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Serial No. 04
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl. Petn. No. 48 of 2022
Date of Decision: 10.02.2023
Shri. T. Pathaw
Vs.
Inspector of Police, CBI & Anr.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. S. Jindal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. K. Gurung, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
J U D G M E N T (O R A L)
1.
This is an application under Section 482 preferred by the
petitioner herein with a prayer to set aside and quash the FIR dated
10.12.2015 filed by the Head of Branch, CBI, ACB, Shillong and upon
investigation, a consequent chargesheet dated 31.12.2016 being filed
leading to the formal proceeding being CR Case No. 38(S) 2017 now
pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shillong with the
petitioner herein as the sole accused.
2.
Heard Mr. S. Jindal, learned counsel for the petitioner, who has
submitted that the background facts and circumstances of the case of the
petitioner is required to be placed before this Court to better understand
the issues involved.
3.
The learned counsel has then submitted that the petitioner herein
is the Chairman of M/s Ranger Security and Service Organisation dealing
mostly in the area of outsourcing of manpower to various organisation
requiring such manpower.
4.
North Eastern Indira Gandhi Regional Institute of Health and
Medical Sciences (NEIGRIHMS) has floated tender for availing the
services of outsource personnel at NEIGRIHMS, Shillong and the
petitioner’s Organisation being the successful bidder has thereafter
entered into an Agreement for Outsourcing Manpower dated 01.01.2012.
5.
Pointing out some relevant clauses from the said agreement,
particularly clauses 6, 7 and 15 of the same, the learned counsel has
submitted that it was agreed that the petitioner/Second Party shall deploy
the required manpower of NEIGRIHMS and such manpower shall be the
employees of the petitioner/Second Party. It was also incumbent upon the
petitioner/Second Party to ensure that due compliance with all statutory
obligations under all related legislations including compliance under the
provisions of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as EPF Act) and ESI Act,
etc., as far as the said personnel deployed are concerned. At this juncture,
the learned counsel has candidly admittedly that the petitioner at the
relevant point of time had failed to comply with the conditions and
provisions of the EPF Act as far as contribution toward the fund on the
part of the employer is concerned.
6.
Again, it is submitted that perhaps on some source information
or complaint, the respondent/CBI through its official had lodged an FIR
No. RC SHG 2015A0005 dated 10.12.2015 under Section 120(B)/420 IPC
read with Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988. In the said FIR it was alleged that one Shri. A.R. Myrthong (A-1),
Data Processing Assistant, NEIGRIHMS and Shri. T.S. Syngkon, (A-2)
Assistant Account Officer, NEIGRIHMS have entered into a criminal
conspiracy with each other and also with Shri. T. Pathaw (A-3), the
petitioner herein by abusing their official power/position to fraudulently
and dishonestly clear the monthly bills claimed by the accused (A-3),
towards deployment of manpower of various categories knowing fully
well that many of the employees deployed by A-3 have not registered with
EPF and ESI in clear violation of the terms and conditions of the tender
agreement and the amount paid by NEIGRIHMS towards wages, causing
wrongful loss to the Government of India to the tune of ₹ 46,79,025/- and
corresponding wrongful gain to themselves.
7.
On the matter being investigated, the Investigating Officer(I/O)
then filed a final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C before the Court of the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shillong, exonerating the role of A-1
and A-2 respectively, on the ground of insufficient evidence, but has
however implicated A-3, the petitioner herein as having committed an
offence under Section 420, 406 IPC for allegedly fraudulently and
dishonestly misappropriating an amount of ₹ 20,93,305/- meant for EPF.
The respondent/CBI has also submitted a list of 164 prosecution witnesses
and 640 voluminous documents to be proved. Accordingly, a regular case
being CR Case No. 38(S) 2017 was registered and is now pending before
the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shillong. The matter is
at the stage of consideration of charges.
8.
The learned counsel has submitted that looking into the totality
of the matter, if there is an allegation of breach of the provisions of the
said Agreement for Outsourcing Manpower, then the remedy would be a
civil remedy for breach of contract, but certainly, no element of
criminality can be inferred upon such breach of contract.
9.
The learned counsel has further submitted that the role of the
CBI in filing the charge sheet is questionable as the public servants
involved had been let off for lack of evidence whereas the petitioner who
is not a public servant has been implicated in the charge sheet. No offences
under the Prevention of Corruption Act have been made out, but instead
only offences under the Indian Penal Code are said to have been
committed by the petitioner and as such, the locus of the CBI as
complainant is questionable and the said charge sheet against the
petitioner ought not to have been filed in court.
