Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
+
Judgment reserved on: 17.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 24.02.2026
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
TDI INTERNATIONAL INDIA LTD
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Ashish Mohan, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Akshit
Mago
and
Mr.
Auritro
Mukherjee, Advocates.
versus
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Manish Kr. Srivastava and
Mr. Ankit Bhushan, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Petition has been instituted under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, challenging the Arbitral
Award dated 26.02.20102 rendered by the learned Sole Arbitrator in
the matter titled 5M/s TDI International India Ltd. vs. Delhi Metro
Rail Corporation Ltd.=. In addition to assailing the Impugned Award,
A&C Act
Impugned Award
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
the Petitioner has, in the present Petition, also sought multiple reliefs
in respect of various Claims.
2.
It is relevant to note that, during the course of arguments before
this Court, the Petitioner confined its challenge primarily to four
claims, namely, Claim Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6, as decided by the learned
Arbitrator.
BRIEF FACTS:
3.
The Petitioner (Claimant in the Arbitral Proceedings) is a
company engaged in the business of outdoor, indoor and transit
advertising.
4.
The
Respondent
herein
(Respondent
in
the
Arbitral
Proceedings), invited tenders vide Tender document dated 19.01.2004
for Advertising Rights inside stations and circulating areas located
between Kanahiya Nagar - Rithala Section (eight stations), for a
period of five (05) years.
5.
The Petitioner emerged as the highest bidder in the tender, and
a Letter of Acceptance dated 19.02.20043 was issued in its favour.
6.
Thereafter, several correspondences took place, and the
Respondent vide letter dated 01.04.2004 informed the Petitioner that
the latest date of submitting the plans for approval will be 12.04.2004,
and in addition, acceding to the Petitioners’ request, provided four
weeks from the date of approval, i.e., 06.05.2005, for fabrication, etc.
and mentioned that no further extension will be provided.
7.
Pursuant thereto, a formal License Agreement dated
01.06.20044 was executed between the parties, wherein Clause 3 of
LoA
License Agreement
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
the Agreement stipulated that the licence would commence from the
date of signing the agreement and continue for five years from the
date of handing over of possession, while Clause 4 of the License
Agreement specifically dealt with the date of start of the licence with
reference to approval of plans or issuance of take-over notice,
whichever was earlier.
8.
However, vide letter dated 03.06.2004, which was signed by
both the parties, advertising sites were handed over to the Petitioner
while mentioning that the lease out will be activated from 01.06.2004,
and the Respondents were obliged to provide the electricity supply.
9.
Thereafter, between July 2004 and March 2005, several letters
were exchanged between the parties regarding the electricity supply
for the advertising panels to start the commercial exploitation of the
advertising sites.
10.
On 18.03.2005, the electrical layout plans were approved. The
Petitioner was permitted to commence commercial exploitation on
07.04.2005, pursuant whereto the Petitioner commenced operations
and sought recognition of the said date as the licence commencement
date.
11.
During the subsistence of the contract, the Petitioner alleges
that, due to a short circuit that occurred at one of its advertising boards
at Kanhaiya Nagar Station, the Respondent, citing safety concerns,
disconnected the electricity supply to all licensed advertising panels
across stations for the period from 28.02.2007 to 12.05.2007,
rendering the advertising sites non-operational during the said period.
12.
Similarly, inter alia, it is stated that due to a fire incident at the
Netaji Subhash Place Metro Station, there was a disruption in the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
electricity supply, which adversely affected the work being carried out
by the Petitioner.
13.
In the interregnum, pursuant to directions issued by this Court
in W.P. (C) No. 165165/2006, titled as 5Court on Its Motion v. Union
of India6 dated 26.03.2007, the Respondent, vide letter dated
13.04.2007, directed the Petitioner to remove hoardings located on the
main roads of Delhi. In compliance thereof, the Petitioner removed the
said hoardings during the period from 25.04.2007 to 15.08.2007.
14.
In the backdrop of, inter alia, the aforesaid facts, disputes arose
between the parties concerning the scope of the advertising rights
granted under the License Agreement and the permissibility of
displaying advertisements thereunder.
15.
In view of the disputes, the Petitioner sought the initiation of
conciliation proceedings in terms of the License Agreement.
Correspondence ensued regarding the furnishing of a bank guarantee
in connection with the proposed conciliation.
16.
Thereafter, in terms of Clause 44 contained in the License
Agreement, a sole Arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate the disputes
that had arisen between the parties.
17.
The Petitioner filed its Statement of Claims before the learned
Arbitrator. In response thereto, the Respondent submitted its Reply to
the Statement of Claims along with its Counter-Claims. Thereafter,
both parties adduced their respective evidence before the learned
Arbitrator.
18.
It is stated that during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings,
the licence granted under the Agreement was terminated with effect
from 31.05.2009.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
19.
After hearing the parties, the learned Arbitrator rendered the
Impugned Award dated 26.02.2010, adjudicating upon the claims and
counter-claims raised by the parties. Upon consideration of the
pleadings, evidence, and material placed on record, the learned
Arbitrator summarized the findings in respect of the claims and
counter-claims in the Impugned Award, in the following terms:
“AWARD BY ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
The Awards given, after due analysis and determination, in respect
of each Claim and Counter Claim above, are listed together below
along with the respective Claims and Counter-Claims:
Claim 1.
Date of Commencement of License be Reckoned as 08.04.2005
instead of 01.06.2004 Rs. 3.27,46,634/-1:
Respondents, in spite of meeting their contractual obligations of
"Providing" the "Advertising Spaces" for "Carrying Out the
Business of Placement of Advertisements" as provided in Clauses
A), B) &2. read with Cl. 15 only on 07.04.2005, as conveyed vide
their letter dt. 07.04.2005 (Ann. E) wherein it clearly states that
"You may commence your commercial activities immediately",
has been insisting on unfairly charging the license fee from the
date of signing the agreement i.e. 01.06.2004.
Award
(a) M/s TDI's claim in respect of date of commencement of license
is rejected. The date of start of license fee will remain. 01.06.2006
and the.5-year/License Period will be reckoned from 01.06.2004.
(b) However, for the period 01.10.2004 upto 31.01.2005, only.
75% of the License Fee otherwise due maybe charged on account
of the delays in completing the work of electrification of the
advertising panels attributable to the delay in clear-cut directions
being given by DMRC soon after receipt of M/s TDI's letter dt.
21.09.2004.
Claim 2.
Arbitrary Disconnection of Electricity Supply by the Respondents
to the Licensed Advertising Spaces Licensed to the Claimants [Rs.
