribution
by the Central Bonded Warehouse to the bonded warehouses
it shall immediately entertain the complaint and take
necessary measures to solve the problem.
• Therefore, as of now, the rules stand but subject to its
application and regulation properly and reasonably by the
government in accordance with our observations and
directions above.
• In those circumstances, we declare that the impugned rules
are valid and intra vires the Constitution and the laws.
• In case of infraction of our directions by the State resulting
in misuse of the rules the writ petitioners shall have a fresh
cause of action to file a proceeding to declare them as invalid
and ultra vires.
• Both the writ petitions are disposed of declaring the
Meghalaya Bonded Warehouse (Amendment) Rules, 2020 as
constitutional and valid but subject to compliance by the
respondent-State with our directions above for
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implementation of the said rules. We grant liberty to the
petitioners to apply afresh for quashing of the said rules in
case of disobedience to our directions or failure to implement
the rules in accordance with our directions.
22.
The directions contained in the aforesaid judgment, therefore,
implicitly advocates for a balanced decision or policy to be arrived at by the
State respondents, taking into consideration all relevant factors, which to the
mind of this Court, will also apply to the present case. From the facts as
narrated above, it can clearly be seen that there has been a financial impact
upon the retailers with the amendments that have been brought by the
impugned notification dated 12-09-2025, which points to a reasonable
connection with the implementation of the IEMS. Though as discussed
earlier, that it is settled law that there is no fundamental right to carry on
trade or business in liquor, and the State is vested with the power to restrict
or even prohibit such trade, however, once the State chooses to permit
private parties to engage in this trade, such as, the various stake holders, its
actions must satisfy the principles of equality and fairness.
23.
It is also would be useful to refer the decision in the case of Gaurav
Kumar vs. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 641, on the point of challenge to
delegated legislation where in Paragraphs 27 and 28, it has been held as
follows:
“(iii) Delegated legislation
27. The basic principle underlying the concept of
delegated legislation is that the legislature cannot
2026:MLHC:282-DB
directly exert its will in every detail. [Mahachandra
Prasad Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council, (2004) 8
SCC 747, para 13]. It lays down the legislative policy
and delegates the subsidiary or ancillary powers to the
delegated or subordinate authorities to carry out the
legislative policy. [Delhi Laws Act, 1912, In re, 1951
SCC 568, para 22]. It is now a settled legal principle
that the legislature cannot abdicate essential legislative
functions to the delegated authority. [Vasantlal
Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay, 1960 SCC
OnLine SC 27, para 4]. The legislature can entrust
subsidiary or ancillary legislation to the delegate.
Before such delegation, the legislature should
enunciate the policy and the principles for the guidance
of the delegated authority. [Harishankar Bagla v. State
of M.P., (1954) 1 SCC 978, para 12]. As a corollary, the
delegated authority must carry out its rule-making
functions within the framework of the law. The
delegated legislation must be consistent with the law
under which it is made and cannot go beyond the limits
of policy and standards laid down in the law.
[MCD v. Birla Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills, 1968 SCC
OnLine SC 13, paras 13, 71].
28. Although delegated legislation enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality, it does not enjoy the
same immunity as the parent legislation. It is now well
established [Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P)
Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641, para
77; State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC
517, para 15] that delegated legislation can be
challenged on the following grounds:
(i) lack of legislative competence to make
delegated legislation;
(ii) violation of fundamental rights guaranteed
under the Constitution;
(iii) violation
Constitution;
of
any
provision
of
the
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(iv) failure to conform to the statute under which
it is made or exceeding the limits of authority
conferred by the enabling Act;
(v) repugnance to any other enactment; and
(vi) manifest arbitrariness.”
24.
Thus, from the above, it is seen that on the aspect of arbitrariness, the
amendment of the Rule can surely be subject to challenge as has been done
in the instant case. Another judgment that has great persuasive value is to
the case of State of A.P. and Anr. vs. Mini Taxi Owners and Drivers
Association, Hyderabad & Ors. 2001 SCC OnLine AP 421, where on the
same question of subordinate legislation at para 24, the relevant part which
is extracted hereinbelow, it has been held as follows:
“24. ….In India arbitrariness is not a separate ground
since it will come within the embargo of Article 14 of
the Constitution. In India any enquiry into the vires of
delegated legislation must be confined to the grounds
on which plenary legislation may be questioned, to the
ground that it is contrary to the statute under which it
is made, to the ground that it is contrary to other
statutory provisions or that it is so arbitrary that it could
not be said to be in conformity with the statute or that
it offends Article 14 of the Constitution.
