Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page No.# 1/15
GAHC010287352019
undefined
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/8727/2019
SULEMA KHATUN @ MUSST. SULEMA KHATUN
W/O- JABBAR ALI @ MD. JABBAR ALI, D/O- LT MANIR UDDIN, R/O- VILL- 8
NO MATIPARBAT, P.S. JAGIROAD, DIST- MORIGAON, ASSAM
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 6 ORS.
REP. BY THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF HOME
AFFAIRS, NEW DELHI-1
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
HOME DEPTT.
DISPUR
GHY-06
3:THE ASSAM STATE ELECTION COMMISSION
ASSAM
HOUSEFED COMPLEX
DISPUR
GHY-6
ASSAM
PIN- 781006
4:THE STATE CO-ORDINATOR
NRC
ASSAM
BHANGAGARH
GHY-5
PIN- 781005
5:THE DY. COMMISSIONER
Page No.# 2/15
MORIGAON
P.O. AND DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM
PIN- 782411
6:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (B)
MORIGAON
P.O. AND DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM
PIN- 782411
7:THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE
JAGIROAD P.S.
JAGIROAD
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM
PIN- 78241
BEFORE
Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE Pranjal Das
Advocate for the petitioner
:
Shri J. Ahmed
Advocates for the respondents
:
Ms. A. Verma, SC- Home Deptt.& NRC,
Shri P. Sarma, GA, Assam;
Shri M. Islam, for ECI.
Shri HK Baishya, CGC.
Date on which judgment is reserved
: 12.08.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
: 11.09.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment? : NA
Whether the full judgment has been pronounced?
: Yes
Page No.# 3/15
Judgment & Order
(S.K. Medhi, J.)
The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked
by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting
to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 16.07.2019
passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.1, Morigaon in F.T. (C)503/2008.
By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the proceedee before the
learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971.
2.
The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows:
(i)
A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Morigaon
District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T.
(C)503/2008.
(ii)
As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that
the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitionerhad filed the written
statement on 26.10.2018along with certain documentsand adduced
evidence through 2 nos. of DWs.
(iii)
The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances
and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the
Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as
opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon her and
accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be
a foreign national post 25.03.1971.
3.
We have heard Shri J. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have
also heard Ms. A. Verma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department& NRC;
Page No.# 4/15
Shri P. Sarma, learned GA, Assam;Shri M. Islam, learned counsel appearing on
instructions of Shri A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of
India and Shri HK Baishya, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the
records which were requisitioned vide an order dated 11.05.2020.
4.
Shri Ahmed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
petitioner could prove her case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that
there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the
said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this
regard, he has referred to the evidence adduced and also the following
documentary evidence.
(i) Ext-A – School Transfer Certificate;
(ii) Ext-B – GaonBurahCertificate;
(iii) Ext-C – Voter Id Card;
(iv) Ext-D – Voters List of 1965;
(v) Ext-E – Voters List of 1970;
(vi) Ext-F – Voters List of 1985;
(vii) Ext-G – Voters List of 1993;
(viii) Ext-H – Voters List of 1997;
(ix) Ext-I – Voters List of 2005;
(x) Ext-J – Copy of Jambandi;
(xi) Ext-K – Voters List of 1997 at village Matiparbat.
5.
Shri Ahmed,learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the
written statement, all material disclosures were made.The petitioner had relied
upon a School Certificate dated 17.04.2018 as per which, her date of birth is
28.01.1982 and she had left school on 31.12.1992. Reliance has been placed on
Ext.B – Certificate issued by the Gaon Burah dated 31.05.2018 which contains
the name of the father of the petitioner. So far as Voters List is concerned, the
Page No.# 5/15
petitioner has relied upon the Voters List of 1997 containing her name with her
husband, namely, Jabbar Ali. Voters Lists of 1965, 1970, 1985, 1993, 1997 and
2005 have also been relied upon containing the name of the father of the
petitioner, Moniruddin and other family members. The learned counsel has also
submitted that the oral evidence especially of the brother Suraj Ali (DW2) was
not considered. He submits that there is a land document in the name of her
brother which would establish a link. He has submitted that the learned Tribunal
has committed material irregularity in not considering the evidence of DW2. In
this connection, he has relied upon the judgment of this Court passed in Sujab
Ali Vs. UoI reported in 2021 (4) GLT 664.
