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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLON
Crl.Petn. No. 29 of 2018 with
Crl.Petn. No. 31 of 2018
Date of Decision: 24.05.2024
Crl.Petn. No. 29 of 2018
Dr. Subhasish Das Gupta,
S/o (L) Mrinal Kanti Das Gupta
R/o C/o “PANORAMA”,
Upper Laban, Shillong-793004,
East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya
:::::
Petitioner(s)
:::::
Respondent(s)
:::::
Petitioner(s)
:::::
Respondent(s)
-VsThe Superintendent of Central Bureau of
Investigation, (ACB), Shillong
Crl.Petn. No. 31 of 2018
Shri. Dhruba Sharma,
Son of (L) B.P. Sharma,
Permanent resident of C/o Shri. Kamal
Sharma, A-8/224, Shantigraham, Housing
Complex, Jayanagar, P.O/P.S Khanapara
Guwahati-22, Assam
Presently residing at House No. 43,
Shantinilaya, Sir-MV layout, Kodgihalli,
Bangalore-560097
-VsThe Superintendent of Central Bureau of
Investigation, (ACB), Shillong
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. K.Ch. Gautam, Adv. with
Ms. G.C. Marboh, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. K. Gurung, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
COMMON JUDGMENT
1.
These two petitions preferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
refers to the proceedings in CBI Case No. 4/2015 under Sections 120B/420/468/471 IPC read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 pending before the Court of Special Judge, CBI at
Shillong.
2.
Since the subject matter relates to allegations of illegal and
fraudulent financial transactions involving a number of accused persons,
the petitioner in Crl.Petn. No. 29 of 2018 as well as the petitioner in
Crl.Petn. No. 31 of 2018 also being impleaded as accused persons
therein, this Court deems it proper to deal with the two petitions and to
pass a common judgment herein.
3.
The background history of the case emanates from a
complaint dated 05.04.2013 filed by one Shri Ratul Rabha who is said to
represent an NGO “Nature People for Protection of Forest and Wildlife”,
Baghmara, South Garo Hills, Meghalaya before the Commissioner,
Central Vigilance Commission, Government of India, wherein it was
alleged that there is presence of nepotism, manipulation and corruption
in the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Govt. of India‟s programme
at the Regional Centre, National Afforestation and Eco-Development
Board (NAEB), Shillong.
4.
Records would show that a Regional Centre of the National
Afforestation and Eco-Development Board (NAEB), Shillong, was set
up at the North Eastern Hill University (NEHU) with jurisdiction over
the entire North Eastern Region. In this regard, a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) was signed by the relevant authorities for a period
of 5 years for such Centre to function.
5.
The Centre is to carry out related Projects for which, during
the period w.e.f. 01.04.2012 to 31.03.2017, Prof. Brajesh Kumar Tiwari
was the Coordinator with Dr. S.S. Chaturvedi and Dr. S.K. Jha as core
members of the said Regional Centre.
6.
The petitioner in Crl.Petn. No. 29 of 2018 was appointed as
Research Officer by the Coordinator of Naib vide appointment order
dated 28.06.2012.
7.
The petitioner in Crl.Petn. No. 31 of 2018 was also appointed
as Research Officer of NAEB, NEHU, Shillong vide appointment order
dated 17.09.2011.
8.
The Central Vigilance Commission on receipt of the said
complaint (supra) had directed the Chief Vigilance Officer, Ministry of
Environment and Forests (MoEF) to furnish a factual report on such
complaint. In this manner, from one authority to the other, finally the
Vice Chancellor, NEHU who is also the Chairman of the Advisory
Management Committee (AMC) of the said Centre on receipt of related
request, had endorsed the matter to the Pro-Vice Chancellor and Chief
Vigilance Officer, NEHU to inquire into the matter and to submit his
report.
9.
A preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Central Bureau
of Investigation (CBI) based on alleged information received from
reliable source that some unknown officers of the Regional Centre
NAEB, NEHU, Shillong in collusion with unknown others, had
committed gross misconduct by unauthorizedly appointing as many as
5(five) Research Officers/Research Fellows and 5(five) supporting staffs
of the said Regional Centre on regular payment of monthly remuneration
in violation of conditions laid down in the MoU (supra). There are also
allegations of non-implementation of works as per the sanctioned
amount and the like.
10.
On the basis of the said preliminary enquiry, a regular First
Information Report (FIR) being No. RC SHG 2015A 0003 dated
28.10.2015 was lodged and on inquiry, the following were found to be
suspected to have committed the offence under Sections 120B/420/468/471 IPC read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988: i)
Prof. Brajesh Kumar Tiwari, Co-Ordinator (A-1);
ii)
Dr. Shiva Shankar Chaturvedi, (A-2), Core Group
Member;
iii) Dr. Sanjeeva Kumar Jha (A-3) Core Group Member;
iv) Dr. Dhruba Sharma (A-4), the then Research Officer
Regional Centre NAEB, NEHU, Shillong (private
person);
v)
Dr. Subhasish Das Gupta (A-5) the then Research
Officer Regional Centre NAEB, NEHU, Shillong
(private person);
vi) Shri Niyanta Purkayastha (A-6) Administrative Officer,
Regional Centre NAEB, NEHU, Shillong (private
person) and unknown others.
11.
On completion of investigation, a final report was placed
before the Special Court under the PC Act with the case being registered
as CBI Case No. 4 of 2015. In course of proceedings, on 25.09.2018,
charges under 120-B/420/468/471 IPC read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 have been framed against four of the
accused persons named in the said report, the petitioners also being
included as such accused persons. Hence, these petitions.
12.
Ms. G.C. Marboh, learned counsel for the petitioners has
submitted that the stand of the petitioners is twofold, firstly, that the
respondent/CBI authority while taking up the investigation into the
allegations made against the petitioners amongst others, had given a go
by to the provisions of the CBI Manual by not following what is
stipulated in Chapter 8 Clause 21 which provides that no action should
be taken on anonymous and pseudonymous complaints, that is, when the
identity of the complainant is not known.
13.
From the records, it is evident that the complainant who has
filed the said complaint on behalf of the said NGO could not be found
and therefore, his statement was not taken down by the Investigating
Officer. This fact could be ascertained from the communication being
No. DSB(SGH)/NGO-1/2012-14/1419 dated 01.12.2014 (Annexure-1 of
the petition) issued by the Superintendent of Police, DSB, South Garo
Hills addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, South Garo Hills,
Baghmara who, when called upon to verify the existence of the said
NGO which goes by the name of “Nature People for Protection of Forest
and Wildlife”, he has reported that there is no such NGO which goes by
such name and also that Shri Ratul Rabha, the alleged complainant could
not be traced out.
14.
While referring to the contents of the affidavit filed by the
respondent/CBI, the learned counsel has submitted that at para 14 and 15
of the same, the CBI has made an averment that the appointment of the
petitioner is illegal as he was unauthorizedly appointed by the Regional
Centre, NEHU on payment of monthly remuneration without the
knowledge and approval of the Ministry of Environment & Forest,
Government of India in clear violation of the MOU(supra), while on the
other hand, it was maintained that the petitioner is a public servant which
is a contrary stand taken by the respondent/CBI, the same cannot be
accepted, further submits the learned counsel.
15.
The learned counsel has also submitted that in the affidavit
filed by the respondent/CBI, a statement has been made that the
registration of the FIR was on the basis of source oral information,
however, the contents of such oral source information has not been
reduced in writing as is required in terms of Chapter-8.27 of the CBI
Manual.
16.
It is also the submission of the learned counsel that it is a fact
that the petitioners have been appointed as Research Officers
respectively, under the Co-Ordinator of the NAEB on a consolidated
pay, therefore, they could not be classed as public servants as defined
under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In fact, even in
the Charge Sheet, the petitioners have been mentioned as „Private
Person‟.
