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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM: GANGTOK
(Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH: BHASKAR RAJ PRADHAN, JUDGE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crl. Rev. P. No. 03 of 2017
Shri Suren Gurung,
S/o Shri Ganga Ram Gurung,
R/o Makaibari, Rongli,
East Sikkim.
…. Revisionist
versus
State of Sikkim
…. Respondent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Application under Section 397 and 401 read with Section
482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
Appearance:
Mr. Ajay Rathi, Mr. Rahul Rathi, and Ms. Phurba
Diki Sherpa, Advocates for the Revisionist.
Mr. S. K. Chettri Assistant Public Prosecutor for the
State-Respondent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------JUDGMENT
(11.04.2018)
Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, J
1.
On 15.04.2013 around 10:40 hours one taxi vehicle
(Scorpio) bearing registration No. Sk.01J/1501 driven by Suren
Gurung, the Revisionist herein, was on the way from Rongli to
Gangtok. The Revisionist parked the car to attend to natures
call. Few passengers also alighted. Thereafter, the said vehicle
rolled back and tumbled about 100 meters below the road at 5th
Mile on Rorathang-Rangpo Road. One Bikram Rai succumbed
to his injuries sustained in the accident while other occupants
sustained bodily injuries, both grievous as well as simple.
2.
On 15.04.2013 on receipt of the information a First
Information Report (FIR) was registered and the investigation
taken up.
3.
Charge-sheet No.8 dated 26.07.2013 was filed against the
Revisionist on finding prima facie offences made out under
Section 279, 304-A, 338, 337 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
read with Section 3, 9 III (b) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
although in the Final Form/Report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.
under
the
head
“(xvi)
Under
Act/s
&
Sections:
304-
A/279/336/337/IPC r/w 183/184 CMM Act, 1988.” has been
endorsed.
4.
&
On 6.05.2014 the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East
North
Sikkim
at
Gangtok
framed
five
substance
accusations under Section 287, 304-A, 337, 338 IPC
of
and
Section 181 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to which the Revisionist
pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
5.
In the trial that commenced the Prosecution examined ten
witnesses including the Investigating Officer. The examination
of the Revisionist under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Cr.P.C.) was conducted on 19.08.2016.
6.
On
04.11.2016 the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
rendered his judgment and convicted the Revisionist for
offences punishable under Section 287, 304-A, 337 and 338 of
IPC. However, the Revisionist was acquitted for offence under
Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
7.
On 11.11.2016 the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
sentenced the Revisionist to simple imprisonment of three
months for offence under Section 287 IPC; a fine of Rs.500/- for
offence under Section 337 and to undergo simple imprisonment
of twenty days for failure to pay the fine; a fine of Rs.1000/- for
offence under Section 338 of IPC and to undergo simple
imprisonment of twenty days for failure to pay the fine; and
rigorous imprisonment of six months for offence under Section
304-A IPC and a fine of Rs.2000/- and to undergo rigorous
imprisonment of one month for failure to pay the fine.
All
sentences were to run concurrently.
8.
Aggrieved by the judgment dated 04.11.2016 and sentence
dated 11.11.2016 rendered by the Learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate the Revisionist preferred an appeal under Section
374 (3) (a) Cr.P.C. before the Court of the Learned Sessions
Judge, East & North Sikkim at Gangtok being Criminal Appeal
No. 08 of 2016.
9.
The
Learned
Sessions
Judge
vide
judgment
dated
06.06.2017 declined to interfere with the conviction and upheld
the judgment and sentences impugned in the appeal.
10. Dissatisfied by the said judgment dated 06.06.2017
passed by the Learned Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No.
08 of 2016 the Revisionist has preferred the present revision
application under Section 397 and 401 read with Section 482
Cr.P.C.
11. Heard Mr. Ajay Rathi, Learned Counsel appearing for the
Revisionist as well as Mr. S. K. Chettri, Assistant Public
Prosecutor appearing for the State-Respondent. Both the
Learned Counsels representing the respective parties led this
Court extensively to the evidence on record and advanced their
respective submissions. Mr. Ajay Rathi propounded that in a
criminal case the burden lies on the prosecution to prove every
ingredient of the offences charged and the accused is to be
considered innocent until proven guilty. This is a salutary
principal in criminal jurisprudence and the prosecution may
not need to quarrel with the defence on this point. He further
submitted that the present case is a case in which the
Revisionist ought to be given the benefit of doubt. Per contra,
Mr. S. K. Chettri asserts that the prosecution has been able to
establish its case beyond reasonable doubt before the Trial
Court as well as the appellate Court and therefore, the
impugned judgment may not be interfered with.
12. As the Revisionist has been found guilty and convicted
under Sections 287, 337, 338 and 304-A IPC it is necessary to
examine the ingredients of the said provisions.
13. Section 287 IPC reads thus:
“287. Negligent conduct with respect to machinery.—
Whoever does, with any machinery, any act so rashly or
negligently as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause
hurt or injury to any other person,
or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with
any machinery in his possession or under his care as is
sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life
from such machinery,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which
may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”
[Emphasis supplied]
14. Section 287 IPC uses the word “machinery” but however,
does not define it. The word “machinery” thus needs to be
understood in its ordinary sense. The following are the
dictionary meanings assigned to the word “machinery” or
“machine”:(i)
The Black’s Law Dictionary, Tenth Edition defines the
word “machine” thus:“machine. (16c) Patents. A device or apparatus
consisting of fixed and moving parts that work together to
perform some function. Machines are one of the statutory
categories of inventions that can be patented.-Also termed
apparatus; device. Cf. MANUFACTURE; PROCESS (3).”
(ii)
The Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language,
Unabridged, Encyclopaedic Edition defines the word
“Machine” as:
“Machine”, n. [Fr. Machine: L. machine; Gr. mēchanē, a
machine, engine, device.]
1.
2.
……..
