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Reserved on:-07.08.2026
Delivered on:-20.08.2026
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
First Appeal No. 157 of 2024
Subhash Chand Arora and Another
….....Appellants
Versus
Pal Singh Kashyap and Others
….….Respondents
Present:Mr. Arvind Vashistha, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. K.R. Gazi,
Advocate for the appellants.
Mr. Piyush Garg, Advocate for the respondents.
JUDGMENT
Hon’ble Ravindra Maithani, J.
The present first appeal is preferred against the judgment
and decree dated 30.07.2024, passed in the Original Suit No.178 of
2015, Pal Singh Kashyap and others v. Subhash Chand Arora and
another (“the suit”), by the court of I Additional Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Haridwar. By it, a suit filed by the respondents for
mandatory injunction and damages has been decreed.
2.
The respondents filed the suit, inter alia, on the ground
that Smt. Rameshwari Devi alias Ramesho Devi was the owner of
the land on which Vinayak Hotel, situated at Ranipur Mor, Haridwar,
has been constructed. Smt. Rameshwari Devi was the wife of
the
respondent
no.,
Pal
Singh
Kashyap,
and
the
mother
of
the respondent nos. 2 to 4. In the year 1993-94, Smt. Rameshwari
Devi and the respondent no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap, planned to
construct a hotel on the land. The hotel was constructed in the year
1994. The appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora, was a friend of the
respondent no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap, and his wife Smt. Rameshwari
Devi. The respondent no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap, and his wife
Smt. Rameshwari Devi were in need of money. Therefore, the appellant
no.1, Subhash Chand Arora, helped them by giving them Rs.
3,95,000/-. In Vinayak Hotel, on the ground floor, a restaurant and a
shop were constructed (“the shop”). The appellant no.1, Subhash
Chand Arora, asked the respondent no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap, and his
wife Smt. Rameshwari Devi, for giving the shop for his employment. In
view of the good relations and also keeping in view the fact that the
appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora, had helped the respondent
no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap and his wife Smt. Rameshwari Devi with Rs.
3,95,000/-, they gave the shop to the appellant no.1, Subhash Chand
Arora, as licensee with Rs. 10,000/- as license fee, and it was decided
that the money that was advanced by the appellant no.1, Subhash
Chand Arora, would be set off in the license fee. The appellant no.1,
Subhash Chand Arora, got possession of the shop in the Year 1995 as
licensee, and started his business in the name and style of “Cambridge
Book Depot”. Now, the shop is being run by his son, the appellant
no.2, Ajay Kumar Arora.
3.
It is further the case of the respondents in the suit that
Smt. Rameshwari Devi died in the Year 2010. After her death, the
respondents became the owner of the Hotel and the shop, and the
appellants became their licensee. The amount, which was advanced by
the appellants, had been set off on the license fees long back, but due
to good relationship, the respondents did not insist the appellants for
vacating the shop. But, thereafter, the respondents asked the
appellants to vacate the shop, to which the appellants were not
agreeable. Finally, a notice was given, but the appellants did not hand
over the possession of the shop. With these and other averments, the
respondents filed the suit seeking mandatory injunction for possession
of the shop as well as for damages for use and occupation of the shop
by the appellants.
4.
The appellants filed their written statements in the suit.
Construction of the Hotel and the shop has been admitted by the
appellants. The appellants also admitted that in the shop, they run
their business in the name and style of “Cambridge Book Depot”.
According to the appellants, Smt. Rameshwari Devi had taken a lot of
loan while constructing the Hotel. Therefore, she wanted to sell the
shop, and she sold the shop to the appellant no.1, Subhash Chand
Arora, in the Year 1993 for Rs. 3,95,000/-, and, thereafter, the
appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora, came in possession of the shop.
The appellants have also taken the plea that the respondents have not
disclosed as to when they gave the shop on license to the appellants.
No date has been disclosed. Therefore, no cause of action arises in the
matter and the suit is liable to be dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the CPC”).
5.
It has further been the case of the appellants that on
01.02.1995, the respondent no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap, and his wife
Smt. Rameshwari Devi, executed an agreement to sale of the shop in
favour of Sanjay, who happens to be the son of appellant no.1,
Subhash Chand Arora, and the brother of the appellant no.2, Ajay
Kumar Arora. Post execution of the agreement, possession was also
delivered. Therefore, the possession and title of the appellants is
absolute under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“the
T.P. Act”).
6.
Based on the pleadings of the parties, on 02.03.2016, the
following issues were framed:-
1)
Whether the shop in question was given by the
plaintiff
no.1
and
Smt.
Rameshwari
Devi,
to
the
defendant no.1, as licensee in the Year 1995? If so, its
effects?
2)
Whether the defendant no.1 had agreed to pay
license fees of Rs.10,000/- per month?