17.
In support of the petitioners‟ case, the learned counsel has
referred to the case of Vineet Narian & Ors v. Union of India & Anr,
(1998) 1 SCC 226, para 58(12) which reads as follows:
“58(12). The CBI Manual based on statutory
provisions of the CrPC provides essential guidelines
for the CBI's functioning. It is imperative that the CBI
adheres scrupulously to the provisions in the Manual
in relation to its investigative functions, like raids,
seizure and arrests. Any deviation from the
established procedure should be viewed seriously and
severe disciplinary action taken against the officials
concerned.”
18.
It is therefore prayed that the charges framed by the learned
Trial Court on 25.09.2018, inter alia, against the petitioners herein, in
fact, that the entire proceedings in the said CBI Case No. 4 of 2015 be
set aside and quashed.
19.
Dr.
N.
Mozika,
learned
DSGI
appearing
for
the
respondent/CBI in his response has submitted that the petitioners have
approached this Court invoking the inherent power under Section 482
Cr.P.C.
20.
On the contention of the petitioners that the FIR and the
subsequent investigation launched, was on the basis of a pseudonymous
complaint, the learned DSGI has submitted that the same is not a fact as
the FIR was registered on 28.10.2015 based on the findings of the
Preliminary Enquiry No. PESHG2015A0002 registered by the CBI,
ACB, Shillong Branch on 26.02.2015, wherein it was found that the
accused persons, including the petitioners herein have committed offence
attracting the provisions of Sections 120-B/420/468/471 IPC read with
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988, such preliminary enquiry being initiated on the basis of
reliable source information and not based on the so called pseudonymous
complaint.
21.
The learned DSGI has reiterated that a perusal of the charge
sheet, would show that the FIR has been lodged based on information
received from reliable source, wherein it was alleged that unknown
officers of the Regional Centre, NAEB, NEHU, Shillong in collusion
with unknown others had committed gross misconduct by appointment
of 5(five) Research Officers and 5(five) supporting staffs of the said
centre on a monthly remuneration of ₹ 1,75,500/- (Rupees one lakh
seventy five thousand five hundred) only in clear violation of the
conditions laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
22.
On a preliminary enquiry being conducted, and on the basis
of the findings on such enquiry, a Regular Case (FIR) was duly
registered. The FIR was not registered on the basis of the said
pseudonymous complaint, the same said to have been made on
05.04.2013 while the Preliminary Enquiry was launched in the month of
January, 2015. Therefore, it could not be that a preliminary enquiry be
initiated after more than one year of the complaint. The fact is, the FIR
was filed in the year 2015 based on such source information. The
reference of the petitioners to the procedure at para 8.5, 8.6 and 8.21 of
the CBI Manual to be followed in the case of pseudonymous complaint
has no relevancy in this case, submits the learned DSGI.
23.
Another limb of argument advanced by the learned DSGI is
that the petitioners, as has been revealed from the records, have been
appointed as Research Officers by the Co-Ordinator, Regional Centre,
NAEB, NEHU, Dr. Subhasish Das Gupta on 28.06.2012 and Dr. Dhruba
Sharma on 17.09.2011, albeit, on contractual basis, however, their
appointment as Research Officers respectively, at the relevant point of
time would qualify them to be public servants within the meaning of
Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act, 1988.
24.
In course of investigation, the Investigating Officer based on
evidence both oral and documentary have been able to find out that the
petitioner Dr. Subhasish Das Gupta by abuse of his official position as a
Research Officer had misappropriated funds amounting to ₹ 2,58,798/(Rupees two lakhs fifty-eight thousand seven hundred ninety-eight) only.
Similarly, petitioner Dr. Dhruba Sharma had misappropriated funds
amounting to ₹ 1,85,495/- (Rupees one lakh eighty five thousand four
hundred ninety five) only.
