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Page No.# 1/24
GAHC010249512018
2026:GAU-AS:13090
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/7759/2018
SUNIL KUMAR SENAPATY
S/O- LATE GOGON CHANDRA SENAPATI, R/O- BISHMILE, CHABUA, P.SCHABUA, DIST- DIBRUGARH, ASSAM
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY, DEPTT OF PUBLIC ENERPRISES, ASSAM
SACHIBALAYA, DISPUR, GUWAHATI- 6
2:ASSAM TEA CORPORATION LIMITED
REP. BY ITS M D
HOUSEFED COMPLEX
BLOCK C
7TH FLOOR
DISPUR
GUWAHATI- 06
3:EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND
REP. BY THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
BHANGAGARH
GUWAHATI- 78100
Advocate for the Petitioner
: MR. J SARMAH, MR. A BHATTACHARJEE,MR. M C DAS
Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM, MR. M DUTTA (r-2),MR J MAHANTA (r-2),MR. P K
ROY (R3),MR. S K CHAKRABORTY (R3)
Page No.# 2/24
Linked Case : WP(C)/1050/2022
SUNIL KUMAR SENAPATI
S/O LATE GOGON CHANDRA SENAPATI
R/O BISHMILE
CHABUA
P.S.-CHABUA
DIST- DIBRUGARH
ASSAM
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES DEPARTMENT
ASSAM SACHIBALAYA
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-06
2:THE ASSAM TEA CORPORATION LTD
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
HOUSEFED COMPLEX
BLOCK C
7TH FLOOR
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-06
3:THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
THE ASSAM TEA CORPORATION LTD
HOUSEFED COMPLEX
BLOCK C
7TH FLOOR
DISPUR
GUWHATI-06
4:THE SENIOR ASSISTANT MANAGER
THE ASSAM TEA CORPORATION LTD
HOUSEFED COMPLEX
BLOCK C
7TH FLOOR
DISPUR
GUWHATI-06
5:EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND
REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
BHANGAGARH
GUWAHATI-781005
Page No.# 3/24
-----------Advocate for : MR. S ISLAM
Advocate for : GA
ASSAM appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR
ORDER
Date : 07-09-2026
Heard Mr. J. Sarmah, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018
and Mr. S. Islam, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 1050/2022. Also heard
Mr. L. Deka, learned counsel appearing for the Assam Tea Corporation Ltd./ respondents
in the above noted two writ petitions.
2.
The issues involved in the above noted two writ petitions, being inter-connected,
with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the said writ petitions were taken
up for hearing, analogously and are being disposed of by the present order.
W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018
The petitioner has instituted the present writ petition assailing the order dated 1703-2008, issued by his Disciplinary Authority, imposing the penalty of removal from
service upon him, in pursuance to a decision arrived at, in this connection, by the Board
of Directors of the Corporation, upon conclusion of a departmental proceeding, instituted
against him.
W.P.(C) No. 1050/2022
The petitioner in the present writ petition, has presented a challenge to the
Resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of Assam Tea Corporation Ltd., in its 209 th
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meeting held on 03-09-2020, to make deductions from the arrear salaries and other
pensionary benefits, receivable by the petitioner against the quantified amount, which has
been established to have been misappropriated by the petitioner.
3.
The facts, in brief, requisite for adjudication of the issue arising in the above noted
two writ petitions, is noticed as under:3.1.
The petitioner, herein, was initially appointed as probationary Assistant Manager
vide order dated 16-10-1982, with the Assam Tea Corporation Ltd. The services of the
petitioner as Assistant Manager, was regularized vide order dated 11-12-1983. As the
petitioner was continuing in his services, the petitioner was issued with a notice dated 0108-2006, directing him to submit his explanation as to why, appropriate action against
him in the matter should not be initiated for the allegation as contained, therein. Vide the
said notice dated 01-08-2006, it was alleged that the petitioner had received an amount
of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine),
being the compensation amount for the land of the Tea Estate of the Corporation
acquired by the ONGC authorities on 12-03-2003, from the establishment of the Deputy
Commissioner, Karimganj. It was alleged that the said amount was not entered in the
cash-book of the garden and/ or deposited in the Corporation’s bank account. It was
further alleged that during the tenure of the petitioner, as the Manager of the Longai Tea
Estate, he was found to be involved collecting tolls from the trucks passing through the
garden gate carrying forest materials. It was alleged that the said gate was so installed by
the petitioner without any direction from the Head Office to erect such gate and collect
toll. It was further alleged that the toll amount so collected was also not deposited in the
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account of the Corporation.