(a) a vehicle, as, formerly, a carriage, cart, etc.; b) a vehicle
operated mechanically; specifically, an automobile.
3.
a structure consisting of a frame work and various fixed
and moving parts, for doing some kind of work; mechanism;
as, a sewing machine.
……..
……..
……..
……..
in mechanics, a device that transmits, or changes the
application of, energy; the lever, wheel, and screw are
called simple machines.”
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
(iii)
The Chambers Thesaurus, 2007 Edition defines
“Machine” and “Machinery” as:
“machine n.
1. INSTRUMENT, device, Contrivance, tool, Contraption,
mechanism, engine, motor, apparatus, appliance, gadget,
hardware
2. AGENCY, organization, structure, instruments, tool, organ,
vehicle, influence, catalyst, system, workings
3. AUTOMATION, robot, mechanical person, tool, mechanism,
zombie, android”
“machinery n.
1. INSTRUMENT, Mechanism, tools, apparatus, equipment,
tackle, gear, gadgetry
2. ORGANIZATION, channel (s), structure, system, procedure,
workings, agency”
(iv)
The
Concise
Oxford
English
Dictionary,
Indian
Edition defines “machine” as:
“machine ■ n.
1.
an apparatus using mechanical power and having
several parts, each with a definite function and together
performing a particular task. ► Technical any device that
transmits a force or directs its application
2.
..........”
15. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 Section 2(28) reads thus:
“2(28) “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” means any
mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads
whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an
external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a
body has not been attached and a trailer; but does not include
a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type
adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed
premises or a vehicle having less than four wheels fitted with
engine capacity of not exceeding 1[twenty-five cubic
centimetres];”
16. In view of the definition of the words “machine” or
“machinery” in
its ordinary grammatical sense
and
the
definition of the word “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” in section
2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 all motor vehicles are
machines but all machines may not be motor vehicles. The
word “machine” would include within its definition “motor
vehicles” also for the purpose of Section 287 IPC.
17. To fall within the mischief of Section 287 IPC an accused
must have done, with any machinery, any act so “rashly and
negligently” as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause
hurt or injury to any person. Section 287 IPC also makes the
“knowingly or negligently” omitting to take such order with any
machinery in his possession or under his care as is sufficient to
guard against any probable danger to human life from such
machinery an offence. The first part of Section 287 IPC thus
deals with the “rash and negligent” act with the machinery
endangering human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to
any person. The second part of 287 IPC deals with “knowingly
and negligently” omitting to take such order with the machinery
in his possession or under his care. Section 287 IPC thus deals
with negligent conduct with respect to machinery.
18. In re: Mohri Ram v. Emperor1 cited by Mr. S. K. Chettri, the
Lahore High Court dealt with the provision of Section 287 IPC
in this manner:
“……. I am of opinion that both these petitioners are liable to be
punished under S. 287 I. P. C. because they were in possession of
and had the care of the flour mill and consequently of the belting
which was the cause of this accident, and it is obvious that they
omitted to take care of such machinery negligently as was sufficient to
guard against probable danger to human life. They should have
known that by leaving the belting protruding outside the building and
without fencing there was danger to persons who might be passing
near the belting.I alter their conviction to S. 287, I. P. C. and reduce
their sentences of fine to Rs. 250/- in the case of Mohri Ram and
Rs.150/- in the case of Munshi Ram; in default of payment of fine
they will both suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months each.”
[Emphasis supplied]
19. A reading of Section 287 IPC and the judgment of the
Lahore High Court in re: Mohri Ram (supra) makes it clear that
the word “order” in the phrase “omits to take such order” used in
the second part of Section 287 IPC would also imply
arrangement
and
thus
the
failure
to
make
adequate
arrangement with the machinery would also fall within its
mischief if the failure is done “knowingly” or “negligently”.
Thus, in order to make the omission to take such order with
any machinery liable for punishment under this part of Section
287 IPC it must necessarily be proved that the accused had
failed or omitted to take such order or make such arrangement
with the machinery “knowingly or negligently” as is sufficient to
AIR 1930 Lahore 453
guard against any probable danger to human life from such
machinery.
20. Section 337 IPC reads thus:
“337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal
safety of others.—Whoever causes hurt to any person by
doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human
life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
rupees, or with both.”
[Emphasis supplied]
21. Section 338 IPC reads thus:
“338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or
personal safety of others.—Whoever causes grievous hurt to
any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to
endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend
to one thousand rupees, or with both.”
[Emphasis supplied]
22. It would be noticed that the difference between Section
337 and Section 338 IPC is the extent of hurt. Whereas an act
to fall within Section 337 IPC hurt must be caused, to fall
within Section 338 IPC the act must result in grievous hurt. The
act in both the sections must be “rash and negligent” as to
“endanger human life, or the personal safety of others”. It is
evident therefore, that the “rash and negligent” act of the
accused must be to such an extent that it should endanger
human life, or the personal safety of others. If the “rash and
negligent” act complained of is to such an extent then for the
purpose of Section 337 IPC it must result in hurt and for the
purpose of Section 338 IPC it must result in grievous hurt.
23.
In re: Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra2 the
Supreme Court examined the provisions of Section 304-A, 337
and 338 and explained it thus:
“37. In Empress of India v. Idu Beg [ILR (1881) 3 All 776]
Straight, J. explained the meaning of criminal rashness and criminal
negligence in the following words: (ILR pp. 779-80)
“… criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or
wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may
cause injury, but without intention to cause injury, or
knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies
in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or
indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the
gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable
and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to
the public generally or to an individual in particular, which,
having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge
has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to
have adopted.”
The above meaning of criminal rashness and criminal negligence
given by Straight, J. has been adopted consistently by this Court.