25.
Finally, the learned DSGI has submitted that the charges
against the petitioners under the said provisions of the IPC and the PC
Act have been framed by the learned Trial Court on 25.09.2018 and in
the meantime, in course of proceedings, the stage of the case is for
recording of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, therefore, at this
point of time, for the petitioners to come before this Court with a prayer
for quashing of the FIR, the same cannot be allowed as that would in
turn amount to an abuse of the process of court.
26.
On the first challenge of the petitioners, that is, that the
respondent/CBI has registered the FIR only on the basis of a
pseudonymous complaint which runs contrary to the provision of the
related CBI Manual at Chapter 8.21 wherein it is clearly stated that “No
action shall be taken on anonymous and pseudonymous complaints…”,
the obvious reference was made to the alleged complaint made by the
Program Leader, Nature People for Protection of Forest and Wildlife,
dated 05.04.2013, addressed to the Commissioner, Central Vigilance
Commission. It is a fact that the authorities have failed to trace out the
said complainant and accordingly, the said complaint can be treated as a
pseudonymous complaint and as such, could not be taken as the basis of
launching of investigation.
27.
However, what the petitioners failed to notice is that the CBI
has maintained that the preliminary enquiry conducted and the
subsequent registration of a regular case was not done so on the basis of
such alleged pseudonymous complaint, but the whole operation was
carried out on the basis of source information, which is allowed under
the relevant provisions of the CBI Manual.
28.
Again, it is noticed that even though, the said pseudonymous
complaint cannot be taken into account to proceed for investigation, on
perusal of the said provision of Chapter 8.21(supra), reproduced herein
for ready reference, it is seen that the investigating agency can utilize the
information contained in such pseudonymous complaint as intelligence
output. The said provision reads as follows:
“8.21. No action shall be taken on anonymous and
pseudonymous complaints. Such complaints need not
even be sent to the Ministry/Department/Public
Sector undertaking concerned by CBI. They should
be filed after entry in the complaint register. If there
is any doubt about a signed or pseudonymous
complaint and enquiry may be held to the limited
extent to check whether the signature is genuine and
whether the signatory admits having sent the
complaint and stands by it. On such a check, if it is
found that the signature is genuine, further action
should be taken as on the basis of a genuine/signed
complaint. Otherwise, no further action need be
taken. However, information contained in such
complaints may be used as intelligence input for
identification public servants indulging in corrupt
activities as well as in finding areas of corruption in
various departments.”
29.
A further perusal of the charge sheet would also reveal that
there are enough materials, especially documentary evidence to implicate
the petitioners to the offence alleged against them, which have to be
proved in course of trial and as such, it cannot be said that the FIR or the
findings upon investigation are based on irrelevant materials. The
petitioners have to stand trial to prove their innocence or otherwise. This,
then, would lead to the only conclusion that the first limb of argument
and contention raised by the petitioners cannot be contemplated by this
Court at this point of time.
30.
Coming to the next issue, that is, whether the petitioners are
private persons or public servants to enable the CBI to prosecute them in
the instant case, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioners in this regard is that they are not public servants, but private
persons which has also been clearly indicated in the charge sheet filed
against them, which is apparently a reference to the identity attached to
the petitioners respectively.
31.
This apart, the learned counsel has also contended that the
respondent/CBI has alleged that the petitioners have been unauthorizedly
appointed by the Regional Centre, NAEB, NEHU without the knowledge
and approval of the Ministry of Forest and Environment in clear
violation of the MoU, however, in the same breath, has maintained that
they are public servants discharging public duty. Such contrary stand
cannot be allowed to be taken.
32.
To answer this question, it would be purposeful to look into
the definition and nature of the term “public duty” and “public servant”
in the context of the provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The relevant provision would be Section 2(b) and (c) which reads as
follows:“2(b) “public duty” means a duty in the discharge of
which the State, the public or the community at large
has an interest.