3.2.
The petitioner on receipt of the said notice dated 01-08-2006, submitted his reply,
thereto, on 19-08-2006 and therein, denied of having committed any misappropriation of
money. It was projected that he was only given a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One
Lakh), by the office of the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner and had retained the said
money on the belief that the same was not due to the Tea Estate, as the compensation
was already paid to it, during the year 1989-90. However, the petitioner undertook to
refund the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh), paid to him by the
establishment of the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner.
3.3.
With regard to the collection of toll at the gate of the Longai Tea Estate, the
petitioner had projected that since the year 1989, such practice was continuing in the
garden and the amount collected during his tenure as the Manager of the garden was
spent on welfare activities of the garden and for which proper record was maintained and
is available in the office. It was further contended that even after the departure of the
petitioner from the said Tea Estate, the said practice of operating of a check-gate, was
continued with.
3.4.
The Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner, not being satisfied with the reply
submitted by him, proceeded vide communication dated 22-08-2006, to place him under
suspension. It is also to be noted that an FIR also came to be lodged against the
petitioner on 11-09-2006, basing on the allegations as contained in the said notice dated
01-08-2006. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner, issued to the
petitioner a charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006 containing, therein, two charges which were
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based on the allegations levelled against the petitioner in the said notice dated 01-082006. The petitioner, on receipt of the said charge-sheet, vide a communication dated 0901-2007, sought for inspection of documents, as set out, therein. The respondent/
Corporation by the communication dated 09-02-2007, proceeded to inform the petitioner
that the documents, basing on which, the charges were framed against him was sought
to be substantiated, was already made available to him for inspection and he had
completed the inspection on 08-01-2007. Further, it was contended that the request of
the petitioner for inspection of documents, which was sought by the petitioner, vide his
communication dated 09-01-2007, was examined and it was held that the said documents
had no relevance to the charges levelled against the petitioner and accordingly, the prayer
of the petitioner for inspection of the said documents was rejected.
3.5.
Thereafter, an Enquiry Officer was appointed in the matter and the petitioner is
also found to have participated in the enquiry. On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry
Officer submitted his report. A copy of the said report was forwarded to the petitioner
vide a communication dated 25-02-2008, requiring him to submit a representation against
the same, within the timeframe mandated, therein. The petitioner, vide a communication
dated 15-03-2008, proceeded to submit his representation against the said enquiry
report. Thereafter, the enquiry report along with the evidences coming on record, in the
enquiry as well as the representation submitted by the petitioner was placed before the
Board of Directors of the Corporation, in its meeting held on 27-11-2007. The Board of
Directors, thereafter, on perusal of the relevant materials, proceeded to resolve that the
penalty of removal from service be imposed upon the petitioner and accordingly, vide
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order dated 17-03-2008, the Managing Director of the Corporation proceeded to intimate
to the petitioner the fact of imposition of the penalty of removal from service upon him.
3.6.
Being aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of instituting writ
petition being W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018.
4.
During the pendency of the W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018, the respondent authorities on
quantification of the loss occasioning to it, on account of the misconduct proved against
the petitioner in the enquiry held against him in pursuance to the issuance of the chargesheet dated 16-11-2006, proceeded to direct for recovery of the amounts involved from
the petitioner. The recovery
was directed to be effected from the arrear salaries
receivable by the petitioner as well as from his retirement benefits and accordingly, the
petitioner has assailed the said decision arrived at in this connection by way of instituting
a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 1050/2022.
5.
