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Page No.# 1/16
GAHC010227192019
2026:GAU-AS:8286
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/7106/2019
SULEMA KHATUN
D/O- NABIE HUSSAIN, W/O- ABDUL KASEM, VILL- UDMARI, P.S- JURIA,
DIST- NAGAON, ASSAM
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 7 ORS
REP. BY THE SECRETARY, HOME DEPTT, NEW DELHI, INDIA
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM
HOME DEPTT
DISPUR
GUWAHATI- 06
3:THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF INDIA
NIRVACHAN BHAWAN
NEW DELHI
4:THE STATE ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF ASSAM
DISPUR
GUWAHATI- 6
5:THE STATE COORDINATOR
NRC
ASSAM
GUWAHATI
6:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER CUM RETURNING OFFICER
DIST- NAGAON
ASSAM
7:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
NAGAON
Page No.# 2/16
ASSAM
8:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (B)
NAGAON
DIST- NAGAON
ASSA
BEFORE
Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE Pranjal Das
Advocate for the petitioner :
Shri AM Barbhuiya
Advocates for the respondents : Shri G. Sarma, SC- Home Deptt. & NRC,
Ms. RB Bora, GA, Assam;
Shri AI Ali, SC, ECI.
Shri UK Goswami, CGC.
Date on which judgment is reserved
: 27.05.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
: 10.06.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the
judgment?
: NA
Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? : Yes
Judgment & Order
(S.K. Medhi, J.)
The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked
by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting
to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 03.06.2019
passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.4 th, Nagaon in F.T. Case No.
399/2015 [Police Reference ‘D’ Case No. 1303/98]. By the impugned judgment,
the petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been
declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971.
2.
The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows:
Page No.# 3/16
(i)
A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Nagaon
District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T. Case
No. 399/2015.
(ii)
As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that
the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written
statement on 02.04.2015 along with certain documentsand adduced
evidence.
(iii)
The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances
and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the
Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as
opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon her and
accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be
a foreign national post 25.03.1971.
3.
We have heard Shri AM Barbhuiya, learned counsel for the petitioner. We
have also heard Shri G. Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department&
NRC; Ms. R.B. Bora, learned GA, Assam, Shri A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel,
Election Commission of India and Shri UK Goswami, learned CGC. We have also
carefully examined the records which were requisitioned vide an order dated
27.01.2020.
4.
Shri Barbhuiya, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that
the petitioner could prove her case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact
that there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted
the said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this
regard, he has referred to her evidence adduced as DW1 and also the following
documentary evidence:
Page No.# 4/16
(i) Ext-1 - certified copy of Voter List of 1966;
(ii) Ext-2 - certified copy of Voter List of 1970;
(iii) Ext-3 - certified copy of Voter List of 1977;
(iv) Ext-4 - certified copy of Voter List of 1997;
(v) Ext-5 – School Certificate dated 10.02.2015;
(vi) Ext-6 – Affidavit sworn by the proceedee;
(vii) Ext-7 – Gaonburah Certificate;
(viii) Ext-8 – Land deed;
5.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the written
statement, all material disclosures were made. He has submitted that in the
Voters’ List of 1966 the names of the grandparents of the petitioner were
enlisted. In the next Voters’ List of 1970, along with the names of the
grandparents, there is the name of her uncle (Rustom) and one Hazera Khatun.
In the next Voters’ List of 1977, there are the names of her uncle, father, mother
and two others. The next Voters’ List is of 1997 containing the names of her
parents. The petitioner has also relied upon a school certificate which, however,
was not proved. Reliance has also been placed on two certificates respectively
by the Gaonburah dated 28.01.2016 and the Gaon Panchayat dated
08.09.2015.The petitioner has also referred to the Voters’ List of 2005, 2010,
2011, 2014 and 2019; containing her name, which were, however, not proved.
6.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the
petitioner had adduced evidence through herself wherein the aspect of shifting
was adequately stated. Her father had adduced evidence as DW2, wherein he
had deposed that he had two sons and five daughters including the petitioner.
The Gaonburah had deposed as DW3 and had proved the Certificate dated
28.01.2016, wherein it was categorically stated that the petitioner is the
daughter of Nobi Hussain.
Page No.# 5/16
7.
The learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly submits that in view of
the availability of the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could not have
been rendered against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires
interference.
8.
Per contra, Shri Sarma, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department
has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. Hesubmits
that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals)
Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner
or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the
proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely
upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act,
1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However,
in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is
also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would
be given only if necessary. He further submits that the evidence of a proceedee
has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only
thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in.
9.
The learning Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written
statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation
of the case of the proceeding and the written statement in the instant case
lacks details and is totally vague. There is no date or year of the birth of the
petitioner and there is no details of the family members. In this connection, he
has relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India reported in(2005)
5 SCC 665:
Page No.# 6/16
“17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon
the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country.
In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to
give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his
parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Some times the place of
birth of his grand parents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1)
(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the
personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of
the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State
authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if
necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a
person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but
almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points.
This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the
knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
10.
Shri Sarma, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that there does
not exist even a single document supporting the petitioner’s claim of citizenship.
So far as the GaonburahCertificate is concerned, he has submitted that the
same contains the National Emblem and therefore, cannot be taken as a legal
document. He has submitted that the School Certificate dated 10.02.2015,
though exhibited, was not proved. The Gaon Panchayat Certificate was not
proved, and in any case, contains a disclaimer in the following manner:
“DISCLAIMER
It may be added that this certificate shall be accepted only as a
Page No.# 7/16
supporting document for establishing linkage with the parent(s) of the
aforementioned person, for whom the certificate is issued. This document
shall be valid only if accompanied by Legacy Data or any of the other
admissible documents issued for the person with whom linkage is claimed
for inclusion in updated NRC.”
11.
He has submitted that so far as the Voters’ Lists are concerned there is an
inexplicable gap of two decades from 1977 to 1997. Furthermore, when the age
of the projected father was 35 years in 1977, his name ought to have been
enlisted in any previous Voters’ List. He has submitted that even the link
between the projected father and projected grandfather has not been
established, as there is not a single common Voters’ List.
12.
As regards the evidence of the projected father as DW2 is concerned,
there are gross inconsistencies. While DW2 had stated to having seven children
including the petitioner, no statements were made by the petitioner regarding
any siblings. He has further submitted that oral evidence of the projected father
in the absence of any documentary support would not be relevant. In this
regard, he has relied upon the case of Asia Khatun Vs. UOI [WP(C)
4020/2017 disposed of on 21.11.2019]. He has also relied upon the case
of Nur Begum v. UoI reported in 2000 (3) GLT 347 and the following
observations have been pressed into service:
“9.
On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered
opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and
documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and
opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari
jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate
jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts
Page No.# 8/16
reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned
opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in
violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from
illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on
evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal
refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no
support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not
been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the
face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.”
13.
By submitting that mere reference to a Voters’ List will not be a conclusive
proof of one’s citizenship, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the case
of Aziz Miya Vs. UoI reported in 2023 (4) GLT 246 and the following
observations have been pressed into service:
“15. We are constrained to observe that a mere claim by a suspected
person by referring to a voters' list claiming a person therein to be his
father is not a conclusive proof and that by doing so, the person has
discharged the burden that he is not a foreigner. This is because there is
also a further requirement to prove that the person who is reflected in the
voters' list relied upon is actually the father of the person who makes the
claim
the
claim
will
have
to
be
substantiated
with
further
material/materials acceptable in law.”
14.
In support of his submission that a certificate has to be proved from
contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the
judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun vs. Union of India reported
in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into
service.
Page No.# 9/16
“20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the
basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and
prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and
proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be
proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the
truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be
established from the record. A document or the contents of the document
cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge. …”
15.
He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum
Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 wherein certain
observations regarding exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction have been made which
read as follows:
“9.
On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered
opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and
documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and
opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari
jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate
jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts
reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned
opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in
violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from
illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on
evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal
refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no
support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not
Page No.# 10/16
been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the
face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.”
16.
He has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rupajan Begum Vs. Union of India reported in(2018) 1 SCC 579, wherein
it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly,
the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents.
17.
The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ
petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated.
18.
The learned counsel for the rest of the respondents have supported the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court in exercise of
its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the
decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. It is
submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision
making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed.