1.12,35,014/-):
Respondents resorted to arbitrarily disconnecting the electric
supplies in contravention to its contractual obligations as provided
in Clauses 2 & 15 of the agreement to the Claimants' licensed and
installed Advertising Spaces as follows:
(d) At all the Eight Metro Stations (Kanhaiya Nagar to Rithala)
from 28.02.2007 to 12.05.2007;
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
(e) At Rohini (WEST) Metro Station from 20.08.2007 to
19.12.2007;
(f) At Netaji Subash Place (Wazirpur) Metro Station from
03.01.2008 to 18.03.2008
These arbitrary disconnections of electric supplies had resulted in
"Non Provision" of "Advertising Spaces" for "Carrying out the
Business of Placement of Advertisements" and therefore not liable
for levy of License Fee.
Award
DMRC is not considered to have violated any contractual
obligation in these cases, hence Claims 2(a), (b), and (c) are
rejected.
Claim 3.
Removal of Advertisement Panels from all Main Roads of Delli
[Rs. 54,94,421/-):
Respondents by a specifically written communication dated
13.04.2007 suspended the display of advertisements on all the
licensed and installed advertisement spaces facing the main roads
of Delhi in accordance with the directives of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court/High Court for the period 25.04.2007 to 15.08.2007 (113
days). Claimants have been seeking relief in payment of License
fee for this period whereas Respondents have been insisting on
levying it.
Award
In terms of the provisions of the License Agreement, the Claim is
rejected.
Claim 4.
Obstructed Advertising Space [Rs. 34,07,807/-]:
Respondents caused to completely block the visibility of the
Licensed, Approved & Installed Advertising Spaces (Panels) of the
Claimants by permitting various retail kiosks to put up their
establishments at these Eight Metro Stations. This deliberate act
resulted in "Non Provision" of "Advertising Spaces" for "Carrying
out the Business of Placement of Advertisements" in case of 9
advt. spaces (area 360 sq.ft or 33.45 sq.ml) and therefore made
them liable to give relief in License Fee on a proportionate basis.
Award
Considering that the viewability of the nine advertising panels got
partially obstructed, 50% remission in license fee for the affected
33.44 Sq.m area is allowed from 01.12.2007 to 31.05.2009.
Claim 5.
Cost of Extra Contractual Additional Bank Guarantee Obtained by
the Respondents [Rs.5.52,840/-]:
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
Respondents obtained an additional Bank Guarantee of Rs. 2.00
Crores in July 2008 as a precondition to appointment of a "Sole
Conciliator" under Clause 44 of the agreement, and have continued
to hold it till date.
Award
Claim towards the cost of obtaining the Bank Guarantee of Rs. 2
crores is rejected.
Claim 6.
Infringement of Claimants' Licensed Rights due to the
Respondents Resorting to Parallel Advertising [Rs. 10.50.000/-]:
Respondents all along the effective period of agreement resorted to
"Parallel advertising" at all the Eight Metro Stations by allowing
mass scale advertising on Retail Outlets, thereby causing a serious
breach of spirit and purpose of the agreement. This intentional act
by Respondents have grossly disadvantaged the Claimants'
position, and caused huge loss of Business Opportunity to the
Claimants.
Award
Considering the terms and conditions of the License Agreement,
the Claim is rejected.
Claim 7.
Cost of Arbitration proceedings.
Award
Under the provisions of the License Agreement, this Claim is
rejected.
Counter-Claims No. 1,2. and 3.
1. Outstanding License Fee and Service Tax of M/s TDI as on
28.02.2009
5,60,84,559
2. Interest on late payment on account of license fee and service
tax upto 28.02.2009
6,25,92,043
3. Electricity dues (Flat charges + meter rate charges)
3,01,706
Award
The Arbitration Tribunal considers that Counter-Claim nos. 1. and
2, are entirely consequential to and dependent on the Award which
has been given in respect of the Claims I.to 6, and do not constitute
as an independent Counter-Claim, Further, based on the Award
which has been given in respect of Claims 1. to 6., the amounts of
the chargeable license fee and the interest for delayed payment, if
any, are fully determined by the terms and conditions of the
License Agreement itself.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
Counter-Claim no. 3. concerns payment of electricity dues about
which there is no dispute, and hence, this is not a matter for
arbitration and should be dealt with in the normal course.
Counter-Claims No. 4.
Penalty for late payment (@5,000/- for 9 times)
(December 04, 05, 06; 07, 08 & June 05, 06, 07, 08)
Rs. 45,000
Award
This issue is fully determined under Cl. 9 (Lic. Agt.) within the
provisions of the License Agreement itself and is not an issue
under dispute for determination through Arbitration.
Counter-Claims No. 5.
Penalty for violating norms vide letters di. 20.08.07, 27.10.08 &
14.01.08
Rs. 15,000
Award
The issue of imposing such Penalty is fully determined under Cl 9
& Cl. 18 of the Lic. Agt, itself and is not an issue under dispute for
determination through Arbitration.
Counter-Claims No. 6.
Cost of litigation
Rs. 1,50,000
Award
In view of the clear stipulation in the License Agreement, this
Counter-Claim is rejected.
Counter-Claims No. 7.
Miscellaneous expenses etc.
25,000
Award
For lack of any supporting evidence or record or provision in the
License Agreement, this Counter-Claim is rejected.
Counter-Claims No. 8.
Defamation of DMRC due to non-adherence to the standards
that DMRC maintenance
5,00,000
Award
For lack of any supporting evidence or record or provision in the
License Agreement, this Counter-Claim is rejected.
Operation of the AWARD:
The above 'AWARD' by the Arbitration Tribunal will be taken as
operative from the date of the AWARD.
Since the duration of the License Agreement has ended on
31.05.2009, taking due notice of thic AWARD, DMRC shall work
out the net payments which may fall as due on 31.05.2009 In
DMRC or to M/s TDI, as the case may be, review the Invoices
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
already issued and issue revised final Invoices as necessary,
keeping in view the various provisions of the License Agreement,
within one month of the date of the AWARD. The payments thus
worked out as due, along witl interest @12% for the period from
01.06.2009 to the date of the Award, shall be cleared within one
month of the revised final Invoices being issued. If these payments
are not cleared within one month of the revised final Invoices
being issued, then interest @ 15% shall be payable for the extra
time taken beyond this period to clear the payments.
The Award has been passed and signed on the 26th day of February
2010.6
20.
A tabulated account of the Claims preferred by the Petitioner, as
adjudicated by the learned Arbitrator, along with the findings returned
thereon, is set out hereunder:
Claims before the
learned
Arbitrator
1.)
Date
of
commencement of
the license to be
reckoned as 08
April 2005 instead
of 01 June 2004.
2.)
Arbitrary
disconnection
of
the
electricity
supply
by
the
Respondent to the
licensed advertising
Claim
Findings
of
the
learned
Amount (In Arbitrator
Rs.)
3,27,46,634/- (a) M/s TDI's claim in respect of
date of commencement of the
license is rejected. The date of
the start of the license fee will
remain. 01.06.2006 and the.5year/License Period will be
reckoned from 01.06.2004.