38. Insofar as Section 304-A IPC is concerned, it deals with
death caused by doing any rash or negligent act where such death is
caused neither intentionally nor with the knowledge that the act of the
offender is likely to cause death. The applicability of Section 304-A
IPC is limited to rash or negligent acts which cause death but fall
short of culpable homicide amounting to murder or culpable homicide
not amounting to murder. An essential element to attract Section 304A IPC is death caused due to rash or negligent act. The three things
which are required to be proved for an offence under Section 304-A
are:
(1) death of human being;
(2) the accused caused the death; and
(3) the death was caused by the doing of a rash or negligent
act, though it did not amount to culpable homicide of either
description.
39. Like Section 304-A, Sections 279, 336, 337 and 338 IPC are
attracted for only the negligent or rash act. The scheme of Sections
279, 304-A, 336, 337 and 338 leaves no manner of doubt that these
offences are punished because of the inherent danger of the acts
specified therein irrespective of knowledge or intention to produce the
result and irrespective of the result. These sections make punishable
the acts themselves which are likely to cause death or injury to
human life.”
(2012) 2 SCC 648
xxxxxxxxxx
78. We have also carefully considered the evidence let in by the
prosecution—the substance of which has been referred to above—and
we find no justifiable ground to take a view different from that of the
High Court. We agree with the conclusions of the High Court and have
no hesitation in holding that the evidence and materials on record
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant can be attributed
with knowledge that his act of driving the vehicle at a high speed in a
rash or negligent manner was dangerous enough and he knew that
one result would very likely be that people who were asleep on the
pavement may be hit, should the vehicle go out of control.”
24. Section 304-A IPC reads thus:
“304-A. Causing death by negligence.—Whoever
causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent
act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
[Emphasis supplied]
25. To fall within the mischief of Section 304-A IPC death
must be the result of the “rash and negligent” act although
without intention to cause death, nor knowledge that the act
done will in all probability result into death. However, the
rashness must be so reckless or indifferent and the negligence
must be so gross or culpable that it would result in the death of
another person.
26. As the IPC has not defined what is “rash and negligent” it
is incumbent to understand and appreciate the phrase in
criminal jurisprudence. It is also equally vital to understand
and appreciate the difference of the said phrase “rash and
negligent” in civil action and criminal cases.
27. The Supreme Court in re: Mahadev Prasad Kaushik v. State
of U.P.3 has explained Section 304-A IPC thus:
“23. Section 304-A was inserted by the Penal
(Amendment) Act, 1870 (Act 27 of 1870) and reads thus:
Code
“304-A. Causing death by negligence.—Whoever causes
the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not
amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
The section deals with homicidal death by rash or negligent act. It
does not create a new offence. It is directed against the offences
outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC and covers those cases
where death has been caused without intention or knowledge. The
words “not amounting to culpable homicide” in the provision are
significant and clearly convey that the section seeks to embrace those
cases where there is neither intention to cause death, nor knowledge
that the act done will in all probability result into death. It applies to
acts which are rash or negligent and are directly the cause of death of
another person.
24. There is thus distinction between Section 304 and Section
304-A. Section 304-A carves out cases where death is caused by
doing a rash or negligent act which does not amount to culpable
homicide not amounting to murder within the meaning of Section 299
or culpable homicide amounting to murder under Section 300 IPC. In
other words, Section 304-A excludes all the ingredients of Section 299
as also of Section 300. Where intention or knowledge is the
“motivating force” of the act complained of, Section 304-A will have to
make room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder or amounting to murder as the
facts disclose. The section has application to those cases where there
is neither intention to cause death nor knowledge that the act in all
probability will cause death.”
28. In re: Sushil Ansal v. State through Central Bureau of
Investigation 4 the Supreme Court would examine Section 304-A
IPC and held as under:
“(ii) “Rash” or “negligent” — Meaning of
56. Section 304-A IPC makes any act causing death by a rash
or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, punishable with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
years or with fine or with both. It reads:
(2008) 14 SCC 479
(2014) 6 SCC 173
“304-A. Causing death by negligence.—Whoever causes the
death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting
to culpable homicide shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.”
57. The terms “rash” or “negligent” appearing in Section 304-A
extracted above have not been defined in the Code. Judicial
pronouncements have all the same given a meaning which has been
long accepted as the true purport of the two expressions appearing in
the provisions. One of the earliest of these pronouncements was in
Empress of India v. Idu Beg [Empress of India v. Idu Beg, ILR (1881) 3
All 776] , where Straight, J. explained that in the case of a rash act,
the criminality lies in running the risk of doing an act with
recklessness or indifference as to consequences. A similar meaning
was given to the term “rash” by the High Court of Madras in
Nidamarti Nagabhushanam, In re [Nidamarti Nagabhushanam, In re,
(1871-74) 7 Mad HCR 119] , where the Court held that culpable
rashness meant acting with the consciousness that a mischievous
and illegal consequence may follow, but hoping that it will not.
Culpability in the case of rashness arises out of the person concerned
acting despite the consciousness. These meanings given to the
expression “rash”, have broadly met the approval of this Court also as
is evident from a conspectus of decisions delivered from time to time,
to which we shall presently advert. But before we do so, we may refer
to the following passage from A Textbook of Jurisprudence by George
Whitecross Paton reliance whereupon was placed by Mr Jethmalani in
support of his submission. Rashness according to Paton means:
“where the actor foresees possible consequences, but foolishly
thinks they will not occur as a result of his act”.
(emphasis supplied)
58. In the case of “negligence” the courts have favoured a
meaning which implies a gross and culpable neglect or failure to
exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard
against injury either to the public generally or to an individual which
having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge arises,
it may be the imperative duty of the accused to have adopted.
Negligence has been understood to be an omission to do something
which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable person would not do.
Unlike rashness, where the imputability arises from acting despite the
consciousness, negligence implies acting without such consciousness,
but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the
caution incumbent upon him. The imputability in the case of
negligence arises from the neglect of the civil duty of circumspection.”
xxxxxxxxxx
72. To sum up, negligence signifies the breach of a duty to do
something which a reasonably prudent man would under the
circumstances have done or doing something which when judged from
reasonably prudent standards should not have been done. The
essence of negligence whether arising from an act of commission or
omission lies in neglect of care towards a person to whom the
defendant or the accused as the case may be owes a duty of care to
prevent damage or injury to the property or the person of the victim.