Mr. J. Sarmah, learned counsel for the petitioner, by reiterating the facts noticed,
hereinabove, has submitted that in the enquiry held, the charges framed against the
petitioner vide the charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006, was not established. He submits that
basing on a presumption drawn in the matter of the petitioner having received amounts
due to the Corporation from the establishment of the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner,
the Enquiry Officer had proceeded to hold the Charge No. 1, levelled against the
petitioner to have been established. Mr. Sarmah submits that with regard to the Charge
No. 2, a general observation was recorded by the Enquiry Officer to the effect that the
collection of tolls in the gate of the Longai Tea Estate was so carried out by the petitioner
without informing his higher authorities and there was no record of the collection of tolls
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made from the trucks passing through the said gate. Mr. Sarmah submits that while the
said finding was recorded by the Enquiry Officer, the Enquiry Officer, had failed to
appreciate the contention of the petitioner that such collection of toll was, in vogue since
long, even before the joining of the petitioner as the Manager of the Longai Tea Estate
and had also continued after the petitioner had left the said Tea Estate.
5.1.
In the above premises, Mr. Sarmah submits that the charges framed against the
petitioner vide the charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006, cannot be held to have been
established in a manner known to law against the petitioner, herein, and accordingly, the
penalty of removal from service imposed upon him vide order dated 17-03-2008, in
pursuance to the decision arrived at in the matter by the Board of Directors of the
Corporation would mandate interference from this Court. Mr. Sarmah, in support of his
such submission has placed reliance on the judgment and order dated 31-08-2017,
passed by the court of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate (S), Karimganj,
wherein basing on the allegation involved in the Charge No. 1, levelled against the
petitioner vide the Charge-Sheet dated 16-11-2006, the trial court on an examination of
the matter had proceeded to acquit the petitioner, therefrom. He submits that the
acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal proceeding so instituted against him would have
to be given a primacy, inasmuch as, the same was so arrived at after evidences were led
in the matter by the prosecution. On a query made by this Court, as to why the penalty of
removal from service imposed upon the petitioner, vide order dated 17-03-2008, was not
assailed promptly before this Court and/ or before any Appellate Authority prescribed in
the matter, Mr. Sarma has fairly submitted that the petitioner was awaiting conclusion of
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the criminal proceeding instituted against him in the matter and the petitioner now having
been acquitted from the charges framed against him in the criminal proceeding, the
penalty of removal from service as imposed upon him basing on similar charges would
mandate interference from this Court.
6.
Mr. S. Islam, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 1050/2022, has
adopted the submissions made by Mr. J. Sarmah, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.
(C) No. 7759/2018. Mr. Islam has submitted that the respondent authorities after
institution of the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018, had placed the matter with
regard to the recovery to be effected from the petitioner, before the Board of Directors of
the Corporation in its 209 th meeting held on 03-09-2020. He submits that the Board of
Directors, in a most illegal manner, had proceeded for directing recovery of the
misappropriated amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight
Hundred Forty Nine) from the arrear salaries receivable by the petitioner as well as the
terminal benefits receivable by him. Mr. Islam submits that the balance payable amount of
Rs. 3,16,074/- (Rupees Three Lakh Sixteen Thousand Seventy Four) was, however,
released to the petitioner. Mr. Islam submits that the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.
1050/2022, was so instituted claiming payment of the amount of Rs. 10,34,923/- (Rupees
Ten Lakh Thirty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty Three) after deducting the amount
of Rs. 3,16,074/- (Rupees Three Lakh Sixteen Thousand Seventy Four) already released
to the petitioner, with due interest.
6.1.
Mr. Islam further submits that the respondent authorities for the purpose of
effecting the said recovery, had not quantified the amount so liable to be recovered from
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the petitioner, herein. Mr. Islam submits that the recovery having been so made with
regard to the amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight
Hundred Forty Nine), purportedly received by the petitioner from the jurisdictional Deputy
Commissioner, however, the said amount not having been demonstrated to be receivable
by the Corporation, the respondent authorities could not have proceeded to effect
recovery of the said amount from the arrear salaries receivable by the petitioner, as well
as from the terminal benefits receivable by him, after being imposed with the penalty of
removal from service.
7.