(c) “public servant” means—
(i) any person in the service or pay of the
Government or remunerated by the
Government by fees or commission for the
performance of any public duty;
(ii) any person in the service or pay of a local
authority;
(iii) any person in the service or pay of a
corporation established by or under a Central,
Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a
body owned or controlled or aided by the
Government or a Government company as
defined in section 617 of the Companies Act,
1956 (1 of 1956);
(iv) any Judge, including any person
empowered by law to discharge, whether by
himself or as a member of any body of persons,
any adjudicatory functions;
(v) any person authorised by a court of justice
to perform any duty, in connection with the
administration of justice, including a
liquidator, receiver or commissioner appointed
by such court;
(vi) any arbitrator or other person to whom
any cause or matter has been referred for
decision or report by a court of justice or by a
competent public authority;
(vii) any person who holds an office by virtue
of which he is empowered to prepare, publish,
maintain or revise an electoral roll or to
conduct an election or part of an election;
(viii) any person who holds an office by virtue
of which he is authorised or required to
perform any public duty;
(ix) any person who is the president, secretary
or other office-bearer of a registered cooperative society engaged in agriculture,
industry, trade or banking, receiving or having
received any financial aid from the Central
Government or a State Government or from
any corporation established by or under a
Central, Provincial or State Act, or any
authority or body owned or controlled or aided
by the Government or a Government company
as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act,
1956 (1 of 1956);
(x) any person who is a chairman, member or
employee of any Service Commission or Board,
by whatever name called, or a member of any
selection committee appointed by such
Commission or Board for the conduct of any
examination or making any selection on behalf
of such Commission or Board;
(xi) any person who is a Vice-Chancellor or
member of any governing body, professor,
reader, lecturer or any other teacher or
employee, by whatever designation called, of
any University and any person whose services
have been availed of by a University or any
other public authority in connection with
holding or conducting examinations;
(xii) any person who is an office-bearer or an
employee of an educational, scientific, social,
cultural or other institution, in whatever
manner established, receiving or having
received any financial assistance from the
Central Government or any State Government,
or local or other public authority.”
33.
In the case of Sheikh Abdul Majeed & Anr v. Union Territory
of J&K Through Senior Superintendent of Police, 2023 SCC Online
J&K 698, the Hon‟ble High Court of J&K has elaborately dealt with the
issue and concept of „public servant‟ and „public duty‟ as is seen in the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which this Court, in the context
relatable to this case is in complete agreement with the proposition
advanced therein. Specific reference is hereby made to para 39, 40, 41,
54, 56 & 58 which are reproduced herein below as: “39. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is intended
to make the anti-corruption law more effective by
widening its coverage and scope of the definition of
'public servant'. Accordingly, a person who holds the
office by virtue of which he/she is authorized or
required to perform any public duty, is a public
servant for the purposes of 1988 Act. The definition
of 'public duty' is capable of encompassing any duty
attached to any office. Thus, performance of such
public duty by a person who is holding the office
which requires or authorizes him to perform such
duty is sine quo non for the application of definition
of 'public servant' for the purposes of P C Act 1988.
Under Section 2(c) viii of PC Act, 1988, a person
who holds the office by virtue of which he is
authorized or required to perform any public duty is
a 'public servant'. While understanding the true
purport and effect of Section 2(C)viii of PC Act, the
meaning of the expression 'office' appearing therein
as well as 'public duty', as is defined by Section 2(b)
is also to be understood. The definition of 'public
duty' in Section 2(b) of the PC Act, indeed, is wide,
which indicates the discharge of duties in which the
State, the public or the community at large has an
interest, has been brought within the ambit of the
expression 'public duty'.
