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[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
(1) S. B. Civil Revision Petition No. 12/2023
1.
M/s Anondita Healthcare through its Proprietor Anupam
Ghosh S/o Shri S.k. Ghosh, R/o A-33-A, Sector -8, Noida,
District Gautam Budh Nagar (Uttar Pradesh)
2.
Anupam Ghosh S/o Shri S.k. Ghosh, Proprietor M/s
Anondita Healthcare R/o A-33-A, Sector-8, Noida, District
Gautam Budh Nagar, (Uttar Pradesh)
----Petitioners/Plaintiffs
Versus
1.
Faiz Mohammad S/o Abdul Rahim,
2.
Mohammad Imran S/o Abdul Rahim,
Both
are
resident
of
Village
Thana
Bhawan
District
Muzaffarnagar, U.P.
----Respondents/Judgment Debtors
3.
SWEAR Healthcare through its Director Sanjeev Gaur S/o
Shri Ramjilal, R/o F-374, RIICO Growth Centre, Extension,
Dholpur.
4.
Sanjeev
Gaur
S/o
Shri
Ramji
Lal,
Director
SWEAR
Healthcare R/o F-374, RIICO Growth Centre, Extension,
Dholpur.
----Respondents/Applicant/Judgment Debtors
5.
Harish Gupta (Harsh) S/o Unknown, R/o House No.24,
West Arjun Nagar, Agra (Uttar Pradesh).
6.
Ashutosh Tiwari S/o Unknown, R/o House No.24, West
Arjun Nagar, Agra (Uttar Pradesh).
7.
Manish Pachori S/o Unknown, R/o House No.24, West
Arjun Nagar, Agra (Uttar Pradesh).
----Respondents/Judgment Debtors
Connected With
(2) S. B. Civil Revision Petition No. 273/2022
1.
Sware Health Care Pvt. Ltd. through its Director Sanjeev
Goud S/o Shri Ramjilal R/o F-374, RIICO Growth Center,
Extention, Dholpur.
2.
Sanjeev Goud S/o Shri Ramjilal, Director Sware Health
Care Pvt. Ltd., R/o F-374, RIICO Growth Center Extention,
Dholpur.
----Petitioners/Applicants
(2 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
Versus
1.
M/s Anondita Healthcare, through Proprietor Anupam
Ghosh S/o Shri S.K. Ghosh, R/o A-33- A. Sector-8, Noida,
District Gautam Buddha Nagar (UP).
2.
Anupam Ghosh S/o Shri S.K. Ghosh, Proprietor M/s
Anondita Healthcare, R/o A-33-A. Sector-8, Noida, District
Gautam Buddha Nagar (UP).
Respondent/Non-Applicant/Decree Holder
3.
Faiz Muhammad S/o Abdul Rahim,
4.
Mohammad Imran S/o Abdul Rahim,
All Resident Village Police Station Building District Muzaffar
Nagar (Uttar Pradesh).
5.
Harish Gupta (Harsh) S/o Naamaloom,
6.
Ashutosh Tiwari S/o Naamaloon,
7.
Manish Pachauri S/o Naamaloom,
All Resident R/o House No. 24, West Arjun Nagar Agra
(Uttar Pradesh).
----Respondents/Non Applicant
For Petitioners
:
Mr. R.D. Rastogi, Senior Advocate
assisted by Mr. Devesh Yadav
Advocate, Mr. Kunal Sharma Advocate,
Ms. Manasvi Tyagi Advocate, Mr.
Tushar Kumar Advocate, Mr. Rajat
Sharma Advocate and Mr. Sarthak
Rastogi Advocate.
For Respondents
:
Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, Senior
Advocate assisted by Mr. Madhusudan
Purohit Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
Date of conclusion of arguments
::
16.01.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved ::
Whether the full judgment or only
16.01.2026
the operative part is pronounced
::
Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement
::
24.01.2026
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
1.
(3 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
Both the aforesaid revision petitions, one filed by the
decree-holder (S. B. Civil Revision Petition No. 12/2023) and the
other filed by the Objector-Judgment debtors (S. B. Civil Revision
Petition No. 273/2022), have arisen out of the common order dated
11.11.2022 passed by the District Judge, Dholpur, acting as the
Executing Court (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Executing
Court'), while deciding Applications No. 15/2021 and 16/2021 filed
under Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. By
the said order, the attachment of one machine was maintained,
whereas the other machine was directed to be released from
attachment. In view of the common origin and interrelated issues
involved, both the revision petitions were heard analogously and
are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2.
The aforesaid revision petitions were earlier decided by
co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 21.04.2025.
Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 21.04.2025, Decree
Holders-M/s Anondita Healthcare & Another filed Civil Appeal Nos.
11733-11734 of 2025 arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 23254-23255
of 2025 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein vide order
dated 03.09.2025, while setting aside order dated 21.04.2025, the
Hon'ble Apex Court remitted the matter back to this Court for fresh
consideration.
3.
In the light of directions given by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the above revision petitions were listed on priority basis and
learned Senior Counsels appearing for the parties have been heard
at length for fresh consideration by this court.
(4 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
Brief facts:
4.
For the purpose of convenience, facts stated in S. B. Civil
Revision Petition No. 12/2023 have been taken into consideration.
The revision petition filed by the Decree-holders under Section 115
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter to be referred as
'CPC') is directed against orders dated 11.11.2022 for releasing one
machine from attachment during execution proceedings and order
dated 07.12.2021 passed by the Executing Court, whereby Decreeholder’s application seeking permission to lead additional evidence
was rejected.
5.
It is stated that the Decree holder-Petitioner No.1 is a
proprietorship concern engaged in the manufacture and supply of
non-drug surgical items and Petitioner No.2 is its proprietor. The
Decree holders claim to have developed and owned the design,
technology and specifications of machines used for manufacturing
surgical gloves around the year 2009. For fabrication, Abdul
Rahman and his sons, Faiz Mohd. and Mohd. Imran, were engaged.
One MOU dated 20.12.2013 was executed by the petitioners-decree
holders with Mr. A.K. Salwan, then General Manager of the
petitioner firm, to ensure confidentiality.
6.
Fabrication was commenced and two machines were
completed by November, 2015. Apprehending unauthorised use of
the
design
of
machines,
the
petitioners
executed
another
agreement dated 18.10.2015 with Respondent No.1, Faiz Mohd, the
fabricator. Despite confidentiality agreement and in violation of the
agreement, the design of machine was shared by the Respondent
no. 1 to Respondent No.3, Swear Healthcare and on the basis of
(5 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
such design in quite unauthorised manner, Respondent No. 1
fabricated machines for the Respondent No. 3.
7.
Thereupon,
petitioners/decree-holders
instituted
Civil
Suit No.101/2016 before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Gautam Budh Nagar, Noida (U.P.), seeking permanent injunction
impleading Faiz Mohd. as Defendant No.1, his brother Mohd. Imran
as Defendant No. 2, Swear Health Care as Defendant No. 3,
Ashutosh Tiwari, an employee of Swear Health Care, as Defendant
No. 4 and Manish Pachori, Director of Swear Health Care as
Defendant No. 5 and also lodged FIR No.115/2016 at Police Station
Sector-20, District Gautam Budh Nagar, Nodia under Sections 420,
467, 468, 471 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code. The defendants
did not appear in Civil Suit despite service of summons, hence, the
trial court proceeded ex-parte against the defendants. By judgment
and decree dated 09.02.2017, an Ex-parte decree of permanent
injunction
was
passed
against
the
defendants.
Thereafter,
application filed by the judgment-debtors under Order IX Rule 13
CPC was dismissed in default and even restoration application was
dismissed for non-prosecution. Thus, the judgment and decree
dated 09.02.2017 has attained finality.
8.
Alleging violation of the decree, the petitioners filed
Execution Case No.65/2019 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Gautam Budh Nagar, Noida (U.P.). Vide order dated 20.03.2021,
attachment of surgical gloves manufacturing machines installed at
the factory of Respondent No.3 at Dholpur was ordered by the
Court at Gautam Budh Nagar. However, as the factory and
machines
of
Respondent
No.
was
beyond
the
territorial
jurisdiction of Gautam Budh Nagar Court, a certificate of non-
(6 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
satisfaction of decree was issued on 23.07.2021 and the execution
petition was transferred to the District Court, Dholpur, where it was
registered
as
Execution
Case
No.34/2021
(Civil
Misc.
Case
No.15/2021). Executing Court at Dholpur proceeded further and
issued
warrants
of
attachment,
which
were
executed
on
07.08.2021, for attaching two machines lying in the factory
premises of the Respondent No. 3.
9.
Respondent No.3 being one of the judgment debtor filed
objections under Section 47 CPC questioning maintainability of the
execution petition as well as executability of the decree, and also
filed an application under Section 151 CPC seeking release of the
machines, relying upon alleged agreements dated 29.01.2015 and
20.06.2020. Only photocopy of the agreement dated 29.01.2015
was produced by the Objector-judgment-debtor to show a separate
agreement of Respondent No. 2 & 3 for fabrication of the machines.
The petitioners/decree holders opposed the objections contending
that the documents were inadmissible and that the objections were
beyond the scope of Section 47 CPC.
10.
Vide order dated 14.09.2021, the learned District Judge
directed to release one machine. The said order was challenged by
the petitioners-decree holders before this Court in Civil Revision
No.114/2021, which was allowed vide order dated 20.10.2021 with
a direction to decide the matter afresh after granting opportunity to
both the parties to lead evidence.
11.
Upon
remand,
Respondent
No.3/objector-judgment-
debtor examined Sanjeev Gaur and Ashutosh Tiwari in support his
objections under Section 47 CPC and application under Section 151
CPC. That apart, an application under Section 65 of the Indian
(7 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
Evidence Act, 1872 was filed seeking permission to lead secondary
evidence of the agreement dated 29.01.2015. Vide order dated
30.10.2021, the
learned
Executing Court observed
that the
conditions for leading secondary evidence were not satisfied, but
application under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 filed
by the objector-judgment debtor was not finally decided by the
Executing Court. Whereas, while opposing the objections and
application filed by the objector-Judgment-debtor, the petitionersdecree holders examined Chandrapal Singh and Manoj Singh in
support of their case.
12.
dated
The petitioners/decree-holders also filed an application
04.12.2021
for
seeking
permission
to
lead
additional
evidence and to examine Mr. A.K. Salwan as an additional witness,
which was rejected vide order dated 07.12.2021.
13.