10.
The main allegation against the petitioner is that he has
committed criminal breach of trust as well as cheating. However, under
Section 405 IPC, Explanation 2 of the same being relevant to the case of
the petitioner, the provision states that an employer who after having
deducted the employees’ contribution from their wages for the purpose of
contribution towards the Employees State Insurance Fund and if he makes
a default in the payment of such contribution, he is deemed to have
committed criminal breach of trust. In this case, there is no question of the
petitioner committing breach of trust as regard the employees’ share of the
Provident Fund as no such deduction has been made from the employees’
wages and admittedly, at the relevant point of time, the petitioner
(employer) has also not contributed his share of the same and as such, this
provision would not be attracted to the case of the petitioner.
11.
Similarly, there is no element of cheating as far as the conduct
of the petitioner is concerned, since in the light of the provision of Section
415 IPC, cheating involves a fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a
person to deliver any property to any person, thus, attracting the
punishment prescribed under Section 420 IPC, which is also not the case
herein as the petitioner has never induced any of his employees to part
with their property.
12.
Another limb of argument advanced by the learned counsel for
the petitioner is that prior to the filing of the aforesaid charge sheet on
31.12.2016, the EPF Authorities had already instituted proceedings
against the petitioner under the provisions of the EPF Act initiated vide
notice No. NE/SHG/AS/4234/7A/ENF/741 dated 24.02.2016 and such
proceedings has culminated in the passing of a formal assessment order
dated 20.11.2018 passed under Section 7A of the EPF Act by which, the
petitioner was assessed to be liable to pay an amount of ₹ 68,25,645/- in
addition to the amount of ₹ 2,64,96,754/- already deposited by him
towards the Employees’ Provident Fund. The said amount of ₹ 68,25,645/was also paid by Demand Draft dated 29.03.2019. Therefore, for the same
charges when the petitioner was made liable in one set of proceedings
under the EPF Act, the continuance of the present criminal proceedings
against him would be without basis and amounts to attracting the principle
of double jeopardy, it is further submitted.
13.
In support of his contention the learned counsel has cited the
case of Bajrang Mica Company (private) Ltd., & Ors. v. State of
Bihar & Anr.: 1990 SCC Online Pat 69 para 21 and also the case of E.
Hill & Company Ltd. v Regional Provident Funds: (1998) ILLJ 76 ALL
para 3.
14.
It is therefore prayed that this Court may be pleased to allow this
petition and to set aside and quash the said FIR and consequential criminal
proceedings against the petitioner.
15.
Per contra, Dr. N. Mozika, learned DSGI along with Ms. K.
Gurung, learned counsel, appearing for the respondents has submitted that
the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) empowered under the Delhi
Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, inter alia, is also
empowered to investigate into offences under the Indian Penal Code,
including offences under Sections 420 and 406 IPC respectively on the
strength of a notification issued by the Central Government pursuant to
the provision under Section 3 of the said DSPE Act.
16.
Alluding to the facts and circumstances of the case between the
parties, the learned DSGI has submitted that facts and circumstances
would reveal that the petitioner herein in terms of the said agreement
(supra) is responsible for the payment of wages to his employees and also
to comply with all existing statutory obligations including the required
registration under the EPF and ESI Act respectively. In the process, the
NEIGRIHMS was induced to release the wages meant for the said
employees out of which an amount of ₹ 20,93,305/- meant for contribution
towards the Employees Provident Fund was not deposited by the
petitioner, thereby constituting the offences of cheating and criminal
breach of trust and as such, the charge sheet wherein a prima facie case
under Section 420 and 406 IPC being found well established against the
petitioner, the prayer of the petitioner to quash the consequential criminal
proceedings cannot be allowed.
17.
On the submission of the petitioner that a proceeding was
initiated against the petitioner under the Employees’ Provident Fund Act,
particularly under Section 7A of the same in which an enquiry was
initiated against him and his Organisation and in the final analysis it was
found that the petitioner’s Organisation was required to clear the
outstanding dues amounting to ₹ 68,25,645/- which was also said to have
been cleared by the petitioner on 29.03.2019, the learned DSGI has
submitted that the petitioner’s complicity in the matter has not been finally
laid to rest and clearance of the outstanding dues would not absolve the
petitioner of the liability of the criminal offence as provided under Section
14 and other related provisions of the EPF Act.
