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Page No.# 1/14
GAHC010266292025
2026:GAU-AS:6692-DB
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WA/412/2025
SURABHI DEY AND 14 ORS
D/O- DURJOY DEY, VILL. KALDOBA PT1, P.O AGOMANI, P.S AGOMANI,
DIST. DHUBRI ASSAM, PIN783335
2: DIKHITA HAZARIKA
D/O- PRASANTA HAZARIKA VILL-MUDOI GAON P.OP.S- SOOTEA DISTBISWANATH
ASSAM PIN-784175
3: SEEMA NATH
D/O-NRIPEN NATH
VILL MADULIJHAR
P.O-CHAKCHAKA BAZAR
P.S-SORBHOG
DIST-BARPETA ASSAM
PIN-781317
4: TAHIR AHMED
S/O- SULEMAN UDDIN
VILL BASATTIHAL
P.S RATABARI
P.O ANIPUR
DIST-SRIBHUMI. PIN- 788734
5: SOLMAN ALOM
S/O-ABDUL SALAM
VILL ANDPO-LAMAJUAR
PS-BADARPUR DIST SRIBHUMIKARIMGANJ PIN-788701.
6: ANUPAM DAS
YEARS S/O NOKA DAS
VILL. BIDYARDABRI
PT-I
P.O- BIDYARDABRI
P.S- GOLAKGANJ
Page No.# 2/14
DIST. DHUBRI
PIN-783335.
7: BEGUM JOBEDA KHATUN
D/O- LT ABDUR RASID
VILL-HATIPOTA PT-2
P.OP.S-BILASIPARA
DIST- DHUBRI
PIN 783348.
8: KALIMULLAH
S/O FAKOR UDDIN
VILL-SALEHPUR P.O. BARAIGRAM P.S PATHARKANDI
DIST SRIBHUMIKARIMGANJ. PIN-788723
9: MAYURI SARKAR
D/O AJIT KUMAR SARKAR
VILL BISHKHOWA
P.O-BISHKHOWA
P.S GOLAKGANJ
DIST DHUBRI ASSAM
PIN 783334.
10: ARJIFA PARBIN
D/O ASHAN ALI AHMED
VILL KHORAGHAT
P/O BARKANDA
P/S BAGRIBARI
DIST KOKRAJHAR
PIN 783348.
11: SHAHANA BEGUM
D/O KAMAL UDDIN AHMED
VILL BAZARGHAT
P.O. BAZARGHAT
P.S. RATABARI
DIST-SRIBHUMI. PIN-788733.
12: TAHIR AHMED
S/O-ABDUL MATIN VILL- HULASHNAGAR P.O-ANIPUR P.S- RATABARI
DIST SRIBHUMI KARIMGANJ. PIN 788734.
13: TUKLU DAS
S/O BABUL DAS
VILL- MANASANGAN
P.O- RAKESH NAGAR
P.S- KARIMGNAJ DISTRICT- SRIBHUMI KARIMGNAJ
PIN 788701
Page No.# 3/14
14: SABINA YASMIN CHOUDHURY
D/O- ISLAM UDDIN CHOUDHURY
VILL BHAIRABNAGAR
P.O. KRISHNAPUR
P.S SILCHAR
DIST -CACHAR
PIN 788025.
15: HUSSAIN AHMED
S/O ALAUDDIN
VILL- WEST SARKARIBARI
P.OP.S- RATABARI
DISTRICT- SRIBHUMI
PIN 788735
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS
REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM, EDUCATION, SECONDARY DEPARTMENT,
GUWAHATI781006.
2:THE DIRECTOR OF SECONDARY EDUCATION
KAHILIPARA
GUWAHATI-781019.
