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2016:SHC:110
THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Extraordinary Jurisdiction)
DATED : 25th JULY, 2016
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------S.B. : HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WP(C) No.65 of 2015
Petitioner
:
Tashi Chopel Bhutia,
S/o Shri Tshering Bhutia,
R/o Lamaten Busty,
East Sikkim.
versus
Respondents
:
1.
The State of Sikkim
through the Director General of Police,
Police Headquarters,
Gangtok.
2.
The DIG (Range)
Appellate Authority,
Police Headquarters,
Gangtok.
3.
The Superintendent of Police,
East District,
Gangtok.
4.
Shri Manoj Tiwari, IPS
Police Headquarters,
Gangtok.
5.
Mrs. Linda Palmo, SPS
Enquiry Officer
(the then SDPO, Rangpo),
Police Headquarters,
Gangtok.
6.
Shri S. R. Shengha, SPS
the then SHO, Sadar Police Station,
Police Headquarters,
Gangtok.
2016:SHC:110
WP(C) No.65 of 2015
Tashi Chopel Bhutia
vs.
The State of Sikkim and Others
Petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Jorgay Namka, Advocate with Mr. Tempo Gyatso Bhutia and
Ms. Panila Theengh, Advocates for the Petitioner.
Petitioner in person.
Mr. J. B. Pradhan, Additional Advocate General, Mr. Karma
Thinlay Namgyal, Senior Government Advocate with Mr. S. K.
Chettri and Mrs. Pollin Rai, Assistant Government Advocates for
State-Respondents No.1 to 3.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
Aggrieved by the impugned Memoranda bearing No.
849/SP/E dated 10-09-2013 and No.1045/SP/E dated 08-11-2013 and
impugned Office Orders (hereinafter “O.O.”) No.1175/SP/EAST
dated 16-12-2013 and No.155/POL/RANGE/2014/235, dated 26-052014 and Findings of the Respondent No.5 in her Enquiry Report
dated NIL, the Petitioner by filing the instant Writ Petition, prays for
quashing of all of the above and for issuance of writ/order or
direction to quash all subsequent amendments to the Sikkim Police
Force (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1989 (for short “the Rules”), to
initiate a Judicial Enquiry against the Respondents No.4 and 6, and
other reliefs.
2.
The Petitioner was selected and appointed on merit to
the post of Sub-Inspector in the Sikkim Police, vide O.O. dated 06-072004 issued by the Respondent No.1 and posted in various Police
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Tashi Chopel Bhutia
Stations in Sikkim.
vs.
The State of Sikkim and Others
During such postings on account of his
commendable work, he was rewarded with Cash and Appreciation
Letters. While the Petitioner was posted at Namchi, South Sikkim, the
Respondent No.4 was posted as the Superintendent of Police (SP),
South District, Shri Mordent Thapa as the SDPO South, Respondent
No.6 as Station House Officer, Jorethang Police Station, South Sikkim.
Due to acrimony with the Respondent No.4 during the course of
official works, the Petitioner sought for and was granted a transfer to
Gangtok, East Sikkim, shortly thereafter Respondent No.4 was also
transferred and posted as S.P. East, Mordent Thapa was transferred
and posted as SDPO, East and the Respondent No.6 as the SHO,
Sadar Police Station, the Respondent No.5 was the SDPO, Rangpo.
Thus, the Respondents No.5, 6 and SDPO Mordent Thapa were
working directly under the Respondent No.4 in the East District at the
relevant time.
Memoranda
The case of the Petitioner arises on account of
bearing
Memo
No.849/SP/E
dated
10-09-2013
(Annexure P7) and Ref. No.1045/SP/E dated 08-11-2013 (Annexure
P28) served against him by Respondent No.4, the First Memo based
on a Complaint of one Shunu Thendup Bhutia, and the second on two
e-mails received from one Indra Kumar Yonzon.
Vide Memo
No.846/SP/E dated 10-09-2013 (Annexure R1) the Petitioner was
placed under suspension with immediate effect until further orders.
The Articles of Charge mentioned in both the Memoranda
respectively are reproduced hereinbelow;
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Tashi Chopel Bhutia
vs.
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Memo No.849/SP/E dated 10-09-2013
Article – I
SI Tashi Chopel Bhutia was not on bonafide
duty on 30/08/13 as there is no relevant record in
general diary of Sadar P.S. relating to his departure to
Star Hotel, Gangtok.
Article – II
SI Tashi Chopel Bhutia have not brought any
information related to the matter involving Shri Shunu
Thendup Bhutia to the notice of SHO/Sadar P.S. and
the Superior Officers.
Article – III
SI Tashi Chopel Bhutia has made no record in
general diary of Sadar P.S. about any matter relating to
Shri Shunu Thendup Bhutia reportedly occurred on
30/08/2013.
Ref. No.1045/SP/E dated 08-11-2013
Article –I
Vide Memo no. 846/SP/E, DATED 10/09/2013
SI Tashi Chopel Bhutia is presently under suspension
and was not on bonafide duty on 16/09/13, his act
amounts to gross violation of established norms and
rules.
Article – II
For wilfully absenting himself to report to the
office of Superintendent of Police, East District,
Gangtok, East Sikkim against O.O no.846/SP/E, dated
10/09/2013 and rule 56.19(1) of the Sikkim Police
Manual.
Article – III
The Delinquent Officer had other two (2)
Departmental Enquiries undergone in the past while
he was posted at Namchi P.S., South Sikkim. Such
repeated
misdemeanour
projects
conduct
of
unbecoming of a police officer.
Article – IV
A Bailable Warrant of Arrest originated from the
Ld Sessions Judge, South & West, Namchi vide
Despatch
No.26/C/S,
dated
31/10/13
was
acknowledged, wherein the Hon’ble court has directed
for the same in connection with SC case No.11/2013,
State v/s Ujwal Gurung, when the delinquent Officer
refused to receive the summon of the said case dated
07/10/2013.
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3.
vs.
The State of Sikkim and Others
On 10-09-2013, besides issuing the Memo No.849/SP/E,
the Respondent No.4 also appointed Respondent No.5 as the
Inquiring Authority (E.O.) vide O.O. No.982/SP/E, dated 10-09-2013
and Tshering Yangzom Bhutia, Court Inspector East as the Presenting
Officer (P.O.), to present the case of the Disciplinary Authority. On
16-09-2013, the Respondent No.4, again vide O.O. bearing Memo
No.869/SP/E (Annexure P9), with the prior approval of the
IGP/L&O, constituted a three Member Committee comprising of (i)
ASP/East Shri Dhiren Lama (ii) Dy.SP/Traffic Smt. Ongmu Bhutia
(iii) SDPO/Gangtok Shri Mordent Thapa, for conducting a discreet
Enquiry on the aforementioned Complaint of Shunu Thendup Bhutia
with a direction to report back to him on or before 19-09-2013. All
Members of the Committee were allegedly working directly under
the Respondent No.4 at the relevant time, who for his part is said to
be prejudiced against the Petitioner.