40. There is no doubt that in the objects and
reasons stated for enactment of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, it has been made more than
clear that the Act, inter alia, envisages widening of
the scope of the definition of 'public servant',
nevertheless, the mere performance of public duties
by the holder of any office cannot bring the
incumbent within the meaning of the expression
'public servant' as contained in Section 2(c) of the PC
Act. Therefore, it would be more reasonable to
understand the expression 'public servant' by
reference to the office and the duties performed in
connection therewith to be of public character.
41. Before proceeding further in the matter, it
would be just and proper to examine the object for
which the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was
enacted by the Parliament. The Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the Bill is reproduced below: "1. The bill is intended to make the existing
anti- corruption laws more effective by
widening their coverage and by strengthening
the provisions.
2. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, was
amended
in
based
on
the
recommendations of the Santhanan Committee.
There are provisions in Chapter IX of the
Penal Code, 1860 to deal with public servants
and those who abet them by way of criminal
misconduct. There are also provisions in the
Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944, to
enable attachment of ill-gotten wealth obtained
through corrupt means, including from
transferees of such wealth. The bill seeks to
incorporate all these provisions with
modifications so as to make the provisions
more effective in combating corruption among
public servants.
3. The bill, inter alia, envisages widening the
scope of the definition of the expression 'public
servant', incorporation of offences under
sections 161 to 165A of the Penal Code, 1860
enhancement of penalties provided for these
offences and incorporation of a provision that
the order of the trial court upholding the grant
of sanction for prosecution would be final if it
has not already been challenged and the trial
has commenced. In order to expedite the
proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of
cases and prohibitory provisions with regard
to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
revision or interlocutory orders have also been
included.
4. Since the provisions of section 161A are
incorporated in the proposed legislation with
an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to
retain those sections in the Penal Code, 1860.
Consequently, it is proposed to delete those
sections with the necessary saving provision.
5. The notes on clauses explain in detail the
provisions of the Bill."
54. It must be taken into consideration that thrust
of Section 2(c) is not on the position held by the
individual; rather, the public duty performed by
him/her as the legislative intention was not to provide
an exhaustive list of authorities which are covered,
but a general definition of "public servant". In other
words, this section also applies to individuals who
are not conventionally considered as public servants.
Accordingly, this Court is required to adopt a
purposive approach which would give the effect to
the intention of legislature.
56. In this regard I am supported by the judgment
of Apex Court in 'State of M.P v. Ram Singh' reported
as (2000) 5 SCC 88, and the operative portion of the
said judgment is reproduced under:"In construing the definition of "public
servant" in clause (c) of Section 2 of the 1988
Act, the court is required to adopt a purposive
approach as would give effect to the intention
of the legislature. In that view the Statement of
Objects and Reasons contained in the Bill
leading to the passing of the Act can be taken
assistance of. It gives the background in which
the legislation was enacted. The present Act,
with a much wider definition of "public
servant", was brought in force to purify public
administration. When the legislature has used
such a comprehensive definition of "public
servant" to achieve the purpose of punishing
and curbing growing corruption in government
and semi-government departments, it would be
appropriate not to limit the contents of the
definition clause by construction which would
be against the spirit of the statute. The
definition of "public servant", therefore,
deserves a wide construction."
58. The Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v.
Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, (2020) 20 SCC 360
has observed: "34. On a perusal of Section 2(c) of the
PC Act, we may observe that the emphasis is
not on the position held by an individual,
rather, it is on the public duty performed by
him/her. In this regard, the legislative
intention was not to provide an exhaustive list
of authorities which are covered, rather a
general definition of "public servant" is
provided thereunder. This provides an
important internal evidence as to the definition
of the term "university".
44. As discussed earlier, the object of
the PC Act was not only to prevent the social
evil of bribery and corruption, but also to
make the same applicable to individuals who
might conventionally not be considered public
servants. The purpose under the PC Act was to
shift focus from those who are traditionally
called public officials, to those individuals who
perform public duties. Keeping the same in
mind, as rightly submitted by the learned
Senior Counsel for the appellant State, it
cannot be stated that a "deemed university"
and the officials therein, perform any less or
any different a public duty, than those
performed by a university simpliciter, and the
officials therein."