After conclusion of evidence, the learned District Judge,
vide impugned order dated 11.11.2022, again directed release of
one machine from attachment allegedly manufactured on the basis
of agreement dated 29.01.2015 and maintained the attachment in
respect of machined fabricated pursuant to subsequent agreement
dated 20.06.2020.
14.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 11.11.2022, the
petitioner/decree-holders
have
preferred
the
revision
petition
challenging the aforesaid order to the extent to which directions for
releasing one of the machine has been issued by the Executing
Court and the objector-judgment debtor has also filed another
revision petition questioning the aforesaid order insofar as the
attachment of one the machine has been maintained by the
Executing Court.
(8 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
I.A. No. 01/2025 and I.A. No. 02/2025
15.
During the pendency of the present revision petitions,
the decree-holders moved two interim applications, being I.A. No.
01/2025 and I.A. No. 02/2025, seeking permission to place certain
additional documents on record. The documents sought to be
introduced primarily pertain to an attempt on the part of the
decree-holders to question the veracity, genuineness and even the
existence of the agreement dated 21.09.2015. In addition thereto,
the decree-holders also sought to place on record a certificate
issued under the Designs Act, evidencing registration of the design
of the machine in question, which certificate was admittedly issued
after the judgment and decree dated 09.02.2017. Learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the decree-holders submitted that the said
documents are relevant and necessary for a just and proper
adjudication of the issues involved in the present revision petitions
and, therefore, ought to be taken on record in the interest of
justice.
16.
The aforesaid applications were vehemently opposed by
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the objector-judgmentdebtor,
who
contended
that
the
applications
are
wholly
misconceived and not maintainable in law. It was argued that there
is no provision under Section 115 CPC permitting the production of
additional evidence or documents at the stage of a revision petition.
It was further submitted that in the earlier Revision Petition No.
114/2021 filed by the decree-holders, while remanding the matter
vide order dated 20.10.2021, this Court had specifically granted
opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence in support of
their respective cases before the Executing Court. The decree-
(9 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
holders had availed such opportunity and were never prevented
from placing any document on record at that stage. Having failed to
do so, they cannot now be permitted to fill up the lacunae by
seeking to introduce additional material at the revisional stage.
17.
It was also pointed out that the efforts to procure the
documents now sought to be brought on record were admittedly
undertaken by the decree-holders only after the passing of the
impugned
order
by
the
Executing
Court.
Such
documents,
therefore, were neither before the Executing Court, nor formed part
of the record on the basis of which the impugned order was passed.
Learned counsel submitted that the present revision petitions are
required to be decided strictly on the basis of the material that was
available before the Executing Court and that any subsequent
material cannot be taken into consideration. On these grounds, it
was urged that I.A. No. 01/2025 and I.A. No. 02/2025 deserve to
be dismissed.
18.
Having
heard
arguments
on
the
above
interim
applications and considered the record, this Court is also of the
considered view that the applications seeking to place additional
documents on record in the present civil revision petitions are
wholly
misconceived
and
not
maintainable.
The
revisional
jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is confined to examining the
legality, jurisdictional error, or material irregularity in the impugned
order passed on the basis of material available before the court
below, and does not permit enlargement of the evidentiary record
or introduction of fresh material which was not before the court
below. This limitation assumes greater significance where the
revision itself arises out of an order passed under Section 47 CPC,
(10 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
inasmuch as proceedings under Section 47 are circumscribed to
questions
relating
strictly
to
the
execution,
discharge,
or
satisfaction of the decree. Permitting additional documents at the
revisional stage would not only amount to allowing the revisional
court to travel beyond the scope of Section 115 CPC, but would also
indirectly enable supplementation of the execution record, which is
impermissible in law. Such a course would defeat the finality of
adjudication and convert a limited revisional scrutiny into a de facto
appellate exercise, which is totally impermissible under law.
Accordingly, I.A. No. 01/2025 and 02/2025 filed by the decree
holders for taking additional documents on record are hereby
dismissed.
Rival Submissions on Revision Petitions :
Arguments on behalf of Decree-holders:
19.
Mr.
Rajdeepak
Rastogi,
Learned
Senior
Counsel
appearing for the decree holder submits that the impugned order
dated 11.11.2022, containing directions to release one of the
machine suffers from patent illegality, material irregularity and
jurisdictional error. It is contended that the learned Executing Court
has passed the order to that extent against the settled principles
governing execution proceedings.
20.
Learned Senior Counsel contended that the scope of
objections maintainable under Section 47 CPC is extremely limited.
It was submitted that once a decree has been passed in clear,
explicit, and unambiguous terms and has attained finality, the
Executing Court is not entitled to entertain objections which, in
substance, seek to reopen or challenge the correctness, legality, or
propriety of the decree. The only exception carved out by law,
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(11 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
according to learned counsel, is where the decree is shown to have
been passed by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction or where the
decree is otherwise a nullity in the eyes of law. In all other
circumstances, the Executing Court has no authority to go behind
the decree or to travel beyond its terms. It is under a statutory
obligation to execute the decree strictly in accordance with its tenor
and to give effect to it as it stands, without adding to, subtracting
from, or modifying the same.
21.
It was further submitted that an Executing Court does
not possess the jurisdiction to record fresh evidence and is required
to confine itself to the pleadings and evidence already adduced
before the Trial Court while passing the decree. The Executing
Court is duty-bound to execute the decree as it stands and cannot
assume the role of a court of first instance by undertaking an
exercise to take fresh evidence to enlarge the scope of objections
under Section 47 CPC. Learned Senior Counsel contended that even
the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction in the earlier
Revision Petition No. 114/2021 filed by the petitioners-decree
holders challenging the order of the Executing Court, could not
have directed the Executing Court to record fresh evidence upon
remand, and even if directed, such directions of this court were
without jurisdiction, as such a course of action is patently contrary
to the settled principles governing execution proceedings. Any
direction permitting the Executing Court to take additional evidence
would, according to learned Senior Counsel, amount to enlarging
the scope of execution proceedings beyond what is permissible
under law and would defeat the finality attached to the decree.
(12 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
22.
[CR-12/2023]
It was further argued by learned Senior Counsel that
photocopy of the alleged agreement dated 29.01.2015 could not
have been read in evidence in the absence of the original
document, as mandated by Sections 62 and 64 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872. No notice under Section 66 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 was ever issued to any of the former directors
or alleged custodians of the original agreement. Learned Senior
Counsel emphasises that the impugned order does not record any
finding that either the existence or the contents of the alleged
agreement dated 29.01.2015 were proved in accordance with
Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the absence of any
such finding and without
allowing application for permitting
secondary evidence, the Executing Court could not have relied upon
the alleged agreement to release one machine from attachment.
Moreso, when the aforesaid document was not marked as an
exhibit by the Executing Court during evidence.
23.
It
was
further
contended
that
the
respondents
deliberately suppressed the fact that they were never in possession
of the original agreement. They maintained complete silence on this
aspect and created an impression that the original existed and was
available. Only after the decree holder objected to admissibility of
the photocopy on 26.10.2021, the respondents filed an application
dated 27.10.2021 seeking permission to lead secondary evidence.
It is submitted that such conduct disentitled the respondents from
any indulgence under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
as foundational facts were neither pleaded nor established.
24.
Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the learned
Executing Court itself, by order dated 30.10.2021, had categorically
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(13 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
held that the respondents had not satisfied the conditions for
leading secondary evidence and that a mere statement of nonavailability of the original was insufficient. However, without
recording any subsequent finding that such deficiency was cured,
the learned District Judge proceeded to pass the impugned order
dated 11.11.2022 releasing one machine solely on the basis of the
same inadmissible document. This, it is submitted, amounts to a
clear contradiction of the court’s own earlier order.
25.
It is argued that none of the contingencies contemplated
under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 were fulfilled. No
effort whatsoever was made to summon the original agreement,
nor was any notice under Section 66 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 issued. Such omission, according to learned Senior Counsel,
itself gives rise to an inference that the alleged agreement never
existed.
26.
Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the alleged
agreement dated 29.01.2015 is a single-page document containing
no specifications, design, dimensions or technical details of the
surgical gloves machine. This, by itself, establishes that no design
was ever provided by Swear Healthcare and that the machines in
question were manufactured using the design acquired by Mohd.
Imran during his employment with the decree holder.
27.
Heavy reliance is placed on the testimony of AW-1, who
admitted that he never demanded the original agreement dated
29.01.2015 from former directors, nor did he issue any notice for
its production, and was unaware of even the names of the
executants or witnesses to the alleged agreement. His admission
that Swear Healthcare was not carrying on any production at the
(14 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
time of its acquisition in January 2019 is stated to conclusively
establish that no machines existed prior to the decree dated
09.02.2017 and that the machines were fabricated thereafter in
violation of the decree.
28.
It is further argued that AW-1 deliberately withheld
documents executed at the time of acquisition of Swear Healthcare,
as those documents did not reflect purchase of any machine or
reference
to
the
alleged
agreement
dated
29.01.2015.
His
admission that the photocopy of the agreement was not even
received from former directors is relied upon to submit that the
document is fabricated and non-genuine.
29.
Learned Senior Counsel submitted that testimony of AW-
2 also demolishes the respondents’ case. AW-2 admitted that he
did not see Mohd. Imran making any machine and that he merely
made a telephonic enquiry about the agreement, without even
disclosing the name of the person contacted. No attempt was made
to summon such person. It is argued that AW-2 is a wholly
interested witness, being a defendant in the original suit, an
accused in the criminal case, a former employee of the decree
holder, a present employee of Swear Healthcare, and an alleged
witness to the agreement itself. His testimony, riddled with
contradictions, could not have been relied upon.
30.
Learned Senior Counsel further submits that even
assuming the agreement dated 29.01.2015 existed, there is no
evidence of any payment made thereunder, no bank statement, no
cash receipt, and no record of procurement of raw materials for
fabrication of any machine. In contrast, the testimony of NAW-1
and NAW-2, supported by Exhibits NA/1 to NA/139, conclusively
(15 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
establishes that the design belonged to the decree holder and was
illegally used by Mohd. Imran after acquiring knowledge of such
design during his employment with the decree holder.
31.
It is contended that the Executing Court exceeded its
jurisdiction under Section 47 CPC by virtually conducting a retrial of
the original suit and by adjudicating issues which stood concluded
by the decree dated 09.02.2017. The impugned order is stated to
be a mere reiteration of the earlier order dated 14.09.2021, which
had already been set aside by this Court.
32.
Learned
Senior
Counsel
also
assailed
order
dated
07.12.2021, submitting that rejection of the decree holder’s
application dated 04.12.2021 to examine Mr. A.K. Salwan caused
grave prejudice. The testimony of the said witness would have
conclusively established the source of the design and the manner in
which it was illegally transferred.