That subordinate legislation cannot be
questioned on the ground of violation of principles of
natural justice on which administrative action may be
questioned has been held in Tulsipur Sugar Company
Limited v. Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur, @ pageSC 543 (1980) 2 SCR 1111 : ((1980) 2 SCC 295 : AIR
SC
882); Rameshchandra
Kachardas
Porwal v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 2 SCR-866 :
((1981) 2 SCC 722 : AIR 1981 SC 1127) and
in Bates v. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone. (1972) 1
WLR 1373. A distinction must be made between
2026:MLHC:282-DB
delegation of a legislative function in the case of which
the question of reasonableness cannot be enquired into
and the investment by statute to exercise particular
discretionary powers. In the latter case the question
may be considered on all grounds on which
administrative action may be questioned, such as, nonapplication of mind taking irrelevant matters into
consideration, failure to take relevant matters into
consideration, etc., etc. On the facts and circumstances
of a case, a subordinate legislation may be struck down
as arbitrary or contrary to statute if it fails to take into
account very vital facts which either expressly or by
necessary implication are required to be taken into
consideration by the statute or, say, the Constitution.
This can only be done on the ground that it does not
conform to the statutory or Constitutional
requirements or that it offends Article 14 or Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It cannot, no doubt be
done merely on the ground that it is not reasonable or
that it has not taken into account relevant
circumstances which the Court considers relevant.”
25.
The petitioner, in their pleadings, though no categorical statement has
been made, however, have sufficiently indicated the nexus between the
increase in cost and the reduction in the maximum profit margin to 15%
from 20%, which this Court has taken due note of. The State, though vested
with the rule making power under section 36 of the Meghalaya Excise Act,
to make rules relating to excise revenue, even without any criteria or
standard being laid down, this however, cannot be said to mean that the State
Government formulates a policy or acts in exercise of delegation of powers
which would offend Article 14 of the Constitution. Though normally,
delegated legislation cannot be challenged on the grounds of
unreasonableness, however, if the same is anchored to Article 14, in the
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considered view of this Court, such delegated legislation can be challenged
on the ground of unreasonableness and arbitrariness. In the instant case, as
observed earlier, the introduction of the IEMS coupled with the reduction of
the retailer profit margin from 20% to 15% by way of the impugned
amendment dated 12-09-2025, without any discernible impact or reduction
in the profit margin on the other stake holders, would surely therefore
amount to an action which is unreasonable and arbitrary and against the
principles of equality and fairness, and as such, the amendment to Rule 372
as contained in clause 5 of the Notification No. ERTS (E) 22/2025/29 dated
12-09-2025, is liable to be struck down as being violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution.
26.
In the context of the above noted finding, it is also worthwhile to refer
to the judgment cited by the State respondents themselves i.e., State of M.P.
vs. Nandlal Jaiswal (supra) where at para 33 it has been held as follows:
“33. But, before we do so, we may at this stage
conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary
nature advanced on behalf of the State Government
and Respondents 5 to 11 against the applicability of
Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor
licences. The contention was that trade or business in
liquor is so inherently pernicious that no one can claim
any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14
cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it
is true, and it is well settled by several decisions of this
Court including the decision in Har Shanker v. Deputy
Excise & Taxation Commissioner [(1975) 1 SCC 737 :
AIR 1975 SC 1121 : (1975) 3 SCR 254] that there is no
2026:MLHC:282-DB
fundamental right in a citizen to carry on trade or
business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power
has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of
activity in relation to intoxicants — its manufacture,
storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one
can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade
or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled
to part with its exclusive right or privilege of
manufacturing and selling liquor. But when the State
decides to grant such right or privilege to others the
State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot
act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with
the equality clause while granting the exclusive right
or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor. It is,
therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the
State Government and Respondents 5 to 11 that Article
14 can have no application in a case where the licence
to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the
State Government. The State cannot ride roughshod
over the requirement of that article.”
(emphasis supplied)
27.
However, with regard to the challenge to the application of the IEMS
system and the applicable rates thereon, the same being well within the
powers of the State respondents, no case has been made out for any
interference by this Court but it is observed that in its implementation, the
same is to be regulated in a fair and transparent manner.
28.
The other judgments cited by the respondents such as the case of
Swiss Ribbons Private Limited (supra) which holds that equality is only
among equals, and also the case of T.B.Ibrahim, Proprietor Bus Stand
Tanjore (supra) and the case of Small-Scale Industrial Manufacturers
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Association (supra) not being relevant for the purposes of this discussion are
not elaborated upon or discussed.
29.
In these circumstances therefore, and in view of the discussions made
hereinabove, the amendment to Rule 372 as contained in clause 5 of the
Notification No. ERTS (E) 22/2025/29 dated 12-09-2025, relating to the
fixation of maximum percentage of profit is struck down as being violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution.
30.
The writ petition is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above.
31.
However, there shall be no orders as to costs.
(B. Bhattacharjee)
JUDGE
SAMANTHA ANNA LIYA
RYNJAH
Date: 2026.03.26 18:34:16 IST
(H.S. Thangkhiew)
JUDGE
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