3:BABA SAHEB AMBEDKAR EDUCATION UNIVERSITY
ADDRESS 25/2 AND 25/3
BALLYGUNGE CIRCULAR RD
GARCHA
BALLYGUNGE
KOLKATA
WEST BENGAL70001
Advocate for the Petitioner
: MR. S HANDIQUE,
Advocate for the Respondent : SC, EDU,
Page No.# 4/14
B E F O R EHON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. ASHUTOSH KUMAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
JUDGMENT& ORDER (CAV)
Date : 15-05-2026
(Arun Dev Choudhury, J)
1.
We have heard Mr. M. Karla, learned counsel for the
appellants and Mr. N.J. Khataniar, learned standing counsel
for the Department of School Education. We have also
perused the records and considered the rival submissions
advanced at the bar.
2.
The present intra-court appeal is directed against the
judgment and order dated 13-11-2025, passed by the
learned Single Judge in WPC No.6409 of 2025, whereby the
writ petition preferred by the present appellants came to
be dismissed.
3.
The learned Single Judge declined to interfere, principally
on grounds of delay and laches, and also held that no legal
rights had been established warranting the exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
4.
The 15 appellants before us are aspirants for appointment
to the posts of graduate and post-graduate teachers in
Government and Provincialised Secondary Schools in the
State of Assam.
Page No.# 5/14
5.
The recruitment process commenced with an online
advertisement
issued
by
the
Director
of
Secondary
Education, Assam, on 26-12-2023, inviting applications for
the notified vacancies.
6.
The appellants responded to the advertisement, submitted
their applications and participated in the Teacher's Eligibility
Test (TET) cum recruitment examination.
7.
Their grievance arises from the fact that they were not
considered for selection and appointment because they
had not furnished their B.Ed degree certificates, which were
one of the essential eligibility qualifications under the
recruitment notice.
8.
According to the appellants, they had successfully pursued
the B.Ed course from Babasaheb Ambedkar Education
University, but the university had not declared the result
before
the
last
date
prescribed
for
submission
of
documents, namely 20-11-2024. It is their case that such
non-declaration of the result was beyond their control and,
therefore, they could not be penalised for the same.
9.
The records further reveal that on 11-11-2024, the appellants
submitted a representation before the competent authority
seeking relaxation of the requirement of immediate
production of the B.Ed certificate with an undertaking that
the same would be furnished as soon as the university
declares the result. It has been urged before us that the
Page No.# 6/14
said representation remained pending and was never
formally considered.
10.
According to the appellants, such inaction created in them
a legitimate expectation that their request would receive
favourable consideration, particularly because, according
to them, a similar indulgence had been shown in an earlier
recruitment exercise.
11.
The appellants further contend that they performed
meritoriously in the recruitment test and that certain
candidates
who
had
secured
lesser
merit
were
subsequently issued appointment letters. According to
them, it was at that stage that they were compelled to
challenge the recruitment process.
12.
Another
limb
of
challenge
is
directed
against
a
corrigendum dated 15-3-2024, by which the provisions
enabling condonation or relaxation of eligibility criteria
stood
withdrawn.
The
submission
is
that
once
the
recruitment process had commenced, such an alteration
amounted to changing the rules of the game after the
game had begun and was therefore impermissible in law.
13.
The
learned
Single Judge
considered
the
aforesaid
contentions and also noted the state's stand that the
original advertisement dated 26-12-2023 was not complete
in all respects and was followed by the necessary addenda
and corrigenda, including the corrigendum dated 15-3-
Page No.# 7/14
2024. It was further noticed by the learned Single Judge
that, by the time the writ petition was taken up, nearly 20
months had elapsed since the issuance of the corrigendum,
and the silence had rendered the claim stale. The learned
Single Judge, accordingly, declined the reliefs prayed for.
14.
Having bestowed our anxious consideration on the matter,
we are unable to persuade ourselves to take a view
different from that taken by the learned Single Judge.
15.
At the outset, it must be borne in mind that in an appeal of
the present nature, interference with the exercise of
discretionary jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge is
warranted only when the decision suffers from manifest
illegality, patent perversity, or grave miscarriage of justice.
None of these features are discernible in the case at hand.
16.
The foundational facts are not in dispute.