(b) However, for the period
01.10.2004 upto 31.01.2005,
only 75% of the License Fee
otherwise due may be charged
on account of the delays in
completing the work of
electrification of the advertising
panels attributable to the delay
in clear-cut directions being
given by DMRC soon after
receipt of M/s TDI's letter dt.
21.09.2004.
1,12,35,014/- DMRC is not considered to have
violated any contractual obligation
in these cases. Hence, Claims 2
(a), (b), and (c) are rejected.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
spaces licensed to
the
Claimant
3.) Remission in 54,94,421/license fee for the
period 25.04.2007
to 15.08.2007 (113
days) due to the
removal of
advertising boards
on all main roads of
Delhi
in
compliance
with
Respondent’s
direction
dated
13.04.2007.
4.)
Obstructed 34,07,807/Advertising Space
5.) Cost of Extra 5,52,840/Contractual
Additional
Bank
Guarantee
Obtained by the
Respondents
6.) Infringement of 10,50,000/Claimants'
Licensed
Rights
due
to
the
Respondents
Resorting
to
Parallel
Advertising.
7.)
Cost
of
Arbitration
proceedings.
21.
In terms of the provisions of the
License Agreement, the Claim is
rejected.
Considering that the viewability of
the nine advertising panels got
partially
obstructed,
50%
remission in license fee for the
affected 33.44 Sq.m. area is
allowed from 01.12.2007 to
31.05.2009
Claim towards the cost of
obtaining, the Bank Guarantee of
Rs. 2 crores is rejected.
Considering the terms and
conditions
of
the
License
Agreement, the Claim is rejected.
Under the provisions or the
License Agreement, this Claim is
rejected.
Aggrieved by the said award, the Petitioner has filed the present
Petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER:
22.
Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner
would submit that the claims awarded in favour of the Respondent
have been allowed without due consideration of the evidence on
record and are contrary to the terms and conditions of the Agreement
executed between the parties.
23.
With respect to Claim No.1, learned senior counsel appearing
for the Petitioner would contend that the learned Arbitrator erred in
holding that the date of commencement of the Licence Agreement was
01.06.2004, i.e., the date of execution of the License Agreement.
24.
It would be submitted by the learned senior counsel that under
Clause 3 of the License Agreement, the licence was to run for a period
of five years from the date of handing over the possession for
commercial exploitation, and that possession of the advertising sites
was not handed over for commercial exploitation until 07.04.2005.
25.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner would
contend that Clause 4 of the License Agreement, which refers to
approval of 5plans6, could not be read in isolation and must be
construed conjointly with Clause 3. Therefore, in the absence of
approval of electrical layout plans and provision of electricity, the
advertising sites could not be commercially exploited.
26.
It would further be contended by learned senior counsel that the
electrical layout plans were only approved by the Respondent via its
letter dated 18.03.2005, and electricity supply was provided thereafter.
Consequently, even if approval of plans was taken as the
determinative factor, the commencement date could not be earlier than
18.03.2005.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
27.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner would
submit that charging a licence fee from 01.06.2004 while permitting
commercial exploitation only from April 2005 results in an anomalous
situation whereby the licence period is effectively reduced.
28.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner would
further submit that any ambiguity between Clauses 3 and 4 ought to
have been resolved against the Respondent as the author of the
contract, in accordance with the principle of contra proferentem and
for the same, he would place reliance upon the judgment of this Court
in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Haryana Telecom Ltd.5.
29.
It would further be submitted by learned senior counsel
appearing for the Petitioner that the learned Arbitrator did not consider
the inconsistency or ambiguity between Clause 3 and Clause 4 of the
License Agreement, as between the parties, and therefore, he would
contend that the learned Arbitrator, while rejecting this claim of the
Petitioner, allowed the Respondent to charge 75% of the license fee
from 06.04.2004, which is arbitrary, unconscionable, contrary to
settled principles of contract law, and suffers from the patent
illegality.
30.
Insofar as Claim No.2 is concerned, learned senior counsel
appearing for the Petitioner would contend that the Respondent
arbitrarily disconnected the electricity supply to all licensed
advertising panels from 28.02.2007 to 12.05.2007, rendering the sites
completely unusable.
31.
It would be submitted that Clause 15 of the License Agreement
did not permit the disconnection of electricity to all sites due to an
2010 SCC OnLine Del 1060
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
alleged issue at one location, particularly when electrical systems at
different stations were independent.
32.
It would also be submitted that Clause 9 of the said agreement
only allows punitive action in the form of a penalty of Rs. 5,000/- in
case of any offence committed by the Petitioner, and via a letter dated
20.08.2007, the said fine of Rs. 5,000/- was also imposed on the
Petitioner by the Respondent.
33.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner would
contend that the learned Arbitrator accepted the Respondent’s
explanation without adequate consideration of the contractual
provisions and evidence on record.
34.
Insofar as Claim No. 3 is concerned, learned senior counsel
appearing for the Petitioner would submit that, pursuant to written
directions dated 13.04.2007 issued by the Respondent citing this
Court’s order dated 26.03.2007 passed in W.P. (C) No. 165165/2006
titled 5Court on Its Motion v. Union of India6, the advertisement
panels facing the main roads were removed by the Petitioner. It
would, therefore, be contended that for the period during which the
licence could not be effectively operated on account of such removal,
the Petitioner was entitled to a proportionate remission of the licence
fee.
35.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner would
submit that Clause 41 of the License Agreement, dealing with force
majeure, was misconstrued, and that principles of quantum meruit and
Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 18726 were applicable.
IC Act
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
36.
It would further be submitted that the learned Arbitrator
completely overlooked the said principles of law and failed to
consider the provisions of the Agreement. Therefore, the learned
senior counsel would contend that the Impugned Award is liable to be
set aside in light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
ONGC v. Saw Pipes Ltd.7.
37.
While assailing Claim No.6, learned senior counsel appearing
for the Petitioner would contend that the License Agreement granted
exclusivity in respect of advertising rights, subject only to limited
exceptions relating to signage of retail outlets.
38.
It would be submitted by learned senior counsel that the
Respondent permitted brand advertisements under the guise of retail
signage, which amounted to infringement of the Petitioner’s licensed
rights.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:
39.
Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent would submit
that the Arbitral Award is well-reasoned and does not merit any
interference.
40.
Learned counsel for the Respondent would contend that the
objections filed under Section 34 of the A&C Act seek re-appreciation
of evidence and re-agitation of facts already adjudicated upon by the
learned Arbitrator.
41.
It would be submitted that the Award is a reasoned Award
based on contractual provisions, pleadings, and evidence, and does not
suffer from patent illegality or conflict with public policy.
(2003) 5 SCC 705
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
42.
For Claim No.1, learned counsel for the Respondent would
contend that the date of commencement of the licence was
unambiguously fixed as 01.06.2004 in terms of the License
Agreement and contemporaneous documents.
43.
It would be submitted that the Letter of Acceptance, office
notes, invoices raised, and correspondence exchanged between the
parties demonstrate that the licence fee was payable from 01.06.2004.
