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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU &KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT
SRINANGAR
Reserved on:
30.06.2026
Pronounced on: 24.07.2026
Uploaded on:
24.07.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
LPA No.264/2022
SYEDA AFSHANA BHAT
...APPELLANT(S)
Through: - Mr. Salih Pirzada, Advocate.
Vs.
UNIVERSITY OF KASHMIR & ORS.
…RESPONDENT(S)
Through: - Mr. Asif Maqbool, Advocate.
Mr. S. M. Ayoub, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD. YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Sanjay Dhar ‘J’:
1)
The appellant/writ petitioner has called in question
judgment dated 28.09.2022 passed by the learned Single
Judge, whereby her writ petition, challenging placement of
private respondent No.6 in the Senior Scale of Assistant
Professors from a date prior to the date on which the writ
petitioner has been placed in the said scale, has been
dismissed.
2)
It appears that the writ petitioner had filed a writ petition
bearing WP(C) No.135/2021 against the respondents before
LPA No.264/2022
the
learned
Writ
No.F(Placement
19.05.2010,
MERC)
Sr.
Court
seeking
Scale-CAS)
communication
quashment
of
order
RC/KU/10/124
dated
bearing
Admn.TW/KU/19/6176
dated
No.F(Seniority-Ap.
27.04.2019
and
communication bearing No.F(MERC-Seniority)Adm-TW-2184
dated 08.01.2021. The writ petitioner had also sought a
direction commanding the official respondents to consider her
case for promotion to the post of Professor ahead of
respondent No.6.
3)
Vide impugned order dated 19.05.2010 (supra), while
placing the writ petitioner in senior scale of Assistant
Professor with effect from 17.05.2008, respondent No.6 has
been placed in the said scale with effect from 17.05.2007.
Vide communication dated 27.04.2019 (supra), the writ
petitioner has been informed by the official respondents that
respondent No.6 is figuring senior to her whereas, vide
impugned communication dated 08.01.2021 (supra), the
official respondents, while rejecting representation of the writ
petitioner, have informed her that services put in by
respondent No.6 as Assistant Professor on temporary basis
have been considered under Career Advance Scheme (CAS) in
the light of the UGC guidelines.
4)
Briefly stated the facts emanating from the pleadings
filed by the parties before the learned Writ Court are that the
LPA No.264/2022
writ petitioner and respondent No.6 had applied for the post
of Lecturer in Media Education and Research Centre (MERC),
which was notified for direct recruitment vide Advertisement
Notice
No.F-10(Appt-Gen)Adm/TW
dated
22.01.2002.
Pursuant to the selection process undertaken by the
respondent University, the writ petitioner came to be selected
for the solitary post which was advertised, and she was
appointed as Lecturer MERC in terms of order No. F-10(ApptGen)Adm/TW/02 dated 16.05.2002. It is pertinent to
mention here that vide the same order, respondent No.6 was
also appointed as Lecturer MERC on regular temporary basis,
though only one post of Lecturer MERC had been advertised
by the respondent University in terms of Advertisement Notice
dated 22.01.2002. The Syndicate of the respondent University
in its meeting held on 06.12.2003 confirmed the appointment
of the writ petitioner, pursuant whereto, vide order dated
03.04.2004, services of writ petitioner as Lecturer MERC were
confirmed with effect from 17.06.2003.
5)
It seems that respondent No.6 continued to discharge
her duties as Lecturer on regular temporary basis and in the
year 2007, she responded to Advertisement Notice No.F-10
(Apptt-Gen)RC/KU dated 20.07.2005, whereby applications
were invited, inter-alia, for two posts of Lecturers (Migrant)
MERC. This time, respondent No.6 made the grade and she
LPA No.264/2022
was selected and appointed as Lecturer on temporary basis
in
terms
of
order
No.F-10(Apptt-Gen)RC/KU
dated
08.12.2007. The said appointment of respondent No.6 was
ratified by the Syndicate and vide order dated 20.10.2017,
appointment of respondent No.6 as Assistant Professor
(previously Lecturer MERC) was confirmed with effect from
08.12.2008.
6)
On 19.05.2010, the respondent University issued an
order, impugned in the writ petition, whereby respondent
No.6 was placed in the senior scale of Assistant Professors in
MERC with effect from 17.05.2007, whereas the writ
petitioner was placed in the said scale with effect from
17.05.2008.