The existence of a duty to care is thus the first and most fundamental
of ingredients in any civil or criminal action brought on the basis of
negligence, breach of such duty and consequences flowing from the
same being the other two. It follows that in any forensic exercise
aimed at finding out whether there was any negligence on the part of
the defendant/accused, the courts will have to address the above
three aspects to find a correct answer to the charge.
(iv) Difference between negligence in civil actions and in
criminal cases
73. Conceptually the basis for negligence in civil law is different
from that in criminal law, only in the degree of negligence required to
be proved in a criminal action than what is required to be proved by
the plaintiff in a civil action for recovery of damages. For an act of
negligence to be culpable in criminal law, the degree of such
negligence must be higher than what is sufficient to prove a case of
negligence in a civil action. Judicial pronouncements have repeatedly
declared that in order to constitute an offence, negligence must be
gross in nature. That proposition was argued by Mr Ram Jethmalani
at great length relying upon the English decisions apart from those
from this Court and the High Courts in the country. In fairness to Mr
Salve, counsel appearing for CBI and Mr Tulsi appearing for the
Association of Victims, we must mention that the legal proposition
propounded by Mr Jethmalani was not disputed and in our opinion
rightly so. That negligence can constitute an offence punishable under
Section 304-A IPC only if the same is proved to be gross, no matter the
word “gross” has not been used by Parliament in that provision is the
settled legal position. It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to trace the
development of law on the subject, except making a brief reference to
a few notable decisions which were referred to at the Bar.
xxxxxxxxxx
78. There is no gainsaying that negligence in order to provide a
cause of action to the affected party to sue for damages is different
from negligence which the prosecution would be required to prove in
order to establish a charge of “involuntary manslaughter” in England,
analogous to what is punishable under Section 304-A IPC in India. In
the latter case it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the
negligence with which the accused is charged is “gross” in nature no
matter that Section 304-A IPC does not use that expression. What is
“gross” would depend upon the fact situation in each case and
cannot, therefore, be defined with certitude. Decided cases alone can
illustrate what has been considered to be gross negligence in a given
situation.”
29. “Rash and negligent” act is the integral ingredient of all the
afore-quoted provisions of law. To hold an accused criminally
liable under the aforesaid provisions it is essential to prove that
the act of the accused is a “rash and negligent” act. The
meaning of the phrase used in the afore-quoted provisions i.e.
“rash and negligent” must necessary be the same in all the said
provision.
30. In re: Emperor v. Omkar Ram Pratap5 it was observed by Sir
Lawrence Jenkins that: “To impose criminal liability under
Section 304-A, Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the death
should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of
the accused, and that act must be the proximate and efficient
cause without the intervention of another’s negligence. It must be
the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the
causa sine qua non.” This view has been followed by the
Supreme Court in several decisions including in re: Kurban
Hussein Mohammedali Rangwala v. State of Maharashtra6 Suleman
Rehiman Mulani & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra 7.
31. “Causa” in latin means cause. “Causa causans” means an
immediate or effective cause. “Causa sine qua non” means a
necessary cause; the cause without which the thing cannot be
or the event would not have occurred. (Black’s Law Dictionary,
Tenth Edition). Therefore, it is clear that the “rash and
negligent” act must be the immediate or effective cause and it is
not enough that it was the necessary cause or the cause
without which the event would not have occurred.
(1902) 4 Bom LR. 679
(1965) 2 SCR 622
(1968) 2 SCR 515
32. In re: Ambalal D. Bhatt v. The State of Gujarat 8 it was held
that in a prosecution for an offence under Section 304-A of IPC,
the Court has to examine whether the alleged act of the accused
is the direct result of a rash and negligent act and that act was
the proximate and efficient cause of the death without
intervention of others negligence.
33. In re: Sushil Ansal v. State through Central Bureau of
Investigation9
the Supreme Court has lucidly explained the
doctrine of causa causans thus:(v) Doctrine of causa causans
80. We may now advert to the second and an equally, if not,
more important dimension of the offence punishable under Section
304-A IPC viz. that the act of the accused must be the proximate,
immediate or efficient cause of the death of the victim without the
intervention of any other person's negligence. This aspect of the legal
requirement is also settled by a long line of decisions of the courts in
this country. We may at the outset refer to a Division Bench decision
of the High Court of Bombay in Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap [(1902)
4 Bom LR 679] where Sir Lawrence Jenkins speaking for the Court
summed up the legal position in the following words:
“… to impose criminal liability under Section 304-A of the
Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the act should have
been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused
and that act must be proximate and efficient cause without the
intervention of another negligence. It must have been the causa
causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine
qua non.”
The above statement of law was accepted by this Court in Kurban
Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla v. State of Maharashtra [Kurban
Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965
SC 1616 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 550 : (1965) 2 SCR 622] . We shall refer to
the facts of this case a little later especially because Mr Jethmalani,
learned counsel for the appellant Sushil Ansal, placed heavy reliance
upon the view this Court has taken in the fact situation of that case.
81. Suffice it to say that this Court has in Kurban Hussein case
[Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla v. State of Maharashtra,
AIR 1965 SC 1616 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 550 : (1965) 2 SCR 622] accepted
in unequivocal terms the correctness of the proposition that criminal
liability under Section 304-A IPC shall arise only if the prosecution
(1972) 3 SCC 525
(2014) 6 SCC 173
proves that the death of the victim was the result of a rash or
negligent act of the accused and that such act was the proximate and
efficient cause without the intervention of another person's negligence.
A subsequent decision of this Court in Suleman Rahiman Mulani v.