3)
Whether the plaintiffs had terminated the license of
the defendants on 15.04.2015? If so, its effects?
4)
Whether license fees is due against the defendants
since 01.04.1998, and the plaintiffs are entitled to get the
license
fees
of
Rs.3,60,000/-
from
01.07.2012
to
30.06.2015?
5)
Whether the plaintiffs, during the pendency of suit,
are entitled to get compensation at the rate of Rs.
30,000/- per month.
6)
Whether the suit of the plaintiffs for injunction is
not legally maintainable?
7)
Whether Smt. Rameshwari Devi or the plaintiffs are
owners in possession of the disputed property?
7.
8)
Whether the suit is undervalued?
9)
Whether the court fee paid is deficient?
10)
Reliefs?
Further, on 31.03.2016, issue no.11 was additionally
framed as follows:11)
Whether the suit is barred by Order 7 Rule 11
CPC?
8.
In evidence, on behalf of the respondents, two witnesses,
namely, PW1, Pal Singh Kashyap and PW2, Sudesh Chanchal, were
examined. The respondents have submitted the papers, as per lists
7C1, 50C1 and 161C1.
9.
On behalf of the appellants, the DW1, appellant no.2,
Ajay Kumar Arora, was examined as witness. The appellants have
submitted the papers, as per lists 26C1/1 to 2, 74C1, 88C1 and 123C1.
10.
Issue nos. 1, 3 and 7 were decided together, and it was
held that the appellants are in possession of the shop as licensees, and
the respondents have a right to revoke the license and regain the
possession of the shop. Smt. Rameshwari Devi was the owner of the
shop and after her death, the respondents are the owner of the shop.
The respondents have revoked the license by giving a notice dated
29.04.2015.
11.
Issue nos. 2, 4 and 5 were decided together, and it was
held that the license fee was Rs. 10,000/-, and the appellants had to
pay Rs. 3,90,000/- as license fee with effect from 01.07.2012 to
30.06.2015, and from 01.05.2015, till possession is given to the
respondents, the respondents are entitled to get Rs.10,000/- per
month as damages for use and occupation of the shop.
12.
On issue no.6, it was held that the appellants could not
clarify as to how the suit is not maintainable. The issue no.6 was
decided accordingly.
13.
Issue no.8 was decided on 23.03.2017, and the court
held that the valuation is to be done as per the Amin report, which
was subsequently done by the respondents.
14.
On issue no.9, which is with regard to the insufficient
court fees, the court held that the suit is valued at Rs.23,33,184/-,
and accordingly, the court fee has been paid.
15.
Issue no.11 was framed on 31.03.2016 to the effect as to
whether the suit is barred by Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. On 02.08.2016, in
the suit, it was ordered that this issue would be decided after the
evidence is lead, but Para 36 of the impugned judgment records that
the appellant did not clarify as to how the provisions of Order 7 Rule
11 CPC are attracted in the suit. Accordingly, it was decided.
16.
Having made discussion on all the issues framed in the
suit, on issue no.10, the impugned judgment recorded that the suit is
liable to be decreed, and it was decreed accordingly.
17.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
18.
After hearing the parties, two points for determination
arise for decision of this Court, which are as follows:1)
Whether the suit is barred by limitation, and
accordingly, the plaint is liable to be rejected under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC?
2)
Whether the appellants are entitled to get the
benefit of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882?
19.
Point No.1:This point is with regard to limitation, and accordingly
barred by Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The point is as follows:Whether the suit is barred by limitation, and accordingly, the
plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC?
Before proceeding further, it would be apt to reproduce
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. It reads as below:“11. Rejection of plaint.— The plaint shall be rejected in the
following cases:—
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff,
on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time
to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint
is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on
being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper
within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to
be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of
rule
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of
the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be
extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied
that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional
nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite
stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court
and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to
the plaintiff.”
20.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants
submits that in a civil suit, plaintiff has to prove its case
independently. He submits that in the instant case, according to the
respondents, they had taken Rs. 3,95,000/- from the appellants, and,
thereafter, the shop was given on license. It is argued that the license
fee was fixed as Rs.10,000/-, which means that the license was for 39
months. Therefore, in view of Section 62(c) of the Easements Act, 1882
(“the Easements Act”), the license has been deemed revoked by the
efflux of time, and, thereafter, as per the Limitation Act, 1963 (“the
Limitation Act”), suit ought to have been filed within limitation, which
was not filed. Therefore, the suit is barred by limitation, and,
accordingly, it was liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. He
further submits that even if plea of limitation is not taken up by the
appellants, it was the duty of the court concerned under Section 3 of
the Limitation Act to see that the suit is filed within limitation; the
court below has wrongly observed in Para No.36 of the impugned
judgment that the appellants could not clarify as to how the suit is
barred by Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
21.