4.
That, on 16-09-2013 the E.O. directed the Petitioner vide
Police Radiogram (Annexure P10), to submit his Written Statement by
20-09-2013 in connection with the Memo No.849/SP/E but without
furnishing relevant documents to him, to enable him to file his
Written Statement.
The Petitioner without the benefit of the
documents listed and the statements of witnesses filed his reply on
20-09-2013, vehemently denying the contents of Annexure I of the
Memorandum dated 10-09-2013. That, on 21-09-2013 Shunu Thendup
Bhutia had written to the Respondent No.5 with a copy to
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Respondents No.4 and 6 stating that the Complaint against the
Petitioner was due to a misunderstanding, which was not considered
and the Departmental Enquiry continued. That, the Respondent No.4
to further harass the Petitioner issued Show Cause Notice being
Memo No.992/SP/E dated 25-10-2013 (Annexure P23) requiring the
Petitioner, to explain why disciplinary action should not be initiated
against him, alleging, inter alia, that during the suspension period of
the Petitioner he had remained absent from 04-10-2013 till 25-10-2013,
without permission resulting in the pendency of Departmental
Proceedings, when in fact the Petitioner had signed on the
Attendance Register when provided to him.
5.
Subsequently, the Respondent No.3 is alleged to have
received two e-mails from one Indra Kumar Yonzon, dated 02-102013 and 04-10-2013, based on which Mordent Thapa, SDPO wrote a
letter to Respondent No.3, surprisingly in the letterhead of
Respondent No.3, bearing Memo No.968/SP/E dated 11-10-2013
(Annexure P27), indicating that since the e-mails bore a similarity to
the earlier Complaint against the Petitioner, the communication be
forwarded to the Respondent No.5, which was duly complied with by
the Respondent No.3 although senior to the SDPO, without verifying
the genuineness of the Complaint.
6.
Consequently, alleging that additional substance of
misconduct had surfaced against the Petitioner, the Respondent No.4
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issued a Memorandum bearing Ref. No.1045/SP/E dated 08-11-2013
(Annexure P28) with four additional new Charges.
Vide Police
Radiogram dated 14-11-2013, he was directed to file his Written
Statement on 15-11-2013, which he filed on 18-11-2013, without
documents or statement of witnesses being furnished to him, denying
all the Charges against him. On 09-12-2013, the Petitioner and Lnk
Mohan Kumar Sharma who had faced a Departmental Enquiry for
the same offence, (vide Memo No.848/SP/EAST dated 10-09-2013)
appeared before Respondent No.4 where both were handed over
copies of O.O., of which O.O. No.1156/SP/E 1156/E dated 09-122013 (Annexure P34) pertained to the Petitioner. The suspension of
Lnk
Mohan
Kumar
Sharma
was
revoked
vide
O.O.
Ref.
No.1155/SP/EAST, dated 09-12-2013, whereas the Petitioner was
directed to Show Cause within one week against the penalty to be
imposed on him. Again, on 16-12-2013 both he and Lnk Mohan
Kumar Sharma were handed over individual O.Os, both bearing
No.1175/SP/E dated 16-12-2013, wherein both were found guilty but
the Disciplinary Authority ordered the Petitioner’s removal from
service with immediate effect.
That, the O.O. was based on the
Enquiry Report and evidence which had not been furnished to the
Petitioner. Later, another O.O. bearing Ref. No.1381/SP/EAST dated
16-12-2013 was issued to him whereby three days’ leave availed by
him was also treated as “E.O.L.”. It is his contention that he was not
given an opportunity to defend himself and to specifically cross-
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examine the witnesses or to examine the documents neither was he
given copies of the relevant documents or opportunity to adduce his
evidence both oral and documentary to counter the allegations
against him, leave alone the opportunity of hearing as required by the
principles of natural justice.
7.
On 29-01-2014, the Petitioner preferred an Appeal before
Respondent No.2, based on the File of the Departmental Enquiry and
Memorandum, sans the Enquiry Report, the basis of the impugned
O.O. dated 16-12-2013. He alleges that he was neither summoned nor
heard by the Appellate Authority but the impugned O.O. dated 2605-2014 was subsequently served on him. Being aggrieved by the
said O.O., he petitioned the Government and while awaiting
adjudication therefrom, he received communication dated 05-05-2015
from the AIGP, Police HQ, Gangtok, Sikkim, informing him that the
Government had rejected his prayer, hence, the instant Petition with
the above prayers.
8.
The Respondents No.1 to 3 apart from denying and
disputing the averments in the Petition, asserted that on 08-09-2013
the Complaint filed by Shunu Thendup Bhutia addressed to the O/C
Sadar P.S. accused the Petitioner and two other staff of cheating, on
30-08-2013 at 12.10 p.m. at the Hotel Star Bar, Gangtok.
The
Respondent No.6 had a discussion with the Respondent No.4 on this
matter who directed the Additional S.P. to enquire into the matter
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and submit a Report on 12-09-2013, as the allegation was of a serious
nature.
On receiving a verbal Report from the Additional S.P.,
Disciplinary Proceedings were initiated against the Petitioner for
misconduct and negligence in accordance with Rule 7 of the Rules
and Sikkim Police Force (Disciplinary and Appeal) Amendment
Rules, 1995. A Supplementary Memorandum was issued based on emails from Indra Kumar Yonzon. The Enquiry Committee on going
through the entire call details of the Petitioner and others received by
them from the Service Providers found that the mobile phone used by
Lnk Mohan Kumar Sharma was in the name of Karma Chedup
Bhutia, which was in constant contact with the mobile number of the
Petitioner.
That, the Enquiry Authority on examining the second
Complainant found that one Tashi Agya had conducted the raid in the
Hotel where the Complainant was lodged but Lnk Mohan Kumar
Sharma and the Petitioner refused to cross-examine Indra Kumar
Yonzon.
That, they had both been identified by Complainant Shunu
Thendup Bhutia also.
9.
That, the Findings of the E.O. with respect to the Articles
of Charge I to III and Supplementary Articles of Charge I to IV reveal
that the Charges against the Petitioner stood proved and records and
evidence of the Enquiry Report were read over to the Petitioner
affording him the opportunity of filing a representation, against the
penalty proposed to be imposed, which the Petitioner failed to avail
of. Opportunities extended to the Petitioner to represent his case
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before the E.O. and to peruse the records of the Enquiry Proceedings
were also neglected. Vide O.O. dated 16-12-2013, he was removed
from service with information of his right to Appeal within forty five
days from the date of delivery of Order. He filed an Appeal on 29-012014 and was heard in person on 19-04-2014.