33.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the impugned order
insofar as it relates to releasing one of the machine is considered,
has been passed mechanically, without application of mind, in
excess of jurisdiction, and in complete disregard of statutory
provisions
and
evidence
on
record,
and
therefore
warrant
interference by this Hon’ble Court under Section 115 CPC. Learned
Senior Counsel, in support of his arguments, has relied upon the
decisions in the cases of Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs.
Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101; State of U.P. & Another vs.
Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. & Another, (1991) 4 SCC 139;
Brakewel Automotive Components (India) Private Limited
vs. P.R. Selvam Alagappan, (2017) 5 SCC 371; R.V.E.
Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P.
(16 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
Temple & Another, (2003) 8 SCC 752; Life Insurance
Corporation of India & Another vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen,
(2010) 4 SCC 491; State of Punjab & Others vs. Mohinder
Singh Randhawa & Another, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 49; Sunder
Dass vs. Ram Prakash, (1977) 2 SCC 662; Rahul S. Shah vs.
Jinendra Kumar Gandhi & Others, (2021) 6 SCC 418; Kaliya
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 10 SCC 758; A.V.
Papayya Sastry & Others vs. Govt. of A.P. & Others, (2007) 4
SCC 221; decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of
Pothuri Thulasidas vs. Portu Nageswara Rao, 2004 SCC
OnLine AP 673; decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Indore
in the cases of Kalabai & Others vs. Durgabai & Others, (Misc.
Petition No. 1799 of 2024 decided on 19.07.2024); Ratanlal
s/o Bagdu vs. Kishanlal s/o Mangilal & Others, 2012 (1)
M.P.L.J. 120; decision of Delhi High Court in the case of S.
Gurbachan Singh & Others vs. Geeta Issar (CM(M) 576/2023
decided on 12.04.2023).
Arguments on behalf of Objector/ Judgment-debor:
34.
Per
Contra,
Mr. Kamlakar Sharma,
learned
Senior
Counsel appearing for the judgment debtor submitted that the
impugned order, to the extent of maintaining attachment on one of
the machine, suffers from serious errors of law, fact and jurisdiction
and therefore warrants interference. It is contended that the
learned Executing Court erred in not releasing the second machine
and, to that extent, the impugned order is unsustainable.
35.
It is argued that the Executing Court acted without
jurisdiction in ordering attachment of the machines installed at the
factory premises of the petitioner company, as the decree dated
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(17 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
09.02.2017 does not direct attachment of any machine. The decree
is limited in scope and merely restrains Defendant No.1 from
disclosing designs to third parties in violation of the agreement
dated 18.10.2015. In the absence of any specific direction in the
decree regarding attachment, seizure or restraint on use of
machines, the Executing Court could not have exercised jurisdiction
to attach the machines and such exercise of power is contrary to
law.
36.
Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the
Executing Court at Gautam Budh Nagar, UP, lacked territorial
jurisdiction to proceed with the execution proceedings insofar as
they related to the machine admittedly lying outside its territorial
jurisdiction at Dholpur. It was submitted that in terms of Section 39
CPC, where the Court which passed the decree does not have
territorial jurisdiction over the property against which execution is
sought, the only course open to it is to transmit the decree for
execution to the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction such
property is situated. Learned Senior Counsel argued that while
exercising such power of transfer, the Court passing the decree is
not empowered to pass any order of attachment in respect of
property situated beyond its territorial limits. In the present case,
however, while transferring the decree for execution, the Court at
Gautam Budh Nagar simultaneously passed an order of attachment
in respect of the machine located at Dholpur, which, according to
learned Senior Counsel, was wholly without jurisdiction and a nullity
in the eyes of law. It was urged that once the foundational order
itself is void for want of jurisdiction, all subsequent proceedings and
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(18 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
orders founded thereon are equally vitiated and lack authority of
law.
37.
Learned counsel further submits that the Executing
Court has travelled beyond the decree, which is impermissible in
execution proceedings. It is a settled principle that an executing
court cannot go behind the decree or enlarge its scope. The
attachment of machines, which are not the subject matter of the
decree, amounts to adding new terms to the decree, rendering the
impugned order without jurisdiction and perverse.
38.
It is further contended that the impugned order does not
disclose any reasons as to why the second machine, which is stated
to have been manufactured pursuant to an agreement dated
20.06.2020, was directed to remain under attachment. The learned
Executing Court has merely recorded that there was justification to
attach the said machine, without assigning any reasons or
discussing the material on record. Such a non-speaking order,
based on bald conclusions, is liable to be set aside.
39.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the finding of the
Executing Court that it could not examine whether the machines
installed at the factory premises were in violation of the agreement
dated 18.10.2015 is erroneous. It is argued that since the decree
itself flows from the said agreement, the executing court was
required to determine whether the machines in question were in
fact manufactured in violation of the agreement. Without such
adjudication, attachment of the machines could not have been
ordered merely on the basis of the decree.
40.
It is urged that the decree does not record any finding
that the machines installed in the factory of the petitioner company
(19 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
are based on or similar to the machines of the decree holder in
design,
nor
does
manufacturing,
it
using
restrain
or
the
operating
petitioner
any
company
machine.
from
Therefore,
attachment of the machines is clearly beyond the decree and
unsustainable in law.
41.
Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the decree
dated 09.02.2017 is executable only against Defendant No.1 and
not against Objectors-Judgment debtors. There is no decree
restraining the petitioner company from using or operating any
machine. Consequently, execution by attachment of machines
belonging to the petitioner company is wholly illegal and without
authority of law.
42.
It is contended that even if the decree is taken at face
value, it could not have been executed by attachment of machines.
At best, the decree holder could have sought damages in a
separate proceeding for alleged violation of the agreement dated
18.10.2015. The Executing Court cannot convert an injunction
decree into one of attachment or seizure.
43.
Learned Senior Counsel also raised an objection that for
getting execution of the vague and unspecific decree dated
09.02.2017, execution petition was filed by the decree-holders after
delay of more than two and a half year, that too without disclosing
a valid and definite cause of action for filing such objections.
44.
Learned counsel submits that unless there is a clear
adjudication that the machines of the petitioner company are
identical to or based upon the design, specifications or model of the
decree holder, the machines cannot be subjected to attachment. No
(20 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
such adjudication despite specific objection raised by the objectorjudgment-debtor, has been made by the Executing Court.
45.
It was further argued that in the absence of any
exclusive right established under the intellectual property laws,
merely claiming ownership over design or specifications cannot
result in restrictions on lawful manufacturing activity. Unless the
decree
holder
obtains
appropriate
relief
under
the
relevant
intellectual property statutes, no embargo can be placed on the
business activities of the petitioner company.
46.
put
Learned Senior Counsel urged that once questions were
by
the
Decree
holders
to
the
witnesses
during
cross
examination in respect of contents, effect and existence of
agreement dated 29.01.2015, now at this stage Decree holders are
estopped from raising any objection with regard to existence,
veracity and admissibility of agreement dated 29.01.2015.
47.
Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that even if, for
the sake of arguments, it is assumed that the objector-judgmentdebtor could not place primary evidence to prove agreement dated
29.01.2015, yet it cannot be ignored that the application for
submitting secondary evidence of such agreement filed by the
objector was not decided by the Executing Court and even
otherwise ample evidence was placed on record by the objectorjuddgment-debtor
of
making
payment
to
the
fabricator
in
pursuance of such agreement, hence, the court below rightly held
that machines were fabricated for the objector by the fabricator
prior to execution of agreement dated 18.10.2015 with the decree
holders.
(21 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
48.
[CR-12/2023]
In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the judgment debtors prays that the
impugned order be set aside to the extent it directs continuance of
attachment of one of the machines and remaining portion of the
order directing for releasing another machine be maintained.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Objectors-Judgment
debtors has relied upon the decisions in the cases of Mohit
Bhargava vs. Bharat Bhushan Bharvava & Others, (2007) 4
SCC 795; Jagmittar Sain Bhagat & Others vs. Director, Health
Services,
Haryana
&
Others,
(2013)
SCC
136;
Machhindranath s/o Kundlik Tarade deceased through legal
representatives
vs.
Ramchandra
Gangadhar
Dhamne
&
Others, (2025) 7 SCC 456; Chief Engineer, Hydel Project &
Others vs. Ravinder Nath & Others, (2008) 2 SCC 350; Jai
Narain Ram Lundia vs. Kedar Nath Khetan & Others, (1956)
1 SCC 75; Sanwarlal Agrawal & Others vs. Ashok Kumar
Kothari & Others, (2023) 7 SCC 307; Ramesh vs. Harbans
Nagpal & Others, (2015) 8 SCC 716; decision of Patna High
Court in the case of Mukhi Ram vs. Firm Kamta Prasad-Balam
Das, 1936 SCC OnLine Pat 197; decision of Allahabad High Court
in the case of Guni Ram & Another vs. Kodai & Others, 1971
SCC OnLine All 307; decision of Himachal Pradesh High Court in
the cases of Shiv Ram vs. Thakar Dutt, 1972 SCC OnLine HP
33; Navneet Kumar vs. Meena Kumari, 2001 SCC OnLine HP
16; decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Sucha
Singh vs. Guman Singh & Another, 1972 SCC OnLine P&H
110; decision of this Court in the case of Ratanlal vs. Daudas,
AIR 1954 Rajashtan 173.
(22 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
Analysis of facts, legal position, Reasons and Findings on
Revisions petitions:
49.
I have heard and considered the rival submissions
advanced by learned Senior Counsels appearing for the parties and
carefully perused the material available on record as well as the
impugned orders.
50.