While arguing on that aspect, learned Senior Counsel for
the appellants has referred to Para Nos. 4, 5, 7 of the plaint, as well as
the statement of PW1, Pal Singh Kashyap.
22.
In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel for
the appellants has placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Draupadi Devi and
others v. Union of India and Others (2004) 11 SCC 425, State of
Gujarat v. Kothari and Associates (2016) 14 SCC 761, Nusli Neville
Wadia v. Ivory Properties and Others (2020) 6 SCC 557 and Dahiben v.
Arvindbhai
Kalyanji
Bhanushali
(Gajra)
DEAD
Through
Legal
Representatives and others (2020) 7 SCC 366.
23.
In the case of Draupadi Devi (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, inter alia, held that, “the plaintiff was bound to
plead in the plaint when the cause of action arose.” In Para No.73
of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:“73. We may notice here that under the Code of Civil
Procedure, Order 7 Rule 1(e) requires a plaint to state “the facts
constituting the cause of action and when it arose”. The plaintiff was
bound to plead in the plaint when the cause of action arose. If he did
not, then irrespective of what the defendants may plead in the
written statement, the court would be bound by the mandate of
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 to dismiss the suit, if it found
that on the plaintiff's own pleading his suit is barred by limitation. In
the instant case, the plaint does not plead clearly as to when the
cause of action arose. In the absence of such pleadings, the
defendants pleaded nothing on the issue. However, when the facts
were ascertained by evidence, it was clear that the decision of the
Government of India not to recognise the suit property as private
property of the Maharaja was taken sometime in the year 1951,
whether in March or May. Dewan Jarmani Dass, the plaintiff and the
Maharaja were very much aware of this decision. Yet, the suit was
filed only on 11-5-1960.”
24.
In the case of Kothari and Associates (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, while interpreting the provisions of Section 3 of the
Limitation Act, observed that, “It is thus incumbent upon the court
to satisfy itself that the suit is not barred by limitation, regardless
of whether such a plea has been raised by the parties.” (Para No.8)
25.
In the case of Nusli Nevilla Wadia (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the plaint can be rejected as barred by
limitation.
“68. In our opinion, it cannot be laid down as proposition of
law under Order 7 Rule 11(d) that the plaint cannot be rejected as
barred by limitation. It can be said that it is permissible to do so
mainly in a case where the plaint averment itself indicates the cause
of action to be barred by limitation and no further evidence is
required to adjudicate the issue.”
26.
In the case of Dahiben (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, In Para No.23.13, observed as hereunder:“23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found
that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does
not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising
the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.”
27.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants,
while arguing, has also placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Associated Hotels
of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor 1959 SCC OnLine SC 62, and Mrs. M.N.
Clubwala and another v. Fida Hussain Saheb and others, 1964 SCC
OnLine SC 134.
28.
In the case of R.N. Kapoor (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has occasion to make distinction between the lease and license.
In Para No.28 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as
follows:“28. There is a marked distinction between a lease and a
license. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease of
immovable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property
made for a certain time in consideration for a price paid or promised.
Under Section 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in
possession of the property. A lease is therefore a transfer of an
interest in land. The interest transferred is called leasehold interest.
The lessor parts with his right to enjoy the property during the term
of the lease, and it follows from it that the lessee gets that right to
the exclusion of the lessor. Whereas Section 52 of the Indian
Easements Act defines a licence thus:
“Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number
of other persons, a right to do or continue to do, in or upon the
immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the
absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount
to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a
license.”
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………..”
29.
In the case of Mrs. M.N. Clubwala (supra), also, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court interpreted the scope of license and in Para
No.12, observed as follows:“12. While it is true that the essence of a licence is that it is
revocable at the will of the grantor the provision in the licence that
the licensee would be entitled to a notice before being required to
vacate is not inconsistent with a licence. In England it has been held
that a contractual licence may be revocable or irrevocable according
to the express or implied terms of the contract between the parties. It
has further been held that if the licensee under a revocable licence
has brought property on to the land, he is entitled to notice of
revocation and to a reasonable time for removing his property, and in
which to make arrangements to carry on his business elsewhere.
(See Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd edn. vol. 23, p. 431). Thus the
mere necessity of giving a notice to a licensee requiring him to vacate
the licensed premises would not indicate that the transaction was a
lease. Indeed, Section 62(c) of the Indian Easements Act. 1882 itself
provides that a licence is deemed to be revoked where it has been
either granted for a limited period, or acquired on condition that it
shall become void on the performance or non-performance of a
specified act, and the period expires, or the condition is fulfilled. In
the agreements in question the requirement of a notice is a condition
and if that condition is fulfilled the licence will be deemed to be
revoked under Section. 62. It would seem that it is this particular
requirement in the agreements which has gone a long way to
influence the High Court's finding that the transaction was a lease.