State of Maharashtra [Suleman Rahiman Mulani v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829 : 1968 Cri LJ 1013] has once again
approved the view taken in Omkar Rampratap case [(1902) 4 Bom LR
679] that the act of the accused must be proved to be the causa
causans and not simply a causa sine qua non for the death of the
victim in a case under Section 304-A IPC. To the same effect are the
decisions of this Court in Rustom Sherior Irani v. State of Maharashtra
[Rustom Sherior Irani v. State of Maharashtra, 1969 ACJ 70 (SC)] ,
Bhalchandra v. State of Maharashtra [Bhalchandra v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 1319 : (1968) 3 SCR 766 : 1968 Cri LJ
1501] , Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana [(1970) 3 SCC 904] , S.N.
Hussain v. State of A.P. [S.N. Hussain v. State of A.P., (1972) 3 SCC
18 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 254] , Ambalal D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat [(1972)
3 SCC 525 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 618] and Jacob Mathew case [Jacob
Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1369] .
82. To sum up: for an offence under Section 304-A to be proved
it is not only necessary to establish that the accused was either rash
or grossly negligent but also that such rashness or gross negligence
was the causa causans that resulted in the death of the victim.
83. As to what is meant by causa causans we may gainfully
refer to Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.) which defines that
expression as under:
“Causa causans.—The immediate cause; the last link in
the chain of causation.”
The Advance Law Lexicon edited by Justice Chandrachud, former
Chief Justice of India defines causa causans as follows:
“Causa causans.—The immediate cause as opposed to a
remote cause; the ‘last link in the chain of causation’; the real
effective cause of damage.”
84. The expression “proximate cause” is defined in the 5th Edn.
of Black's Law Dictionary as under:
“Proximate cause.—That which, in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces injury and without which the result would not
have occurred. Wisniewski v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
[226 Pa Super 574 : 323 A2d 744 (1974)] , A2d at p. 748. That
which is nearest in the order of responsible causation. That
which stands next in causation to the effect, not necessarily in
time or space but in causal relation. The proximate cause of an
injury is the primary or moving cause, or that which, in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the
accident could not have happened, if the injury be one which
might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a natural
consequence of the wrongful act. An injury or damage is
proximately caused by an act, or a failure to act, whenever it
appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission
played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing
the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either
a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act
or omission.
34. Mr. S. K. Chettri, Assistant Public Prosecutor for the
State-Respondent citing a judgment of the Supreme Court in re:
Duli Chand v. Delhi Administration10 submitted that since there
are concurrent findings of fact the jurisdiction of the High Court
in a criminal revision application is severely restricted and it
cannot embark upon a re-appreciation of evidence.
35. In re: State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh
Anand & Ors. with Satish Kaur Sahni v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip
Singh Anand & Ors.11 the Supreme Court has held:“22. The revisional court is empowered to exercise all the
powers conferred on the appellate court by virtue of the provisions
contained in Section 401 CrPC. Section 401 CrPC is a provision
enabling the High Court to exercise all powers of an appellate court, if
necessary, in aid of power of superintendence or supervision as a
part of power of revision conferred on the High Court or the Sessions
Court. Section 397 CrPC confers power on the High Court or Sessions
Court, as the case may be,
“for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any
proceedings of such inferior court”.
It is for the above purpose, if necessary, the High Court or the
Sessions Court can exercise all appellate powers. Section 401 CrPC
conferring powers of an appellate court on the revisional court is with
the above limited purpose. The provisions contained in Section 395 to
Section 401 CrPC, read together, do not indicate that the revisional
power of the High Court can be exercised as a second appellate
power.
23. On this aspect, it is sufficient to refer to and rely on the
decision of this Court in Duli Chand v. Delhi Admn. [(1975) 4 SCC 649
: 1975 SCC (Cri) 663 : AIR 1975 SC 1960] in which it is observed thus:
(SCC p. 651, para 5)
“The High Court in revision was exercising supervisory
jurisdiction of a restricted nature and, therefore, it would have
been justified in refusing to reappreciate the evidence for the
(1975) 4 SCC 649
(2004) 7 SCC 659
purposes of determining whether the concurrent finding of fact
reached by the learned Magistrate and the learned Additional
Sessions Judge was correct. But even so, the High Court
reviewed the evidence presumably for the purpose of satisfying
itself that there was evidence in support of the finding of fact
reached by the two subordinate courts and that the finding of
fact was not unreasonable or perverse.”
24. It is necessary to note that in the case of Duli Chand [(1975)
4 SCC 649: 1975 SCC (Cri) 663 : AIR 1975 SC 1960] the High Court
had reappreciated the whole evidence and confirmed the findings of
the two courts below. This Court, therefore, did not interfere with
them.”
36. Mr. Ajay Rathi, drew the attention of this Court to the
evidence of a vital prosecution witness Bijay Gurung (P.W.2)
who was one of the occupants of the vehicle driven by the
Revisionist from Rongli for going to Gangtok. Bijay Gurung
(P.W.2) identified the Revisionist in Court. He stated that:“I know the accused present before the Court. On 15.04.2013. I along
with my family members boarded the vehicle driven by the accused
from Rongli for going to Gangtok. On reaching Kumrek the accused
driver stopped the vehicle on the way and went for short toilet. At that
time, the vehicle which we had boarded suddenly started moving and
fell below the road. I along with other passengers travelling in the
said vehicle also fell along with the vehicle. From the PO I along with
the others were evacuated to Rangpo hospital from where I was
referred to CRH, Tadong. In the said accident I sustained fracture,
injury on my left leg and I had to undergo 17 stitches on my right. I
was admitted in the hospital for 2 months for the treatment of my
injuries sustained in the said accident.
xxx on behalf of the accused
It is not a fact that on 15.04.2013 I did not board the vehicle
driven by the accused from Rongli towards Gangtok. It is true that I
was seated at the back seat of the vehicle i.e., Scorpio. It is true that
on the relevant day of 15.04.2013 the vehicle/driver/accused person
and some of the passengers had stopped at the PO to attend the call
of the nature. It is true that there were other vehicles already parked
in front of our vehicle at the PO. I do not know if the accused person
had pulled the handbrake of the vehicle. I also do not know if the
accused had put a stone at the back side of the tyre to stop the flow.