18.
In support of this contention, the learned DSGI has referred to
the decision of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Anjuman
Tea Company Ltd. & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors.: 2007 SCC
Online Cal 463 para 24 wherein the High Court in a case in which the
facts and circumstances are similar to the present case, has observed that
“…This Court is, however, of the firm opinion that subsequent deposit,
though welcome, as it is better late than never, cannot and does not
absolve the accused persons of the liability of the criminal offence…”
19.
In a similar case, also cited by the learned DSGI, the Hon’ble
Calcutta High Court in the case of Ajay Jalan & Ors. v. State of West
Bengal & Anr., 2018 SCC Online Cal 1367 at para 22 has held as follows:
“22. In the instant case, admittedly, there was a default in
deposit of employees share of Provident Fund contribution for
the period in question which was deposited subsequently after
initiation of the instant proceeding. But mere payment of the
contributions after filing of the case will not absolve the
employer from his liability. Moreover, there is also neither any
law nor any decision that in case of subsequent payment of
employees share of Provident Fund contribution would result in
quashing of the proceeding though it can be a mitigating
circumstances to be taken into consideration in the event of the
employer/accused found guilty by the trial court. In the matter
of Sajjan Kumar Jhunjhunwala and Ors. (Supra) and Anjuman
Tea Company Ltd. and Ors. (Supra) also this court held that
subsequent deposit will not absolve the defaulter nor lead to
quashing of the proceeding.”
20.
Again, yet another judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court
in a case of Hotel Dock Palace (Private), Ltd. & Anr. v State of West
Bengal & Anr.: 2007 (3) L.L.N. 766 was cited by the learned DSGI
wherein in a case of similar nature involving Section 7A of the said EPF
Act, the High Court at para 10 has held that the fact that subsequent
payment was made is a necessary circumstance which should not miss the
attention of the learned Trial Court if and when the learned Trial Court
proceed to award punishment to the petitioners only when guilt is
established according to law.
21.
The learned DSGI has fairly submitted that in the event this
Court finds that there are no ingredients or evidence to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 420 and 406 IPC, however on the basis of the
authorities cited above, the competent authority may be allowed to
proceed against the petitioner under the other penal provisions of the EPF
Act including Section 14 of the same.
22.
This Court, on the submission and contention of the learned
counsels for the rival parties have given its anxious consideration to the
same. It appears that the issues involved here are two-fold, one which
concern the jurisdiction of the CBI and the other, the proceedings under
the EPF and ESI Act.
23.
Factually established, the CBI on some source information or
otherwise have found it fit to lodge an FIR implicating two persons who
are admittedly public servants being employees of NEIGRIHMS and the
petitioner herein who is a private individual, in a case under Section 120B,
420 IPC and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. At this stage, nobody has questioned the
jurisdiction of the CBI to launch prosecution. However, once investigation
is completed, the Investigating Officer has filed the final report under
Section 173 Cr.P.C and has come to the conclusion that no case is made
out against the two public servants, but instead a case under Section 420
and 406 IPC has been made out against the petitioner herein and the matter
was forwarded to the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Shillong for trial.
24.
The CBI is the premiere investigating agency of India known to
investigate several cases of corruption particularly under the PC Act, 1988
as well as other economic crimes or special crimes. The legal powers of
investigation of the CBI are derived from the DSPE Act, 1946. As pointed
out by the learned DSGI, Section 3 of the DSPE Act provides for offences
to be investigated by the CBI on being notified by the Central Government
in this regard. An extract from the CBI manual was produced in court by
the learned DSGI wherein under the heading Section 3, at column A, a list
of offences punishable under various sections of the Indian Penal Code
has been listed, Section 420 and 406 being included therein which can be
investigated upon by the CBI.
25.