Mr. L. Deka, learned counsel for the Assam Tea Corporation Ltd. (respondent), has
submitted that the charges framed against the petitioner vide the charge-sheet dated 1611-2006 were specific. He submits that the first charge levelled against the petitioner
pertains to the misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh
Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine) by him, which was required to be
deposited in the account of the Corporation. Mr. Deka submits that the petitioner misusing
his position as the Manager of the Longai Tea Estate had proceeded to draw the amount
of Rs, 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine) from
the
establishment
of
the
jurisdictional
Deputy
Commissioner,
which
was
the
compensation, determined for the land of the tea garden acquired for the ONGC
authorities.
7.1.
Mr. Deka, submits that the said charge was established in the enquiry and the
petitioner had also admitted to have received the amount towards payment of the cost of
acquisition to the Corporation from the ONGC authorities. He submits that from the
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evidences coming on record in the enquiry, it was established that the amount of Rs.
7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine) was
withdrawn under the signature of the petitioner, from the establishment of the
jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner. However, he submits that the petitioner had admitted
to have been received an amount of only Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh). He submits
that the said admission on the part of the petitioner would go to establish the charges
framed against him under Article of Charge No. 1. Mr. Deka has submitted that during the
enquiry, the factum that the petitioner had received an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees
Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine) from the establishment of the
jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner and had misappropriated the said amount, was duly
established. Mr. Deka further submits that the petitioner during his deposition had
submitted that an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight
Hundred Forty Nine) was withdrawn from the bank by the officials of the establishment of
the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner, under his signature. Accordingly, Mr. Deka
submits that the said admission on the part of the petitioner, proceeds to establish the
Charge No. 1, framed against him.
7.2.
With regard to the Article of Charge No. 2, framed against the petitioner vide the
said charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006, Mr. Deka submits that, in the enquiry it was
established that there was collection of tolls from the trucks passing through the gate of
the Tea Estate, during the period when the petitioner was functioning as the Manager of
the said Tea Estate. He submits that the amount so collected were not deposited in the
account of the Corporation and the petitioner had miserably failed to explain the manner
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in which the toll amount collected was being utilized. He submits that the petitioner had
only made a vague statement to the effect that the amount collected were being used for
welfare activities of the garden, without specifying the actual welfare activities so carried
out. Accordingly, he submits that applying the principle of preponderance of probability,
Article of Charge No. 2, must also be held to have been established against the petitioner,
herein. Mr. Deka further submits that the misappropriation of the amount of Rs.
7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine), being
established in the enquiry, the respondent authorities were within their powers to recover
the said amount from the arrear salary receivable by the petitioner, as well as from his
gratuity amount and other terminal benefits due to him, on he being imposed with the
penalty of removal from service. Accordingly, Mr. Deka submits that the misappropriation
of an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/-, (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred
Forty Nine), by the petitioner having been established in the enquiry held against the
petitioner, the amount which was recovered from the arrear salaries, as well as, the
terminal benefits receivable by the petitioner, has to be held to have been quantified in
the manner know to law and accordingly, the recovery so effected would not mandate
interference from this Court. Mr. Deka submits that the balance amount receivable by the
petitioner after effecting the recovery, in question, was duly released to the petitioner and
he had received the same.
8.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the
materials available on record.
9.
The petitioner was issued with a charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006 and therein, two
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Article of Charges were framed against the petitioner. The Article of Charge framed
against the petitioner being relevant, the same is extracted, here-in-below:“Article of charge-I
That while you were functioning as Manager, Longai Tea Estate an amount
of Rs 7,18,849/-(Rupees seven lakhs eighteen thousand eight handed forty nine)
only being compensation/requisition cost of land acquired by ONGC was received
by you on 12-03-2003 through the Deputy Commissioner, Karimganj (land
acquisition branch). The said amount was drawn by you without the knowledge of
the Managing Director, ATCL or without any authority from the Corporation and
purposefully did not enter the said amount in the garden cash book nor remit the
said amount to Head Office with the clear intention of misappropriation.
You are therefore charged with
(a) An act of dishonesty and fraud.
(b) Causing damage/harm to the Corporation through dishonesty
(c) Misappropriation of land compensation Amounting to Rs.7,18,849/- of
Longai T.E.