Before analysing the rival arguments, it would be
apposite
to
consider
relevant
agreement
dated
18.10.2015,
contents of the plaint, relevant part of judgment and decree, and
material contents of execution application filed by the decree
holders. Relevant part of agreement dated 18.10.2015 is quoted as
below:
QSfczds'ku vuqcU/k
;g vuqcU/k vkt fnukad 18 OCT 2015 ekg vDVwcj o"kZ 2015 dks e/;
Jh vuqie ?kks"k Lokeh eS0 vuksfUnrk gsYFk ds;j] ,&33,] lsDVj&8]
ukS,Mk&20301 ds LFkku ij fuekZ.k dk;Z dh lqfo/kk gS ftls vkxs pydj
lsok izkIr fuekZ.k drkZ dgk tk;sxkA
vkSj
QSt eksgEen iq= vCnqy jghe fuoklh xzke Fkkuk Hkou] ftyk eqt¶Qj
uxj m0 iz0
eqt¶Qjuxj] m0 iz0 ftls vkxs pydj QSfczdsVj dgk tk;sxkA
2- ;g fd lsokizkIr drkZ ¼izFke i{k½ viuk xYIl e'khu vkSj d.Mkse
e'khu dk fMtkbu] ekWMy] vuqikr dk fooj.k] f}rh; i{k dks iznku
djsxkA rn~uqlkj f}rh; i{k ,d o"kZ ds vUnj mldk fuekZ.k djds
lsokdrkZ ¼izFke i{k½ dks lkSai nsxkA izFke i{k vxj le; ij jkW
eSVsfj;y ugha nsxk rks mldk f}rh; i{k dh le; lhek esa ysV gksus dh
ftEesnkjh izFke i{k dh gksxhA
5- le; lhek bl vuqcU/k dh fo'ks"k fuf'pr le;kof/k gS vU;Fkk
f}rh; i{k gtkZus ;k vfxze Hkqxrku jkf'k dk nksxquh jkf'k f}rh; i{k
izFke i{k dks ykSVk;sxkA flQZ fdlh vkdfLed ?kVuk ftl ij f}rh;
i{k dk dksbZ daVªksy ugha gS] dks NksM+dj vU;Fkk lHkh ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa
mijksDr of.kZr e'khuksa dk fuekZ.k djds izFke i{k dh larqf"V vkSj le;
lkj.kh ds vuqlkj fuekZ.k djds f}rh; i{k izFke i{k dks vo'; lkSaisxkA
8- izFke i{k }kjk iznRr lHkh fMtkbu o ekWMy rFkk vU; dksbZ
tkudkjh mijksDr dk;Z gsrq nh x;h gSA mls izFke i{k ds vykok fdlh
vU; ls lk>k ugha djsxk vkSj uk gh fdlh dks crk;sxkA mRiknu dh
xq.koRrk ds tkudkjh f}rh; i{k dh jgsxhAß
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(23 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
Relevant contents of the plaint read as under:
Þ2- ;g fd oknh QeZ }kjk dUMksEl o lftZdy XyCl cukus dh
eSuqQSDpfjax o foØ; djus dk dkjksckj eSllZ vuksfUnrk gsYFk ds;j ds
uke ls fiNys dkQh vlsZ ls fd;k tk jgk gSA blds vfrfjDr oknh la1 QeZ }kjk lftZdy XyCl cuk;s tkus dh e'khu o dUMkse ds fuekZ.k
ds e'khuksa dk dk;Z fd;k tk jgk gS] ftlds fMtkbZu o VSDuksyksth dks
Lo;a oknh la- 1 }kjk fodflr fd;k x;k gSA
6- ;g fd oknhx.k o izfroknh ua- 1 ds e/; gq, vuqcU/k fnukafdr 1810-2015 dh 'krkZs ds vuqlkj ;g Hkh r; ik;k x;k Fkk fd oknhx.k }kjk
izfroknh ua-1 dks tks fMtkbZu o ekWMy o vU; tkudkjh ckor fuekZ.k
fd;s tkus dUMkse e'khu o XyCl e'khu iznku dh tk;sxh] mDr
tkudkjh dks izfroknh ua-1 fdlh vU; O;fDr ls u rks lk>k djsxk vkSj
u gh fdlh vU; O;fDr dks cryk;sxkA
7- ;g fd izfroknh ua-1 }kjk oknhx.k o izfroknh ua- 1 ds e/;
fu"ikfnr vuqcU/k fnukafdr 18-10-2015 dh 'krksZa dk mYya?ku djrs gq,]
oknhx.k dks] oknhx.k dh lUrqf"V esa u rks mijksDr e'khusa le; vof/k
ds vUnj iznku dh x;h cfYd izfroknh ua-1 }kjk] oknh }kjk miyC/k
djk;h x;h fMtkbZu o ekWMy dk nq#i;ksx djrs gq,] dUMkse o XyCl
cukus dh e'khuksa ds fMtkbZu o ekWMy dh tkudkjh dks izfroknhx.k 2
rk 5 dks miyC/k djk;k tks oknhx.k o izfroknh ua-1 ds e/; gq,
vuqcU/k fnukafdr 18-10-2015 dh 'krksZa dk [kqYye [kqYyk mYya?ku gSA
8- ;g fd oknhx.k }kjk tks fMtkbZu o ekWMy o tkudkjh ckor fuekZ.k
djus e'khu dUMkse o XyCl izfroknh ua-1 dks miyC/k djk;h x;h Fkh]
mDr tkudkjh dk nq#i;ksx djrs gq, izfroknh ua-1 }kjk dUMkse o
XyCl dh e'khuksa dks fufeZr dj cSlkt izfroknh ua-2] izfroknh ua-3 dks
lIykbZ fd;k x;k tks izfroknh ua-1 }kjk fd;s x;s mDr voS/kkfud dk;Z
esa vU; izfroknhx.k 2 rk 5 'kkfey jgs gSa rFkk izfroknhx.k ds mijksDr
voS/kkfud dk;Z ls oknh QeZ dk vR;kf/kd uqdlku gqvk gSA
9- ;g fd izfroknh ua-1 dks dksbZ dkuwuh vf/kdkj vuqcU/k fnukafdr 1810-2015 dh 'krksZa dk mYya?ku djrs gq, oknhx.k }kjk miyC/k djk;h
x;h fMtkbZu] ekWMy o vU; tkudkjh tks dUMkse e'khu] XyCl e'khu
ds lEcU/k esa oknhx.k }kjk miyC/k djk;h x;h Fkh] fdlh vU; O;fDr
dks miyC/k djkus o gLrkUrfjr djus dk ugha FkkA
11- ;g fd izfroknh ua-1 cSlkt izfroknhx.k 2 rk 5 vuqcU/k fnukafdr
18-10-2015 dh 'krksZa dk mYya?ku djrs gq, cnLrwj oknhx.k }kjk
miyC/k djk;h x;h fMtkbZu o ekWMy ds lkFk dUMkse o lftZdy
XyCl dh e'khuksa dk fuekZ.k dj] izfroknh ua-3 dks gLrkUrfjr dj jgk
gS vkSj vU; O;fDr;ksa dks Hkh gLrkUrfjr dj jgk gSA ftldk dksbZ
dkuwuh vf/kdkj izfroknh ua-1 dks izkIr ugha gSA
13- ;g fd okn dk dkj.k fnukad 18-10-2015 dks tc oknhx.k o
izfroknh ua-1 ds e/; vuqcU/k fu"ikfnr gqvk ckngw tc izfroknh ua1 }kjk] oknhx.k }kjk miyC/k djk;s x;s fMtkbZu] ekWMy o e'khu
fuekZ.k dh vU; tkudkjh dks vuqcU/k dh 'krksZa dk mYya?ku djrs gq,
izfroknhx.k 2 rk 5 dks miyC/k djk;k ckngw izfroknh
ua-1 }kjk
vuqcU/k fnukafdr 18-10-2015 dh 'krksZa dk mYya?ku djrs gq, dUMkse o
lftZdy XyCl dh e'khuksa dks oknh dks gLrkUrfjr u djds nhxj
O;fDr;ksa dks gLrkUrfjr fd;k x;k] ukS,Mk] ftyk xkSre cq) uxj esa
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(24 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
U;k;ky; ds U;k;{ks= ds vUrxZr mRiUu gqvk rFkk U;k;ky; dks okn
dks lquus o r; djus dk {ks=kf/kdkj izkIr gSA
15- ;g fd oknhx.k fuEufyf[kr avuqrks"k dh ekax djrs gSa %&
v- ;g fd izfroknh ua-1 dks }kjk loZdkyhu LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk fu"ksf/kr
fd;k tkos fd izfroknh ua- 1 cSlkt izfroknhx.k 2 rk 5] oknhx.k o
izfroknh ua-1 ds e/; fu"ikfnr vuqcU/k fnukafdr 18-10-2015 dh 'krksZa
ds vuqlkj oknhx.k }kjk miyC/k djk;s x;s fMtkbZu o ekWMy ds vk/kkj
ij fufeZr e'khu lftZdy XyCl o e'khu dUMkse dks fdlh vU; O;fDr
dks fdlh Hkh izdkj gLrkUrfjr djus ls ckt jgsAß
Relevant part of judgment dated 09.02.2017 passed by
the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gautam Budh Nagar
reads as under:
Þoknhx.k dk dFku gS fd og daMkse o lftZdy XyCl ds fuekZ.k ,oa
foØ; dk dk;Z djrh gS o bUgs cukus gsrq e'khu dk dk;Z Hkh djrh gSA
oknh o izfroknh la0 1 ds e/; fnukad 18-10-2015 dks ,d vuqca/k gqvk]
ftlds vUrxZr oknhx.k }kjk izfroknhx.k dks daMkse o XyCl ds fuekZ.k
gsrq e'khu ds fMtkbZu] ekWMy o vuqikr dh tkudkjh nsxk vkSj
izfroknh la0 1 mls 6 ekg ds vUnj e'khu nsxk vkSj fMtkbZu] ekWMy o
vuqikr dh tkudkjh fdlh vU; O;fDr ls lk>k ugha djsxk] fdUrq
izfroknh la0 1 }kjk mDr tkudkjh izfroknhx.k 2 rk 5 dks lk>k dh
x;h] ftlls oknhx.k dks uqdlku dkfjr gqvk gSA oknhx.k }kjk vius
dFku ds leFkZu esa dfri; izi= nkf[ky fd;s x;s gSa] ftlds voyksdu
ls fofnr gS fd oknhx.k o izfroknh la0 1 ds e/; QSczhds'ku vuqcU/k
fu"ikfnr fd;k x;kA izfroknhx.k }kjk U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr vkdj
oknhx.k ds dFkuksa ds foijhr dksbZ lk{; nkf[ky ugha fd;k x;k]
ftlls oknhx.k ds dFkuksa ij vfo'okl dkfjr gksA blds foijhr
oknhx.k }kjk vius okni= ds dFkuksa dks ekSf[kd ,oa nLrkosth lk{;ksa
ls lkfcr fd;k x;k gSA vr% mijksDr leLr rF;ksa ,oa ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks
n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, oknhx.k dk okn ,d i{kh; :i ls vkKIr fd;s tkus
;ksX; gSA
vkns'k
oknhx.k dk okn ,d i{kh; :i ls Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gS vkSj
izfroknh la0 1 dks vknsf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og cSlkt izfroknhx.k 2
rk 5] oknhx.k ,oa izfroknh la0 1 ds e/; fu"ikfnr QSfczds'ku vuqcU/k
fnukad 18-10-2015 dh 'krksZa ds vuqlkj oknhx.k }kjk miyC/k djk;s
x;s fMtkbZu o ekWMy ds vk/kkj ij fufeZr e'khu lftZdy XYCl o
e'khu daMkse dks fdlh vU; O;fDr dks fdlh izdkj ls gLrkarfjr u
djsaAß
Relevant part of execution application filed by the decree
holder reads as under:
10- rkjh[k ftlesa vnkyr
dh vekur erywc gSA
Jheku th]
en;wuku }kjk ceqfto fu.kZ; o fMØh fnukafdr 09-02-2017 dh
tkucw>dj vogsyuk djrs gq, vuqcU/k fnukafdr 18-10-2015 dh
'krksZa dk mYya?ku djrs gq, yxkrkj lftZdy XyCl o e'khu
daMkse dks cukdj nhxj O;fDr;ksa dks gLrkUrfjr fd;k tk jgk gS
tks U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; o fMØh fnukafdr 09-02-2017 dh
tkucw>dj dah x;h vogsyuk o vekuuk gS] ftlds fy,
(25 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
en;wuku dks flfoy dkjkxkj Hkstk tkdj] en;wuku dh py o
vpy lEifÙk dks dqdZ fd;k tkuk vko';d gSA
51.