6.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the two link
documents, namely, the School Certificate (Ext.A) and the Goan Burah
Certificate (Ext.B) were not proved in accordance with law, the matter may be
remanded back. He has also relied upon a judgement dated 06.03.2019 of this
Court in WP(C)/3651/2016 [Rahela Bibi Vs. UoI].
7.
Per contra, Ms. Verma, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department
has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. She
submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners
(Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is
a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the
knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship
rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the
Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act,
1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the
burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every
case and would be given only if necessary. She further submits that the
Page No.# 6/15
evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence
and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence
may come in.
8.
Shehas further submitted that the written statement is the basic document
which is supposed to lay down the foundation of the case of the proceeding and
the written statement in the instant case lacks details and is vague. There is no
date of birth of the petitioner. In this connection, she has relied upon the
following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India reported in(2005) 5 SCC 665:
“17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon
the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country.
In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to
give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his
parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of
birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1)
(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the
personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of
the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State
authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if
necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a
person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but
almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points.
This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the
knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
9.
She has submitted that no link could be established with the projected
Page No.# 7/15
father. Further, though certain Voters Lists of the projected father have been
proved, there is no Voters Lists of crucial periods from 1970-1985. Furter, in the
Voters List of 1995, the village is different. She has further submitted that the
only documentary evidence that may be construed as a link of the petitioner
with her projected father are Ext.A and Ext.B. However, neither of the two
documents have been proved by the petitioner in accordance with law. Be that
as it may, those two documents were discussed by the learned Tribunal and
findings arrived and therefore, the submissions for remand made on behalf of
the petitioner is not countenanced.
10.
In support of her submission that a certificate has to be proved from
contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the
judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun vs. Union of India reported
in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into
service.
“20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the
basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and
prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and
proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be
proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the
truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be
established from the record. A document or the contents of the document
cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge. …”
11.
The learned Standing Counsel has also relied upon the case of Nur
Begum vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347wherein
certain observations regarding exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction have been made
Page No.# 8/15
which read as follows:
“9.
On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered
opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and
documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and
opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari
jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate
jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts
reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned
opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in
violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from
illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on
evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal
refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no
support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not
been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the
face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.”
12.
She has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rupajan Begum vs. Union of India reported in(2018) 1 SCC 579, wherein
it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly,
the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents.
13.
The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ
petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated.
14.
The learned counsel for the rest of the respondents have supported the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court in exercise of
Page No.# 9/15
its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the
decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. It is
submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision
making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed.
They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a
reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time
frame for completion. It is also submitted that there is a question of national
security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is
taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to
prove the citizenship through cogent, credible and acceptable evidence.
15.
The rival submissions advanced in the Bar have been duly considered and
the materials placed before this Court,including the records of the Tribunal have
been carefully perused.
16.
With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of
the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a
proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts.
In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is
extracted hereinbelow“9.
Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any
question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction
given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not
a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that
such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class
or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything
Page No.# 10/15
contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such
person.”
17.
In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [AIR 1963 SC 1035] which
followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of
Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 1526] in the context
of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which areextracted hereinbelow“22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or
with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or
description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his
entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their
arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is
Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a
foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as
the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order
made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises
whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner
or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a
person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi
served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as
he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High
Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima
facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an
order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the
Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that
Page No.# 11/15
onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.”
18.
Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the
submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would
confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the
present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings
based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be
interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction.
19.
Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after
discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ
of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in
Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No.
3339 of 2023]has laid down as follows:
“49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something
important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law
governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari.
50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more
particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in
granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of
Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which
the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It
demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or
palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the
Page No.# 12/15
inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is
apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high
prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking.