Article of Charge-II
That while functioning as Manager Longai Tea Estate of the Assam Tea
Corporation Ltd. during the period from 29-03-2001 to 30-06-2005, you had set up
check gate in front of the factory gate of the Longai Tea Estate and you used to
collect money (as toll) from each truck that passed through the garden carving
goods such as forest products. The amount so collected was not accounts for in
the garden i.e. Longai Tea Estate's account. The amount was collected by the staff
under your instruction on a Kutcha slip and it is alleged that the money so collected
were handed over to you. You were not given any authority to set up such check
gate. The collection of money in such manner was illegal and unauthorized. The
Corporation at no time gave such authority to collect money to any Officer of the
Corporation. You thus got involved in such unauthorized and illegal activities
harassing the public also misappropriate public money by dishonest practice which
is grossly immoral.
You are therefore hereby charged for(1) An act prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation
(2) An act unbecoming of a responsible officer of the Corporation.
(3) An act grossly immoral and is unsafe to remain in service.”
10.
A perusal of the Article of Charges framed against the petitioner would go to reveal
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that therein it was alleged that the petitioner had received an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/from the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Karimganj towards compensation/ requisition
cost of land acquired by the ONGC. It was further alleged that the petitioner had
withdrawn the said amount without the authority and/ or approval of the Managing
Director of the Corporation. It was further alleged against the petitioner that he had not
entered the said amount in the garden cash book nor remitted the said amount to the
Head Office of the Corporation and with the clear intention to misappropriate the same.
11.
A perusal of the Article of Charge No. II, levelled against the petitioner would go to
reveal that during the period the petitioner had function as the Manager of the Longai Tea
Estate, he had set up a check gate in front of the factory gate of Longai Tea Estate and
had collected amounts as tolls from the trucks passing through the garden carrying goods
such as forest products. It was further alleged that the amounts were not entered in the
Longai Tea Estate’s accounts. It was further alleged that the petitioner had no authority to
set up such check gates and the collection of money in such manner was illegal and
unauthorized.
12.
The petitioner had denied the allegation of charges levelled against him. The
petitioner on receipt of the said charge-sheet had sought for inspection of certain
documents, however, the same was not granted by the authorities of the Corporation. The
petitioner, however, had submitted earlier an explanation in the matter, and therein, with
regard to the Article of Charge No. I, he had contended that he was directed to appear in
the office of the Deputy Commissioner to withdraw the amount involved and he was
informed that the amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight
Page No.# 15/24
Hundred Forty Nine), did not belong to the Corporation or the Longai Tea Estate and the
amount involved was already paid to the Estate and the money was so drawn on account
of extra expenditure incurred by the office of the Deputy Commissioner while surveying
the land for giving it to ONGC. He further contended that he had received a sum of Rs.
1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) only, which was accepted by him in the belief that the
money did not belong to the Corporation and/ or to Longai Tea Estate and accordingly, he
had not reflected the said amount paid to him in the accounts of the Corporation. The
petitioner had undertaken to refund the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh)
paid to him by the Corporation authorities.
13.
With regard to the Article of Charge No. II, the petitioner had submitted that the
check gate, in question, were in existence even before he had joined the Longai Tea
Estate as the Manager and the amount so collected were being spent on the various
welfare activities of the garden, for which proper record was maintained and was
available in the office of the garden. He submits that after he had left the garden, the
said process of collection of tolls was continued with.
14.
As noticed, hereinabove, an enquiry was instituted in the matter and on conclusion
of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer had submitted his report. On a perusal of the Enquiry
Report, this Court finds that in the enquiry, it was established that an amount of Rs.
7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine), was
withdrawn under the signature of the petitioner on 12-03-2003, from the office of the
Deputy Commissioner, Karimganj. However, the said amount was not reflected in the
accounts of the said Tea Estate. The contention raised by the petitioner about the
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disclosure made to him by the officials of the establishment of the Deputy Commissioner,
Karimganj, was not established in the enquiry. Accordingly, from the evidences coming on
record in the enquiry, the amount being found to have been withdrawn by the petitioner,
the Article of Charge No. I, was held to have been established.
15.
