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2026:HHC:30216
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.679 of 2025
Date of Decision: 22.7.2026
_____________________________________________________________________
Sumitra
……...Petitioner
Versus
Mukesh Panta
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Pritam Singh Chandel, Advocate.
For the Respondent:
Ms. Anita Mokta, Advocate.
___________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition, lays challenge to judgment
dated 1.7.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II,
Shimla,
District
Shimla,
Himachal
Pradesh,
in
Criminal
Appeal
No.151/2024, CNR No. HPSH10028192024, affirming the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 28/30.3.2024, passed by the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-3, Shimla, District Shimla,
Himachal Pradesh in Case No.159/2016, titled as “Mukesh Panta v. Smt.
Sumitra”, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioneraccused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and
sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of fifteen days
and pay fine of Rs.60,000 to the complainant.
2.
2026:HHC:30216
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that respondent/complainant instituted a complaint under Section 138 of
the Act, before the competent court of law, alleging therein that the
accused, who was known to him, approached him for financial assistance
of Rs.40,000/- in the month of August 2015 under the pretext of financial
crisis. Complainant lent sum of Rs.40,000/- in cash to the accused, who,
in order to discharge her liability, issued cheque bearing No. 270721, dated
15.9.2015, for Rs.40,000/- in favour of the respondent towards discharge
of lawful liability. However, the same was dishonored and returned to the
complainant with remarks 'Account Closed' vide dishonor memo dated
25.11.2015.
Immediately
after
receipt
of
aforesaid
return
memo,
complainant served legal notice dated 24.12.2015 upon the accused,
calling upon her to make the payment good within the stipulated time, but
since needful was not done within the stipulated time, complainant
instituted complaint under Section 138 of the Act before the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-3, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh (in short
the “trial court”).
3.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 28/30.3.2024, held
the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under
2026:HHC:30216
Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per
the description given herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of
conviction recorded by the court below, petitioner-accused preferred an
appeal before the learned first appellate Court, but the same was dismissed
vide judgment dated 1.7.2025. In the aforesaid background, accused has
approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to setaside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the
court below.
5.
Vide order dated 13.11.2025, this Court suspended the
substantive sentence imposed by the court below, subject to petitioner’s
depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal
bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the trial Court, within four weeks.
Though afore order
stands complied with, but thereafter, repeatedly, matter came to be
adjourned on the request of learned counsel for the petitioner, enabling her
to deposit the remaining amount, but in vain. Neither petitioner has settled
the matter with the respondent/complainant nor has deposited the entire
amount of compensation and as such, this Court has no option but to
decide the petition on merit.
6.
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Having carefully perused grounds taken in the appeal vis-à-vis
reasoning assigned by the learned Sessions Judge, thereby upholding the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial
Court, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner that courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in
its right perspective, rather this Court finds that both the courts below
have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously and
there is no scope of interference.
7.
Interestingly, in the case at hand, accused in her statement
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., never denied factum with regard to issuance of
cheque as well as signatures thereupon, rather she attempted to set up a
defence that her cheque got misplaced. Though accused with a view to
probablise her aforesaid defence examined Shri Hem Dutt Shandil,
Manager of Golf Link Finance, as DW-1, but was unable to probablise the
afore defence and as such, no illegality, otherwise, can be said to have been
committed by the court below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the
Act, which clearly provide that there shall be presumption available in
favour of the holder of the cheque that same was issued in discharge of the
lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that
purpose, accused is/was under obligation to raise probable defence.
Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the
2026:HHC:30216
documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the complainant or by
leading some cogent and convincing evidence.
However, in the case at
hand, accused, despite sufficient opportunity, failed to raise probable
defence.
8.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:
“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of
Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility of
negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong
criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent
undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further
2026:HHC:30216
observed that it must be remembered that the offence made
punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory
offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a
civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of
reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected
to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further
observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to
rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for
doing so is all preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable
defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused
can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to
raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the
accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If
however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a
probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section
139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play
if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by
the complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to
qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to
avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered
by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of
such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the
2026:HHC:30216
amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour
constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases,
the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or
liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a
matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the
evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption
that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for
a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial
judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where
there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed
in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
9.
Complainant, with a view to prove his case, examined his SPA,
Shri Ramesh Chauhan, who stated that complainant serves in the Excise
and Taxation Department and on account of transfer, he has issued SPA
Ext.C1-CW1 in his favour. He deposed that in August 2015, accused came
to borrow Rs.40,000/- from Mukesh Panta (i.e. complainant), which was
handed over to him. He further deposed that the accused assured that she
would repay the amount within one month and in his presence, she gave
cheque Ext.C1/CW2 to the complainant. He further deposed that cheque,
on presentation, was dishonored vide memo Ext.C1/CW3. He also deposed
that complainant, before initiation of proceedings under Section 138 of the
Act, served accused with legal notice, copy whereof is Ext. C1/CW4 and
receipt is Ext.C1/CW5, but despite receipt of notice, she failed to make the
payment. Cross-examination conducted upon afore witness nowhere
2026:HHC:30216
suggests that accused was able to extract anything contrary to what this
witness stated in his examination-in-chief. He specifically denied the
suggestion put to him that cheque in question has been misused. He also
denied that figures and words on the cheque are in different handwriting.
While admitting that in complaint, he has not mentioned that he got the
payment delivered to the accused from the complainant, he denied that he
does not know the accused and self-stated that he knows her for the last 15
years and she is also his sister-in-law in relation. Pattern of crossexamination clearly establishes factum with regard to issuance of cheque
and signature thereupon.
10.
Though accused attempted to set up a case that cheque has
been misused, but she was unable to probablise the afore defence by
leading cogent and convincing evidence. She was unable to explain that
how and under what circumstances, cheque in question, came into the
hands of the complainant, if she had not issued it to the complainant,.
Accused examined Shri Hem Dutt Sharma, as DW-1, who testified that
accused was never employed in Golf Link Finance. He also proved the
certificate Ext.D2/DW1, however, in his cross-examination, he feigned
ignorance that complainant used to take loan on less rates and used to
further lend it on higher interest. There is nothing in the statement, which
2026:HHC:30216
can be said to be sufficient to rebut the presumption in favour of the holder
of the cheque that cheque was issued toward discharge of lawful liability.
11.
During proceedings of the case, an attempt came to be made by
Shri P.S. Chandel, Advocate, appearing for the petitioner that there is
overwriting and cutting in the cheque, but having carefully perused cheque
Ext.C1/CW1, this Court is not persuaded to agree with him, rather, this
Court finds that date as well as amount mentioned in the cheque, in words
as well as in figures, have been clearly mentioned and there is no
overwriting, hence no illegality can be said to have been committed by the
courts below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act.
12.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view
of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be
2026:HHC:30216
equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated
even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would
not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge
in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the
High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage
of justice.”
13.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if
any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments,
there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
14.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the
process
or
miscarriage
of
justice
or
to
correct
irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
2026:HHC:30216
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts
below.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
15.
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts
below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of
evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
16.
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court within six weeks to serve the sentence as
awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction,
if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the
amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate
application by the complainant within one week. Pending applications, if
any, also stand disposed of.
July 22, 2026
(manjit)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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