[Emphasis Supplied]
34.
If one is to understand as to whether the person in question is
a public servant or not in terms of the provisions of the PC Act, 1988, the
function and duty of such person as to be established to see as to whether
he is performing a public duty or not.
35.
The petitioners have not denied the fact that at the relevant
period, they have been appointed as research officers to perform duties
in furtherance of the objectives of the „National Afforestation and EcoDevelopment Board‟ (NAEB) under the aegis of the North Eastern Hill
University (NEHU), which in turn is under the direct control and
supervision of the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of
India. The duties performed by the petitioners would definitely be in the
interest of the State or public or community development. This, by itself
can only mean that the nature of the duties and functions of the
petitioners respectively are in public interest, or rather is one which
involves public duty.
36.
Situated thus, it can be safely said that the petitioners herein
are public servants in terms of the provision of Section 2 (c) of the PC
Act. This has also been observed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the
case of State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, (2020) 20 SCC
360, at para 49 & 50.
“49. In order to appreciate the amplitude of the
word “public servant”, the relevance of the term
“public duty” cannot be disregarded. “Public duty”
is defined under Section 2(b) of the PC Act, which is
reproduced below:
2(b) ‘public duty’ means a duty in the
discharge of which the State, the public or the
community at large has an interest.
50. Evidently, the language of Section 2(b) of the
PC Act indicates that any duty discharged wherein
State, the public or community at large has any
interest is called a public duty. The first explanation
to Section 2 further clarifies that any person who falls
in any of the categories stated under Section 2 is a
public servant whether or not appointed by the
government. The second explanation further expands
the ambit to include every person who de facto
discharges the functions of a public servant, and that
he should not be prevented from being brought under
the ambit of public servant due to any legal
infirmities or technicalities.”
37.
On the contention of the petitioners that the provision of
Chapter 8.27 of the CBI Manual was given a go by, by the Investigating
Officer in that the contents of the source information have not been
reduced in writing and thus, procedural impropriety has been occasioned,
the case of Vineet Narian (supra) being applicable. This Court on an
overall analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case of the CBI
made out against the petitioners, would opine that there are enough
available materials including documentary evidence to conclude that a
prima facie case has been made out against them, thus, the source
information has credence in this regard, irrespective of whether the same
ought to be reduced in writing or not.
38.
These petitions have been filed taking recourse to the
provision of Section 482 Cr.P.C. This provision expresses the inherent
power of the High Court to exercise jurisdiction in cases and situations
so as to prevent the abuse of the legal process and to secure the ends of
justice
39.
In a catena of
judgments by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
dealing with this provision, certain parameters and guidelines have been
laid down to enable the High Court to properly exercise this power. One
such case is the case of State of Haryana & Ors v. Bhajan Lal & Ors
reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein at para 102, the following
is found
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated
by this Curt in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226
or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code
which we have extracted and reproduced above, we
give the following categories of cases by way of
illustrations wherein such power could be exercised
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulac and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even
if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with malafide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with
an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite
him due to private and personal grudge.”
40.
The High Court while exercising its inherent power to quash
an FIR or criminal proceeding may do so, if the guidelines at para 102
(supra) can be applied to a particular case. However, in the case of the
petitioners herein, the guidelines at 1, 3 and 7 cannot be applied,
inasmuch as, the facts and circumstances as discussed hereinabove
would reveal that the FIR and the allegations made in the complaint do
contain prima facie evidence to establish the complicity of the petitioners
to the offence alleged.
41.
Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that the
petitioners have not been able to make out a case in their favour and for
this Court to exercise its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
42.
Accordingly, these petitions are found to be devoid of merits
and the same are hereby dismissed.
43.
Petitions disposed of. No costs.
44.
Registry is directed to return back the Lower Court case
record.
Judge
Meghalaya
24.05.2024
“D. Nary, PS”
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