Further, learned counsel for the Respondent would rely on
correspondence wherein the Petitioner acknowledged payment
obligations with reference to June 2004.
44.
It would be contended that the execution of work or installation
of electrical systems was not determinative of the commencement of
the licence period.
45.
Learned counsel for the Respondent would submit that the
learned Arbitrator granted partial relief by allowing only 75% of the
licence fee for a limited period and that such determination was
reasonable.
46.
With respect to Claim No.2, learned counsel for the Respondent
would contend that electricity was disconnected due to safety
concerns and in accordance with the contractual provisions. It would
be submitted that the learned Arbitrator has already examined the
issue and rejected the claim, and the said finding is purely factual.
47.
With respect to Claim No. 3, learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent would submit that the removal of the advertisement
panels was necessitated pursuant to the directions issued by this Court
in W.P. (C) No. 165165/2006 titled 5Court on Its Motion v. Union of
India6. It would be contended that, under the terms of the License
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
Agreement, the licence fee was payable irrespective of the actual
utilisation of the advertising spaces, and therefore, the Respondent
cannot be held liable for any alleged non-utilisation thereof.
48.
For Claim No.6, learned counsel for the Respondent would
contend that Clause 43 of the License Agreement expressly permitted
display of advertisements/ signage in property development and
circulation areas. It would be submitted that no exclusivity was
violated and the learned Arbitrator rightly rejected the claim.
ANALYSIS:
49.
This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties at length and, with their able assistance, has carefully
perused the paperbook and other material documents placed on record,
including the record of the Arbitral Tribunal, as well as the written
submissions filed by the respective parties.
50.
At the outset, it is apposite to note that this Court is conscious
of the limited scope of its jurisdiction while examining an objection
petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The contours of judicial
intervention in such proceedings have been authoritatively delineated
and settled by a consistent and evolving line of precedents of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
51.
In this regard, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, after an exhaustive consideration of a catena of earlier
decisions, in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power
Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd.8, while dealing with the grounds of
conflict with the public policy of India and perversity, grounds which
(2025) 2 SCC 417
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
have also been urged in the present case, made certain pertinent
observations, which are reproduced hereunder:
<Relevant legal principles governing a challenge to an arbitral
award
30. Before we delve into the issue/sub-issues culled out above, it
would be useful to have a look at the relevant legal principles
governing a challenge to an arbitral award. Recourse to a court
against an arbitral award may be made through an application for
setting aside such award in accordance with sub-sections (2), (2-A)
and (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section
34 has two clauses, (a) and (b). Clause (a) has five sub-clauses
which are not relevant to the issues raised before us. Insofar as
clause (b) is concerned, it has two sub-clauses, namely, (i) and (ii).
Sub-clause (i) of clause (b) is not relevant to the controversy in
hand. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) provides that if the Court finds
that the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India,
it may set aside the award.
Public policy
31. 5Public policy6 is a concept not statutorily defined, though it
has been used in statutes, rules, notification, etc. since long, and is
also a part of common law. Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872
uses the expression by stating that the consideration or object of an
agreement is lawful, unless, inter alia, opposed to public policy.
That is, a contract which is opposed to public policy is void.
*****
35. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994
Supp (1) SCC 644, a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed
that the doctrine of public policy is somewhat open4textured and
flexible. By citing earlier decisions, it was observed that there are
two conflicting positions which are referred to as the 5narrow
view6 and the 5broad view6. According to the narrow view, courts
cannot create new heads of public policy whereas the broad view
countenances judicial law making in these areas. In the field of
private international law, it was pointed out, courts refuse to apply
a rule of foreign law or recognise a foreign judgment or a foreign
arbitral award if it is found that the same is contrary to the public
policy of the country in which it is sought to be invoked or
enforced. However, it was clarified, a distinction is to be drawn
while applying the rule of public policy between a matter governed
by domestic law and a matter involving conflict of laws. It was
observed that the application of the doctrine of public policy in the
field of conflict of laws is more limited than that in the domestic
law and the courts are slower to invoke public policy in cases
involving a foreign element than when a purely municipal legal
issue is involved. It was held that contravention of law alone will
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
not attract the bar of public policy, and something more than
contravention of law is required.
*****
37. What is clear from above is that for an award to be against
public policy of India a mere infraction of the municipal laws of
India is not enough. There must be, inter alia, infraction of
fundamental policy of Indian law including a law meant to serve
public interest or public good.
*****
40. In ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9
SCC 263, paras 35, 38 & 39, which also related to the period prior
to the 2015 Amendment of Section 34(2)(b)(ii), a three-Judge
Bench of this Court, after considering the decision inONGC
Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, without exhaustively
enumerating the purport of the expression 5fundamental policy of
Indian law6, observed that it would include all such fundamental
principles as providing a basis for administration of justice and
enforcement of law in this country. The Court thereafter
illustratively referred to three fundamental juristic principles,
namely:
(a) that in every determination that affects the rights of a citizen or
leads to any civil consequences, the court or authority or quasijudicial body must adopt a judicial approach, that is, it must act
bona fide and deal with the subject in a fair, reasonable and
objective manner and not actuated by any extraneous
consideration;
(b) that while determining the rights and obligations of parties the
court or Tribunal or authority must act in accordance with the
principles of natural justice and must apply its mind to the
attendant facts and circumstances while taking a view one way
or the other; and
(c) that its decision must not be perverse or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at the same.
41. InAssociate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, a two-Judge
Bench of this Court, held that audi alteram partem principle is
undoubtedly a fundamental juristic principle in Indian law and is
enshrined in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1996 Act. In
addition to the earlier recognised principles forming fundamental
policy of Indian law, it was held that disregarding:
(a) orders of superior courts in India; and
(b) the binding effect of the judgment of a superior court would
also be regarded as being contrary to the fundamental policy of
Indian law.
Further, elaborating upon the third juristic principle (i.e. qua
perversity), as laid down in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco
International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263, it was observed that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to
the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision
would necessarily be perverse [Associate Builders case,
(2015) 3 SCC 49, para 31].
To this a caveat was added by observing that when a court applies
the 5public policy test6 to an arbitration award, it does not act as a
court of appeal and, consequently, errors of fact cannot be
corrected; and a possible view by the arbitrator on facts has
necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of
the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he
delivers his arbitral award. It was also observed that an award
based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up
in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on
that score. Thus, once it is found that the arbitrator's approach is
not arbitrary or capricious, it is to be taken as the last word on
facts.
The 2015 Amendment in Sections 34 and 48
42. The aforementioned judicial pronouncements were all prior to
the 2015 Amendment. Notably, prior to the 2015 Amendment the
expression 5in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law6 was not used by the legislature in either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or
Section 48(2)(b). The pre-amended Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and its
Explanation read:
*****
44. By the 2015 Amendment, in place of the old Explanation to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Explanations 1 and 2 were added to remove
any doubt as to when an arbitral award is in conflict with the public
policy of India.
45. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that we are dealing
with a case where the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act
was filed after the 2015 Amendment, therefore the newly
substituted/added Explanations would apply [SsangyongEngg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
46. The 2015 Amendment adds two Explanations to each of the
two sections, namely, Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b), in
place of the earlier Explanation. The significance of the newly
inserted Explanation 1 in both the sections is two-fold. First, it does
away with the use of words : (a) 5without prejudice to the
generality of sub-clause (ii)6 in the opening part of the preamended Explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii); and (b) 5without
prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of this section6 in the
opening part of the pre-amended Explanation to Section 48(2)(b);
secondly, it limits the expanse of public policy of India to the three
specified categories by using the words 5only if6.
Whereas, Explanation 2 lays down the standard for adjudging
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
Indian law by providing that a review on merits of the dispute shall
not be done. This limits the scope of the enquiry on an application
under either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996
Act.
47. The 2015 Amendment by inserting sub-section (2-A) in Section
34, carves out an additional ground for annulment of an arbitral
award arising out of arbitrations other than international
commercial arbitrations. Sub-section (2-A) provides that the Court
may also set aside an award if that is vitiated by patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award. This power of the Court is,
however, circumscribed by the proviso, which states that an award
shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous
application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
48.Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii), specifies that an arbitral
award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if:
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or
corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law;
or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice.
49. In the instant case, there is no allegation that the making of the
award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was in
violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Therefore, we shall confine
our exercise in assessing as to whether the arbitral award is in
contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law, and/or
whether it conflicts with the most basic notions of morality or
justice. Additionally, in the light of the provisions of sub-section
(2-A) of Section 34, we shall examine whether there is any patent
illegality on the face of the award.
50. Before undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be apposite
to consider as to how the expressions:
(a) 5in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law6;
(b) 5in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice6;
and
(c) 5patent illegality6 have been construed.
In contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law
51. As discussed above, till the 2015 Amendment the expression
5in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law6 was
not found in the 1996 Act. Yet, in Renusagar Power Co.
Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, in the
context of enforcement of a foreign award, while construing the
phrase 5contrary to the public policy6, this Court held that for a
foreign award to be contrary to public policy mere contravention of
law would not be enough rather it should be contrary to:
(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; and/or
(b) the interest of India; and/or
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
(c) justice or morality.
*****
55. The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid discussion
is that after 5the 2015 Amendments6 in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and
Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase 5in conflict with the
public policy of India6 must be accorded a restricted meaning in
terms of Explanation 1. The expression 5in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law6 by use of the word
5fundamental6 before the phrase 5policy of Indian law6 makes the
expression narrower in its application than the phrase 5in
contravention with the policy of Indian law6, which means mere
contravention of law is not enough to make an award vulnerable.
To bring the contravention within the fold of fundamental policy of
Indian law, the award must contravene all or any of such
fundamental principles that provide a basis for administration of
justice and enforcement of law in this country.
56. Without intending to exhaustively enumerate instances of such
contravention, by way of illustration, it could be said that:
(a) violation of the principles of natural justice;
(b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or the binding
effect of the judgment of a superior court; and
(c) violating law of India linked to public good or public interest,
are considered contravention of the fundamental policy of
Indian law.
However, while assessing whether there has been a contravention
of the fundamental policy of Indian law, the extent of judicial
scrutiny must not exceed the limit as set out in Explanation 2 to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii).
*****
Patent illegality
65. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, which was
inserted by the 2015 Amendment, provides that an arbitral award
not arising out of international commercial arbitrations, may also
be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is visited
by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. The proviso
to sub-section (2-A) states that an award shall not be set aside
merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by
reappreciation of evidence.
66. In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, while
dealing with the phrase 5public policy of India6 as used in Section
34, this Court took the view that the concept of public policy
connotes some matter which concerns public good and public
interest. If the award, on the face of it, patently violates statutory
provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest. Thus, an award
could also be set aside if it is patently illegal. It was, however,
clarified that illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
illegality is of trivial nature, it cannot be held that award is against
public policy.
67. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, this Court
held that an award would be patently illegal, if it is contrary to:
(a) substantive provisions of law of India;
(b) provisions of the 1996 Act; and
(c) terms of the contract [See also three-Judge Bench decision of
this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. SAL Udyog (P) Ltd.,
(2022) 2 SCC 275].
The Court clarified that if an award is contrary to the substantive
provisions of law of India, in effect, it is in contravention of
Section 28(1)(a) of the 1996 Act. Similarly, violating terms of the
contract, in effect, is in contravention of Section 28(3) of the 1996
Act.
68. In SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131 this Court specifically dealt with the 2015
Amendment which inserted sub-section (2-A) in Section 34 of the
1996 Act. It was held that 5patent illegality appearing on the face
of the award6 refers to such illegality as goes to the root of matter,
but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of law. It
was also clarified that what is not subsumed within 5the
fundamental policy of Indian law6, namely, the contravention of a
statute not linked to 5public policy6 or 5public interest6, cannot be
brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award
on the ground of patent illegality [See SsangyongEngg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131]. Further, it
was observed, reappreciation of evidence is not permissible under
this
category of
challenge
to
an
arbitral
award
[See SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131].
Perversity as a ground of challenge
69. Perversity as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award was
recognised inONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd.,
(2014) 9 SCC 263. Therein it was observed that an arbitral
decision must not be perverse or so irrational that no reasonable
person would have arrived at the same. It was observed that if an
award is perverse, it would be against the public policy of India.
70. InAssociate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 certain tests
were laid down to determine whether a decision of an Arbitral
Tribunal could be considered perverse. In this context, it was
observed that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to
the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision
would necessarily be perverse.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
However, by way of a note of caution, it was observed that when a
court applies these tests it does not act as a court of appeal and,
consequently, errors of fact cannot be corrected. Though, a possible
view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the
arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of
evidence to be relied upon. It was also observed that an award
based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up
in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on
that score.
71. In SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131, which dealt with the legal position post the 2015
Amendment in Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it was observed that a
decision which is perverse, while no longer being a ground for
challenge under 5public policy of India6, would certainly amount
to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. It was
pointed out that an award based on no evidence, or which ignores
vital evidence, would be perverse and thus patently illegal. It was
also observed that a finding based on documents taken behind the
back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision
based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on
evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be
characterised as perverse [See SsangyongEngg. & Construction
Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
72. The tests laid down inAssociate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3
SCC 49 to determine perversity were followed in SsangyongEngg.
& Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 and later
approved by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Patel Engg.
Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC
167.
73. In a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this Court inDMRC
Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., (2024) 6 SCC 357,
the ground of patent illegality/perversity was delineated in the
following terms: (SCC p. 376, para 39)
539. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available
for setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the
arbitrator is found to be perverse, or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at it; or the
construction of the contract is such that no fair or
reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the
arbitrator is not even a possible view. A finding based on
no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital
evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liable to be set aside under the head of 5patent illegality6.