The Appellate
Authority on due consideration of the matter confirmed the penalty
imposed vide its O.O. dated 26-05-2014. The Order was pasted in his
house at Chujachen, Rongli in the presence of two witnesses. On 2305-2014,
13-07-2014
and
28-07-2014
the
Petitioner
submitted
representations before the Hon’ble Chief Minister but reinstatement
was not considered.
10.
The allegation of motive and mala fide intention of the
Respondent No.4 and misuse of his official position is denied. That,
the records of the Order Sheet would reveal that on 21-11-2013, the
Respondent No.5 had sent a WT Message to the Petitioner and the
P.O. to appear on 22-11-2013, but the P.O. informed the Respondent
No.5, on the same night, that the Petitioner did not seek to be present
in the Office of the E.O. for cross-examination. It was averred that the
Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the grounds that no
fundamental or legal rights of the Petitioner have been violated as
well as on the ground of delay and laches inasmuch as the Disciplinary
Proceedings was initiated on 10-09-2013 and O.O. dated 16-12-2013
issued for removal of the Petitioner from service, duly confirmed by
the Appellate Authority on 26-05-2014, the Order being served on the
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Petitioner on 13-06-2014. The Writ Petition was filed on 13-10-2015
after a delay of one year and four months.
11.
Before this Court, the arguments canvassed by Learned
Counsel for the Petitioner was that various provisions of Rule 7 of the
Rules at the stage of Enquiry and Rule 11 at the Appellate Stage, were
flouted, besides the penalty imposed was not proportionate to the
Charges.
It is pointed out that initially the Complaint of Shunu
Thendup Bhutia was made to the SHO, Sadar P.S., surprisingly the
Respondent No.4 sought an Enquiry by the ASP/E, but before the
Report of the ASP could be filed, Memorandum dated 10-09-2013 was
issued, evidently on realisation by Respondent No.4 that he had
failed to adhere by the procedure prescribed by Law.
Compromise
entered into with the Complainant Shunu Thendup Bhutia who in the
first instance had not named the Petitioner or Lnk Mohan Kumar
Sharma in the Complainant was not considered and a second
Memorandum bearing Memo No.1045/SP/E dated 08-11-2013, was
issued to the Petitioner, on the basis of e-mails which also did not
name the Petitioner or Lnk Mohan Kumar Sharma. That, the E.O.
conducted the Enquiry as per her whims without sufficient Notice to
him, while the P.O. appeared once during the Enquiry, although Rule
7(11) requires her to be present during the entire period of Enquiry.
12.
That, the Respondent No.6 neither registered the
Complaint of Shunu Thendup Bhutia nor did he verify the
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genuineness of the Complaint, and the entire records of the
Departmental Enquiry were not supplied to the Petitioner. Whatever
records the Petitioner could gather revealed that, on 10-09-2013 he
was summoned by Respondent No.3 to his Office at Gangtok, where
Respondent No.5, was already present with the Court Inspector
Tshering
Yangzom
Bhutia.
According
to
Learned
Counsel,
Respondent No.4 in the presence of the above Officers verbally
abused him and threatened to finish his career. That, in fact the face
off culminated in the issuance of the Memoranda and O.Os without
determining the genuineness of the Complaints, thereby rendering
the Departmental Enquiry against the Petitioner as void ab initio and
illegal.
13.
That, the records of the Enquiry Report are not in
consonance with the ground reality of the Enquiry inasmuch as the
Respondent No.5 in her Report had suggested that Lnk Mohan
Kumar Sharma’s statement was recorded and made available by the
Respondent No.6, while the Departmental Enquiry reveals that Lnk
Mohan Kumar Sharma was in fact interrogated by Respondent No.5
and the three Member Enquiry Team. That, the Respondent No.5 has
tried to imply that Lnk Mohan Kumar Sharma was examined by the
Enquiry Committee before 16-09-2013, which is incorrect as the
Committee was constituted only on 16-09-2013. Although Respondent
No.5 vide records admits that the statement of Shunu Thendup
Bhutia was recorded by her on 21-09-2013, in the absence of the
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Petitioner and the P.O., but the signature of the P.O. appears therein.
The statement of Indra Kumar Yonzon having been recorded on 2110-2013 is false, as records reveal that it was on 23-10-2013 this too in
the absence of the Petitioner and the P.O., but once again the P.O’s
signature appears therein, which tantamounts to a criminal act. That,
on 30-08-2013 he had duly informed the Respondent No.6 that he was
going to Adampool in connection with a theft case thus, the allegation
that he was not on duty on 30-08-2013 is incorrect.
14.
That the E.O. took the statement of PI Karma Chedup
Bhutia on record which was sent with a covering letter dated 21-102013, duly affixing her signature and allowing the P.O. also to affix
her signature.
A Notice under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.”), was issued to BSNL Telecom
Service, Vodafone Telecom Service and Airtel Telecom Service in the
letterhead of Respondent No.5, countersigned by the Respondent
No.4, substantiating that the Departmental Enquiry against him was
illegal and motivated. It is contended that due to the Show Cause
Notice dated 25-10-2013, he was unable to be present before the Court
at Namchi as the Respondent No.3 deliberately failed to grant him
leave on time.
15.
That, the records of the Departmental Enquiry also
revealed that on 21-11-2013 Lnk Mohan Kumar Sharma of Sadar P.S.
had undertaken to pay a sum of Rs.1,25,000/- (Rupees one lakh and
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twenty five thousand) only, to Indra Kumar Yonzon, which reveals
that the Petitioner was not involved in the case for which
Memorandum bearing Ref. No.1045/SP/E dated 08-11-2013 was
issued to him. That, after Written Statement was filed, the Petitioner
was not summoned by the Respondents No.3 or 5 to inform him of
the results of his Written Statement in violation of the Rules. That
although Lnk Mohan Kumar Sharma and he were tried for similar
offences there was no compliance of Rule 8.
16.
He denies that there was any delay or laches as after the
last Order dated 26-05-2014 he approached the Government as borne
out by the records. To buttress his submissions on the various points
raised by him, he has placed reliance on Anil Kumar vs. Presiding
Officer and Others1; Kashinath Dikshita vs. Union of India and
Others2; Union of India and Others vs. Prakash Kumar Tandon3;
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha4; Union of
India and Others vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan5; Lajja Ram and Others
vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh and Others6; Basanti Prasad vs.
Chairman, Bihar School Examination Board and Others7 and Ashok
Kumar vs. State of Bihar and Others8.
17.
Per contra, the Learned Additional Advocate General
opened his arguments citing the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court
1.
3.
5.
7.
AIR 1985 SC 1121
(2009) 2 SCC 541
(1991) 1 SCC 588
(2009) 6 SCC 791
2.
4.
6.
8.