At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the scope of
interference under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. Jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is extremely limited.
Interference is warranted only where the subordinate court has
exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, failed to exercise
jurisdiction so vested, or acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction
illegally or with material irregularity. The revisional court does not
act as a court of appeal and cannot reappreciate evidence or
substitute its own conclusions merely because another view is
possible.
52.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunder Dass
(supra), while dealing with scope of Section 47 CPC held as under:
"3. Now, the law is well settled that an executing court cannot
go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or
correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule
and that is that where the decree sought to be executed is a
nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it,
its invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding. Where
there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the
competence of the court to try the case and a decree which is
a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any court in
which it is presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and
wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even
at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings.
The executing court can, therefore, entertain an objection
that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the
decree. By doing so, the executing court would not incur the
reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the
decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at
all. Vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 340 and
Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath AIR 1962 SC 199. It is,
therefore, obvious that in the present case, it was competent
to the executing court to examine whether the decree for
eviction was a nullity on the ground that the civil court had no
inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit in which the decree
for eviction was passed. If the decree for eviction was a
nullity, the executing court could declare it to be such and
decline to execute it against the respondent."
53.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rahul S.
Shah (supra) held as under:
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(26 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
"24. In respect of execution of a decree, Section 47 CPC
contemplates adjudication of limited nature of issues relating
to execution i.e. discharge or satisfaction of the decree and is
aligned with the consequential provisions of Order 21 CPC.
Section 47 is intended to prevent multiplicity of suits. It
simply lays down the procedure and the form whereby the
court reaches a decision. For the applicability of the section,
two essential requisites have to be kept in mind. Firstly, the
question must be the one arising between the parties and
secondly, the dispute relates to the execution, discharge or
satisfaction of the decree. Thus, the objective of Section 47 is
to prevent unwanted litigation and dispose of all objections as
expeditiously as possible.
25. These provisions contemplate that for execution of
decrees, executing court must not go beyond the decree.
However, there is steady rise of proceedings akin to a retrial
at the time of execution causing failure of realisation of fruits
of decree and relief which the party seeks from the courts
despite there being a decree in their favour. Experience has
shown that various objections are filed before the executing
court and the decree-holder is deprived of the fruits of the
litigation and the judgment-debtor, in abuse of process of law,
is allowed to benefit from the subject-matter which he is
otherwise not entitled to.
42.9. The court should allow taking of evidence during the
execution proceedings only in exceptional and rare cases
where the question of fact could not be decided by resorting
to any other expeditious method like appointment of
Commissioner or calling for electronic materials including
photographs or video with affidavits."
54.
In the case of Kaliya (supra), dealing with a case
relating to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the
Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
"13. Section 65(c) of the 1872 Act provides that secondary
evidence can be adduced relating to a document when the
original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering
evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason, not
arising from his own default, or neglect, produce it in
reasonable time. The court is obliged to examine the
probative value of documents produced in the court or their
contents and decide the question of admissibility of a
document in secondary evidence. (Vide H. Siddiqui v. A.
Ramalingam (2011) 4 SCC 240 and Rasiklal Manikchand
Dhariwal v. M.S.S. Food Products (2012) 2 SCC 196.)
However, the secondary evidence of an ordinary document is
admissible only and only when the party desirous of admitting
it has proved before the court that it was not in his possession
or control of it and further, that he has done what could be
done to procure the production of it. Thus, the party has to
account for the non-production in one of the ways indicated in
the section. The party further has to lay down the factual
foundation to establish the right to give secondary evidence
where the original document cannot be produced. When the
party gives in evidence a certified copy/secondary evidence
without proving the circumstances entitling him to give
secondary evidence, the opposite party must raise an
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(27 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
objection at the time of admission. In case, an objection is
not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being
raised at a belated stage. Further, mere admission of a
document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor mere
marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its
proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance
with law. (Vide Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras AIR
1966 SC 1457, Marwari Kumhar v. Bhagwanpuri Guru
Ganeshpuri (2000) 6 SCC 735, R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder
v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple (2003) 8 SCC
752, Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi (2004) 7 SCC 107 and LIC
v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen (2010) 4 SCC 491)"
55.
In the case of A.V. Papayya Sastry & Others (supra),
it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under:
"22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment,
decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court,
tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the
law. Such a judgment, decree or order—by the first court or
by the final court—has to be treated as nullity by every court,
superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any
time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral
proceedings.
23. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley
(1956) 1 All ER 341 Lord Denning observed: (All ER p. 345 C)
“No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be
allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud.”
24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th
Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J.
stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not
impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from
without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show
that the court was “mistaken”, it might be shown that it was
“misled”. There is an essential distinction between mistake
and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an
action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the
ground that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the
merits, the decision was one which should not have been
rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed
upon or tricked into giving the judgment.
26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception
with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit
by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at
the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand
vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an
extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether
in rem or in personam. The principle of “finality of litigation”
cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can
be utilised as an engine of oppression by dishonest and
fraudulent litigants."
56.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Narain
Ram Lundia (supra) held as under:
"21. The learned counsel for the appellant-defendant
contended that even if the Marwari Brothers had ceased to
exist as a firm the plaintiff was still entitled to a five annas
share in its assets on dissolution. But a five annas share in
the assets of a dissolved firm which has ceased to exist is a
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(28 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
very different thing from a five annas share in a going
partnership concern; and to permit this substitution in the
decree would be to alter it in a very material particular. The
defendant may or may not have the right to ask the court
which passed the decree to vary it in that way but he can
certainly not ask the executing court to do so. The decree
must either be executed as it stands in one of the ways
allowed by law or not at all.
24. The next point urged by the appellant was that as the
plaintiff did not raise the present objection before the Federal
Court when it passed its decree he is precluded from doing so
now. It is true this would have been a good ground for
resisting a decree for specific performance but is no answer to
the objection to execution. The defendant undertook to
perform his part when the decree was passed and he must
make good that undertaking before he can seek execution
because the decree, in view of its language and intendment,
must either be executed as a whole or not at all; it cannot be
split up into different and uncorrelated parts and be executed
unilaterally. It may be observed in passing that it was as
much the duty of the defendant to seek modification of the
contract by the court which passed the decree, or modification
of the terms of the decree later if he did not know these facts
at the time, as he says it was of the plaintiff. The fact remains
that the decree was passed in these terms and it must either
be executed as it stands or not at all unless the court which
passed it alters or modifies it.
25. Then it was argued that this objection to execution should
have been taken by the plaintiff in the Calcutta High Court
when the defendant asked for transfer of the decree to
Motihari and that as that was not done it is too late now. But
here also the answer is the same. The only question before
the Calcutta High Court on the application made to it was
whether the decree should be transferred or not. Whether the
plaintiff might or could have taken the objection in the High
Court is beside the point because it is evident that he need
not have done so on the only issue which the application for
transfer raised, namely, whether the decree should be
transferred or not; at best it could only be said that the
plaintiff had a choice of two forums. But normally this sort of
question which involves an enquiry into fact would not be
tried by an appellate court. It would be more appropriate for
an original court to which the decree is transferred for
execution to enquire into it. In any case, if the appellant's
contention is pushed to its logical conclusion it would mean
that whenever a decree is transferred all objection to
execution must cease unless the order of the court directing
the transfer expressly enumerates the issues that the
transferring court is at liberty to determine. In our opinion
Section 42 of the Civil Procedure Code is a complete answer
to this contention."
57.
In the case of Sanwarlal Agrawal & Others (supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"16.This Court has time and again cautioned against the
Execution Court adopting such an approach. In Topanmal
Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram, AIR 1960 SC 388, a
three-Judge Bench held as follows : (AIR p. 390, para 5)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(29 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
“5. … It is a well-settled principle that a court
executing a decree cannot go behind the decree : it
must take the decree as it stands, for the decree is
binding and conclusive between the parties to the
suit”.
17. Yet again, in Meenakshi Saxena v. ECGC Ltd., (2018) 7
SCC 479 it was reiterated that : (SCC p. 486, para 17)
“17. The whole purpose of execution proceedings is to
enforce the verdict of the court. Executing court while
executing the decree is only concerned with the
execution part of it but nothing else. The court has to
take the judgment in its face value. It is settled law
that executing court cannot go beyond the decree.
But the difficulty arises when there is ambiguity in the
decree with regard to the material aspects. Then it
becomes the bounden duty of the court to interpret
the decree in the process of giving a true effect to the
decree. At that juncture the executing court has to be
very cautious in supplementing its interpretation and
conscious of the fact that it cannot draw a new
decree. The executing court shall strike a fine balance
between the two while exercising this jurisdiction in
the process of giving effect to the decree.”
18. As is commonly known, the stream cannot rise above its
source. Both Courts have, by selectively perusing the emails,
altered the terms of the decree to include the loan amount
into the agreement consideration. It is also imperative to note
that such a reading was despite the clauses in the joint
venture agreement entered into between the parties in 2017,
which provided for a separate mechanism of settling all
outstanding loans:
“Clause 4: In case of a deadlock, there will be bidding
between the groups for sale of shares to each other,
and the group offering higher valuation for shares
(successful bidder/buyer) will retain the company,
preferably by making one-time payment or as per
terms agreed by both groups, but not exceeding 180
days from the date of bidding/agreement in any case.