However, under Section 6 of the said DSPE Act, if the CBI is to
operate in any of the States, consent of such State Government for exercise
of its powers and jurisdiction is required. By now, it is well settled that
CBI can investigate into cases involving offences under the PC Act,
however, when it comes to offences under the IPC which are generally
taken up and investigated into by the State or local police, if a particular
case involves provisions of offences under the PC Act as well as IPC then
the CBI would be well within its right to investigate into such cases, but
if, as in the present case, though initially the offences involves provisions
under the PC Act along with those under the IPC, which was rightfully
investigated into by the CBI, after the filing of the charge sheet wherein
only the provisions under the IPC remains, while the offences under the
provisions of the PC Act were dropped, including release of liabilities of
the public servants implicated therein, it stands to reason that the
jurisdiction of the CBI would ceased as on the date of filing of the charge
sheet. At this juncture, if the CBI is to continue prosecution, the specific
consent of the State is required. Admittedly, nothing is on record as to
whether such consent was given or not or whether the same was requested
or not. In view thereof, as submitted by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, that the charge sheet was forwarded by the CBI in the court of
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the same was without jurisdiction. On this
ground alone, the entire proceedings against the petitioner are vitiated.
26.
As to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that
even otherwise, prima facie, no offence against the petitioner is made out
under Section 406 and 420 IPC, as noted at para 10 and 11 above, this
Court on careful examination of the same is also persuaded to believe that
there are no ingredients under Section 406 and 420 IPC present in the
allegation against the petitioner since the issue revolves around the
question of contribution of the employer and the employees’ share
towards the Employees’ Provident Fund.
27.
The other aspect of the matter involves the provisions of the EPF
Act to which the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in
course of the investigation carried out by the CBI against the petitioner
and others, the EPF Authorities have initiated proceedings under Section
7A of the said Act and as submitted, though the petitioner has candidly
admitted initial default on his part, eventually as borne out by records, he
has, in totality paid about ₹ 3,33,22,399/- including pending dues, fines,
penalties, interests, etc., which was also reflected in the proceedings
before the Assessing Authority, Regional Office, Shillong of the
Employee’s Provident Fund and the final order dated 20.11.2018 passed
by the Regional P.F. Commissioner.
28.
In the case of Bajrang Mica Company (Private) Ltd. (supra), in a
matter under the EPF Act dealing with the provisions of Section 14(1-A)
the court at para 21 has observed that before filing of the case the
petitioners therein have complied with all the requirements, have paid
administrative charges, deposited the Provident Funds and filed returns,
the same not being brought to the notice of the sanctioning authority, the
sanctioning authority could not have permitted to file such criminal cases.
29.
In the case of E. Hill & Company (supra), the learned counsel for
the petitioner has referred to paragraph 3 of the same to only point out that
the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in that case has held that proceedings
under Section 7A of the EPF Act are quasi-judicial proceedings and as
such, in the context of the case of the petitioner herein, once the said
proceedings under Section 7A has been finally disposed of, another
proceeding, be it under Section 406 and 420 IPC cannot be prosecuted on
the same facts and circumstances as the principle of double jeopardy
would come into play and continuation of the latter proceedings would
prejudice the petitioner’s rights. In the context of the case of the petitioner
this argument is found relevant, though this Court in a different context
has held that the preference of the charge sheet by the CBI is vitiated visà-vis the proceedings under the provisions of Section 406 and 420 IPC.
30.
In the cases cited by the learned DSGI a common refrain is that
proceedings under the relevant provisions of the IPC can be continued or
initiated in spite of the dues as required under the EPF Act being satisfied
by the petitioner. In this regard, a look at the order dated 20.11.2018
passed by the said Regional PF Commissioner in the case concerning the
petitioner and his Organisation as aforementioned, would reveal that a
rider was inserted in the said order to the extent that it is indicated that the
order is passed without prejudice to any action to be taken by the
Department under Section 7C, 7Q, 8, 14 and 14B of the Employees’
Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 for the inquiry
period against the employer and the establishment. This, accordingly
would answer the contention of the learned DSGI in this regard.
31.
On an analysis of the case of the parties herein and the
observations made above, this Court would refer to the case of State of
Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajanlal & Ors.: 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335, wherein
the Hon’ble Supreme Court categorising instances or illustrations within
which the inherent power of the High Court under 482 can be exercised,
one such instance being para 102(1), this Court applying the principle
therein, is convinced that the petitioner has made out a case for his prayer
to be allowed. The said paragraph reads as follows:
“102.(1) Where the allegations made in first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused…”
32.
In the light of the above, this petition is hereby allowed, the FIR
dated 10.12.2015 filed by the Head of Branch, CBI, ACB, Shillong and
the related proceedings in CR Case No. 38(S) of 2017 before the court of
the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shillong are hereby set aside and
quashed.
33.
Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
10.02.2023
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