It is true that I was listening to the music being played inside the
vehicle. It is true that three persons including the driver had gone out
of the vehicle and the rest (7) of the passengers were in the vehicle. It
is true that the accused drove the vehicle smoothly from Rongli to PO.
It is true that movement among the sudden passengers inside the
vehicle cause the same to flow backwards towards the cliff, the PO
was an uphill road. I cannot say if the vehicle had back flowed due to
the negligence of the accused person. It is not a fact that I am
deposing falsely.”
[Emphasis supplied]
37. The Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in his judgment
dated 04.11.2016 has dealt with this crucial evidence in this
manner:
“the argument that the passengers contributed the roll because
of their movement inside is fallible, as no passenger can be expected
to sit like an inanimate object inside a vehicle, in fact long sittings at a
same place inclines any person to adjust his sittings more so when
the vehicle is halted, this cannot at all be termed as contributory
negligence. A vehicle is not manufactured even ordinarily not to
withstand the movement of the passengers occupying it if sufficient
care and precaution is taken to secure any slipping of the vehicle by
the movement of the passengers occupying it. The evidence clearly
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act of the accused was
negligent culpable in nature.”
38. The Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has dealt with the
evidence in cross-examination of a prosecution witness who was
not declared hostile or cross-examined in that aspect as if the
Court was dealing with an improbable and obnoxious statement
of a defence witness failing to appreciate that it was a statement
of a fact from the mouth of the injured prosecution witness who
had suffered severe injuries in the accident.
Bijay Gurung
(P.W.2) has categorically stated two facts. He stated that it was
the sudden movement amongst the passengers which caused
the vehicle to roll back. He also stated that he could not say if
the vehicle had back flowed due to the negligence of the
Revisionist. Bijay Gurung (P.W.2) was a passenger who was
inside the vehicle when the vehicle rolled back and because of
which he suffered injuries. His statement must be accepted
with the seriousness it deserves.
39. The Learned Sessions Judge has quoted the relevant
cross-examination of Bijay Gurung (P.W.2) but highlighted and
emphasised only the portion which reads “the PO was an uphill
road….” ignoring the rest. The Learned Sessions Judge has
thereafter, held that the evidence of Bijay Gurung (P.W.2) has
not been demolished during his cross-examination without
reference or adverting to the statement of Bijay Gurung (P.W.2)
that it was the movement amongst the passengers inside the
vehicle which caused the vehicle to flow backwards towards the
cliff.
40. On this vital aspect there is no concurrence of findings of
the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the Learned Sessions
Judge. In fact there is no finding on this aspect by the Learned
Sessions Judge and as stated above the Learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate has simply brushed aside this evidence on a
reasoning of probability only. The evidence in cross-examination
deserves equal weightage to the evidence in examination-inchief.
41. Both the Courts below have held that the prosecution has
been able to prove that the Revisionist had failed or omitted to
secure the vehicle safely while parking. Section 101 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 provides whoever desires any Court to give
judgment as to any legal right or liability depending on the
existence of facts which he asserts, must prove those facts
exist. However, on perusal of the prosecution evidence there is
no cogent evidence to show that the Revisionist failed to secure
the vehicle. Thus, this Court is of the view that for the purpose
of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
the findings and sentences passed by the Courts below this
Court must necessarily examine the same.
42. It is well settled that if a prosecution witness deposes facts
in favour of the accused and the prosecution fails to declare the
said witness hostile and cross-examine him the prosecution
cannot wriggle out of the statement. The said evidence is
binding on the prosecution. The accused can rely upon such
evidence. It must be taken that the prosecution has accepted
that evidence to be true. (vide Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N;
Raja Ram v. State of Rajasthan12; Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari v. State
(NCT of Delhi13); Javed Masood & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan14; Assoo v.
State of Madhya Pradesh15 and Sanjay Subba v. State of Sikkim16)
43. Bijay Gurung (P.W.2) was an injured witness. Bijay
Gurung (P.W.2) has stated that the accident had occurred on
15.04.2013 after the Revisionist had stopped the vehicle on the
way to answer to natures call. Bijay Gurung (P.W.2) has also
stated that the vehicle which he along with his family members
had boarded suddenly started moving and fell below the road as
a result of which he sustained fracture on his left leg and had to
undergo 17 stitches on his right leg and was hospitalised for
two months for treatment. Bijay Gurung (P.W.2) has also
candidly admitted that he was seated at the back seat of the
said vehicle while the Revisionist and some passengers had
stopped at the place of occurrence to attend to the call of
(2005) 5 SCC 272
(2005) 5 SCC 258
(2010) 3 SCC 538
(2011) 14 SCC 448
2017 SCC OnLine Sikk 184
nature. The evidence of Bijay Gurung (P.W.2) to the aforesaid
effect is also supported by the evidence of other injured
witnesses Santosh Kumar Pradhan (P.W.3) who sustained
injuries on his hands and Nilu Pradhan (P.W.4) who sustained
injuries on her leg.
44. Santosh Kumar Pradhan (P.W. 3) who was also one of the
passengers of the vehicle stated that:
“As soon as the accused got down of the vehicle, the vehicle
started moving backwards and fell the road. When the accused got
down from the vehicle the engine of the vehicle was still running. As
soon as the accused got down of the vehicle, the vehicle started
moving backward and fell the road. When the vehicle was falling
down I jumped out of the vehicle, in the said accident we all sustained
injuries. I sustained injuries on my hands. My father-in-law Bikram
Rai was also travelling in the said vehicle. He succumbed to his
injuries at the PO due to the accident. After getting down from the
vehicle the accused did not put any stone in the tyres of the said
vehicle to secure the from moving backward.”