They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a
reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time
frame for completion. It is also submitted that there is a question of national
security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is
taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to
prove the citizenship through cogent, credible and acceptable evidence.
19.
The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials
placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been
carefully perused.
Page No.# 11/16
20.
With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of
the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a
proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts.
In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is
extracted hereinbelow“9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question
arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given
thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner
of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a
foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case
may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person.”
21.
In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [AIR 1963 SC 1035] which
followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of
Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 1526] in the context
of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow“22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or with
respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of
foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or
their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and
confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden
of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such
particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person.
Page No.# 12/16
Therefore, where an order made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a
question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a
foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a
person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi
served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he
was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which
set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the
basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c)
of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the
judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a
foreigner was upon the respondent.”
22.
Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the
submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would
confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the
present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings
based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be
interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction.
23.
Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after
discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ
of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in
Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No.
3339 of 2023]has laid down as follows:
“49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something
important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law
governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Page No.# 13/16
Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari.
50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more
particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in
granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of
Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which
the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It
demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or
palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the
inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is
apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high
prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking.
51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some
action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and
invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction
thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice
between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an
extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded
on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this
flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates &equity
projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the
realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to
be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after
setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the
High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable
Page No.# 14/16
consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal
court of appeal which it is not.”
24.
In the instant case, the written statement is absolutely vague and
apparently, has not met the requirements,as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to
disclose the following:
(i) his date of birth;
(ii) place of birth;
(iii) name of his parents;
(iv) their place of birth and citizenship.
Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the grandparents. It
has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal
knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State.
25.
As regards the Voters’ List are concerned, there is not even one Voters’
List which can connect the petitioner with her projected father. The same link is
essential as admittedly, the petitioner was born on 01.01.1978, which is post
1971. Further, even in the Voters’ List produced, those are full of
inconsistencies. In the Voters’ List of 1996, the names of the projected
grandparents appear and in the Voters’ List of 1970 along with the names of the
grandparents, there contains the name of one Rustom- the projected uncle,
aged 54 years. There is no explanation as regards who is Hazera Khatun, whose
name appears together. In the Voters’ List of 1977, for the first time the name of
the projected parents appears with their ages as 35 years and 25 years
respectively. There seems to be no explanation as to why the name of the
Page No.# 15/16
father was not enlisted in any of the earlier Voters’ List. Furthermore, in this
Voter List of 1977, the age of the projected uncle gets reduced to 45 years.
There is a long, inordinate and unexplained gap of two decades with the next
Voters’ List of 1997. There also exists gross inconsistencies with regard to the
ages of the projected parents. The School Certificate dated 10.02.2015, though
exhibited, was not proved. As regards the Gaonburah Certificate dated
28.01.2016 is concerned, apart from unauthorised use of the National Emblem,
the Gaonburah who was examined as DW3 in response to the Court’s query had
stated that his evidence was not based on any records. The Gaon Panchayat
Certificate was not exhibited. The other Voters’ List having the name of the
petitioner starts from the year 2019 and are all uncertified copies and thus will
not have any probative value.
26.
We have also noticed that when the petitioner had claimed to be born on
01.01.1978, her name should have been enlisted in the Voters’ List at least from
1998. It may be mentioned by the Sixty First Amendment of the Constitution of
India, 1988, the voting age was reduced from 21 years to 18 years. We are,
therefore, of the view that the petitioner had failed to discharge her burden.
27.
In the case of Bijoy Das Vs. UOI reported in 2018 (3) GLT 118, this Court
has laid downthat in proceedings of this nature, oral evidence alone would not
be enough and such evidence is required to be supported and corroborated by
documentary evidence and contemporaneous records. However, in this case, the
same has not been able to be done by the petitioner.We are of the view that the
petitioner as proceedee had failed to discharge her burden to prove her
citizenship.
28.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion
Page No.# 16/16
that the impugned order dated 03.06.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners
Tribunal No.4th, Nagaon in F.T. Case No. 399/2015 [Police Reference ‘D’ Case
No. 1303/98] does not call for any interference.
29.
The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed
earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by
the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law.
30.
The records be returned to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal forthwith,
along with a copy of this order.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
JUDGE
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