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GAHC010176972018
2026:GAU-AS:8346
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 5666 OF 2018
1(A) Smti Sudarshana Chakraborty,
Wife of Late Sridhar Chakraborty
1(B) Smti Suranya Chakraborty,
Daughter
of
Late
Sridhar
Chakraborty
Both are residents of Lachit
Nagar, Bye Lane 4/5, House No.
4(2), P.O. Ulubari,
Dist- Kamrup, Ghy- 781007
…….Petitioners
-Versus1.
Central Bank of India
Represented by its Managing
Director, Chandermukhi Nariman
Point, Mumbai-21.
2.
Zonal Manager,
Central Bank of India,
C.B. Building, Bhangagarh,
Guwahati -781005.
3.
Regional Manager,
Central Bank of India,
Nehru Park Road, Jorhat,
Guwahati -785001.
4.
Union of India,
Represented by the Secretary
to the Government of India,
Ministry of Finance Deptt.
Dispur, PIN - 781006
…….Respondents
–BEFORE–
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI
For the Petitioner(s)
:Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Ms. B. Das.
For the Respondent(s)
:Mr. M. Sharma, Advocate.
Date of Hearing
: 11.06.2026.
Date of Judgment
: 11.06.2026.
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned Senior Counsel assisted
by Ms. B. Das, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners.
Also heard Mr. M. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents.
2.
By way of this petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner is assailing the impugned
dismissal order dated 19.05.2017, issued by the Regional
Manager, Central Bank of India, Guwahati, whereby the
petitioner was dismissed from service.
3.
The brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are
that the petitioner was an employee of Central Bank of India
and came to be dismissed from service by order dated
19.05.2017. During his service tenure, a charge sheet dated
15.06.2016 was issued to him containing twelve articles of
charge.
Pursuant
thereto,
a
department
enquiry
was
conducted. The Enquiry Officer, upon finding the charges
proved, submitted his report on 24.03.2017. Acting on the said
report, the disciplinary authority passed the order dated
19.05.2017 imposing various penalties upon the petitioner.
Insofar as the charge Nos. 1 to 5 were concerned, the penalty
of dismissal from service was imposed. In respect of charge
Nos. 6, 7, 9 and 10, the petitioner was visited with the penalty
of reduction in the scale of pay by four increments for a period
of 2 years. For charge No. 8, the penalty of reduction by one
increment for a period of 2 years was imposed, while for
charge Nos. 11 and 12, the penalty of reduction by 2
increments was awarded. It is however not in dispute that the
petitioner had already attained the age of superannuation and
retired from service on 31.08.2016.
4.
The principal contention advanced on behalf of the
petitioner is that having superannuated on 31.08.2016, the
disciplinary authority lacked the jurisdiction to impose the
impugned penalty of dismissal by order dated 19.05.2017.
According to the petitioner, by the time the disciplinary
proceeding culminated and the impugned came to be passed,
the relationship of employer and employee had already ceased
on account of his retirement from service. It is further
contended that although representations were submitted
seeking reconsideration of the impugned order, no favourable
decision was taken thereon. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner
has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition.
5.
Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners, submits that since the petitioner having in the
meantime superannuated pending disciplinary proceedings,
the disciplinary authority could not have inflicted major
substantive punishment of dismissal upon him. He further
submits that the issue is no longer res-integra in view of the
judgments passed by the Apex Court in the case of UCO
Bank and Ors. Vs. Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade,
reported in (2018) 14 SCC 98 and UCO Bank and Ors.
Vs. Rajendra Shankar Shukla, reported in (2018) 14
SCC 92.
6.
Per contra, Mr. M. Sharma, learned counsel appearing
for the respondents submits that since the proceedings have
been initiated while the petitioner was in service, there is no
bar upon the respondent bank for inflicting the punishment of
dismissal
upon
the
petitioner
notwithstanding
that
he
superannuated in the meantime. In support of the aforesaid,
he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Chairman-cumCoalfields
Managing
Limited
Vs.
Director,
Mahanadi
Rabindranath
Choubey ,
reported in (2020) 18 SCC 71.
7.
I have given my prudent consideration to the arguments
advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have
perused the material available on record. I have also
considered the case laws cited at the bar.
8.
Before proceeding to examine the merits of the
controversy, it may be noted that the original petitioner
expired during the pendency of the writ petition. Pursuant to
the order dated 19.09.2024 passed by this Court, his wife has
been brought on record by way of substitution and is
continuing the proceedings as the legal representative of the
deceased petitioner.