17.
Possession of a B.Ed degree was one of the essential
eligibility conditions for appointment to the post in question.
It is equally undisputed that on the relevant cut-off date,
the appellants did not possess documentary proof of such
qualifications.
18.
Their inability may have arisen because the university did
not declare the results in time; the legal consequence,
however, is that the prescribed condition remained
unfulfilled on the crucial date.
Page No.# 8/14
19.
In matters of public employment, prescription of a cut-off
date
serves
recruitment
to
an
important
constitutional
the
state
must
service
purpose;
proceed
on
transparent, objective, and uniform standards applicable
equally to all candidates.
20.
In our considered view, mere submission of a representation
does not create an enforceable legal right. At the highest,
such representation invites administrative consideration.
Unless the recruitment rules or the advertisement itself
confer a right to relaxation, no candidate can claim that
the eligibility conditions must be suspended pending
consideration of a request.
21.
A representation neither overrides the terms of the
advertisement
nor
postpones
the
operation
of
the
prescribed cut-off date.
22.
Equally untenable is the plea founded on legitimate
expectation.
23.
The doctrine of legitimate expectation operates in the
realm of fairness in administrative action, but it cannot be
invoked contrary to law, contrary to recruitment rules, or in
any manner destructive of equal opportunity.
24.
To sustain such a plea, there must exist a clear and
consistent past practice or a specific representation
capable of enforcement in public law.
Page No.# 9/14
25.
Even assuming that, in some earlier recruitment exercise, a
degree of relaxation had been granted, such a concession
cannot crystallise into a perpetual right binding the State in
every subsequent recruitment. The recruitment process is
governed by its own terms, timeline, and administrative
exigencies.
26.
Another circumstance of considerable significance is the
delay with which the appellants approached the writ Court.
27.
The recruitment process commenced in December 2023,
and the Corrigendum was issued on 15-03-2024. The
appellants participated in the process and chose to await
the outcome. It was only after the appointments were
issued that the appellants became wise. Even the writ
petition was filed after a substantial lapse of time from
15.03.2024.
28.
Delays in service matters, particularly in recruitment
disputes, are not mere technicalities. Public appointments
create third-party rights, affect institutional functioning, and
attain finality. Courts, therefore, insist that challenges to
recruitment conditions or the selection process be brought
promptly, before the process culminates.
29.
The conduct of the appellant also cannot be overlooked. A
candidate who participates in a selection process with full
knowledge of its governing conditions ordinarily cannot,
after being unsuccessful, turn around and assail those very
Page No.# 10/14
conditions. This principle is founded upon fairness and
consistency of conduct.
30.
One who takes a calculated chance by participating in the
process cannot thereafter approbate and reprobate
depending upon the result. If the appellants were genuinely
aggrieved by the absence or withdrawal of a relaxation
clause, the challenge ought to have been raised at the
earliest available stage and certainly before the process
concluded.
31.
We are equally unable to accept the contention that the
Corrigendum
dated
15-03-2024
amounted
to
an
impermissible change in the rules of the game.
32.
The doctrine that the rules of the game cannot be
changed after the commencement of selection is not a
rigid formula to be applied in isolation. What law bars is a
change that alters essential eligibility criteria, disturbs the
level playing field, modifies comparative merit standards or
otherwise prejudices candidates after they have entered
the
field.
Administrative
clarifications,
corrections,
procedural streamlining or modification intended to carry
the process to its logical end stand on an altogether
different footing.
33.
In the present case, possession of a B.Ed qualification was
always an essential requirement. The Corrigendum did not
introduce a new disqualification nor did it alter the criteria
Page No.# 11/14
of comparative merit or change the mode of selection. It
merely clarified that applications seeking condonation or
relaxation of criteria would not be entertained.
34.
Such a measure cannot be equated with retrospective
alteration
of
substantive
recruitment
norms.
On
the
contrary, it ensured uniform application of existing eligibility
requirements and curtailed discretionary power to relax
eligibility conditions.