7)
In the year 2019, a representation came to be filed by
the writ petitioner, projecting her grievance against the
placement of respondent No.6 ahead of her. Vide impugned
communication dated 27.04.2019, the writ petitioner was
informed that respondent No.6 was senior to her and vide
another communication dated 08.01.2021, she was informed
that the services put in by respondent No.6 as Assistant
Professor on temporary basis have been counted in the light
of CAS of University Grants Commission regulations. It is at
this stage that the writ petitioner assailed the action of the
LPA No.264/2022
respondent University in placing respondent No.6 ahead of
her, by filing the writ petition before the learned Writ Court.
8)
Vide the impugned judgment passed by the learned
Single Judge, the writ petition has been dismissed on merits
as well as on the grounds of delay and laches. It has been
observed by the learned Writ Court that because the writ
petitioner did not choose to challenge the action of the official
respondents, whereby respondent No.6 was placed in the
senior scale of Assistant Professors from a date one year prior
to the date on which the writ petitioner was placed in the said
scale, for a long period of 11 years after passing of impugned
order dated 19.05.2010, which was, admittedly, within her
knowledge, the writ petition suffers from acquiescence on the
part of the writ petitioner and it is also hit by delay and laches.
Thus, the writ petitioner has lost the right to challenge the
impugned action of the respondent University. Even on
merits, the learned Single Judge did not find any substance
in the case set up by the writ petitioner.
9)
The writ petitioner has challenged the impugned
judgment of the learned Writ Court on the grounds that initial
appointment of respondent No.6 in the year 2002 was in
complete violation of the rules, as the same was made against
a non-existent post, as such, her appointment is fraudulent
in nature. It has been submitted
LPA No.264/2022
that because
the
appointment of respondent No.6 is in violation of the Articles
14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as such, the service
rendered by respondent No.6 pursuant to the said fraudulent
appointment, could not have been taken into consideration
while giving benefit to her under CAS. According to the writ
petitioner, the learned Single Judge has ignored the fact that
initial appointment of the respondent No.6 on regular
temporary basis in the year 2003 was not in accordance with
the prescribed selection procedure, as such, requirement of
sub-clause (e) of Regulation 10.1 of UGC Regulations was not
satisfied in her case so as to enable the University authorities
to give benefit of her temporary service while considering her
case for CAS. It has further contended that respondent No.6
could not have been given the benefit of CAS from a date when
she was not even substantively appointed to the post of
Assistant Professor. In this regard, it has been submitted that
respondent No.6 was appointed as Assistant Professor
(Lecturer) on substantive basis only on 8th December 2007,
but she has been bestowed the benefit of CAS with effect from
17.05.2007, which cannot be countenanced in law.
10)
On the question of delay and laches, it has been
contended that because the initial appointment of respondent
No.6 was fraudulent in nature, as such, equity cannot be
utilized to cure the said defect. It has further contended that
LPA No.264/2022
the learned Writ Court had come to the conclusion that
appointment of respondent No.6 is illegal in nature, therefore,
doctrine of acquiescence and waiver emanating from delay
could not have been pressed into service.
11)
We have heard learned counsel the parties and perused
the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge,
the grounds of challenge projected by the appellant and
record of the case.
12)
Much emphasis has been laid by learned counsel for the
writ petitioner on the argument that initial appointment of
respondent No.6 as Lecturer MERC in terms of order dated
16.05.2002, was made on a non-existent post which had not
been advertised by the respondent University, therefore, her
appointment was illegal and fraudulent in nature and once it
is so, the service rendered by respondent No.6 pursuant to
her said appointment cannot be counted for the purpose of
considering her case under CAS. Reference in this regard has
been made to sub-clause (e) of Regulation 10.1 of the UGC
regulations, which provides that post must have been filled in
accordance with the prescribed selection procedure as laid
down
in
the
regulations
of
the
University
for
such
appointment. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has
placed reliance upon the ratio laid down by the Supreme
Court in the cases of District Collector & Chairman,
LPA No.264/2022
Vizianagaram v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC
655, Krishna Rai (Dead) through Legal Representatives &
Ors. v. Banaras Hindu University & Ors. (2022) 8 SCC713,
Renu v. District and Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari, AIR 2014
SC 2175, Amrit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand and others,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 280, and Division Bench judgment of
this Court in the case of Tabassum Qadir Parray & Ors. v.