(1986) 3 SCC 229
(2010) 2 SCC 772
(2013) 11 SCC 235
(2008) 8 SCC 445
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in Union of India and Others vs. P. Gunasekaran9 and State of Uttar
Pradesh and Another vs. Man Mohan Nath Sinha and Another10,
urging that, these Judgments lay down the parameters of Judicial
Review in disciplinary matters and that Courts should refrain from
travelling beyond the said ambit. Controverting the submissions of
the Petitioner, he asserts that the entire Disciplinary Rules have been
duly adhered to by the concerned authorities, the Charges were
framed, Inquiry completed, the Findings arrived at and the penalty
imposed. The Petitioner was given a copy of the Findings after the
matter was completed as evident from the Appeal. According to him,
Rule 8 of the Rules is not mandatory. The records would also reveal
that Enquiry Report was made over to the Petitioner before the
Appeal which is evident from the fact that the said Report has been
filed in his Appeal. Placing reliance on State of U.P. vs. Harendra
Arora and Another11, he submitted that every infraction of Rule does
not vitiate proceedings.
He also placed reliance on Managing
Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Others vs. B. Karunakar and Others12.
18.
The next point canvassed in his argument was with
regard to delay and laches. Relying on Naresh Kumar vs. Department
of Atomic Energy and Others13 and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd.
through its Chairman & Managing Director and Another vs. K.
Thangappan and Another14, it was contended that making multiple
9. (2015) 2 SCC 610
11. (2001) 6 SCC 392
13. (2010) 7 SCC 525
10. (2009) 8 SCC 310
12. (1993) 4 SCC 727
14. (2006) 4 SCC 322
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petitions before the Government is no ground for condonation of
delay and laches. Reiterating that the procedure prescribed has been
duly followed and the principles of natural justice duly complied
with, he contended that the Writ Petition deserves no consideration
and ought to be dismissed.
19.
Heard Counsel at length and submissions considered. I
have also meticulously perused the records of the case, the relevant
Rules and the cases cited at the Bar.
20.
The question that arises for consideration is whether the
impugned Memoranda and O.Os were issued by the Authorities
without compliance of procedure prescribed by Statue.
21.
This Court is aware that the scope of Judicial Review in
dealing with Departmental Enquiry cannot be directed against the
decision, but has to be confined to the decision-making process. I am
also aware and conscious that in Disciplinary Proceedings, it is not
open to this Court to re-appreciate and reappraise the evidence led
before the Inquiry Authority and to arrive at its own conclusion. This
has clearly been opined in the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
Court relied on by Learned Additional Advocate General in State of
Uttar Pradesh and Another vs. Man Mohan Nath Sinha and
Another10 (supra) wherein at Paragraph 14, it is held as follows;
“14. The scope of judicial review in dealing
with departmental
enquiries came up for
consideration before this Court in the case of State of
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A.P. v. Chitra Venkaka Rao [(1975) 2 SCC 557] and this
Court held: (SCC pp.562-63, paras 21 and 23-24)
“21. …….... The High Court is not a court
of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant. The Court is concerned
to determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf and
according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice
are not violated. Second, where there is some
evidence which the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and
which evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty
of the charge, it is not the function of the High
Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High
Court may interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against
the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry
or where the authorities have disabled
themselves from reaching a fair decision by
some considerations extraneous to the evidence
and the merits of the case or by allowing
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the
very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever
have arrived at that conclusion. The
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts
and if there is some legal evidence on which
their findings can be based, the adequacy or
reliability of that evidence is not a matter which
can be permitted to be canvassed before the
High Court in a proceeding for a writ under
Article 226.
………………………………..”
The ambit of Judicial Review in Disciplinary Proceedings has
thus been lucidly laid down.
22.
It would now be necessary to embark on an assessment
as to whether the procedure prescribed by the Rules was adhered to
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by the concerned authorities.
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Rule 7 of the Rules deals with
procedure for imposing penalties specified in Clauses (xi) to (xv) of
Rule 3, which reads as follows;
“3. Penalties.- Without prejudice to the
provision of any law, or any special orders for the time
being in force, the following penalties may, for good
and sufficient reasons, be imposed on any police
officer, namely:................................................................
(xi)
Reduction to a lower stage in the
time scale of pay for a specified
period, with further directions as
to whether or not the police officer
will earn increments of pay during
the period of such reduction and
whether on the expiry of such
period, the reduction will or will
not have the effect of postponing
the future increments of his pay;
(xii)
Reduction to a lower time-scale of
pay, grade, post or Service which
shall ordinarily be a bar to
promotion of the police officer to
the time scale of pay, grade, post
or Service from which he was
reduced, with or without further
directions regarding conditions of
restoration to the grade or post or
Service from which the police
officer was reduced and his
seniority and pay on such
restoration to that grade, post or
Service;
(xiii) Compulsory retirement;
(xiv) Removal from service which shall
not be a disqualification for future
employment
under
the
Government;
(xv)
Dismissal from service which shall
ordinarily be a disqualification for
future employment under the
Government.
.................................................................”
[emphasis supplied]
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23.
vs.
The State of Sikkim and Others
Presently, we are concerned with the penalty imposed on
the Petitioner as provided in Rule 3(xiv), i.e., removal from service,
vide O.O. bearing Ref. No.1175/SP/EAST, dated 16-12-2013, duly
confirmed vide O.O. No.155/POL/RANGE/2014/235, dated 26-052014 of the Appellate Authority. Rule 7(1) in this regard mandates
that, no order imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses (xi) to
(xv) of rule 3 shall be made, except after an inquiry held, as far as may
be, in the manner provided in the rule.
Rule 7(2) provides that
whenever a disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are
grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct
or misbehaviour against a police officer, it may itself inquire into, or
appoint an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. Pausing here
for a moment, in the light of the above Rule, O.O. No.982/SP/E dated
10-09-2013 (Annexure R3) was issued by the Respondent No.3 in
exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 7(2), appointing Smt. Linda
Palmu Chettri, SDPO, Rangpo Respondent No.5, as the Inquiring
Authority to inquire into the truth of any imputation or misconduct
against the Petitioner. Rule 7(5)(c) of the Rules lays down that; where
the disciplinary authority itself inquires into any article of charge or
appoints an inquiring authority for holding an inquiry into such charge, it
may, by an order, appoint a police officer or a legal practitioner, to be known
as the Presenting Officer to present on its behalf the case in support of the
article of charge. There has been no compliance of this Rule as no
separate O.O. appointing PI Tshering Yangzom Bhutia as the P.O. has
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been issued. Although in O.O. bearing No.1175/SP/EAST dated 1612-2013 (Annexure P36) the Respondent No.3 has stated, inter alia, at
Article IV, Paragraph 3 that, CI/East, Tshering Yangzom was
appointed as Presenting Officer vide O.O. No.982/SP/East, dated 1009-2013, perusal of the said O.O. would prove to the contrary.
