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NAFR
INDRAJEET
SAHU
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally signed
by INDRAJEET
SAHU
Date: 2026.02.13
19:14:44 +0530
WA No. 143 of 2026
1 - Tarachand Ratnakar S/o Shri S. P. Ratnakar Aged About 53 Years
Presently Working As Assistant Director, Finance At Office Of Commissioner
Co-Operative And Registrar Co-Operative Societies, Indrawati Bhawan, Naya
Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
... Appellant
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Principal Secretary Finance
Department Mahanadi Bhawan Atalnagar, Raipur, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - The Director Treasury Account And Pension Indrawati Bhawan, Block -1,
First
Floor,
Naya
Raipur,
District
Raipur
Chhattisgarh
3 - Smt. Kalpana Hedau Account Officer, Chhattisgarh State Police
Accountability Authority Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant
For State
:
:
Shri Somkant Verma, Advocate.
Shri P.K. Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate
General.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
Order on Board
13.02.2026
Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ.
Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties on the application for
condonation of delay of 68 days in preferring the instant appeal.
The appellant has filed this writ appeal against an order dated
02.09.2025, passed by learned Single Judge, in WPS No.360 of 2019.
On a pointed query being made to the learned counsel for the
appellant as to why he has approached this Court against the
impugned order after an inordinate delay of 68 days, she has not
offered any plausible explanation or any cogent reason for delay in
filing the writ appeal.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submit that the writ
appeal is barred by delay and laches and further there is no cogent
reason or explanation has been given in the delay and laches
application filed for condonation of delay. Hence, the appeal is not
liable to be entertained.
We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties as also
perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the
instant writ appeal.
The primary question that arises for consideration before this Court is
whether the delay of about 68 days in preferring the present writ
appeal deserves to be condoned or not.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary,2024 INSC 932, while considering
the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:“5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court
beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v.
Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that
even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be
applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also
made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC
Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition
Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in
Paragraph 15 as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation
of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever,
amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court
did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation
application of the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay
has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and
circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient
cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his
legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was
a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in
unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is
not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of
the same is profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear
that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as
long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been
made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate
delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a
State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross
delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to
approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed
under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn
around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either
side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the
parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43
years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has
not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a
mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and
158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the
rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the
court must take into consideration while considering whether
the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix
their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is
held that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long,
it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that
the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits
of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally
balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not
merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public policy and principles
of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’
hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period
of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the
appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the
conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less
any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even
otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said
that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they
were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this
vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is
hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present
case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly
refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by
observing that such inordinate delay was not explained
satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and
no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we
are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred
in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical
attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery.
Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the
legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/ appeals well
within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be
caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such
case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring
the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials
functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were
involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery
touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before
the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s)
concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for
delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to
the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the
States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore
or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever
there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a
private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from
the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3
years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of
limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain
why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of
limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no
consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way
of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the
90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of
limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire
and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or
circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible
to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after
the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may
be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation
which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation
has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be
traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit
Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC
733).”
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in
the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the discretion to
condone delay has to be exercised with great caution and only upon a
clear and satisfactory demonstration of “sufficient cause.” The law is
well-settled that ignorance of law, by themselves, do not constitute
such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of advancing substantial
justice.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful
consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the delay of
68 days in filing the present appeal is grossly inordinate. The
explanation offered by the appellant cannot be treated as “sufficient
cause” in the eye of law.
The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks to
ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory period has
expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show diligence
and bona fides, and must explain satisfactorily the circumstances
which prevented timely action. In the present case, the appellant has
not been able to point out any circumstance arising within the period of
limitation which disabled them from approaching this Court.
Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for
condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of
delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence, the instant writ
appeal, being hopelessly barred by limitation, also stands dismissed
on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
inder
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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