[Emphasis supplied]
45.
In cross-examination, Santosh Kumar Pradhan (P.W.3)
stated:
“It is true that the PO is an uphill road. I do not know the
mechanism of the vehicle. It is not true that the accused person pulled
the handbreak of the vehicle. I do not know how the handbreak
functions. I do no remember if the accused person had turned of the
ignition of the said vehicle. It is true that I have not mentioned any of
my today’s deposition while giving my statement to the police u/s.
161 of the Cr.P.C., 1973. It is true that I was sitting at the last seat of
the said vehicle, it is true that I could not see the rear tyre from my
seat. .....”.
[Emphasis supplied]
46. However, Santosh Kumar Pradhan (P.W.3) also stated in
cross-examination that:
“It is true that the accused person had driven the said vehicle
in a safe manner from Rongli till PO. I cannot say if the accident
occurred due to the negligence of accused person or due to the
movement of nine passengers inside the said vehicle causing the
same to flow backwards.”
[Emphasis supplied]
47. Nilu Pradhan (P.W.4) stated that:
“At around 9:30 am we reached Roarathang and the accused
got down to attend nature’s call. We were all together nine persons
inside the said vehicle. When the accused got down from the vehicle,
the vehicle started moving backward and fell off the road. When the
vehicle was falling down I jumped out of the vehicle. In the said
accident we all sustained injuries. I sustained injuries on my leg. I
was taken to CRH Tadong for my treatment after my accident.
My sister-in-law’s father, Bikram Rai who was also travelling in
the said vehicle succumbed to his injuries at the PO due to the said
accident.
After getting down from the vehicle the accused did not put any
stone in the tyres of the said vehicle to secure the from moving
backward.”
[Emphasis supplied]
48. Nilu Pradhan (P.W.4) in cross-examination stated:
“It is true that the PO is usually used as toilet by the drivers
and passengers. It is true that on the relevant day the accused person
had parked the vehicle to attend the nature’s call. It is true that the
PO is an uphill road. I do not know the mechanism of the vehicle. It is
true that I do not remember whether the accused person had pulled
the handbrake of the vehicle. I do not know how the handbrake
functions. I do not remember if the accused person had turned off the
ignition of the said vehicle. It is true that I have not mentioned any of
my todays deposition while giving my statement to the police u/s. 161
of the Cr.P.C., 1973. It is true that I was sitting at the second seat of
the said vehicle. It is true that I did not exit the said vehicle while the
accused person left the vehicle. It is true that I could not see the rear
tyre from my seat. It is not true that as soon as the accused got off
from the vehicle, the vehicle did not flow backwards and did not fall
off the road. It is not true that my sister in law’s father did not
succumb to his injuries at the PO due to the said accident. It is true
that the accused person had driven the said vehicle in a safe manner
from Rhenock till PO. I cannot say if the accident occurred due to the
negligence of accused person or due to the movement of nine
passengers inside the
said vehicle causing the same to flow
backwards. It is not true that I did not sustain injuries due to the said
accident. It is not a fact that I am deposing falsely.”
[Emphasis supplied]
49. From the depositions and the evidence on record it is
established that on 15.04.2013 the vehicle driven by the
Revisionist with nine passengers was travelling from Rongli to
Gangtok. The Revisionist had driven the said vehicle in a safe
manner from Rhenock to the place of occurrence. At around
9:30 am when the vehicle reached Rorathang, the Revisionist
parked the vehicle and got down along with some of the
passengers to attend to natures call. At that time the vehicle
suddenly started moving and fell below the road. When the
vehicle was falling down Santosh Kumar Pradhan (P.W.3)
jumped out of the vehicle and as a result sustained injuries on
his hands. Nilu Pradhan (P.W.4) also jumped out of the vehicle
and sustained injuries on her leg. Bijay Gurung (P.W.2)
however, fell with the vehicle and sustained fracture on his left
leg and had to undergo 17 stitches on his right leg. Santosh
Kumar Pradhan’s (P.W.3) father-in-law one Bikram Rai who was
in the vehicle succumbed to his injuries at the PO due to the
accident.
50.
The evidence of Dr. Tej Chettri (P.W.7) the Medico Legal
Consultant at District Hospital, Singtam confirms the death of
Bikram Rai due to the accident. The evidence of Dr. Yankee D.
Bhutia (P.W.8) establishes grievous injury on Durga Rai. Her
evidence also establishes simple injury on one Kinara Gurung.
Dr. D. P. Sharma (P.W.9) establishes the examination of
Buddha Rai, Santosh Kumar Pradhan (P.W.3) and Niku
Pradhan and that they had sustained simple injuries. His
evidence also establishes that one Sinara Pradhan had
sustained grievous injuries. None of the injured prosecution
witnesses have named Durga Rai, Kinara Gurung, Niku
Pradhan and Sinara Pradhan as those people who were injured
in the accident although they state that there were other
passengers in the vehicle.
51. Although, Nilu Pradhan (P.W.4) stated in her examinationin-chief that the accused did not put any stone in the tyres of
the said vehicle to secure it from moving backwards she
admitted that she was sitting at the second seat of the said
vehicle and could not see the rear tyre from her seat. The fact
that Nilu Pradhan (P.W.4) admits in cross-examination that she
was sitting on the second seat of the said vehicle and could not
see the rear tyre coupled with the admission that she had not
stated what she stated in her examination-in-chief
in her
statement to the police under section 161 Cr.P.C. creates doubt
in the mind of this Court regarding her statement in
examination-in-chief that after getting down from the vehicle
the Revisionist did not put any stone in the tyre of the vehicle to
secure it. There is no positive assertion as to the fact that the
Revisionist had not pulled the handbrake of the vehicle by any
prosecution witnesses although in cross-examination Santosh
Kumar Pradhan (P.W.3) denied that the Revisionist had pulled
the handbrake of the vehicle. Bijay Gurung (P.W.2) is however,
uncertain if the Revisionist had pulled the handbrake of the
vehicle or not or if he had put a stone to secure the back tyre of
the vehicle. In view of the aforesaid there is no clear and cogent
evidence brought forth by the prosecution to establish that the
Revisionist had not secured the tyres of the vehicle by putting
stones or otherwise or that he had not applied the handbrakes
of the vehicle before he got out of the vehicle to answers to
natures call. The Investigating Officer visited the place of
occurrence and exhibited the rough sketch map (exhibit 14)
prepared. The rough sketch map does not, however, give any
idea about the incline or the gradient of the road. The
Investigating Officer’s deposition is also silent about it. He did
not also enlighten about the incline or the gradient of the road.