Clause 5: Whatever consideration and payment time
line is decided mutually between the groups for share
transfer, will be adhered strictly by buyer for smooth
exit of seller, payable directly to the seller account,
and in case of any delay in payment, compounding
interest @ 18% p.a. will be payable by buyer. There
will be a lien of the seller group on their shares till
payment is completed with interest, if any. The loans
and advances of the seller will have to be repaid by
the
buyer
separately
within
days
of
bidding/agreement,
failing
which
compounding
interest @ 18% p.a. from date of bidding/agreement
both principal and interest being routed through
company account. Upon completion of both
payments, the shares of seller group will be deemed
to be transferred to buyer group, and seller cannot
delay the transfer on any pretext.”
(emphasis supplied)"
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
58.
(30 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh (supra),
held as under:
"9. We have gone through the record and considered the rival
submissions. In our view, no dimensions were given in the
plaint nor did the plaint refer to any sketch. The judgment
and decree also did not refer to any dimensions of the chhajja
in question nor did it incorporate or refer to any sketch from
which dimensions could be gathered. In the premises the view
taken by the trial court was absolutely correct, in that any
exercise would amount to going behind the decree. The
application preferred under Section 151 CPC was also vague
and lacking in any particulars. The High Court was, therefore,
not justified in passing the instant directions. We, therefore,
allow the appeal and set aside both the orders under appeal.
It is open to Respondent 1-plaintiff to take such steps as are
open to him in law. We may also observe that the application
for setting aside the ex parte decree preferred by the
appellant shall be considered on its own merits."
59.
In the light of the above principles of law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, when this Court examined the scope,
extent, nature and executability of the decree in the present case,
it found that the decree dated 09.02.2017 is a decree of permanent
injunction restraining the defendants from unauthorised use and
disclosure of the design claimed by the decree holder, thus it was
basically prohibitory in nature. The execution proceedings were
initiated alleging continued violation of the decree and alleging
personal disobedience. In such circumstances, the executing court
was required to examine whether the property subjected to
attachment was liable to execution and whether the objections
raised by the judgment debtor fell within the ambit of Section 47
CPC.
60.
It is well settled that while an executing court cannot go
behind the decree, it is nevertheless competent to interpret the
decree and examine questions relating to its execution, discharge
or satisfaction as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Rahul S. Shah (supra). The contention that the executing court
lacked jurisdiction to examine whether the machines in question,
(31 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
which
are
in
possession
of
[CR-12/2023]
objector/Judgment-debtor,
were
connected with the alleged violation of the decree is totally
misconceived and is against the settled preposition of law.
61.
The contention advanced on behalf of the decree-holder
that the Executing Court has committed jurisdictional error in
recording evidence, does not merit acceptance. At the outset, it is
to be noted that the stand now sought to be taken by the decreeholders is wholly self-contradictory. It was on Revision Petition No.
114/2021 filed by the decree-holder themselves that this Court, by
its earlier order dated 20.10.2021, remanded the matter to the
Executing
Court
for
fresh
consideration
after
affording
due
opportunity of hearing to both the parties. The said order of
remand was never assailed by the decree-holder before any higher
forum and, therefore, attained finality. Pursuant to the remand, the
decree-holder not only participated in the proceedings before the
Executing Court without any demur or protest but, on the contrary,
voluntarily led evidence in support of their case. They even raised a
grievance before the Executing Court that they were not permitted
to examine an additional witness. Further, during the pendency of
the present revision petitions, the decree-holder has filed I.A. No.
1/2025 and I.A. No. 2/2025 seeking permission to place additional
documents on record. Having themselves invited the remand,
participated in the evidentiary proceedings, and sought further
opportunity to adduce additional material, the decree-holder cannot
now be permitted to contend that the Executing Court lacked
jurisdiction to record evidence. A party cannot be allowed to
approbate and reprobate or to blow hot and cold at the same time.
Even
otherwise,
the
contention
that
an
Executing
Court
is
(32 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
absolutely barred from taking evidence is not a correct statement of
law. In the case of Rahul S. Shah (supra), while laying down
exhaustive guidelines for deciding execution petitions, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has also permitted leading of evidence before the
executing court in appropriate cases. It is well settled that where
the circumstances so warrant and where recording of evidence
becomes necessary for the effective and proper execution of the
decree, the Executing Court is competent to take evidence within
the limited scope of execution proceedings. In the present case, the
Executing Court has recorded evidence strictly in compliance with
the directions issued by this Court while remanding the matter. No
error
of
jurisdiction,
illegality,
or
material
irregularity
can,
therefore, be attributed to the Executing Court on this count. In
view of the above, the objection raised by the decree-holders is
devoid of substance and is accordingly rejected.
62.
So far as contention of learned counsel for the objector-
judgment-debtor that the Executing Court at Gautam Budh Nagar
lacked territorial jurisdiction to pass order of attachment at the
time of transfer of decree for execution relating to the machine
admittedly lying outside its territorial jurisdiction at Dholpur, it is
sufficient to observe that in the obtaining facts and circumstances
of the case, such argument lacks merit and force. The aforesaid
contention regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction at this stage is
also liable to be rejected. It is not in dispute that the order passed
by the Court at Gautam Budh Nagar, while transferring the decree
along with the order of attachment, was never challenged by the
objector–judgment-debtor at the relevant point of time. On the
contrary,
the
judgment-debtor
participated
in
the
execution
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(33 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
proceedings before the Executing Court at Dholpur without raising
any objection or protest as to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court
at Gautam Budh Nagar or the legality of the order of transfer and
attachment. Having acquiesced in the proceedings and submitted to
the jurisdiction of the Executing Court, the judgment-debtor cannot
now be permitted to turn around and question the validity of the
earlier order. Moreover, it is to be noted that the earlier order
passed by the Executing Court at Dholpur was itself challenged by
the decree-holders by filing Revision Petition No. 114/2021 before
this Court. While allowing the said revision, this Court remanded
the matter to the Executing Court at Dholpur with a specific
direction to decide the execution afresh after affording opportunity
to both the parties to lead evidence. Pursuant thereto, a fresh and
independent order dated 11.11.2022 has been passed by the
Executing Court. In view of the passing of the fresh order upon
remand, any alleged illegality or irregularity in the earlier order
does not survive, nor can it be pressed into service to assail the
impugned order. The execution proceedings now stand governed by
the order dated 11.11.2022, which has been passed after due
compliance with the directions issued by this Court.
63.
It is trite law that not every erroneous decision amounts
to an illegal exercise of jurisdiction. The revisional jurisdiction
cannot be invoked to correct mere errors of law or fact unless they
go to the root of jurisdiction.
64.
As regards order dated 07.12.2021 rejecting the decree-
holders' application to lead additional evidence, it is found that the
Executing Court exercised its discretion judiciously. The application
was filed by the decree-holders, when evidence had already been
(34 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
concluded, and the application was filed at a belated stage. No
sufficient cause was shown to justify reopening of evidence. The
order does not disclose any arbitrariness or failure to exercise
jurisdiction.
65.
This court finds that decree dated 09.02.2017, passed in
Suit No. 101/2016, is a decree of permanent injunction restraining
Defendant No.1 from disclosing or sharing the design of a surgical
gloves manufacturing machine in violation of the agreement dated
18.10.2015. The decree does not contain any direction for delivery,
seizure, attachment, or restraint on operation of any machine.
66.
In execution of the said decree, the decree holder sought
attachment of two machines installed in the premises of the
petitioner company, alleging that the machines were manufactured
in
violation
of
the
decree.
By
the
impugned
order
dated
11.11.2022, the Executing Court released one machine taking into
consideration alleged agreement dated 29.01.2015, but maintained
attachment of the second machine, purportedly on the ground that
the said machine was fabricated pursuant to an agreement dated
20.06.2020.
67.
This court finds valid force in the submission of learned
Senior Counsel for the decree holders that the photocopy of the
agreement dated 29.01.2015 could not have been taken into
consideration by the Executing Court while adjudicating objections
under Section 47 CPC, as the said document was never proved in
accordance with law. It is undisputed that the agreement was not
marked as an exhibit during the trial or even during execution
proceedings and, therefore, did not form part of the evidentiary
record on the basis of which the decree was passed. An executing
(35 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
court cannot rely upon documents which were neither proved nor
judicially
accepted.
Further,
although
an
application
seeking
permission to lead secondary evidence under Section 65 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was filed, the same was neither allowed
nor adjudicated upon by the Executing Court. In the absence of a
judicial
determination
photocopy
of
the
permitting
agreement
secondary
continued
to
evidence,
remain
the
legally
inadmissible and devoid of evidentiary value. Mere filing of an
application under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does
not, by itself, confer admissibility upon a document unless the
foundational facts are established and permission is expressly
granted by the court. This view is guided by the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation
of India & Another vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen (supra).
68.
It is also well settled that merely putting questions in
cross-examination with reference to a document which is otherwise
inadmissible or unproved does not clothe such document with
legality or render it admissible in evidence. Cross-examination
cannot be used as a device to indirectly introduce or validate
material which has not been proved in accordance with law. An
unexhibited document does not acquire evidentiary status merely
because it is referred to or confronted to a witness during crossexamination, in the absence of its formal proof and admissibility
being judicially determined. Similar view has been taken by Delhi
High Court in the case of S. Gurbachan Singh & Others vs.
Geeta Issar (supra). Consequently, the impugned order, insofar
as it proceeds on reliance upon an unexhibited document and an
undecided application for secondary evidence, suffers from a patent
(36 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
jurisdictional error and material irregularity. Such an approach
undermines the principles of leading documentary evidence and is
not tenable under law.
69.
photocopy
Be that as it may, notwithstanding the issue that the
of
agreement
dated
29.01.2015
was
erroneously
considered by the Executing Court or not; nevertheless the core
and fundamental question before this court is as to whether even if
the aforesaid agreement dated 29.01.2015 as well as other
evidence of judgment debtor is ignored and not taken into
consideration, even then whether the decree dated 09.02.2017, if
taken as it is, can be held to be executable under law, or not?
70.
Burden to prove that the decree was executable in its
form and substance, as it stands, solely rests upon the decreeholder, who has come before the executing court for getting the
decree executed. This Court finds that on a plain reading of decree
dated 09.02.2017, it is evident that the decree is one of injunction
simpliciter. It restrains Defendant No.1 from disclosing the design
covered under the agreement dated 18.10.2015 to third parties.