An award without reasons would suffer from patent
illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by
deciding a matter not within its jurisdiction or violating a
fundamental principle of natural justice.6
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
Scope of interference with an arbitral award
74. The aforesaid judicial precedents make it clear that while
exercising power under Section 34 of the 1996 Act the Court does
not sit in appeal over the arbitral award. Interference with an
arbitral award is only on limited grounds as set out in Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts is to be
respected as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon. It is only when an arbitral
award could be categorised as perverse, that on an error of fact an
arbitral award may be set aside. Further, a mere erroneous
application of the law or wrong appreciation of evidence by itself is
not a ground to set aside an award as is clear from the provisions of
sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
75. In Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.,
(2019) 20 SCC 1, paras 27-43, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
held that courts need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards
are not to be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless
the court concludes that the perversity of the award goes to the root
of the matter and there is no possibility of an alternative
interpretation that may sustain the arbitral award. It was observed
that jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot be equated with the
normal appellate jurisdiction. Rather, the approach ought to be to
respect the finality of the arbitral award as well as party's autonomy
to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided
under the law.
*****
Scope of interference with the interpretation/construction of a
contract accorded in an arbitral award
84. An Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms
of the contract. In a case where an Arbitral Tribunal passes an
award against the terms of the contract, the award would be
patently illegal. However, an Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction to
interpret a contract having regard to terms and conditions of the
contract, conduct of the parties including correspondences
exchanged, circumstances of the case and pleadings of the parties.
If the conclusion of the arbitrator is based on a possible view of the
matter, the Court should not intefere [See: SAIL v. Gupta Brother
Steel Tubes Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 63; Pure Helium India (P)
Ltd. v. ONGC, (2003) 8 SCC 593; McDermott International
Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181; MMTC
Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163]. But where, on a full
reading of the contract, the view of the Arbitral Tribunal on the
terms of a contract is not a possible view, the award would be
considered perverse and as such amenable to interference [South
East Asia Marine Engg. & Constructions Ltd. v. Oil India Ltd.,
(2020) 5 SCC 164].
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
Whether unexpressed term can be read into a contract as an
implied condition
85. Ordinarily, terms of the contract are to be understood in the
way the parties wanted and intended them to be. In agreements of
arbitration, where party autonomy is the grund norm, how the
parties worked out the agreement, is one of the indicators to
decipher the intention, apart from the plain or grammatical
meaning of the expressions used [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2016) 4 SCC 126].
86. However, reading an unexpressed term in an agreement would
be justified on the basis that such a term was always and obviously
intended by the parties thereto. An unexpressed term can be
implied if, and only if, the court finds that the parties must have
intended that term to form part of their contract. It is not enough for
the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by the
parties as reasonable men if it had been suggested to them. Rather,
it must have been a term that went without saying, a term necessary
to give business efficacy to the contract, a term which, although
tacit, forms part of the contract [Adani Power (Mundra)
Ltd. v. Gujarat ERC, (2019) 19 SCC 9].
87. But before an implied condition, not expressly found in the
contract, is read into a contract, by invoking the business efficacy
doctrine, it must satisfy the following five conditions:
(a) it must be reasonable and equitable;
(b) it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract,
that is, a term will not be implied if the contract is effective
without it;
(c) it must be obvious that 5it goes without saying6;
(d) it must be capable of clear expression;
(e) it must not contradict any terms of the contract [Nabha Power
Ltd. v. Punjab SPCL, (2018) 11 SCC 508, followed in Adani
Power case, (2019) 19 SCC 9].
(emphasis supplied)
52.
A careful and comprehensive perusal of the Impugned Award
demonstrates that the learned Arbitrator has examined the pleadings,
documentary material, correspondence exchanged between the parties,
and the evidence led in support of their respective claims and counterclaims. The Impugned Award reflects due consideration of the
relevant facts and surrounding circumstances germane to the disputes.
Upon such evaluation, the learned Arbitrator arrived at the
conclusions summarized in the preceding paragraphs. To the limited
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
extent that the findings have been assailed before this Court, the same
are examined hereinafter.
Claim 1
53.
The principal challenge under Claim No. 1 pertains to the
determination of the date of commencement of the licence and the
corresponding liability of the Petitioner to pay the licence fee. The
learned Arbitrator, upon an examination of the contractual terms and
the contemporaneous correspondence exchanged between the parties,
concluded that the licence fee was contractually payable with effect
from 01.06.2004 and that the five-year licence period was liable to be
reckoned from the said date. At the same time, having found that a
part of the delay in electrification was attributable to the Respondent,
the learned Arbitrator granted partial and equitable relief to the
Petitioner by directing that only 75% of the licence fee would be
payable for the period from 01.10.2004 to 31.01.2005.
54.
A careful reading of the Award in respect of Claim No. 1
reveals that the learned Arbitrator recorded a categorical finding that
the plans submitted by the Petitioner stood approved by the
Respondent vide letter dated 06.05.2004. In view of such approval,
and in the absence of any contractual stipulation postponing the
commencement date, the learned Arbitrator held that the date of
commencement of the licence would remain 01.06.2004. This finding
is based on documentary material forming part of the record.
55.
It is now well settled that the interpretation of contractual terms
squarely falls within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal. Where the
learned Arbitrator adopts a plausible and reasonable interpretation of
the contract, the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
of the A&C Act, cannot interfere merely because another view is
possible or even preferable. The supervisory jurisdiction under
Section 34 of the A&C Act does not permit re-appreciation of
evidence or substitution of the Court’s interpretation for that adopted
by the learned Arbitrator.
56.
Further, the Petitioner’s reliance upon the doctrine of contra
proferentem is equally unavailing. The Impugned Award in respect of
Claim No. 1 is not founded upon any unresolved ambiguity in the
contractual terms but upon contemporaneous correspondence between
the parties. The Respondent, vide letter dated 06.05.2004, approved
the plans submitted by the Petitioner and granted an additional period
of four weeks from that date for activation of the Licence Agreement
at the Petitioner’s request. Subsequently, vide letter dated 03.06.2004,
it was expressly recorded that the lease stood activated with effect
from 01.06.2004. Significantly, these foundational facts were not
controverted by the Petitioner and, therefore, stand admitted. For
ready reference, the relevant portion of the letter dated 03.06.2004 is
reproduced hereunder:
“3rd June 2004
Sub: Handing over and taking over of Advertising sites inside
stations and their traffic integration areas (Khanya Nagar 3 Rithala
Section of MRTS Phase3I)
M/s. TDI International India Ltd., a company incorporated under
the Companies Act 1956 and having its Registered office at B-4/62,
Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 3 110 029 have been allotted the
license for advertising rights inside all stations and their traffic
integration areas in the Khanya Nagar 3 Rithala section of MRTS
phase-I, after approval of the competent authority.