High Court of J&K and anr. (SWP No.1577/2018 decided on
06.05.2026), to contend that once the appointment of
respondent No.6 as Lecturer on regular temporary basis to a
post which was not advertised in terms of the Advertisement
Notice dated 22.01.2002, the same was fraudulent in nature,
as such, the learned Writ Court could not have dismissed the
writ petition of the writ petitioner, either on merits or on the
ground of delay and laches.
13)
There can be no quarrel with the legal position that an
appointment made to a post which has not been advertised
and which did not form the subject matter of the selection in
terms of the Advertisement Notice, is an illegal appointment,
and the same cannot be termed to be an appointment made
in accordance with the Recruitment Rules of the University.
However, the facts and circumstances of the present case are
somewhat different. It is true that only one post of Lecturer
MERC was advertised by the respondent University vide
LPA No.264/2022
Advertisement Notice dated 22.01.2002. It is an admitted
case of the parties that not only the writ petitioner but
respondent No.6 also participated in the selection process.
While the writ petitioner was appointed to the vacant post on
substantive basis in terms of order dated 16.05.2002, the
appointment of respondent No.6 was made on a regular
temporary basis from the same date. She came to be
appointed on substantive basis as Lecturer against migrant
vacancy only on 08.12.2007 but she continued to function as
Lecturer with effect from 16.05.2022 to 08.12.2007 on
regular temporary basis.
14)
In the present case, services of respondent No.6 have not
been confirmed on the post on which she had been appointed
on temporary basis on 16.05.2002 but her services were
confirmed with effect from 08.12.2008 after her appointment
on substantive basis on a migrant vacancy on 08.12.2007.
However, respondent No.6 continued to function as Lecturer
from 16.05.2002 to 08.12.2007 on stopgap/temporary basis.
Thus, it is not a case where initial appointment of respondent
No.6 as Lecturer can be termed as illegal against a nonexistent post but it is a case where her initial appointment
was temporary or fortuitous in nature and she was allowed to
function on stopgap basis after she, along with others, had
participated in the selection process, though the said process
LPA No.264/2022
was initiated only for filling up of one clear vacancy to which
the writ petitioner was appointed. Had it been a case where
services of respondent No.6 would have been confirmed with
effect
from
the
date,
she
was
appointed
temporary/stopgap
basis,
then
certainly
her
on
initial
appointment would have qualified to be fraudulent in nature
because only one post was put advertisement to which the
writ petitioner was appointed. However, it is a case where
services of respondent No.6 have been confirmed after her
substantive appointment and only the benefit of services put
in by her on temporary basis has been given to her in terms
of CAS. Thus, the very basis of the argument of learned
counsel for the writ petitioner that initial appointment of
respondent No.6 was against a non-existent post in
derogation of the rules and, therefore illegal, is misconceived.
Once it is held so, the consequent argument of learned
counsel for the writ petitioner that respondent No.6 could not
have been granted the benefit of the service which she had
rendered on temporary basis for the purpose of counting her
service in connection with grant of benefit under CAS, is
without any substance.
15)
It is to be noted that requirements in terms of sub-
clauses (e) and (f) of Regulation 10.1 of the UGC Regulations,
which have been quoted by the learned Writ Court in the
LPA No.264/2022
impugned judgment, clearly stand satisfied in the case of
respondent No.6, and therefore, she was entitled to be given
the benefit of the service which she had rendered as Lecturer
on temporary basis with effect from 2002 to 2007. Upon
according benefit of the said service to her and after taking
into account the fact that she was holding M.Phil degree, the
official respondents have rightly conferred the benefit of
senior scale in favour of respondent No.6 after completion of
five years of service as Assistant Professor with effect from
17.05.2007. In the case of the writ petitioner, she was rightly
granted senior scale after completion of six years of service on
17.05.2008 because she was holding only a postgraduate
degree.
16)
So far as contention of the writ petitioner that
respondent No.6 could not have been granted senior scale
under CAS from a date when she was not even appointed on
substantive
basis,
is
concerned,
the
same
is
also
misconceived because Regulation 10.1 of UGC Regulations
provides that previous service in certain circumstances has
to be counted for direct recruitment and promotion under
CAS of a teacher as Assistant Professor, Associate Professor
and
Professor.