With regard to the Article of Charge No. II, the contentions of the petitioner that
the said collection of tolls was being continued with by him following the earlier
procedure, in place and spent on various welfare activities of the garden, the Enquiry
Officer had concluded that although the petitioner had made the said contention, he
could not establish the same by way of production of records. Accordingly, the said
charge was also held to have been established against the petitioner.
16.
The Enquiry Report submitted in the matter was forwarded to the petitioner by his
Disciplinary Authority and he was required to submit a representation, thereon. The
petitioner, submitted his representation on 15-03-2008. A perusal of the said
representation would go to reveal that the petitioner had not brought on record any
material to dispute the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Accordingly, the
Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner vide order dated 17-03-2008, reckoning the
admissible evidences coming on record in the enquiry as well as the findings recorded
thereon by the Enquiry Officer in his Enquiry Report, proceeded to concur with the
findings of the Enquiry Officer and imposed upon the petitioner the penalty of removal
from service. On a perusal of the materials coming on record, in the enquiry, this Court
finds that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are all based on admissible
evidences coming on record as well as admission made in the matter by the petitioner.
Page No.# 17/24
The conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer of the two Article of Charges framed against
the petitioner to have been established, is found by this Court, to have been so drawn
based on admissible evidences coming on record in the enquiry and accordingly, this
Court is of the considered view that the findings of the Enquiry Officer as recorded in the
Enquiry Report would not mandate interference.
17.
This Court has carefully perused the order dated 17-03-2008 issued by the
Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner and therefrom, finds that the said order was so
based on an appreciation of the admissible evidences coming on record in the enquiry
and this Court finds that the conclusions drawn by the Disciplinary Authority to be not
erroneous. Further, this Court finds that the penalty of removal from service in view of the
establishment of both the charges levelled against the petitioner, to be also not
disproportionate.
18.
The scope of examination and interference, under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, in a case like the present nature, was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao
reported in AIR (1963) SC 1723 and had drawn the following conclusions :
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and
according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the
authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ
under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding
Page No.# 18/24
on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the
departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have
disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves
to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very
face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental
authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts
and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to
be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226
of the Constitution.”
19.
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Chitra Venkata Rao reported in (1975) 2 SCC 557, had drawn
the following conclusions :
“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up
before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P.
v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723 (1964) 3 SCR 25 (1964) 2 LLD 150).
First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer,
is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials
that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied
by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under
Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are
not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted
with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the
charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere
where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation
of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities
have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations
Page No.# 19/24
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves
to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very
face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the
enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some
legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of
that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the
High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
XXX
23.
The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a
supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The
findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the
appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An
error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a
writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a
finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in
recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit
admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is
based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot
be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced
before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be
drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477: (1964) 5 SCR 64].
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to
its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the
aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that
the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which
was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify
the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the
Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons
for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable
person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the
evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no
evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue
a writ of certiorari should not do.
XXX
26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting
aside the dismissal order by reviewing and reassessing the evidence. The appeal
is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and
Page No.# 20/24
bear their own costs.
20.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI Vs. S.K. Sharma reported in
(1996) 3 SCC 364 had drawn the following conclusions:28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural
justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v.
Duke of Norfolk [[1949] 1 All ER 109: 65 TLR 225] way back in 1949, these
principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the
context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v.
Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405: (1978) 2 SCR 272]) The objective is to
ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be
affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152]
and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664].) As pointed out
by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262], the dividing
line between quasi-judicial function and administrative function (affecting the
rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable a fact also
emphasised by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for
the Civil Service [[1984] 3 All ER 935: [1984] 3 WLR 1174: [1985] A.C. 374, HL]
where the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as
synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing
applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called that any and every complaint of
violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there
may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/hearing
may defeat the very proceeding which may result in grave prejudice to public
interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a sufficient
compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil
Mills v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465]. There may also be cases where the
public interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar
considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram
partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and
(c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a
particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying
situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion,
the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following
terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries a distinction ought to be
made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem,
as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is
between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no adequate hearing" or to put it in
different words, "no opportunity" and "no adequate opportunity". To illustrate
take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him
altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin [[1964] A.C. 40: [1963] 2 All ER 66: [1963] 2
WLR 935]). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of
Page No.# 21/24
dismissal would be invalid or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v.