24.
The documents on record would reveal that in terms of
Rule 7(3)(i) the substance of imputations of misconduct or
misbehaviour were framed into definite and distinct Articles of
Charge.
25.
Rule 7(4) of the Rules requires the Disciplinary Authority
to deliver or cause to be delivered to the police officer a copy of the
articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or
misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article
of charge is proposed to be sustained. This Rule is specific, in that, the
Disciplinary Authority has to indicate the name of the witnesses and
the exact document on which it would rely for the purpose of proving
each specific Article of Charge. However Annexure I in Annexure P7
contains an omnibus list of documents and list of witnesses with no
specifications as required supra.
Secondly, as per the same Rule the
Petitioner is required to submit, within such time as may be specified,
a Written Statement of his defence and whether he desired to be
heard in person. On this aspect, the E.O. has neglected to send a
proper Notice to the Petitioner, Notice having been issued by her only
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by a Police Radiogram dated 16-09-2013 (Annexure P10), addressed to
the Petitioner, giving him four days time to submit Written
Statement.
There is nothing in the Notice to indicate that the E.O.
had enquired of the Petitioner as to whether he desired to be heard in
person.
This circumstance clearly works to the prejudice of the
Petitioner as he is uninformed of the circumstance that he can make
verbal submission if he so desires.
It is also the constant refrain of
the Petitioner that no documents were made available to him thereby
causing him serious prejudice in preparation of defence. The records
bear out this argument as no documents apparently were made over
to him. While on this subject useful reference can be made to the
decision in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others vs. B.
Karunakar and Others12 (supra) wherein the decision of Khem Chand
vs. Union of India15 was relied on. The relevant extract is as follows;
“................................................................................
“If the opportunity to show cause is to be
a reasonable one it is clear that he should be
informed about the charge or charges levelled
against him and the evidence by which it is
sought to be established, for it is only then that
he will be able to put forward his defence. If the
purpose of this provision is to give the
Government servant an opportunity to
exonerate himself from the charge and if this
opportunity is to be a reasonable one he should
be allowed to show that the evidence against
him is not worthy of credence or consideration
and that he can only do if he is given a chance to
cross-examine the witnesses called against him
and to examine himself or any other witness in
support of his defence. All this appears to us to
be implicit in the language used in the clause,
15. AIR 1958 SC 300
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but this does not exhaust his rights. In addition
to showing that he has not been guilty of any
misconduct so as to merit any punishment, it is
reasonable that he should also have an
opportunity to contend that the charges proved
against him do not necessarily require the
particular punishment proposed to be meted out
to him. He may say, for instance, that although
he has been guilty of some misconduct, it is not
of such a character as to merit the extreme
punishment of dismissal or even of removal or
reduction in rank and that any of the lesser
punishments ought to be sufficient in his case.””
As laid down hereinabove, the purpose of furnishing
documents would be to enable the Petitioner to have a level playing
field to exonerate himself.
26.
Rule 7(6)(v) of the Rules provides that, disciplinary
authority where it is not the inquiring authority, shall forward to the
inquiring authority, a copy of the Order appointing the Presenting
Officer, as already discussed. Here the Disciplinary Authority has
appointed the Inquiring Authority being Respondent No.5, vide
Memorandum No.982/SP/E dated 10-09-2013, but there is no order
appointing the P.O. as required by the Rules.
27.
Rule 7(7) of the Rules requires that the concerned officer
shall appear in person before the inquiring authority on such day and
time within ten working days from the date of receipt by him of the
articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct
or misbehaviour as the inquiring authority may, by a notice in
writing, specified in this behalf, or within such further time, not
exceeding ten days, as the inquiring authority may allow. The WT
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Message dated 16-09-2013 issued rather peremptorily, cannot be said
to be a Notice in writing issued by the inquiring authority as required
by the Rules. There is no indication in the Notice as to when the
Memo with the Articles of Charge were sent by the E.O. or the
Disciplinary Authority and received by the Petitioner.
The
Radiogram gives him four days to file his reply whereas Rule 7(7)
states as follows;
“(7) The police officer shall appear in person
before the inquiring authority on such day and time
within ten working days from the date of receipt by
him of the articles of charge and the statement of the
imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour as the
inquiring authority, may by a notice in writing, specify
in this behalf, or within such further time, not
exceeding ten days, as the inquiring authority may
allow.”
[emphasis supplied]
Evidently the Inquiry Authority has overlooked this provision
of the Rules.
28.
Rule 7(11) of the Rules provides that the inquiring
authority shall, if the police officer fails to appear within the specified
time or refuses or omits to plead, require the Presenting Officer to
produce the evidence by which he proposes to prove the articles of
charge, and shall adjourn the case to a later date, not exceeding thirty
days, after recording an order that the Police Officer may, for the
purpose of preparing his defence,“(i)
inspect within five days of the order or within
such further time not exceeding five days as the
inquiring authority may allow, the documents
specified in the list referred to in sub-rule 3;
(ii)
submit a list of witnesses to be examined on his
behalf.”
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29.
vs.
The State of Sikkim and Others
In this regard, it would be worthwhile to firstly refer to
the Show Cause of the Petitioner dated 20-09-2013 (Annexure P13)
where he, inter alia, denies and objects to the allegations made against
him as nothing more than a conspiracy to break the morale of men in
action and he vehemently denies the Charges imputed against him as
fabricated and malicious.
Rule 7(11) of the Rules is extracted
hereinbelow;
“(11) The inquiring authority shall, if the police
officer fails to appear within the specified time or
refuses or omits to plead, require the Presenting Officer
to produce the evidence by which he proposes to prove
the articles of charge, and shall adjourn the case to later
date not exceeding thirty days after recording an order
that the police Officer may, for the purpose of
preparing his defence,-“
30.
On going through the Order dated 20-09-2013 of the
Departmental Inquiry No.30 in the Office of the Sub-Divisional Police
Officer, Rangpo Sub-Division, East Sikkim, the Petitioner denied all
the Charges against him but the E.O. has not indicated any directions
given by her to the P.O. in compliance of the Rules (supra). The P.O.
for her part is conspicuous by her absence on the said date. Thus, the
procedure prescribed, requiring the P.O. to produce the evidence to
prove the Articles of Charge has evidently not been complied with,
neither was the matter listed to another date not exceeding thirty
days.
Annexure R6, the Order, claims to have examined Shunu
Thendup Bhutia and Renuka Chhetri on 20-09-2013 but no separate
statements are found in the records of the case and the categorical
contention of the Petitioner is that no such documents were made
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over to him. In the same breath, it is relevant to impress here that the
scheme of Rule 7(11) does not envisage that the witnesses will be
examined on the same day that the Officer denies the Charges, but in
the instant matter as would clearly appear from the Order dated 2009-2013, Shunu Thendup Bhutia and Renuka Chettri have been
examined on the same day. The Petitioner is also to be extended the
opportunity as enumerated in Rules 7(11)(i) and 7(11)(ii) supra this
has clearly been circumvented. The E.O. has apparently not recorded
the statement of the witnesses on separate sheets of papers, but has
merely reflected such examination in her Order Sheet that the
witnesses were examined, needless to mention that no evidence
emerges to indicate opportunity to the Petitioner to cross-examine
any of the witnesses or to examine himself and his witnesses.