The
expression
used
is
“counted
for
promotion”, and not “for eligibility to promotion”. There is a
fine distinction between the two expressions. When past
LPA No.264/2022
service is to be counted for grant of higher scale and the
Regulations provide that for according said higher scale under
CAS, a particular number of years has to be put in by an
incumbent, once it is shown that the said person has put in
that particular number of years in service in a lower scale of
pay, he becomes automatically entitled to higher scale of pay
whereas in the case of eligibility conditions for promotion, the
past service can only be considered as a condition for
ascertaining the eligibility for promotion to the higher post.
Promotion to a post, under normal circumstances, is available
only if a post is vacant but, in the case of grant of higher scale
under CAS, an incumbent is entitled to be granted higher
scale of pay after putting in a particular number of years of
service, irrespective of the fact whether or not the post in
higher scale of pay is available. Therefore, the fact that
respondent No.6, has been granted upgradation under CAS
from a date when she was not even substantively appointed
to the post, is legally permissible.
17)
That takes us to the issue of delay and laches. As already
stated, the initial appointment of respondent No.6 to the post
of Lecturer was not illegal in nature, but it was a stop-gap
arrangement
made
by
the
respondent
University
by
appointing the said respondent, who had also participated in
the selection process for the post to which the writ petitioner
LPA No.264/2022
was appointed, by considering her performance in the said
selection process. It is an admitted case of the writ petitioner
that respondent No.6 was granted higher scale of pay in terms
of order dated 19.05.2010 and vide the same order, the writ
petitioner was also granted senior scale, though from a date
one year after the date on which respondent No.6 was granted
the senior scale. Thus, the writ petitioner cannot plead her
ignorance about the issuance of the aforesaid order. She
approached the Court only in the year 2021 to challenge the
order issued in May 2010, which is after more than ten years.
For the first time in the year 2019, she made a representation
against the impugned action of the official respondents.
18)
Thus, there has been inordinate delay and laches on the
part of the writ petitioner in challenging the impugned action
of the official respondents.
The writ petitioner has not
tendered any explanation whatsoever, in her writ petition for
the delay in approaching the Court. Thus, she has acquiesced
in the impugned action of the official respondents and allowed
the seniority of the Lecturers to settle, as a result which,
another order came to be issued on 19.10.2020 by the
respondent University, whereby respondent No.6 has been
upgraded to the next level of Associate Professor with effect
from 17.05.2015 ahead of the writ petitioner, who has been
upgraded to the said level with effect from 17.08.2016. The
LPA No.264/2022
writ petitioner has, thus, allowed the respondent University
to act upon the impugned order dated 19.05.2010.
19)
The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated the legal
position, that if the claim involves issues relating to seniority
or promotion etc., affecting others, the delay would render the
claim stale and the doctrine of laches/limitation has to be
applied. (Refer Union of India vs. Tarseem Singh, (2008) 8
SCC 648).
20)
Recently, the Supreme Court has, in the case of T.
Gnanavel v. R. Sasipriya and others, 2026 LiveLaw (SC)
457, after analyzing its previous decisions on the issue, held
that fence-sitters cannot be permitted to raise a dispute
relating to seniority and consequential promotion or challenge
the validity of an order after the matter has concluded. The
Supreme Court has further held that no party can claim relief
as a matter of right and one of the well-recognized grounds
for refusing relief is that the person approaching the Court is
guilty of delay and laches. The Court went on to hold that
while exercising public law jurisdiction, the Court does not
encourage the agitation of stale claims, particularly in the
matters of seniority and promotion, where the rights of third
parties have crystallized in the interregnum.
LPA No.264/2022
21)
In view of the aforesaid legal position, the petition filed
by the writ petitioner was otherwise not maintainable on the
ground of delay and laches.
22)
For what has been discussed hereinabove, we do not
find any illegality, much less perversity, in the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Writ Court that would
warrant interference by this Court. The appeal lacks merit
and is dismissed accordingly.
(Mohd. Yousuf Wani)
Judge
(Sanjay Dhar)
Judge
SRINAGAR
24.07.2026
“Bhat Altaf-Secretary”
Whether the judgment is reportable: YES/NO
LPA No.264/2022
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