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2026:CGHC:1585-DB
NAFR
Digitally
signed by
ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI
Date:
2026.01.12
17:08:25
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 981 of 2025
The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
1 - Girish Sharma S/o Shri P.L. Sharma Aged About 46 Years Working
As Fireman, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, R/o New Sarkanda,
Bangalipara, Gali No. 4, Tah. And Distt. Bilaspur, Civil And Revenue
Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
2 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Urban
Administration And Development, Mahanadi Bhavan, Raipur, District
Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Director Department of Urban Administration And Development,
R.D.A. Bhavan, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant
: Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, Advocate
For Respondent No.1
: Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Advocate
For Respondents No.2
and 3
: Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy Government
Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
12.01.2026
1.
Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, learned counsel for the appellant,
submits that the defects pointed out by the Registry have been
duly cured. Accordingly, the objections raised by the Registry
stand overruled.
2.
Heard Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant on I.A. No.01 of 2025, which is an application for
condonation of delay of 121 days in preferring the writ appeal.
Also heard Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.1 as well as Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, learned Deputy
Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondents No.2
and 3.
3.
Mr. Marhas, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
present appeal has been preferred against the order dated
30.04.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Hon’ble
Court in WPS No. 482 of 2016 (Girish Sharma vs. State of
Chhattisgarh & Ors.). He further submits that though the appeal
has been filed on 14.10.2025, resulting in a delay of 121 days
beyond the prescribed period of limitation, the said delay is
neither deliberate nor intentional.
4.
It is submitted by Mr. Marhas that the order dated 30.04.2025 was
communicated
to
the
office
of
the
appellant/Municipal
Corporation, Bilaspur through its counsel on 06.05.2025.
Thereafter, the concerned officer of the appellant addressed a
communication
dated
25.05.2025
to
the
Director,
Urban
Administration and Development Department, seeking information
regarding availability of a vacant post for the purpose of
regularisation of respondent No.1.
5.
It is further contended by Mr. Marhas that upon receipt of legal
opinion, permission to file the writ appeal was sought by the
Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur on 12.06.2025, which was
granted in the month of September, 2025. Subsequently, the brief
was handed over to another counsel for preparation of the appeal,
who submitted the draft for approval on 08.09.2025, and upon
approval, the present appeal came to be filed without any further
delay.
6.
On the other hand, Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for
respondent No.1, vehemently opposes the appeal and submits
that on an identical issue, this Court has already dismissed a writ
appeal bearing WA No.468/2024 vide judgment dated 29.07.2024.
He, therefore, contends that the present appeal is squarely
covered by the aforesaid decision and deserves to be dismissed
on the same lines.
7.
The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for
condonation of delay.
8.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General
and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3
SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with
the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by way
of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They
cannot claim that they have a separate period of
limitation when the Department was possessed
with competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the Government
or a wing of the Government is a party before
us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted
to advance substantial justice, we are of the view
that
in
the
facts
and
circumstances,
the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal
machinery
and
inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several
notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern
technologies
being
used
and
available. The law of limitation undoubtedly
binds everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government
bodies,
instrumentalities
that
their
unless
agencies
and
they
have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file
was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the
process. The government departments are under
a special obligation to ensure that they perform
their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should
not be used as an anticipated benefit for
government
departments.
The
law
shelters
everyone under the same light and should not be
swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper
explanation offered by the Department for the
delay
except
mentioning
of
various
dates,
according to us, the Department has miserably
failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons
sufficient to condone
Accordingly,
the
such
appeals
a huge
are
liable
delay.
to
be
dismissed on the ground of delay.”
9.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932,
while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed
as follows:“5. The legal position is that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the
petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was
the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the Court within limitation. In Majji
Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online
SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even
though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a
party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. A reference was also made
to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v.
Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was
held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC
81] while rejecting an application for condonation
of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded
in Paragraph 15 as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented
in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the
court within limitation. In case a party is found to
be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or
found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing
any condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by
this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In
case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning
the delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court did not commit any mistake in
dismissing the delay condonation application of
the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously
based on facts and circumstances of each case
and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot
be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC
262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a
member, after referring to various decisions on
the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed
by this Court that delay should not be excused as
a matter of generosity and rendering substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it
very clear that we are not going to look into the
merits of the matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has been made
out for condonation of such a long and inordinate
delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it comes
to condoning the gross delay of more than 12
years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court
long after the lapse of the time prescribed under
the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot
turn around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the parties
started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost
43 years have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of
his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we
condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and
once again ask the respondent to undergo the
rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration while
considering
whether
the
delay
should
be
condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach
of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix
their own period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a party
has lost his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long, it
cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay
and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot
be heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start with
the merits of the main matter. The court owes a
duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the
explanation
offered
by
the
party
seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration.
The rules of limitation are based on the principles
of sound public policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging
over the head of the respondent for indefinite
period of time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to
the conclusion that the High Court committed no
error much less any error of law in passing the
impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court
was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has
been said that delay should not be excused as a
matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice
is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party.
The appellants have failed to prove that they were
reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and
this vital test for condoning the delay is not
satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails
and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order
as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts
of the present case, we are of the opinion that the
High Court correctly refused to condone the delay
and dismissed the appeal by observing that such
inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily,
no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and
no plausible reason was put forth by the State.
Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at
the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the
second
appeal,
due
to
callous
and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery.
Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/applications/appeals
well within the time, due to the fault on the
part of the officials in merely communicating
the information on time, huge revenue loss
will be caused to the Government exchequer.
The present case is one such case, wherein,
enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to the
lapses on the part of the officials functioning
under the State, though valuable Government
lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the
State to streamline the machinery touching
the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing
of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix
the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned,
and
penalize
the
officer(s),
who
is/are
responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if
any, to the value of the loss caused to the
Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that whenever
there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at
the instance of a private litigant or State the delay
is sought to be explained right from the time, the
limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2
years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the
same. For example if the period of limitation is 90
days then the party seeking condonation has to
explain why it was unable to institute the
proceedings within that period of limitation. What
events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of
no consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the party that it
was unable to file it between the 1st day and the
90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait
until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal.
But when it allows the limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal
earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising
before the limitation expired it was not possible to
file
the
appeal
within
time.
No
event
or
circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation
can constitute such sufficient cause. There may
be events or circumstances subsequent to the
expiry of limitation which may further delay the
filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has
been allowed to expire without the appeal being
filed must be traced to a cause arising within the
period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh
and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC
733).”
10.
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra)
and
Ramkumar
Choudhary
(supra),
it
is
evident
that
Government departments are under a special obligation to
discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be
claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all
litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon
a select few.
11.
Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of
Shivamma (dead) by LRS v. Karnataka Housing Board &
Others, 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State
authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a Stateauthority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant.
12.
Upon due consideration of the submissions made by Mr. Ranbir
Singh Marhas, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, this
Court finds that the instant writ appeal against the order dated
30.04.2025 passed in W.P.(S) No. 482/201+ suffers from
inordinate delay of 121 days. While the appellant have attributed
the delay to routine administrative and procedural steps, the
explanation offered is neither sufficient nor convincing. In light of
the consistent legal position laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court
in
Postmaster
General
(supra)
and
Ramkumar
Choudhary (supra), and other subsequent judgments, mere
departmental formalities or bureaucratic processes cannot
constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay.
13.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and in the
absence of any plausible, satisfactory, or bona fide explanation for
the inordinate delay, this Court is not inclined to exercise its
discretionary power to condone such an extraordinary delay.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has failed to place on
record any convincing or bona fide reason justifying the delay.
Consequently, no sufficient cause is made out for condonation of
the delay of 121 days in preferring the present appeal.
14.
Accordingly, the instant writ appeal is dismissed at the threshold
on the ground of delay and laches. There shall be no order as
to costs.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Anu
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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