31.
The P.O. appears to have been present at the Enquiry,
only on 19-11-2013 whereas Rule 7(14) requires as follows;
“(14) On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral
and documentary evidence by which the articles of
charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by
or on behalf of the disciplinary authority.
The
witnesses shall be examined by or on behalf of the
Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on
behalf of the police officer. The Presenting Officer shall
be entitled to re-examine the witnesses on any point on
which they have been cross-examined, but not on any
new matter, without the leave of the inquiring
authority. The inquiring authority may also put such
questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit.”
The Presenting Officer is to produce the oral and documentary
evidence for the Disciplinary Authority but if she has remained
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absent this process was obviously not adhered to.
Thus, the
argument of the Petitioner that the P.O. was absent on the dates of
Inquiry is substantiated by the records.
32.
Lnk Mohan Kumar Sharma who was not mentioned as a
witness in Annexure IV of the Articles of Charge, in Memo
No.849/SP/E has also been examined by the E.O. as per the Order
Sheet, dated 19-11-2014. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate
that the Petitioner was given an opportunity to cross-examine this
witness as prescribed under Rule 7(14) of the Rules. In this context, it
is true that Rule 7(15) of the Rules allows the P.O. to produce
evidence not included, in the list given to the Petitioner, but this is,
subject to permission of the Inquiring Authority. The Order Sheet in
question reflects no such prayer for examination of additional
witnesses or permission thereof by the E.O. thereby singularly
flouting the provisions of Rule 7(15) of the Rules.
33.
The records also reveal that there has been no compliance
of procedure prescribed in Rule 7(16)(17)(18)(19) of the Rules which
reads as follows;
Rule 7(16)
(16) When the case for the disciplinary
authority is closed, the police officer shall be required
to state his defence, orally or in writing, as he may
prefer. If the defence is made orally, it shall be
recorded and the police officer shall be required to sign
the record. In either case, a copy of the statement of
defence shall be given to the Presenting Officer, if any,
appointed.
No records exist in this context.
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Rule 7(17)
(17) The evidence on behalf of the police
officer shall then be produced. The police officer may
examine himself in his own behalf if he so prefers. The
witnesses produced by the police officer shall then be
examined and shall be liable to cross-examination, reexamination and examination by the inquiring
authority according to the provisions applicable to the
witnesses for the disciplinary authority.
The Order Sheet does not reflect at all that the Petitioner was
allowed to examine himself or his witnesses which is indeed
unconscionable conduct on the part of the E.O.
Rule 7(18)
(18) The inquiring authority may after the
police officer closes his case, and shall, if the police
officer has not examined himself, generally question
him on the circumstances appearing against him in the
evidence for the purpose of enabling the police officer
to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence
against him.
This provision can be juxtaposed with Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.
but no such statement appears to have been prepared by the E.O.
Rule 7(19)
(19) The inquiring authority may, after the
completion of the production of evidence, hear the
Presenting Officer, if any, appointed and the police
officer, or permit them to file written briefs of their
respective case, if they so desire.
This bears a similarity to criminal proceedings as final
arguments are to be after closure of the matter but records are devoid
of either verbal or written arguments.
34.
Rule 7(22) of the Rules requires that;
“(22) (1)
After the conclusion of the inquiry, a
report shall be prepared and it shall
contain –
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(a)
the articles of charge and the
statement of the imputations of
misconduct or misbehaviour;
(b)
the defence of the police officer in
respect of each article of charge;
(c)
an assessment of the evidence in
respect of each article of charge;
(d)
the findings on each articles of
charge and the reasons therefor.
……………………………………….”
35.
Annexure
R7
of
the
joint
Counter-Affidavit
of
Respondents No.1 to 3 would reveal that the Findings of the E.O.
(Annexure R7) are as per the requisites of Rule 7(22)(1)(a) and (b) of
the Rules, but in the instant matter it is observed that there is no
independent assessment of the evidence, by the E.O., in respect of
each Articles of Charge, as required under Rule 7(22)(1)(c) of the
Rules. It is also apparent that there has been no compliance of Rule
7(22)(1)(c) [sic, (d)] of the Rules, i.e., there are no Findings by the E.O.
on each Articles of Charge and the reasons therefor, she has merely
noted what the witnesses have stated. On this aspect, we may advert
usefully refer to the decision in Anil Kumar vs. Presiding Officer and
Others1 (supra) where it has been held that“5. We have extracted the charges framed
against the appellant. We have also pointed out in clear
terms the report of the Enquiry Officer. It is wellsettled that a disciplinary enquiry has to be a quasijudicial enquiry held according to the principles of
natural justice and the Enquiry Officer has a duty to act
judicially. The Enquiry Officer did not apply his
mind to the evidence. Save setting out the names of
the witnesses, he did not discuss the evidence. He
merely recorded his ipse dixit that the charges are
proved. He did not assign a single reason why the
evidence produced by the appellant did not appeal to
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him or was considered not credit-worthy. He did not
permit a peep into his mind as to why the evidence
produced by the management appealed to him in
preference to the evidence produced by the appellant.
An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must
show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an
ipse dixit of the Enquiry Officer. It has to be a speaking
order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by
reasons. ............... It should all the more be so where the
quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of
livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. In this
case the enquiry report is an order-sheet which merely
produces the stage through which the enquiry passed.
It clearly disclosed a total non-application of mind and
it is this report on which the General Manager acted in
terminating the service of the appellant. ......................”
[emphasis supplied]
Thus, it concludes that the E.O. as a quasi-judicial authority has
to exhibit her application of mind judicially which is woefully lacking
herein.
36.
What emerges as another ambiguous situation is the
subsequent appointment of a three Member Committee by the
Respondent No.4 on 16-09-2013, vide Memo No.869/SP/E, after
appointment of the Inquiring Authority.
The Rules do not speak of
constitution of a Committee for the purposes of any discreet Enquiry,
pursuant to appointment of an Inquiry Authority.
37.
Vide Memorandum bearing Ref. No.1045/SP/E dated
08-11-2013 supplementary Articles of Charge were framed against the
Petitioner in connection with a Complaint from one Indra Kumar
Yonzon as already detailed hereinabove. Vide the said Memorandum
the Respondent No.5 was appointed as E.O. vide Order No.98 (sic,
982) dated 10-09-2013 and a direction also given to PI Tshering
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Yangzom to continue as the P.O., although it may again be reiterated
that there was no specific order appointing PI Tshering Yangzom as
the P.O. The E.O., by Police Radiogram, dated 14-11-2013, directed
the Petitioner to be present before her on 15-11-2013. It has not been
disclosed as to when the Memo was made available to the Petitioner.