51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some
action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and
invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction
thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice
between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an
extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded
on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this
flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity
projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the
realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to
be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after
setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the
High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable
consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal
court of appeal which it is not.”
20.
In the instant case, the written statement is absolutely vague and
apparently, has not met the requirements,as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to
disclose the following:
(i) date of birth;
(ii) place of birth;
Page No.# 13/15
(iii) name of parents;
(iv) their places of birth and citizenship.
Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the
grandparents. It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within
the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of
the State.
21.
So far as Ext.A - the School Certificate is concerned, the same was issued
in the year 2018 whereas the petitioner had left school in the year 1992 and
there is no explanation of the delay. In any case, the same was not proved in
accordance with law by the School Authorities and therefore, would not be
relevant. So far as Ext.B – Certificate issued by the Gaon Burah dated
31.05.2018 is concerned, the same was not proved by the issuing authority and
therefore, cannot be construed as a relevant piece of evidence. So far as the
Voters Lists are concerned, the one of 1997 would be inconsequential as the
same does not establish a link with the projected father as there are no names
of the parents or other siblings in that. As regards the Voters Lists of 1965,
1970, 1985, 1993, 1997 and 2005 are concerned, the projection is that the
name of the father Moniruddin appears along with other family members.
However, the same would not establish any link with the petitioner. It has also
been rightly pointed out on behalf of the respondents that for the crucial period
1970 to 1985, the Voters List is missing and in the Voters List of 1985, the name
of the village is different.
22.
As regards the submission that the evidence of DW2 was not considered,
this Court is of the opinion that oral evidence alone given by a projected relative
would not be sufficient to prove one’s citizenship. Though the case of Sujab Ali
(supra) has been cited by the petitioner, in subsequent decisions, the samehas
Page No.# 14/15
been distinguished. In the case of Bijoy Das Vs. UOI reported in2018 (3) GLT
118, this Court has laid downthat in proceedings of this nature, oral evidence
alone would not be enough and such evidence is required to be supported and
corroborated by documentary evidence and contemporaneous records.
23.
We are also of the opinion that the requirement to corroborate oral
evidence by documentary evidence to prove one’s citizenship is absolutely
necessary both in terms of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 as well as the
serious issue of unabated influx of foreigners illegally in the State of Assam
which is to be dealt with firmly in the interest of the unity and integrity of the
country.
24.
However, in this case, the same has not been able to be done by the
petitioner. Further, so far as the DW2, the projected brother is concerned, there
is not a single link document to connect him with the petitioner. The land
document of DW2 does not establish any connection with the petitioner and
therefore, would be irrelevant. We are of the view that the petitioner as
proceedee had failed to discharge her burden to prove her citizenship.
25.
As regards the prayer for remand to prove the School Certificate and Gaon
Burah Certificate, we find force in the objection raised by the learned Standing
Counsel, Home Department. We are of the view that in a given case where
certain document has not been considered at all in spite of being duly proved, a
case for remand may be justified. However, in the instant case, the learned
Tribunal had taken into consideration both Ext.A and Ext.B and has come to a
conclusion that those have not been proved in accordance with law. We are of
the opinion that the facts of the Rahela Bibi (supra) relied upon by the learned
counsel for the petitioner are clearly distinguishable as in the instant case, there
is adequate discussion on the two certificates, as indicated above.
Page No.# 15/15
26.
This Court also finds force in the contention advanced on behalf of the
respondents that the findings arrived at by the learned Tribunal that it was not
normal that when the petitioner was born, her projected father was 77 years of
age and mother was 53 years. We are of the opinion that the said conclusion
being reasonable, it would not be proper to alter the findings. Under the
aforesaid background, this Court in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction would
decline to accept the said submission.
27.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion
that the impugned order dated 16.07.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners
Tribunal No.1, Morigaon in F.T. (C)503/2008 does not call for any interference.
28.
The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed
earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by
the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law.
29.
The records be returned to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal forthwith,
along with a copy of this order.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
JUDGE
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review