The decree does not identify any machine, does not declare any
machine to be infringing, nor does it restrain the use, operation, or
possession of any machine by the petitioner company.
71.
It is can be deduced from the judgments relied upon by
both the sides that it is a settled principle of law that an executing
court cannot travel beyond the decree, nor can it grant reliefs which
were neither claimed nor granted in the original suit. The decree
must be executed as it stands and not as it ought to have been
passed.
(37 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
72.
[CR-12/2023]
The decree in question is prohibitory in nature and
purports to restrain the judgment debtor from manufacturing a
machine embodying the same design as that prepared by the
decree holder. However, a careful examination of the agreement
between the parties, the plaint, the judgment and decree, as well
as the execution petition, reveals complete silence with regard to
the specifications, contours, or technical particulars of the allegedly
protected design. No drawings, dimensions, distinguishing features,
or identifying parameters have been specified at any stage.
73.
It
is
significant
that
a
prohibitory
decree,
to
be
executable, must define with precision the act or conduct that is
intended to be prohibited by the decree. Where the decree is vague
and leaves the scope of restraint indeterminate, the executing court
cannot enforce it without engaging in speculation, which is
impermissible in execution proceedings. Accordingly, the decree, as
framed, lacks the essential certainty required for enforcement and
is rendered inexecutable. In the case of Brakewel Automotive
Components (India) Private Limited (supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has clearly held that the executing court while
deciding objections under Section 47 CPC can also examine as to
whether the decree is capable of execution under law or not? In the
case of Sanwarlal Agrawal & Others
(supra), while referring
the earlier judgment of Meenakshi Saxena v. ECGC Ltd., (2018)
7 SCC 479, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that
when there is ambiguity in the decree with regard to material
aspects, then it becomes the bounden duty of the executing court
to interpret the decree in the process of giving a true effect to the
(38 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
decree. The objection raised by the judgment debtors, therefore,
deserves to be sustained.
74.
Under Section 47 CPC, all questions arising between the
decree-holder and the judgment debtor relating to execution,
discharge, or satisfaction of the decree must be decided by the
executing court. This includes objections that the decree is
inherently vague or incapable of execution. Although while an
executing court cannot go behind the decree, yet it can examine
whether the decree is a nullity or incapable of execution due to
inherent defects or even vagueness.
75.
It is also noteworthy that Order XXI Rule 32 CPC, which
governs execution of injunction decrees, presupposes that the
injunction is capable of precise ascertainment. Execution for
disobedience can arise only when the prohibited act is clearly
identifiable; otherwise, no objective breach can be established.
76.
It is a settled principle that a decree must be clear,
definite, and specific to be executable. Although an executing court
may construe a decree by reference to the judgment and, if
necessary, the pleadings, such construction is permissible only
where sufficient guidance exists. Where the decree and the
foundational
pleadings
are
themselves
silent
on
essential
particulars, the defect is incurable at the execution stage. The
execution
cannot
be
founded
on
conjecture
or
assumptions
regarding what the decree-holder intended to restrain, as the
executing court must enforce the decree as it stands and not as it
ought to have been framed. However, a vague injunction decree
magnifies enforcement difficulties and risks arbitrariness. Similarly,
it is also settled preposition of law where the subject matter of
(39 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
restraint
is
not
distinctly
identifiable,
[CR-12/2023]
the
decree
becomes
inexecutable.
77.
In the present case, this Court finds that the prohibitory
decree dated 09.02.2017 is entirely silent on the specifications and
identifying features of the machine design sought to be protected,
not only in the decree, but also in the agreement, pleadings, and
execution petition. Such foundational vagueness deprives the
decree of enforceable content. Applying the settled principles under
Section 47 CPC and the authoritative pronouncements of the
Supreme Court, the decree lacks the requisite clarity and certainty
for execution and is inexecutable in law.
78.
In the present case, the Executing Court has maintained
attachment of one machine on the premise that it was fabricated
pursuant to an agreement dated 20.06.2020. This reasoning, in the
considered opinion of this Court, suffers from a fundamental
jurisdictional error. It is a matter of record that the agreement
dated 20.06.2020 was not the subject matter of the decree. The
decree emanates from the agreement dated 18.10.2015 and
restrains only disclosure of design by Defendant No.1. Whether any
subsequent agreement violates the earlier agreement is a matter
requiring independent adjudication and cannot be presumed in
execution proceedings.
79.
Following findings given recorded the Executing Court in
order dated 11.11.2022 are relevant for examining its legality,
validity and jurisdictional propriety:
Þ13- vkifRrdrkZ dh vksj ls ;g nyhy j[kh xbZ fd] bl U;k;ky; dks
igys ;g fuf.kZr djuk vko';d gksxk fd tks e'khusa nkSjkus btjk;
dk;Zokgh dqdZ dh xabZ gSa] og fMØhnkj }kjk crk, x, fMtkbu rFkk
ekWMy dh e'khu gS] vkSj ;fn U;k;ky; bl fu"d"kZ ij igqaprh gS] rHkh
bu e'khuksa dh dqdhZ dh tk ldrh gSA vius rdZ dh iqf"V gsrq
vkifRrdrkZ dh vksj ls fo}ku vf/koDrk dh nyhy gS fd Losvj gSYFk
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(40 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
ds;j ds iwoZ Mk;jsDVj gjh'k mQZ g"kZ xqIrk us QSt ekSgEen ds lkFk
fnuakd 29-01-2015 dks vuqca/k fd;k ftlds vuqlkj ,d e'khu rS;kj
gqbZA okn esa oknhx.k ;g dgdj vk, fd fnukad 18-10-2015 dks
oknhx.k dk QSt eksgEen ¼en~;wu½ ds lkFk vuqca/k fu"ikfnr gqvk vkSj
bl vuqca/k ds vuqlkj oknh ds crk, x, fMtkbu o ekWMy vkSj
vuqikr vuqlkj e'khu fufeZr dh tkuh FkhA vkifRrdrkZ ds iflj esa
fLFkr nks e'khuksa esa ls ftl e'khu dks iqjkuh e'khu dgk x;k gS]
ekSgEen bejkj }kjk cuk;h x;hA ;g e'khu ekSgEen bejku vkSj Losvj
gSYFk ds;j ds iwoZ Mk;jsdVj gjh'k mQZ g"kZ xqIrk ds chp gq, vuqcU/k
fnukafdr 29-01-2015 ds vuqlj.k esa rS;kj dh x;h blfy, tc ;g
iqjkuh e'khu fufeZr dh x;h] rc rd oknhx.k us ekSgEen bejku ds
lkFk dksbZ fMtkbZu] ekWMy ;k vuqikr lk>k ugha fd;k Fkk blfy, ;g
e'khu oknhx.k ds crk;s fMtkbu dks izfroknhx.k }kjk o&lkt lk>k
djds e'khu cukus dk dksbZ u rks iz'u gS] vkSj u gh volj gks ldrk
gSA
14- vkifRrdrkZ ds bl rdZ ds [k.Mu esa fMØhnkj us nLrkost
izn'kZ ,u-,-1] vuqcU/k izn'kZ ,&3] ,&4] ,&5] ,&6] ,&7 yxk;r ,&12
ij cy fn;k vkSj ;g rdZ j[kk fd ;g ogh fMtkbu gSa tks ekSgEen
QSt ds lkFk fd;s x;s vuqcU/k fnuakfdr 18-10-15 ds vuqlj.k esa crk;ah
x;ha FkhaA
15- nksuksa vksj ls mifLFkr nksuksa vf/koDrkx.k us viuh iqjtksj cgl esa
nksuksa i{kksa }kjk crk;s x;s ,xzhesaV ,oa ,xzhesUV ds lanHkZ esa izLrqr dh
x;h lk{; ij foLr`r cgl dh fatlesa eq[;r% fcUnq ;g j[kk fd
vkifRrdrkZ iwoZ Mk;jsDVj g"kZ xqIrk ds ,xzhesUV fnukafdr 29-01-2015
dks izekf.kr ugha dj ldk vkSj bl ,xzhesUV ds fy, cuk;h x;h fdlh
e'khu ds fy, vnk dh x;h jkf'k dks Hkh izekf.kr ugha dj ldkA blh
izdkj ls vkifRrdrkZ us oknhx.k@fMØhnkj ds }kjk vuqcU/k] e'khu
fMtkbu] vnk jkf'k ds laca/k esa fookn mBkrs gq, rdZ j[ksA
16- bl U;k;ky; ds vkns'k fnukad 14-09-2021 ds }kjk vkifRrdrkZ ds
ifjlj esa lapkfyr nks dqdZ dh x;h e'khuksa esa ls ,d dks dqdhZ ls
ckxqtkj djus ds vkns'k dks fMdzhnkj us ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds
le{k pqukSrh nh ftl ij ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; us vkns'k fnukafdr
20-10-2021 ds }kjk nksuksa i{kksa dh lk{; ys[kc) djus ds vkns'k ikfjr
fd;sA mDr vkns'k dh ikyuk esa nksuksa i{kksa dh vksj ls ekSf[kd o
nLrkosth; lk{; is'k dh x;hA
18- nksuksa i{kksa dh vksj ls izLrqr lk{; dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA ;g
lk{; eq[;r% QSDVªh esa fufeZr e'khu] fMtkbu] mlds laca/k esa vuqcU/k]
[kjhns x;s eky vkSj vnk dh x;h jkf'k ds laca/k esa gSA lk{; ds ckor~
nksuksa i{kksa ds rdZ&fordksZa dks lquus ds mijkar esjk ;g er gS fd ;g