The authorized representative of TDI International India Ltd., Shri
Vijay Bajaj, whose signature is attested below, will take over
possession of the sites. They may be given access to the sites after
due verification of his/their credentials and as per procedures
followed by O&M for the purpose of installation, maintenance,
placement of advertisements panels and advertisements after
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
approval by GM (O&M)’s office. A copy of the agreement is also
enclosed for your reference.
The lease out is activated from the 1st of June 2004. One set of
plans have been approved by the undersigned (copy enclosed).
They shall in future be submitting their plans for placement of
advertisement panels etc., for which they shall seek approval from
GM (O&M)’s office.
They are to be provided electric power supply as required, subject
to availability and technical feasibility after taking refundable
electricity consumption deposit @ Rs.1500 per Kva.
Please notify this office after handover, along with details.
Sd/Chief Urban Planner
Shri Vijay Bajaj
Director, M/s. TDI International India Ltd.
Attested6
57.
In these circumstances, the doctrine of contra proferentem
cannot be invoked to displace a reasoned contractual interpretation
arrived at by the learned Arbitrator on the basis of admitted
correspondence. Once the learned Arbitrator has undertaken the
interpretative exercise and arrived at a plausible and contractually
sustainable conclusion, it is not open to this Court to substitute its own
construction. The conclusion that the licence commenced from
01.06.2004 is both plausible and supported by the material on record.
58.
The Impugned Award, in the present case, neither rewrites the
contract nor disregards its essential stipulations. On the contrary, the
learned Arbitrator has harmonised the contractual terms with the
factual matrix and granted limited equitable relief in respect of
delayed
electrification
attributable
to
the
Respondent.
The
determination of the commencement date, coupled with partial
remission of the licence fee, represents a commercially reasonable and
legally permissible outcome, well within the jurisdiction of the
Arbitral Tribunal.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
59.
The reliance placed by the Petitioner on ONGC v. Saw Pipes
Ltd. (supra) is misplaced. The reasoning of the learned Arbitrator
under Claim No. 1 cannot be characterised as perverse, patently
illegal, or contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law. As
reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Associate Builders v.
DDA9, interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act is warranted
only where the illegality goes to the root of the matter or the decisionmaking process is so irrational that no reasonable person would have
arrived at such a conclusion. Re-appreciation of evidence or
substitution of the Court’s view is impermissible. The finding of the
learned Arbitrator on the commencement of the licence does not suffer
from patent illegality and, therefore, warrants no interference.
Claim 2
60.
Under Claim No. 2, the grievance of the Petitioner arises from
the disconnection of the electricity supply to the licensed advertising
sites for the period from 28.02.2007 to 13.05.2007, purportedly on
account of a short circuit incident at one location. The Petitioner has
contended that such disconnection adversely affected its ability to
operate the licensed sites and seeks relief on that basis.
61.
The learned Arbitrator, while adjudicating this claim, examined
the relevant provisions of the Licence Agreement, particularly Clause
Nos. 10 and 15. Upon appreciation of the material placed on record,
the learned Arbitrator recorded a finding that the disconnection was
occasioned by a safety concern arising from a short circuit and that
electricity had, in fact, been disconnected only at Kanhaiya Nagar
Station.
(2015) 3 SCC 49
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
62.
This finding was supported by the circumstance that the
Petitioner continued to pay electricity charges in respect of the other
stations during the relevant period, thereby indicating that supply at
those locations had not been interrupted. The learned Arbitrator
further noted that the requisite assurance report, in conformity with
the Respondent’s specifications and safety requirements, was
submitted by the Petitioner only on 10.05.2007, and electricity supply
was restored shortly thereafter on 13.05.2007. Accepting the
Respondent’s justification founded on public safety considerations
and contractual compliance, the learned Arbitrator rejected the
Petitioner’s claim.
63.
As authoritatively elucidated in Associate Builders (supra) and
OPG Power Generation (supra), the scope of interference under
Section 34 of the A&C Act on the ground of patent illegality does not
extend to mere errors in the appreciation of evidence or to an
alternative interpretation of contractual clauses. Interference is
warranted only where the award is in contravention of an express
contractual provision, is perverse, or effectively rewrites the contract
between the parties.
64.
In the present case, in the considered opinion of this Court, the
learned
Arbitrator
has
adopted
a
plausible
and
reasonable
interpretation of the contractual framework, read in conjunction with
the factual matrix and safety considerations. Such an approach
squarely falls within the arbitral domain and does not invite
interference.
65.
The contention advanced by the Petitioner that, in the absence
of an express contractual clause specifically authorising disconnection
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
of electricity, the Impugned Award is rendered patently illegal is
wholly untenable. The ground of patent illegality under Section 34 of
the A&C Act does not extend to every alleged omission, arguable
interpretation, or debatable construction of contractual provisions. It is
well settled that patent illegality must go to the root of the matter and
cannot be invoked to challenge a plausible interpretation adopted by
the arbitral tribunal.
66.
Even assuming that the Agreement does not expressly stipulate
the precise contingencies in which electricity supply may be
disconnected, the determinative question is whether the view adopted
by the learned Arbitrator is a possible and reasonable one based on the
material on record.
67.
So long as the interpretation falls within the bounds of
reasonableness and does not rewrite or disregard the contract, this
Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C Act,
cannot substitute its own interpretation in place of that of the
Arbitrator. In the present case, the learned Arbitrator has consciously
taken into account considerations of public safety, the occurrence of a
short circuit, and the necessity of compliance with requisite technical
assurances prior to restoration of supply. The conclusion arrived at is
founded upon a rational evaluation of the contractual framework and
factual circumstances. The decision cannot be characterised as
arbitrary, perverse, or contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian
law, and therefore does not warrant interference by this Court.
Claim 3
68.
Claim No. 3 arises from the removal of advertisement panels
pursuant to the Respondent’s letter dated 13.04.2007, whereby the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
Petitioner was restrained from utilising approximately 1,000 sq. ft. of
licensed advertising space for the period from 24.04.2007 to
15.08.2007. The learned Arbitrator rejected the said claim primarily
by placing reliance upon Clause 41 of the Licence Agreement, which
deals with force majeure. The said Clause 41 provides as follows:
“41. Force Majeure:
Neither DMRC nor the LICENSEE shall be liable for any inability
to fulfill their commitments and obligations hereunder occasioned
in whole or in part by Force Majeure, fire, war, or any other cause
beyond their reasonable control. Such Force Majeure occurrence
shall be notified to the other party within 15 days of such
occurrence. If such Force Majeure continues for a period of three
months, the other party may be entitled to, through not being
obliged to terminate this agreement.6
69.
A plain and meaningful reading of Clause 41 unequivocally
indicates that the parties consciously agreed that performance of their
respective contractual obligations would stand excused, in whole or in
part, upon the occurrence of a force majeure event or any
circumstance beyond their reasonable control. The clause embodies a
clear allocation of risk and recognises that, in specified contingencies,
strict performance may neither be feasible nor enforceable.