9.
The admitted position is that while the petitioner was in
service, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him.
However, before the proceedings could culminate, the
petitioner attained the age of superannuation and retired from
service on 31.08.2016. Subsequently, the Enquiry Officer
submitted his report on 11.05.2017 and, acting upon the
same, the disciplinary authority, by the impugned order dated
19.05.2017, imposed major penalties, including dismissal from
service. The principal question which arises for consideration is
whether, under the applicable Regulations, a major penalty
such as dismissal from service could be imposed upon an
employee who had already ceased to be in service on account
of superannuation.
10.
The Central Bank of India Officer Employees’ (Conduct)
Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1976
Regulations”) enumerate the penalties that may be imposed
upon an officer employee for acts of misconduct or for any
other good and sufficient reason. Regulation 4 classifies such
penalties into minor and major penalties. Significantly, all the
penalties contemplated therein are directed against an “officer
employee”, thereby indicating that the disciplinary jurisdiction
under the Regulation is exercisable against a person who
continues to hold that status.
11.
Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Central Bank of India Officer
Employees’ (Service) Regulations, 1979 (hereinafter referred
to as “the 1979 Regulations”) provides that where disciplinary
proceedings have been initiated prior to superannuation, such
proceedings may continue notwithstanding the retirement of
the officer and shall be concluded as if he were still in service
until a final order is passed. The Regulation further stipulates
that the concerned officer shall not be entitled to retiral
benefits, save and except his own contribution to the
Contributory Provident Fund, until the proceedings attain
finality.
12.
A conjoint reading of Regulation 4 of the 1976
Regulations and Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the 1979 Regulations
makes the legislative intent abundantly clear. While the latter
provision
permits
the
continuation
and
conclusion
of
disciplinary proceedings even after retirement, it does not
create a substantive power to impose penalties which, by their
very nature, are applicable only to a serving employee. The
fiction created by Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the 1979 Regulations
is limited to the continuation of the proceedings and cannot be
extended to confer jurisdiction upon the disciplinary authority
to impose penalties such as dismissal, removal or compulsory
retirement upon a person who has already superannuated.
13.
The issue is no longer res integra. In Prabhakar
Sadashiv
Karvade
(supra),
the
Apex
Court,
while
interpreting regulations in pari materia, categorically held that
although disciplinary proceedings initiated before retirement
may continue after superannuation, none of the substantive
penalties specified under the disciplinary regulations, including
dismissal from service, can be imposed upon an officer
employee after his retirement. The Court observed that the
relationship of master and servant comes to an end upon
superannuation and that the continuation of the proceedings
thereafter is only for the limited purpose of determining the
employee’s entitlement to pensionary and retiral benefits. The
relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
“9. A reading of the plain language of Regulation 4
of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations and
Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the 1979 Regulations makes
it clear that any of the penalties, whether major or
minor can be imposed only on a serving officer
employee of the Bank. This necessarily implies that
none of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 of the
Discipline and Appeal Regulations can be imposed
on an officer employee after his retirement from
service, though in terms of Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the
1979 Regulations, the disciplinary proceedings
initiated against an officer employee before his
retirement can be continued and final order is
passed and further that such officer employee is not
entitled to retiral benefits till the conclusion of
disciplinary proceedings and passing of final order.
The only exception to this is that the officer is
entitled to receive his own contribution to CPF.
However, there is nothing in the language of these
regulations from which it can be inferred that the
disciplinary authority has the power to impose a
substantive punishment on retired officer employee.
This becomes more explicit from a conjoint reading of
Regulation 48 of the Pension Regulations which
empowers the competent authority to withhold or
withdraw a pension or a part thereof and order
recovery from pension of the whole or part of any
pecuniary loss caused to the bank if in a
departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner
is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence or
criminal breach of trust or forgery or acts done
fraudulently during the period of his service. Second
proviso to Regulation 48 contains a fiction and lays
down that if the departmental proceedings are
instituted while the employee was in service, the
same shall be deemed to be proceedings under the
regulations and continued and concluded as if the
employee had continued in service. The third proviso
imposes a bar on the initiation of departmental or
judicial proceedings against an employee after his
retirement in respect of an event which took place
more than 4 years before such institution. The sum
and substance of these regulations is that even
though a departmental inquiry instituted against an
officer employee before his retirement can continue
even after his retirement, none of the substantive
penalties specified in Regulation 4 of 1979
Regulations, which include dismissal from service,
can be imposed on an officer employee after his
retirement on attaining the age of superannuation.
Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that order
dated 12-10-2004 passed by the disciplinary
authority dismissing the respondent from service,
who had superannuated on 31-12-1993 was ex
facie illegal and without jurisdiction and the High
Court did not commit any error by setting aside the
same.
10. We may also observe that master and servant
relationship between the respondent and the
employer i.e. Appellant 1 Bank had come to an end
for all practical purposes on 31-12-1993 i.e. the date
of
superannuation.
The departmental
inquiry
initiated against the respondent before his
retirement could be continued for a limited purpose
for determining whether or not he is entitled for full
pensionary benefits and gratuity.”
14.
The aforesaid principle was reiterated by the Apex Court
in Rajendra Shankar Shukla (supra), wherein it was
once
again
emphasized
that
after
an
employee
has
superannuated, no substantive penalty under the disciplinary
regulations can be imposed upon him. The continuation of the
inquiry post-retirement is thus confined to the consequences
expressly contemplated under the pensionary framework and
does not authorise the imposition of service penalties. The
relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
“16. Finally, we may also draw attention to an
unreported decision of this Court in UCO Bank v.
Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade³. In this decision, the
Court considered the provisions of the Regulations
that we are concerned with and held:
‘The sum and substance of these Regulations is that
even though a departmental inquiry instituted
against an officer employee before his retirement
can continue even after his retirement, none of the
substantive penalties specified in Regulation 4 of
1979 Regulations, which include dismissal from
service, can be imposed on an officer employee after
his
retirement
on
attaining
the
age
of
superannuation. Therefore, we have no hesitation to
hold that order dated 12-10-2004 passed by the
disciplinary authority dismissing the respondent
from service, who had superannuated on 31-121993 was ex facie illegal and without jurisdiction
and the High Court did not commit any error by
setting aside the same.’
We may also make reference to another decision of
this Court in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor. This
decision also related to the very same Regulations
that we are concerned with.”
15.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondents sought
to place reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in
Chairman-cum-Managing
Coalfields
Ltd.
(supra)
to
Director,
Mahanadi
contend
disciplinary
that
proceedings validly initiated during service may culminate in
the imposition of punishment even after an employee has
retired from service. The submission, however, does not merit
acceptance. The said decision arose in a distinct statutory
framework and was rendered in the context of service rules
materially different from the regulations governing the present
case. More importantly, the Apex Court therein recognized
that the permissibility of imposing punishment after retirement
depends upon the existence of an enabling provision in the
applicable statutory rules or regulations. The issue, therefore,
necessarily turns on the language of the governing provisions.
In the present case, the controversy is directly covered by the
decisions in Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade (supra) and
Rajendra Shankar Shukla (supra), wherein the very
regulations applicable to the respondent Bank fell for
consideration. The ratio laid down therein, being directly on
point, binds this Court and leaves little scope for any contrary
interpretation.
16.
It is trite that a judgment is an authority for what it
actually decides and not for every proposition that may
logically be deduced therefrom. The applicability of a
precedent must always be tested in the backdrop of the
statutory
provisions
under
consideration.
The
decisions
rendered in Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade (supra) and
Rajendra Shankar Shukla (supra) interpret the very
regulatory framework governing the parties before this Court
and, therefore, constitute binding precedents on the issue.
Consequently, reliance upon decisions rendered in a different
statutory setting is misplaced. On the contrary, the applicable
regulations, as interpreted by the Apex Court, do not confer
any authority upon the disciplinary authority to impose
substantive penalties, including dismissal from service, after
an employee has superannuated.
17.
In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Apex
Court and the plain language of the governing Regulations,
this Court has no hesitation in holding that once the petitioner
stood superannuated on 31.08.2016, the disciplinary authority
lacked jurisdiction to impose upon him the major penalty of
dismissal from service. Consequently, the impugned order
dated 19.05.2017, insofar as it imposes the penalty of
dismissal after the petitioner had ceased to be a serving officer
employee, is without jurisdiction, legally unsustainable and
liable to be set aside.
18.
Accordingly, the impugned dismissal order to that
extend stands interfered with.
19.
Resultantly, the writ petition stands allowed to that
extend.
JUDGE
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