It would also be unfair on the Petitioner to have received an
indifferent Notice by Police Radiogram, dated 14-11-2013, directing
him to be present on 15-11-2013, when natural justice would dictate
that sufficient time ought to be afforded to him to meet and avert the
serious allegations as made in the Articles of Charge. Apart from
which the Rules lay down the period of time to be given to the
Petitioner for his defence. The Petitioner instead of filing his reply on
15-11-2016, as per Annexure R6 of the Counter-Affidavit of
Respondents No.1 to 3 (i.e., Order Sheet of the E.O.), appears to have
filed his Show Cause on 18-11-2013. However, in this matter too, the
same procedure as in the Memo No.849/SP/E dated 10-09-2013
appears to have been followed by the E.O., instead of strictly
adhering to the Rules.
38.
It is also evident from the O.O. dated 09-12-2013 bearing
Ref. No.1156/SP/EAST 1156/E, issued after completion of the
Enquiry, that, the records and evidence of the Enquiry Report had not
been made available to the Petitioner but admittedly the contents had
merely been read over to him, which is by itself appalling as the
Authority assumes that the Petitioner would have an elephantine
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memory to recall all relevant points on a mere reading of the contents.
The said O.O. may be beneficially quoted hereinbelow;
“……………………………………………….
The enquiry report of the departmental enquiry,
which was ordered vide Memo No.849/SP/East dated
10/09/2013, and subsequently supplementary charges
framed
vide
Memo
No.1045/SP/East
dated
08/11/2013, initiated against you under Rule 7 of the
Sikkim Police Force (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1989
is submitted today.
All the records and the evidences of the
enquiry report have been read over to you.
You are hereby allowed to show cause within
one weeks (sic) time against the penalty proposed to be
inflicted. Any representation on this behalf submitted
by you shall be duly taken into consideration before
final orders are passed.
…………………………”
39.
[emphasis supplied]
This is clear indication that fair play was thrown out of
the window with no qualms by the Disciplinary Authority and
adequate opportunity denied to the Petitioner to disprove the
allegations or to put forth his case.
In this context, one may
beneficially refer to the decision by Kashinath Dikshita vs. Union of
India and Others2 (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court setting
aside the order of dismissal rendered by the Disciplinary Authority as
violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, inter alia, opined that –
“12. Be that as it may, even without going into
minute details it is evident that the appellant was
entitled to have an access to the documents and
statements throughout the course of the inquiry. He
would have needed these documents and statements in
order to cross-examine the 38 witnesses who were
produced at the inquiry to establish the charges against
him. So also at the time of arguments, he would have
needed the copies of the documents. So also he would
have needed the copies of the documents to enable him
to effectively cross-examine the witnesses with
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reference to the contents of the documents. It is
obvious that he could not have done so if copies had
not been made available to him. Taking an overall view
of the matter we have no doubt in our mind that the
appellant has been denied a reasonable opportunity of
exonerating himself. ............................................”
In the same vein in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Saroj
Kumar Sinha4 (supra) the decision of State of Punjab vs. Bhagat
Ram16 was relied on wherein it was held as follows;
“7.
The meaning of a reasonable opportunity
of showing cause against the action proposed to be
taken is that the government servant is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself against
charges on which inquiry is held. The government
servant should be given an opportunity to deny his
guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so when he
is told what the charges against him are. He can do so
by cross-examining the witnesses produced against
him. The object of supplying statements is that the
government servant will be able to refer to the previous
statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined
against the government servant. Unless the statements
are given to the government servant he will not be able
to have an effective and useful cross-examination.
8.
It is unjust and unfair to deny the
government servant copies of statements of witnesses
examined during investigation and produced at the
inquiry in support of the charges levelled against the
government servant. A synopsis does not satisfy the
requirements of giving the government servant a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the
action proposed to be taken.”
40.
That having been said, the O.O. at paragraph 3 (supra) is
de hors the provisions of the Rules as Rule 7(25) provides that if the
Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of
the Articles of Charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties
specified in clause (xi) to (xv) of Rule 3 should be imposed on a police
officer, it shall not be necessary to give the police officer any
16. (1975) 1 SCC 155
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opportunity of making representation to the penalty proposed to be
imposed. Thus, the question of the Disciplinary Authority asking the
Officer to file a representation does not arise, hence the O.O. No.
1156/SP/EAST 1156/E dated 09-12-2013 on this count is superfluous.
I hasten to add that in fact as per the Proviso (iii) of Rule 11(5) the
Appellate Authority is to extend to the Petitioner an opportunity to
file such a representation. The relevant Proviso reads as follows;
“Provided that ..............................................................................
(iii) if the proposed penalty which the
appellate authority proposes to impose is
one of the penalties specified in clauses
(ix) to (xv) of rule 3 and an inquiry under
rule 7 has already been held in the case,
the appellate authority shall, after giving
the appellant a reasonable opportunity
for making representation against the
penalty proposed on the basis of the
evidence adduced during the inquiry,
make such orders as it may deem fit;
and”
41.
Needless to add such an opportunity finds no place in
the proceedings before the Appellate Authority allegedly held on 1904-2014. The O.O. bearing No.1175/SP/EAST dated 16-12-2013 does
not elucidate the separate Findings of the Disciplinary Authority,
save the statement that he agrees with the findings of the E.O., that
each Article of Charge has been proved thereby establishing noncompliance of Rule 7(27) of the Rules which requires as follows;
“(27) Orders made by the disciplinary
authority shall also be communicated to the police
officer who shall be supplied with a copy of the report
of the inquiry, if any, held by the disciplinary authority
and a copy of its findings of each articles of charge, or,
where the disciplinary authority is not the inquiring
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authority, a copy of the report of the inquiry authority
and a statement of the findings of the disciplinary
authority together with brief reasons for its
disagreement, if any, with the findings of the inquiring
authority unless they have already been supplied to
him and also a copy of the advice, if any, given by the
Commission, and where the disciplinary authority has
not accepted the advice of the Commission, a brief
statement of the reasons for such non-acceptance.”
[emphasis supplied]
42.
It was argued by Learned Additional Advocate General
that every infraction does not make the proceedings invalid relying
on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. vs.
Harendra Arora and Another11 (supra) wherein it was held as follows;
“13. The matter may be examined from another
viewpoint. There may be cases where there are
infractions of statutory provisions, rules and
regulations. Can it be said that every such infraction
would make the consequent action void and/or
invalid? The statute may contain certain substantive
provisions, e.g., who is the competent authority to
impose a particular punishment on a particular
employee. Such provision must be strictly complied
with as in these cases the theory of substantial
compliance may not be available. For example, where a
rule specifically provides that the delinquent officer
shall be given an opportunity to produce evidence in
support of his case after the close of the evidence of the
other side and if no such opportunity is given, it would
not be possible to say that the enquiry was not vitiated.