70.
However, the Impugned Award does not sufficiently analyse
the legal consequences that flow from the invocation of such a clause,
particularly in relation to the continuing obligation to pay the licence
fee during a period when the licensed area was admittedly rendered
unusable. Where reciprocal obligations under a contract are
interdependent, and performance on one side becomes impossible or
commercially impracticable due to supervening events beyond the
control of the parties, the corresponding obligation to pay
consideration cannot be enforced in a purely mechanical or isolated
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
manner. The principle of reciprocity inherent in contractual
arrangements requires that the rights and obligations of the parties be
construed harmoniously and contextually.
71.
In this regard, the Impugned Award does not meaningfully
engage with the foundational principles embodied in Section 56 of the
IC Act, which addresses frustration or impossibility of performance
arising from supervening events. Nor does it advert to the doctrine of
restitution enshrined in Section 65 of the IC Act, which mandates
restoration of advantage received under a contract that becomes void
or unenforceable, thereby preventing unjust enrichment. The absence
of any discussion on these aspects results in an incomplete legal
analysis of the consequences of a force majeure event on the
obligation to pay licence fee.
72.
Furthermore, as per Clause 41 of the Licence Agreement, the
contractual scheme appears to contemplate suspension, adjustment, or
recalibration of obligations in circumstances beyond the parties’
control. By nevertheless holding that the licence fee remained fully
payable despite the admitted non-usability of the licensed sites for the
relevant period, the learned Arbitrator failed to adequately reconcile
the suspension of the Petitioner’s right to commercially exploit the
licensed premises with the Respondent’s insistence on continued
payment.
73.
The Impugned Award does not disclose a clear, cogent, or
reasoned basis explaining how the obligation to pay licence fee could
survive in its entirety, notwithstanding the suspension of the very right
for which such fee constituted consideration.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
74.
Such an approach, in the considered view of this Court, departs
from settled principles of contractual interpretation and substantive
law. An Arbitral Award that overlooks material contractual provisions
or fails to furnish intelligible reasoning supporting its conclusions may
fall within the limited but recognised ground of patent illegality. As
clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Associate Builders (supra)
and OPG Power Generation (supra), judicial interference is
warranted where the reasoning is so deficient, inconsistent, or legally
untenable that the conclusion becomes unsustainable.
75.
In light of the foregoing, the finding of the learned Arbitrator in
respect of Claim No. 3 cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside
to that limited extent.
Claim 6
76.
Claim No. 6 pertains to the allegation of infringement of the
Petitioner’s licensed advertising rights on account of what has been
described as 5parallel advertising6, allegedly permitted by the
Respondent during the subsistence of the Licence Agreement. The
Petitioner has contended that such permission diluted the commercial
value of its licence and amounted to a breach of the contractual
arrangement.
77.
The learned Arbitrator has examined this claim in the context of
the contractual framework governing the parties and the documentary
material placed on record. The Impugned Award demonstrates that the
learned Tribunal undertook a detailed scrutiny of the relevant
provisions of the Licence Agreement, including Clause Nos. 3, 11, 33,
38 and, in particular, Clause 43.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
78.
Clause 43 expressly reserves to the Respondent the right to
permit signage and advertisements of retail outlets and toilet blocks
within the property development and circulating areas of the metro
stations. The Impugned Award reflects that these provisions were read
harmoniously in order to ascertain the true scope and extent of the
advertising rights granted to the Petitioner.
79.
Upon such examination, the learned Arbitrator returned a
categorical finding that the Licence Agreement did not confer any
exclusive advertising rights upon the Petitioner. It was specifically
observed that the Agreement did not contain any clause prohibiting
the Respondent from allowing advertisements of the nature
complained of, nor did it vest exclusivity in favour of the Petitioner in
respect of all advertising spaces within the station premises. The
learned Arbitrator further noted that, despite being afforded the
opportunity, the Petitioner was unable to identify any express
contractual stipulation that barred the Respondent from permitting
such advertisements.
80.
The Impugned Award also records that although the Petitioner
relied upon extensive correspondence asserting commercial prejudice
and loss of business, it failed to substantiate its claim by
demonstrating the precise or quantifiable impact of the alleged parallel
advertising on its licensed operations. No cogent evidence was placed
on record to establish actual financial loss or diminution in revenue
attributable to the Respondent’s actions. The learned Arbitrator treated
this absence of concrete and measurable evidence as a significant
factor in rejecting the claim.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
81.
In view of the detailed consideration of the contractual
provisions, the evaluation of the material on record, and the plausible
and cogent reasoning recorded by the learned Arbitrator, this Court
finds no ground for interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act. As
consistently held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, a court exercising
limited supervisory jurisdiction cannot re-appreciate evidence or
substitute its own interpretation of contractual clauses where the
arbitral view is a possible and reasonable one. The findings rendered
in respect of Claim No. 6 do not suffer from patent illegality,
perversity, or contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law
and, therefore, warrant no interference.
CONCLUSION:
82.
Viewed in its entirety, the Impugned Award reflects a reasoned
and structured adjudication of the disputes by the learned Arbitrator
within the confines of the contractual terms agreed upon by the
parties, the material placed on record, and the jurisdiction vested in
the Arbitral Tribunal. The Award demonstrates due application of
mind to the pleadings, evidence, and relevant contractual provisions.
83.
This Court is of the considered view that, in respect of Claim
Nos. 1, 2 and 6, the learned Arbitrator has adopted a plausible and
legally sustainable interpretation of the Licence Agreement, duly
appreciated the evidence and correspondence on record, and furnished
intelligible and cogent reasons in support of the conclusions arrived at.
In relation to these claims, no perversity, patent illegality,
contravention of the contract, or violation of public policy has been
established so as to warrant interference under Section 34 of the A&C
Act.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
84.
However, insofar as Claim No. 3 is concerned, this Court finds
that the Arbitral Award does not adequately address the legal
consequences arising from the admitted non-usability of the licensed
advertising sites pursuant to binding court directions. While invoking
Clause 41 of the Licence Agreement relating to force majeure, the
learned Arbitrator has not sufficiently examined the effect of such
supervening circumstances on the reciprocal obligation to pay licence
fees. Nor has due consideration been accorded to the principles
embodied in Sections 56 and 65 of the IC Act. The reasoning in
respect of Claim No. 3, therefore, discloses a flaw in the decision and
attracts interference on the limited ground of patent illegality, as
explained in the precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to
hereinabove.
85.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Impugned Award dated
26.02.2010 is upheld insofar as it pertains to Claim Nos. 1, 2 and 6.
However, the Award is set aside to the limited extent relating to Claim
No. 3.
86.
The present Petition, along with pending application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the above terms.
87.
No Order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 24, 2026/sm/jk
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 184/2017
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review