35.
The authorities cited on behalf of the appellants, namely
Abhimit Sinha and others versus High Court of Judicature at
Patna and others, reported in (2024) 7 SCC 262 and Dr.
(Major) Meeta Sahai versus State of Bihar , reported in AIR
Online 2019 SC 1766, do not carry the matter any further.
36.
On the other hand, the broader principles enunciated by
the Constitution Bench in Tej Prakash Pathak and others
versus Rajasthan High Court and others, in Civil Appeal
No.2634/2013, lend support to the learned single judge's
conclusion that not every modification during an ongoing
recruitment process is forbidden. What is impermissible is a
change that is arbitrary, unfair or destructive of equal
opportunity. If the modification is regulatory in nature and
intended to facilitate completion of the process without
disturbing its essential framework, judicial intervention would
be unwarranted.
37.
The scope of judicial review in matters of recruitment is
Page No.# 12/14
confined to examining the decision-making process, not to
substituting
administrative
decisions
with
judicial
preferences. So long as the action is informed by reason,
conforms with the governing norm and is free from
malafides or manifest arbitrariness, the court does not sit as
a recruiting authority.
38.
We find no allegation, much less any material, establishing
malafides. What is essentially sought is an equitable
exemption from an eligibility condition that lies beyond the
legitimate scope of judicial review.
39.
It is apposite to record herein that this court, under its order
dated 24.02.2026, taking note that appellants have lost
their age because of intervening litigation but had
performed very well in the recruitment process in question
and that they were not selected only for the reason of their
not having obtained and supplied the certificate of
eligibility, sought for an information from the State whether
the candidature of the appellants could be considered
against vacant post, if not already filled up.
40.
The respondent state has filed an affidavit in that regard,
contending that although 1659 posts are presently lying
vacant pursuant to the selection process in question, the
candidature of the appellants cannot be considered for
said posts, as they did not possess the requisite qualifications
as on the last date of submission of applications. It is further
Page No.# 13/14
contended that such consideration would confer an undue
and
impermissible
advantage
upon
the
appellants
inasmuch as several other similarly situated candidates,
who acquired the essential eligibility qualifications after the
prescribed cut-off date, were not considered. It is also
contended that entertaining the appellants’ candidature
at this stage would result in unequal treatment, violate the
principle of level playing field and render the selection
process legally unsustainable.
41.
Such contention cannot be brushed aside on equitable
consideration.
42.
It is correct that once a date is fixed for determining
eligibility, relaxation in favour of a few candidates outside
the governing norms would itself generate inequality and
expose the process to challenge on the grounds of
arbitrariness. Courts have consistently held that sympathy
arising
from
individual
hardship
cannot
supplant
compliance with notified eligibility conditions, particularly
where public posts are concerned, and rights of numerous
competing candidates are involved.
43.
There is another aspect of the matter. Acceptance of the
appellant's plea at this stage would essentially entail
unsettling a completed recruitment process and reopening
of appointments already made in favour of candidates
who are not before the court. Courts exercising writ
Page No.# 14/14
jurisdiction are slow to disturb concluded selections unless a
grave illegality touching the root of the process is
demonstrated. No such foundational illegality has been
shown to us.
44.
We also looked at the age of the appellants and it appears
to us that they would be eligible, age wise, in the next
recruitment process, which the state contends shall be
undertaken in due course of time.
45.
For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered
opinion that the learned single judge was fully justified in
declining relief to the appellants.
46.
The appellants failed to satisfy the essential eligibility criteria
on the prescribed date; no enforceable right accrued from
the
pending
representation;
the
plea
of
legitimate
expectation is misconceived; the silence caused delay and
acquiescence; the correspondence does not amount to an
unlawful alteration of the rules of the game.
47.
The
impugned
judgment,
therefore,
warrants
no
interference.
48.
The writ appeal accordingly stands dismissed.
49.
No orders as to cost.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
CHIEF JUSTICE
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