But in respect of many procedural provisions, it would
be possible to apply the theory of substantial
compliance or the test of prejudice, as the case may be.
Even amongst procedural provisions, there may be
some provisions of a fundamental nature which have
to be complied with and in whose case the theory of
substantial compliance may not be available, but the
question of prejudice may be material. In respect of
procedural provisions other than of a fundamental
nature, the theory of substantial compliance would be
available and in such cases objections on this score
have to be judged on the touchstone of prejudice. The
test would be, whether the delinquent officer had or
did not have a fair hearing. In the case of Russell v.
2016:SHC:110
WP(C) No.65 of 2015
Tashi Chopel Bhutia
vs.
The State of Sikkim and Others
Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109 (CA)] it was laid down
by the Court of Appeal that the principle of natural
justice cannot be reduced to any hard-and-fast
formulae and the same cannot be put in a straitjacket as
its applicability depends upon the context and the facts
and circumstances of each case.”
The decision, however, does not prescribe to the view that
substantive provisions of the Statute are not to be complied with. It
only elucidates that in respect of procedural provisions other than of
a fundamental nature the theory of substantial compliance would be
available and in such cases objections have to be judged on the
touchstone of prejudice. The foregoing discussions which for brevity
are not repeated is proof of the fact that the procedure imbibed by the
E.O. and the Disciplinary Authority was fraught with serious
procedural lapses which have undoubtedly vitiated the Departmental
Enquiry. The manner of Enquiry conducted by the E.O. leaves much
to be desired as without a doubt the Rules have either been ignored
or circumvented.
43.
On the question of delay and laches although it has been
pointed out by Learned Additional Advocate General that in Naresh
Kumar vs. Department of Atomic Energy and Others13 (supra) it was
opined that that where an employee keeps making representation
after representation which are consistently rejected he cannot seek
any relief on that ground. That, in the instant case after the notice of
dismissal was issued to him the Petitioner has failed to approach the
Court on time. On this aspect, we may usefully refer to the decision
of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Basanti Prasad vs. Chairman, Bihar
2016:SHC:110
WP(C) No.65 of 2015
Tashi Chopel Bhutia
vs.
The State of Sikkim and Others
School Examination Board and Others7 (supra) wherein it was, inter
alia, held that “19. Reference may be made at this stage to the
decisions of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial
Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant
Regular Motor Service [AIR 1969 SC 329] wherein this Court
has approved the view expressed by the Privy Council
in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd
[(1874) 5 PC 221]. The Court had observed: (Lindsay case,
PC pp.239-40)
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be
regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the
other party in a situation in which it would not
be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting
to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity
of that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the length
of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval, which might affect either
party and cause a balance of justice or injustice
in taking the one course or the other, so far as
relates to the remedy.”
20. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC
566], it was held as under: (SCC p.594, paras 23-24)
“23. ……… There can be doubt that the
petitioners were guilty of gross delay in filing
the writ petitions with the result that by the time
the writ petitions came to be filed. ……….
24. …….. If there is inordinate delay on
the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition
and such delay is not satisfactorily explained,
the High Court may decline to intervene and
grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is
premised upon a number of factors. …… Of
2016:SHC:110
WP(C) No.65 of 2015
Tashi Chopel Bhutia
vs.
The State of Sikkim and Others
course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid
rule which can be cast in a straitjacket formula,
for there may be cases where despite delay and
creation of third-party rights the High Court
may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere
and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases
where the demand of justice is so compelling
that the High Court would be inclined to
interfere in spite of delay or creation of thirdparty rights would by their very nature be few
and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter
within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi
every discretion must be exercised fairly and
justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat
it.””
44.
Reverting to the matter of State of U.P. vs. Harendra
Arora and Another11 (supra), referring to the case of Russell vs. Duke
of Norfolk17 it was correctly observed therein that the principle of
natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae and
the same cannot be put into a straitjacket as its applicability depends
upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case.
45.
It would also be worthwhile to point out that in
Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing
Director and Another vs. K. Thangappan and Another14 (supra) it was
held as hereinbelow;
“7. What was stated in this regard by Sir
Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221] (PC at p.239) was
approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M. R.
Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri
Balwant Regular Motor Service [AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir
Barnes had stated:
“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of
equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine.
Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy either because the party has, by his conduct
17. (1949) 1 All ER 109 (CA)
2016:SHC:110
WP(C) No.65 of 2015
Tashi Chopel Bhutia
vs.
The State of Sikkim and Others
done that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct
and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that
remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in
which it would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of
these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded
upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting
to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of
that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances always
important in such cases are, the length of the delay
and the nature of the acts done during the interval
which might affect either party and cause a balance
of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”
On a consideration of the above Judgments, it is manifest that
when it comes to the question of delay and laches the Court is to
exercise its discretion, of course this cannot be arbitrary but must be
fair and just and above all to secure the ends of justice.
46.
On the anvil of the above decisions, and on considering
the cogent and consistent grounds put forth by the Petitioner the
delay has been satisfactorily explain which does not appear to be an
inordinate or unexplained nor is it the Respondents’ case that third
party rights have accrued in the interregnum. Resultant, I am of the
considered opinion that non-compliance of the statutory procedure
has prejudiced the Petitioner as he was denied the opportunity of
proving his innocence having been issued ambiguous Notices, given
insufficient time to resist the Charges, no opportunity of crossexamining the witnesses, no opportunity of examining himself or his
witnesses and not being handed over the relevant documents. The
2016:SHC:110
WP(C) No.65 of 2015
Tashi Chopel Bhutia
vs.
The State of Sikkim and Others
other shortcomings have already been enumerated and discussed
hereinabove and to avoid prolixity are not being reiterated.
47.
Accordingly, I have to opine that the Enquiry is vitiated
being in violation of the Rules which provide for specific procedure to
be adhered to in the Disciplinary Proceedings. Consequently, the
impugned Memoranda bearing Memo No.849/SP/E dated 10-092013 and Ref. No.1045/SP/E dated 08-11-2013 and impugned O.Os
Ref. No.1175/SP/EAST dated 16-12-2013 and No.155/POL/RANGE/
2014/235 dated 26-05-2014 as also the Findings of Respondent No.5
due to the aforesaid reasons, are a nullity and non est in the eyes of
the Law and are hereby quashed and set aside.
48.
The Writ Petition is allowed.
49.
In view of the Order supra, the necessary consequential
benefits to the Petitioner will follow, in accordance with Law.
50.
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
25-07-2016
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