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Page No.# 1/19
GAHC010256282019
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/7934/2019
SUKURON NESA
D/O- HABEZUDDIN MOLLAH, W/O- AFZAL HAQUE, VILL- 36 SALMARA
PART-VII, P.S. FAKIRGANJ, DIST- DHUBRI, ASSAM
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 5 ORS.
REP. BY ITS SECY. OF THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, UNION OF INDIA,
NEW DELHI
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
HOME DEPTT.
DISPUR
GHY-6
3:THE ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
REP. BY THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF INDIA
NIRVACHAN SADAN
ASHOKA ROAD
NEW DELHI
4:THE STATE COORDINATOR OF NATIONAL REGISTER OF CITIZENS
ASSAM
1ST FLOOR
ACHYUT PLAZA
GHY SHILLONG ROAD
BHANGAGARH
GHY
ASSAM
PIN- 781005
Page No.# 2/19
5:THE DY. COMMISSIONER OF DHUBRI
AT DHUBRI
P.O.
P.S. AND DIST- DHUBRI
ASSAM
PIN6:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (B)
DHUBRI AT DHUBRI
P.O.
P.S. AND DIST- DHUBRI
ASSAM
PIN
Advocate for the Petitioner
HUSSAIN
: MR. J AHMED, MR. A S CHOUDHURY,MR A MOTALIB,MS A
Advocate for the Respondent : ASSTT.S.G.I., SC, ELECTION COMMISSION.,SC, NRC,SC,
F.T,SC, ELECTION COMMISSION.,SC, NRC,SC, F.T
BEFORE
Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE Pranjal Das
Advocate for the petitioner :
Shri J. Ahmed
Advocates for the respondents : Ms. A. Verma, SC- Home Deptt. & NRC,
Shri P. Sarma, GA, Assam;
Shri N. Kalita, for ECI.
Ms. B. Sarma, CGC.
Date on which judgment is reserved
: 20.05.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
: 29.05.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the
judgment?
: NA
Whether the full judgment has been pronounced?
: Yes
Page No.# 3/19
Judgment & Order
(S.K. Medhi, J.)
The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked
by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting
to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 09.08.2019
passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.2nd, Dhubri in F.T. Case No. FT
1123/F/16 (Police Ref. Case No. 609/98). By the impugned judgment, the
petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been
declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971.
2.
The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows:
(i)
A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Dhubri
District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T. Case
No. FT 1123/F/16.
(ii)
As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that
the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written
statement on 27.12.2018 along with certain documents and adduced
evidence through 3 DWs.
(iii)
The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances
and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the
Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as
opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon her and
accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be
a foreign national post 25.03.1971.
3.
We have heard Shri J. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have
Page No.# 4/19
also heard Ms. A. Verma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department & NRC;
Shri P. Sarma, learned GA, Assam, Shri A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel,
Election Commission of India and Shri AK Dutta, learned CGC. We have also
carefully examined the records which were requisitioned vide an order dated
04.03.2020.
4.
Shri Ahmed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
petitioner could prove her case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that
there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the
said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this
regard, he has referred to the evidence adduced by 3 nos. of DWs and also the
following documentary evidence:
(i) Ext-1 – Marriage registered Kabinnama dated 03.10.93;
(ii) Ext-2 – Certified copy of the draft Chitha copy dated
19.11.18;
(iii) Ext-3 – Certified copy of Final Khatian dated 01.11.18;
(iv) Ext-4 – Certified extract copy of E/Roll of 1966;
(v) Ext-5 – Certified extract copy of E/Roll of 1970;
(vi) Ext-6 – Certified extract copy of E/Roll of 1977;
(vii) Ext-7 - – Certified extract copy of E/Roll of 1985;
(viii) Ext-8 – Certified extract copy of E/Roll of 1997;
(ix) Ext-9 – Electronic Certified extract copy of E/Roll of
2018.
5.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted at the outset that the
LVO had furnished the report without proper verification and therefore, the
proceeding stood vitiated. He has submitted that in the written statement, all
material disclosures including the aspect of the faulty LVO report were made. It
is submitted that the aspect of shifting from Village Salmara Part-VI to Salmara
Page No.# 5/19
Part-VII was pleaded. He has submitted that the Kabinnama dated 13.09.1993
would prove the linkage. He has submitted that in the Voters List of 1997, “D”
was prefixed before the name of the petitioner. Reliance has been placed upon a
Voters List of 1966 containing the names of her grandfather – Jaynuddin Mollah
and father – Habez Uddin Sk. He has also referred to a land document (Ext.2) in
the name of the petitioner as being daughter of Habez Uddin Mollah. He has
referred to the evidence adduced by the petitioner as DW1 and two other
witnesses, namely, her father as DW2 and the Mondal as DW3. He has
submitted that DW3 had deposed that the daughters had got their names
mutated over the plot of land.