However, Bijay Gurung (P.W.2), Santosh Kumar Pradhan
(P.W.3) as well as Nilu Pradhan (P.W.4) in cross-examination
admit that the place of occurrence was an uphill road. The
defence is bound by their statement in cross-examination as
held by the Supreme Court in re: Ashok Kumar v. State of
Haryana17.
The Revisionist in his statement recorded under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. states that he had put a stone in the tyre of
the vehicle to secure it from moving in any direction. Therefore,
although it is admitted that the place of occurrence was an
uphill road it is uncertain whether the Revisionist had secured
the vehicle or not. The fact that the vehicle started moving
backwards coupled with the admission that the place of
occurrence was an uphill road permits this Court to presume
that the vehicle had not been secured by a stone or by applying
the handbrakes which was in working condition. However, with
the positive assertion of the injured witnesses named above that
the Revisionist had driven the said vehicle from Rongli till the
place of occurrence in a safe manner coupled with the assertion
of the Revisionist in his Statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
(2010) 12 SCC 350
that he had in fact secured the vehicle, must permit the Court
to give him the benefit of doubt on this factual score.
52. However, Bijay Gurung’s (P.W.2) admission that the
sudden movement of the passengers inside the vehicle caused
the same to flow backwards towards the cliff is a statement
which
stands
un-assailed.
Bijay
Gurung
(P.W.2)
was
a
prosecution witness and therefore, the prosecution is bound by
his admission to the aforesaid effect made in his crossexamination before the Trial Court. Bijay Gurung (P.W.2) was
not declared hostile and cross examined on the said statement
and injured witness in the natural course of events would not
let go the real culprit. Furthermore, Bijay Gurung (P.W.2) also
had his family members in the said vehicle. Bijay Gurung
(P.W.2) was a witness who was in the vehicle when the accident
occurred. His admission that it was because of the sudden
movement of the passengers in the vehicle which caused the
vehicle to flow backwards towards the cliff may be fatal to the
prosecution case in the facts of the present case. It is well
settled that the testimony of an injured witness stands on a
higher pedestal than other witnesses and is considered reliable
as it comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the
scene of occurrence. (vide Jodhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh18
and Kaziman Gurung v. State of Sikkim19.
The said evidence
stands un-impeached and makes it clear that the sudden
movement of the passengers in the vehicle was the causa
(2015) 11 SCC 52
SLR 2017 Sikk 134
causans of the accident. The evidence produced clearly suggests
that after the Revisionist had parked the vehicle few passengers
as well as the Revisionist alighted from the vehicle. Therefore it
cannot be said that the vehicle started rolling back as soon as it
was parked. There was therefore a time gap between the
parking, alighting of the Revisionist and some of the passengers
and the vehicle rolling back.
53. Consequently, the alleged act of the Revisionist cannot be
held to be the proximate cause of death of one of the passengers
or the injuries sustained by the other passengers.
54. It cannot be said that the Revisionist has done any “rash
and negligent” act with the machinery so as to endanger human
life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any person or that
he “knowingly and negligently” omitted to take such order with
the machinery in his possession or under his care as is
sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life
from such machinery that would make him culpable under
Section 287 IPC. Parking a vehicle on an uphill road, the extent
of its gradient or incline not being known would not drag the
Revisionist within the mischief of Section 287 IPC unless it is
also
proved
that
the
Revisionist
failed
to
“rashly
and
negligently” secure the vehicle by taking proper care or made
arrangement or omitted to secure the said vehicle “knowingly
and negligently”. Mr. S. K. Chettri submits that there is no
evidence that the Revisionist secured the vehicle. That is true.
However, there is also no cogent evidence that he did not too.
When
the
entire
prosecution
against
the
Revisionist
is
dependent on this crucial fact it may be unfair to harness
culpability upon him on the basis of presumption more so when
it is the duty of the prosecution to prove every ingredient of the
offence alleged. There is no evidence that the Revisionist did any
act which would enable the Court to come to a conclusion that
the proved acts tantamount to running the risk of doing such
an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences.
It must always be remembered that for an act of “rashness” and
“negligence” to be culpable in criminal law the degree of such
rashness and negligence must be more than what is required to
be proved in civil cases.
55. It cannot also be said that the Revisionist caused hurt or
grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so “rashly and
negligently” as to endanger human life or the personal safety of
others that would attract the mischief of Section 337 or 338 IPC
keeping in mind the degree of rashness and negligence required
to be proved in criminal prosecutions.
56. In the facts of the present case, limiting the examination to
the evidence produced, it cannot also be said that the
Revisionist had hazarded a dangerous and wanton act with
“knowledge” that it is so and that it may cause death to satisfy
all the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 304A IPC.
57. The Criminal Revision Petition No. 03 of 2017 is allowed.
The judgment of the Learned Sessions Judge dated 06.06.2017
in Criminal Appeal No. 08 of 2016 as well as the conviction of
the Revisionist under Section 287, 337, 338 and 304-A, IPC is
set aside. The Revisionist is on bail. The bail bonds of the
Revisionist stands cancelled. He is set at liberty forthwith.
(Bhaskar Raj Pradhan)
Judge
11.04.2018
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