U;k;ky; u rks bl fo"k; ij er O;Dr dj ldrh gS fd D;k en~;wuku~
us fo}ku U;k;ky; }kjk tkjh fu"ks/kkKk dk dksbZ mYya?ku fd;k\ u
gh ;g er O;Dr djus ds fy, l{ke gS fd oknhx.k us izfroknh la[;k
1 o 2 ds lkFk dkSu lk fMtkbu] ekWMy o vuqikr lk>k fd;k vkSj
izfroknh la[;k 1 o 2 ¼ekSgEen QSt vkSj ekSgEen bejku½ fdlh
fMtkbZu ds vk/kkj ij vkifRrdrkZ ;k en~;wuku 3 yxk;r 5 dks e'khusa
fufeZr djds nhaA esjk ;g er bl rF; ij vk/kkfjr gS fd ewy okn esa
ikfjr ,di{kh; fMdzh ds fo:) dk;Zokgh fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds
le{k yfEcr gSaA fMdzh ls fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ vkifRr ;k pqukSrh
izLrqr djus ds fy, dkuwu esa fu/kkZfjr mipkj gS] vkt ;fn ;g
U;k;ky; izdj.k esa izLrqr lk{; ds vk/kkj ij ;g er O;Dr djrh gS
fd eSllZ vuksfUnrk gSYFk ds;j vkSj mlds Mk;jsDVj dk ekSgEen QSt
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(41 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
ds lkFk vuqcU/k vkSj mldh ifj.khfr D;k jgh rFkk ml vuqcU/k dk
dksbZ mYya?ku fd;k x;k ;k ugha] rks ;g U;k;ky; vius {ks=kf/kdkj ls
ckgj tkdj er O;Dr djsxh tks fdlh Hkh izdkj ls dkuwu lEer~ ugha
gSA
/kkjk 47 nh-iz-la- fuEu izdkj gSa %&
iz'u ftudk vo/kkj.k fMdzh dk fu"iknu djus okyk U;k;ky;
djsxk %& ¼1½ os lHkh iz'u] tks ml okn ds i{kdkjksa ds ;k muds
izfrfuf/k;ksa ds chp iSnk gksrs gSa] ftlesa fMdzh ikfjr dh x;h Fkh vkSj tks
fMdzh ds fu"iknu] mUekspu ;k rqf"V ls lacaf/kr gSa] fMdzh dk fu"iknu
djus okys U;k;ky; }kjk] u fd i`Fkd okn }kjk] vof/kkfjr fd;s
tk;saxsA
¼2½ -----------¼3½ tgka ;g iz'u iSnk gksrk gS fd dksbZ O;fDr fdlh i{kdkj dk
izfrfuf/k gS ;k ugha gS ogka ,slk iz'u ml U;k;ky; }kjk bl /kkjk ds
iz;kstuksa ds fy, vo/kkfjr fd;k tk,xkA
21- fMdzhnkj ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dk rdZ gS fd vkifRrdrkZ ds ifjlj
esa lapkfyr nksuksa e'khusa dqdZ dh x;h ftlesa ls ,d e'khu dks bl
U;k;ky; us dqdhZ ls ckxqtkj fd;k rks fMdzhnkj gh ekuuh; mPp
U;k;ky; ds le{k bl vkns'k dks pqukSrh nsus gsrq x;k FkkA bldk ;g
vFkZ ekus tkuk pkfg, fd vkifRrdrkZ dks ;g Lohdkj Fkk fd
mldh ,d e'khu dqdZ fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS vkSj blfy, og dHkh Hkh
dqdhZ ds fo:) vkifRr ysdj ugha vk;k] ijUrq eSa fMdzhnkj dh vksj ls
mBk;s x;s bl rdZ dks Lohdkj djuk mfpr ugha le>rh] D;ksafd nksuksa
e'khusa dqdZ fd;s tkus ds fo:) gh izLrqr vkifRr;ka vkifRrdrkZ us bl
U;k;ky; esa is'k dh gSaA ;g lgh gS fd dqdhZ ls dsoy ,d e'khu dks
ckxqtkj djus ds vkns'k ds fo:) vkifRrdrkZ ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;
ds le{k x;k] nksuksa e'khuksa dks dqdhZ ls ckxqtkj djus dh izkFkZuk ysdj
ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds le{k ugha x;k] ysfdu blls ;g vFkZ ugha
j[kk tk ldrk fd vkifRrdrkZ nksuksa e'khuksa dh dqdhZ dks Lohdkj
djrk gSA
22- ;g U;k;ky; bl ck/;rk ds izfr ltx gS fd /kkjk 47 tkCrk
nhokuh dh 'kfDr;ka vihy ds eqdkcys de o rax gSa vkSj fu"iknu
dk;Zokgh esa dksbZ u;k dsl fufeZr ugha fd;k tk ldrkA fo}ku fopkj.k
U;k;ky; }kjk bl U;k;ky; dks btjk; vUrfjr djrs gq, ;g vis{kk
ugha dh x;h fd ;g U;k;ky; fu/kkZfjr djs fd dkSu lh e'khu okn
la[;k 101@2016 muokuh eSllZ vuksfUnrk gSYFk ds;j cuke QSt
ekSgEen oxSjg] U;k;ky; flfoy tt~ lhfu;j fMohtu xkSre cq) uxj
ds fu.kZ; fnukafdr 09-02-2017 dh vogsyuk esa fufeZr dh x;h gS vkSj
ml e'khu dh igpku dh tkj mls dqdZ fd;k tk;s] ijUrq ;g Hkh
vo/kkfjr ugha fd;k tk ldrk fd fMdzh ds fu"iknu gsrq fdlh
ifjlj ;k laLFkku esa ftruh e'khusa lapkfyr gksa] lHkh dks dqdZ dj fn;k
tk;sA blfy, fu"iknu dh vUrfjfr U;k;ky; ds :i esa ;g ns[kuk bl
U;k;ky; ds vf/kdkj lhek {ks= esa gS fd vUrfjfr U;k;ky; dh fMdzh
dk fu"iknu fdl e'khu ls rkRif;Zr gSA fo}ku fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds
le{k izLrqr okn i= la[;k 101@2016 ¼ftldh izekf.kr izfr i=koyh
ij izLrqr gS½ esa] oknh fMdzhnkj us ;g vfHkopu fd;k fd izfroknh
la[;k 1 ¼ekSgEen QSt½ ds lkFk oknh dk fnukad 18-10-2015 dks
vuqcU/k gqvk vkSj blh vuqcU/k esa ;g r; fd;k x;k fd oknh ekSgEen
QSt dks XyCl vkSj dUMkWe e'khu dk fMtkbu] ekWMy] vuqikr dk
fooj.k nsxk vkSj izfroknh ¼ekSgEen QSt½ crk;s vuqlkj e'khu fuekZ.k
(42 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
[CR-12/2023]
djsxkA okn i= ds bl vfHkopu ls gh ;g Li"V gS fd fnuakd 18-102015 ds vuqcU/k ls igys u rks oknh us ekSgEen QSt dks dksbZ e'khu
dk fMtkbu] ekWMy ;k vuqikr crk;k u gh ekSgEen QSt dks oknh ds
efLr"d ds ekWMy] fMtkbu ;k vuqikr dh tkudkjh gks ldrh FkhA vr
% oknh vkSj izfroknh la[;k 1 ds vuqcU/k fnukafdr 18-10-2015 dh frfFk
ls cgqr igys fnukad 29-01-2015 dh tks g"kZ xqIrk o izfroknh la[;k 1
ds vuqcU/k ds vuqlkj e'khu fufeZr dh x;h gS] bl btjk; dh
vuqikyuk esa dqdhZ ;ksX; ugha gks ldrh gSA blfy, esjs fuf'pr
erkuqlkj ftl iqjkuh e'khu dks bl U;k;ky; ds vkns'k fnuakd 14-092021 ds }kjk dqdhZ ls ckxqtkj fd;k x;k og dqdhZ ls ckxqtkj
j[kus ;ksX; gS tcfd fnukad 20-06-2020 ds vuqcU/k ds vk/kkj ij
fufeZr e'khu dks dqdZ fd;s tkus dk U;k;laxr dkj.k gSA vr%
vkifRrdrkZ dk izkFkZuk i= varxZr /kkjk 47 nh-iz-la- vkaf'kd :i ls
Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA
24- vr% vkifRrdrkZ dk izkFkZuk i= varxZr /kkjk 47 nh-iz-lavkaf'kd :i ls Lohdkj fd;k tkdj mDr btjk; la[;k 34@2021 ds
fu"iknu esa fnukad 07-08-2021 }kjk dh x;h e'khu dh dqdhZ cjdjkj
jgsxh tcfd vkns'k fnukafdr 14-09-2021 ds }kjk ftl e'khu dks dqdhZ
ls ckxqtkj fd;k x;k gS ¼tks fMdzhnkj@oknh ds en~;wu la[;k 1 ds
lkFk vuqcU/k dh frfFk ls iwoZ esa fufeZr dh x;h] e'khu gS½ dks dqdhZ ls
ckxqtkj fd;k tkrk gSAß
80.
Bare perusal of the entire order passed by the Executing
Court would make it clear that the Executing Court nowhere
considered that the decree does not contain any finding that the
machines installed at the petitioner’s premises are based on or
derived from the protected design. In the absence of such
adjudication, attachment of a machine amounts to enforcement of a
right which is not crystallised by the decree.
81.
A
careful
perusal
of
the
impugned
order
dated
11.11.2022 reveals that the Executing Court has not assigned
cogent reasons as to how the second machine falls within the
mischief of the decree. The order merely records that there is
justification to maintain attachment of the machine fabricated
under the agreement dated 20.06.2020, without examining how
such fabrication, by itself, constitutes violation of the injunction
decree.
(43 of 44)
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
82.
[CR-12/2023]
The impugned order, to that extent, is non-speaking and
rests on conjectural findings. Such an order cannot be sustained in
law, particularly when it results in deprivation of property without a
clear adjudicatory foundation.
83.
While an executing court is empowered to decide
questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the
decree, it cannot undertake an inquiry which effectively amounts to
determination of fresh substantive rights. The question whether the
machine in question embodies the protected design, or whether its
manufacture violates contractual or intellectual property rights,
cannot be adjudicated in execution proceedings in the absence of a
clear finding in the decree. Permitting such inquiry would amount to
converting
execution
proceedings
into
a
retrial,
which
is
impermissible.
84.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the executing court, while maintaining
attachment of one machine, has exercised jurisdiction not vested in
it by law and has travelled beyond the scope of the decree dated
09.02.2017. The impugned order, to the extent it maintains
attachment of one machine, suffers from material irregularity and
cannot be sustained.
85.
In the light of foregoing discussions, analysis of the
facts, material on record, findings recorded by the Executing Court
and the prevailing law, the objections raised by the ObjectorsJudgment debtors under Section 47 CPC are sustained and hereby
allowed. The impugned order dated 11.11.2022 is set aside to the
extent it maintains attachment of one machine installed at the
premises of the Objectors-Judgment debtors. The Executing Court
[2026:RJ-JP:2385]
(44 of 44)
[CR-12/2023]
is directed to release both the said machines forthwith in favour of
the Objectors-Judgment debtors.
86.
Accordingly, S. B. Civil Revision Petition No. 12/2023
filed by the Decree-holders is hereby dismissed and S. B. Civil
Revision Petition No. 273/2022 filed by the Objectors-Judgment
debtors is allowed with the aforesaid directions.
87.
Pending applications, if any, stands disposed of.
88.
Office is directed to place a copy of this judgment on
record of connected revision petition.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI /**
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