6.
On the aspect of the nature of the investigation, the learned counsel for
the petitioner had relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Rahim Ali Vs. UoI reported in AIR 2024 SC 3551.
7.
By submitting that the father’s evidence as DW2 has to be given due
weightage under Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act, the learned counsel for
the petitioner has relied upon the following case laws:
i) AIR 1959 SC 914, Dolgobinda Paricha Vs. Nimai Charan Misra
& Ors.;
ii) 2008 (4) SCC 75, Bant Singh & Anr. Vs. Niranjan Singh (D) by
Lrs. & Ors.;
iii) 2020 (1) GLT 330, Motior Rahman Vs. UoI;
iv) 2021 (4) GLT 664, Sujab Ali (Md.) Vs. Union of India & Ors.
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly submits that in view of
the availability of the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could not have
Page No.# 6/19
been rendered against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires
interference.
9.
Per contra, Ms. Verma, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department
has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. She
submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners
(Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is
a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the
knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship
rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the
Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act of
1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the
burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every
case and would be given only if necessary. She further submits that the
evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence
and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence
may come in.
10.
The learning Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written
statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation
of the case of the proceedee and the written statement in the instant case lacks
details and is vague. There is no date or year of the birth of the petitioner. In
this connection, she has relied upon the following observations made by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal Vs. Union of
India reported in(2005) 5 SCC 665:
“17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon
the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country.
Page No.# 7/19
In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to
give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his
parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Some times the place of
birth of his grand parents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1)
(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the
personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of
the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State
authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if
necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a
person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but
almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points.
This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the
knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
11.
She has submitted that in the instant case there is not a single
documentary evidence which can be regarded as a proof of citizenship. The
Kabinnanma was not proved by the Kazi and in any case, would not serve as a
link document of the petitioner with her father / parents. The Voters List of
1997 is an uncertified document and therefore, cannot be taken into
consideration. The Voters List of 1966 containing the name of the grandfather
and father will not serve as a link document qua the petitioner. The only
document which requires consideration is the land document (Ext.2). However,
the petitioner has been shown to be the daughter of Habez Uddin Mollah
whereas the projected father has been stated to be Md. Habez Uddi son of Zonu
Mollah. It may be mentioned that in the Voters List of 1966 relied upon by the
Page No.# 8/19
petitioner herself, the name of her grandfather is Jaynuddin Mollah and the
name of her father Habez Uddin Sk. There is also no explanation as to why the
names of the other children, more particularly the sons were not mentioned in
the Draft Chitha.
12.
In support of her submission that a document has to be proved from
contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the
judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun Vs. Union of India reported
in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into
service:
“20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the
basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and
prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and
proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be
proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the
truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be
established from the record. A document or the contents of the document
cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge. …”
13.
She has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum
Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 wherein certain
observations regarding exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction have been made which
read as follows:
“9.
On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered
opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and
documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and
Page No.# 9/19
opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari
jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate
jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts
reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned
opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in
violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from
illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on
evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal
refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no
support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not
been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the
face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.”
14.
She has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rupajan Begum Vs. Union of India reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579,
wherein it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two
aspects, firstly, the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of
the contents.
15.
The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ
petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated.
16.
The learned counsel for the rest of the respondents have supported the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court, in exercise of
its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the
decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. It is
Page No.# 10/19
submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision
making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed.
They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a
reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time
frame for completion. It is also submitted that there is a question of national
security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is
taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to
prove the citizenship through cogent, credible and acceptable evidence.
17.