Carr [[1980] A.C. 574: [1979] 2 All ER 440 [1979] 2 WLR 755, PC]). But where
the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the
enquiry officer's report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC
727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704]) or without affording him a due
opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC 43: 1984
SCC (L&S) 62]) it would be a case falling in the latter category violation of a facet
of the said rule of natural justice in which case, the validity of the order has to be
tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person
concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct in the light
of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural
justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void
and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach
and test adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184:
(1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there
was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not
affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a
procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be
examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid."
21.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Bharti Airtel Ltd. Vs. A.S.
Raghavendra reported in (2024) 6 SCC 418 had drawn the following conclusions :
“29.
As regards the power of the High Court to reappraise the facts, it cannot
be said that the same is completely impermissible under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution. However, there must be a level of infirmity greater than ordinary
in a tribunal's order, which is facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court, to
justify interference. We do not think such a situation prevailed in the present
facts. Further, the ratio of the judgments relied upon by the respondent in
support of his contentions, would not apply in the facts at hand.”
22.
A perusal of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, would bring to the
forefront that the legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not
directed against the decision, but is confined to the decision making process. This Court
does not sit in judgment on the merits of the decision. Further it is not open to this
Court to re-appreciate and re-appraise the evidences laid before the Enquiry Officer and
examine the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, as a Court of appeal and reach its
own conclusions. The scope of the judicial review, is limited to the deficiency in the
Page No.# 22/24
decision making process and not the decision itself.
23.
Accordingly, in view of the settled position of law that the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court noticed, hereinabove, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate any
anomaly existing in the departmental proceeding instituted against him and/ or findings of
the Enquiry Officer to be perverse, this Court is of the considered view that the penalty
imposed upon the petitioner is not disproportionate to the charges framed against him
and accordingly, the enquiry report as well as the order dated 17-03-2008, in the
considered view of this Court, would not mandate interference.
24.
Having drawn the said conclusions, this Court would now consider the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the criminal proceeding instituted
against the petitioner basing on the Article of Charge No. I, so framed against him vide
the charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006, having resulted in the acquittal of the petitioner, the
same would now be required to be given a primacy and the findings of the Enquiry Officer
as well as the order dated 17-03-2008 would mandate interference from this Court. The
said submission is noticed only to be rejected. It is a settled position of law that a
subsequent acquittal in a criminal proceeding, basing on similar charge involved in a
departmental proceeding initiated against the delinquent, cannot be highlighted, to set
aside a concluded departmental proceeding. The manner of establishment of charge in a
departmental proceeding and in a criminal proceeding is different. While the departmental
proceeding, the charge is permissible to be established by applying the principles of
preponderance of probability, in a criminal proceeding, the charge is to be established
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the said contention of the learned counsel for the
Page No.# 23/24
petitioner would not mandate acceptance from this Court.
25.
The respondent authorities had proceeded to recover from the petitioner an
amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty
Nine), from the arrears of salary receivable by the petitioner as well as from his gratuity
and leave encashment benefits. In the enquiry held against the petitioner, the charge of
he having received an amount of Rs, 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand
Eight Hundred Forty Nine), from the establishment of the District Commissioner towards
the cost of acquisition of land of the Longai Tea Estate, having been found to be
established, the petitioner having not disputed the said position and it being established
in the enquiry that the amount was so drawn under the signature of the petitioner, this
Court is of the considered view that the amount now sought to be recovered from the
petitioner being established and quantified in the enquiry held against him in the matter,
the recovery of the amount of Rs. 7,18,849/-, (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand
Eight Hundred Forty Nine), from the petitioner, in the considered view of this Court is not
erroneous and accordingly, the same would also not mandate interference by this Court.
26.
For the reasons assigned, hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that
the claim made by the petitioners, in the above noted two writ petitions, would not
mandate acceptance. Consequently, the writ petitions being W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018 and
W.P.(C) No. 1050/2022, stand dismissed.
However, there would be no order as to cost.
JUDGE
Page No.# 24/24
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