Shri Ali, the learned Standing Counsel, ECI has specifically contended that
Ext.2 – Draft Chitha would not have any probative value in the instant case. He
has submitted that from the said document, it appears that the father had
inherited the land from Jolu Sheikh on 01.06.1966 and on 13.07.2015, the
names of the petitioner and her sisters were inserted leaving behind the
brothers. Ext.3 – the final Khatian is however in the name of Jolu Mollah, son of
Jabbar. He has highlighted that the descriptions of the land in Ext. 2 and Ext. 3
are different. He submits that under those facts and circumstances, there would
be absolutely no documentary evidence to support the petitioner. In this regard,
he
has
relied
upon
a
decision
of
this
Court
dated
29.05.2018
in
WP(C)/2641/2017 [State of Assam Vs. Ohab Ali].
18.
The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials
placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been
carefully perused.
19.
With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of
the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a
proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts.
Page No.# 11/19
In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is
extracted hereinbelow“9.
Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any
question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction
given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not
a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that
such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class
or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such
person.”
20.
In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [AIR 1963 SC 1035] which
followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of
Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 1526] in the context
of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which are extracted hereinbelow“22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or
with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or
description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his
entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their
arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is
Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a
foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as
the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order
Page No.# 12/19
made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises
whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner
or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a
person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi
served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as
he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High
Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima
facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an
order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the
Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that
onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.”
21.
Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the
submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would
confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the
present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings
based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be
interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction.
22.
Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after
discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ
of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in
Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No.
3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows:
“49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something
important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law
Page No.# 13/19
governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari.
50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more
particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in
granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of
Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which
the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It
demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or
palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the
inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is
apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high
prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking.
51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some
action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and
invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction
thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice
between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an
extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded
on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this
flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity
projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the
realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to
be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after
Page No.# 14/19
setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the
High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable
consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal
court of appeal which it is not.”
23.
In the instant case, the written statement is absolutely vague and
apparently, has not met the requirements, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to
disclose the following:
(i) the date of birth;
(ii) place of birth;
(iii) name of the parents;
(iv) their place of birth and citizenship.
Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the grandparents.
It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal
knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State.
24.
With regard to the submissions advanced on the LVO report, the issue is
no longer res integra. In fact, the entire facet has been discussed and answered
in details by this Court in the case of Sayam Uddin Vs. Union of India &
Ors. reported in 2019 (4) GLT 456 which has also been upheld by the Hon’ble
Division Bench in WA/170/2019 vide judgment and order dated 29.07.2019. It
has been held that lack of details in the LVO Repot or an incompletely filled up
LVO Report would not come to the advantage of a proceedee. Further, the
proceedee is not at all prejudiced inasmuch as, he / she will not be precluded
from raising all valid defence in the Reference to prove that he / she is an
Page No.# 15/19
Indian citizen. The aforesaid views have been endorsed and reiterated by a
Coordinate Bench in the subsequent case of Shukurjan Nessa @ Sukurjan
Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2025 (2) GLT 1058. We are in
respectful agreement with the aforesaid decision and accordingly hold that the
contention of the petitioner is not sustainable.
25.
We have seen that the Kabinnama dated 13.10.1993 has not been proved
by the Kazi or any authorized person. The Voters List of 1997 is an uncertified
copy in which the petitioner’s name is prefixed with “D” and that document
would not be relevant. The Voters List of 1966 contains the name of the
projected grandfather and father which would not serve as a link document. In
any case, as observed above, there are palpable discrepancies in the name and
address of the projected father. The only document worth consideration is the
Draft Chitha (Ext.2). However, the said document is not at all reliable inasmuch
as, it is not clear as to how the petitioner’s name got inserted along with her
projected sisters and the projected brothers are left out. It also appears that at
the time of the preparation of the same, the projected father was still alive and
therefore, the question would arise as to how the land was mutated. There are
also inconsistencies in the name of the father along with the grandfather. We
also find force in the contention advanced by the learned Standing Counsel, ECI
that the description of the land in Ext.2 and the Final Khatian (Ext.3) are
different. In the case of Ohab Ali (supra), the following observations were
made by a Coordinate Bench which we respectfully endorse:
“13. Though petitioner exhibited a number of documents from Exhibits-A
to M, we find that none of these documents were proved in accordance
with law. There were simply filed and marked as exhibits. It is trite that
Page No.# 16/19
mere filing of document or marking of document as exhibit is not enough.
Not only the document has to be proved, the contents of the document
would also have to be proved; that apart truthfulness of the contents
would have to be proved too.
14. The two crucial documents which say that Ahed Ali @ Oheb Ali was
the son of Late Shangser Ali are Exhibits-H and Exhibit-I. Exhibit-H is a
certificate dated 02.06.2014, issued by one Akmat Ali, Gaonburah,
certifying that Ohed Ali was the son of Late Shangser Ali, but Akmat Ali
did not appear before the Tribunal alongwith the contemporaneous record
to prove Exhibit-H as well as the contents thereof. Therefore, this exhibit
was not proved. That apart, we find that the Gaonburah had embossed
the State Emblem of India in Exhibit-H certificate. Under the State
Emblem of India (Prohibition of Improper Use) Act, 2005, and the State
Emblem of India (Regulation of Use) Rules, 2007, Gaonburah is not
authorized to use the State Emblem of India in any manner. Such
unauthorized use of the State Emblem of India had rendered Exhibit-H
inadmissible in evidence. Similar is the position in respect of Exhibit-I,
issued by another Gaonburah, Jahidul Islam Bhuyan on 23.12.2014. For
the reasons mentioned above, this exhibit is also inadmissible in evidence.
Therefore, these two exhibits besides not being proved were inadmissible
in evidence. If these documents are excluded from consideration, there is
nothing on record to establish linkage between Ahed Ali @ Oheb Ali or
Ohed Ali on the one hand and Shangser Ali on the other hand.”
26.
The case of Md. Rahim Ali @ Md. Abdul Rahim (supra) has been cited
on behalf of the petitioner with regard to the aspect of the initial investigation.
Page No.# 17/19
It, however, clearly appears that certain binding observations of a Larger Bench
in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra) were not brought to the notice of
the Court and therefore, reliance upon the case of Md. Rahim Ali @ Md.
Abdul Rahim (supra) would be of no avail.
27.
The cases of Bant Singh (supra) and Dolgobinda Paricha (supra) are
on the aspect of Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act relating to evidence
adduced by family members. However, the present subject matter is governed
by Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act which, as discussed above, excludes the
provisions of the Indian Evidence Act with a specific non obstante clause.
28.
The case of Motior Rahman (supra) is on the aspect that minor
discrepancies may be ignored / overlooked and the said case is based on the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sirajul Hoque Vs. State
of Assam & Ors. reported in 2019 (5) SCC 534. In the said case, while the
Hon’ble Supreme Court had laid down that minor discrepancy in the voters list
may be ignored, the same is with a rider that all other things are to remain
consistent. In that case, except a minor change in the name of the grandfather
of the proceedee from Kematullah to Kefatullah, all other things were
consistent. For ready reference, the relevant observations are extracted
hereinbelow:
“3.
There is no doubt that the great grandfather`s name Amtullah
appears as Amtullah throughout the document. Equally, there is no doubt
about the father's name which appears as Hakim Ali throughout. The only
discrepancy found is that in some of the documents Kefatullah later
becomes Kematullah. However, what is important to note is that his
Page No.# 18/19
father's name Amtullah continues as Amtullah and the other family
members associated continued as such. Also produced are NRC
Registration details of the year 1971 of the grandfather who is noted to be
Kefatullah in this document. Other voters lists are then produced where
the letter F becomes the letter M with other family names remaining the
same. In fact, the appellant has himself produced a document of 1981
from the Income Tax Department giving his Permanent Account Number.
Apart from these documents, certain other later documents have also
been produced including photo identity cards issued by the Election
Commission of India and identity cards issued to his brother including
voters lists in which the appellant's name appears.”
29.
However, the facts of the present case would show that the discrepancies
are not minor or trivial and therefore, the case of Motior Rahman (supra)
cannot be applied mechanically.
30.
The reliance upon the case of Md. Sujab Ali (supra) is misplaced. In the
instant case, there is no documentary evidence to connect the DW-2 with the
proceedee.
31.
In the case of Bijoy Das Vs. UoI reported in2018 (3) GLT 118, this
Court has laid down that in proceedings of this nature, oral evidence alone
would not be enough and such evidence is required to be supported and
corroborated by documentary evidence and contemporaneous records. However,
in this case, the same has not been able to be done by the petitioner.We are of
the view that the petitioner, as proceedee had failed to discharge her burden to
prove her citizenship.
32.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion
Page No.# 19/19
that the impugned order dated 09.08.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners
Tribunal No.2nd, Dhubri in F.T. Case No. FT 1123/F/16 (Police Ref. Case No.
609/98) does not call for any interference.
33.
The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed
earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by
the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law.
34.
The records be returned to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal forthwith,
along with a copy of this order.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
JUDGE
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