Whether an agreement creates between the parties the relationship
of landlord and tenant or merely that of licenser and licensee the
decisive consideration is the intention of the parties. This intention
has to be ascertained on a consideration of all the relevant provisions
in the agreement. In the absence, however, of a formal document the
intention of the parties must be inferred from the circumstances and
conduct of the parties…………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………………….”
30.
Learned counsel for the respondents submits that in a
civil suit, generally, dilatory tactics are adopted by the litigants, who
are wrongdoers. He would refer to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Ramrameshwari Devi and Others v.
Nirmala Devi and Others, (2011) 8 SCC 249. In Para Nos. 36, 37 and
49 of the judgment in the case of Ramrameshwari Devi (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:“Profits for the wrongdoer
36. According to the learned amicus curiae, every lease on its
expiry, or a licence on its revocation cannot be converted itself into
litigation. Unfortunately, our courts are flooded with these cases
because there is an inherent profit for the wrongdoers in our system.
It is a matter of common knowledge that domestic servants,
gardeners, watchmen, caretakers or security men employed in a
premises, whose status is that of a licensee indiscriminately file suits
for injunction not to be dispossessed by making all kinds of
averments and may be even filing a forged document, and then
demand a chunk of money for withdrawing the suit. It is happening
because it is the general impression that even if ultimately the
unauthorised person is thrown out of the premises the court would
not ordinarily punish the unauthorised person by awarding realistic
and actual mesne profits, imposing costs or ordering prosecution.”
“37. It is a matter of common knowledge that lakhs of flats
and houses are kept locked for years, particularly in big cities and
metropolitan cities, because owners are not certain that even after
expiry of lease or licence period, the house, flat or the apartment
would be vacated or not. It takes decades for final determination of
the controversy and wrongdoers are never adequately punished.
Pragmatic approach of the courts would partly solve the housing
problem of this country.”
“49. The learned amicus articulated the common man's
general impression about litigation in following words:
“Make any false averment, conceal any fact, raise any plea,
produce any false document, deny any genuine document, it
will successfully stall the litigation, and in any case, delay the
matter endlessly. The other party will be coerced into a
settlement which will be profitable for me and the probability of
the court ordering prosecution for perjury is less than that of
meeting with an accident while crossing the road.”
31.
Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that
it is not a case of deemed revocation of license. He would raise the
following points in his submission:i)
The appellants were not given shop as
licensee for a limited period.
ii)
The appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora,
was given the shop for his employment, and since
he had advanced Rs. 3,95,000/- to the respondent
no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap, and his wife Smt.
Rameshwari Devi, it was decided that that amount
shall be set off in the license fee. It is argued that it
does not make license for a limited period. He
would refer to the averments of Para 4 of the plaint.
iii)
32.
The suit is not barred by limitation.
Undoubtedly, a plaintiff has to succeed on his own legs.
He cannot take advantage of any weakness of the defendants. This is
the settled legal position.
33.
It has been the consistent case of the respondents that
the shop was given as license to the appellant no.1, Subhash Chand
Arora, for which Rs. 10,000/- was license fee. It was further stipulated
as per the respondents that Rs. 3,95,000/-, which the appellant no.1,
Subhash Chand Arora, had advanced to the respondent no.1, Pal
Singh Kashyap, and
Smt. Rameshwari Devi, shall be set off in the
license fee. Para Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the plaint nowhere stipulate that
the license was given for 39 months.
34.
Extensively, reference has been made to the statements
of PW1, Pal Singh Kashyap and PW2, Sudesh Chanchal. PW1, Pal
Singh Kashyap, has, in his examination in chief, reiterated the
respondents’ case, and has stated that the license was given. In Para
No.6 of his affidavit, it is stated that when Rs. 3,95,000/- would be set
off against Rs. 10,000/- license fee, the license would be over and the
appellants would vacate the shop. This has been referred to by learned
Senior Counsel for the appellants and reference has also been made to
the cross examination of PW1, Pal Singh Kashyap, recorded on
04.08.2018, when in Page 4 of his statement, PW1, Pal Singh Kashyap,
has stated that the appellants had to vacate the shop till March, 1998.
35.
Making reference to this, it is argued that, in fact,
initially, the license was given for 39 months. Learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellants has also referred to the statements of the
witnesses to argue that in the Municipal records, the name of
appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora, is recorded. At some places, the
word ‘sauda’, (“transaction”) has been recorded in the statement of
PW1, Pal Singh Kashyap. It has also been highlighted by learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants.
36.
PW2,
Sudesh
Chanchal,
has
also
supported
the
statement of PW1, Pal Singh Kashyap.
37.
DW1, Ajay Kumar Arora, has reiterated his version in the
written statement. It would require deliberation because in his cross
examination, he has not proved the agreement dated 01.02.1995,
which was allegedly executed between respondent no.1, Pal Singh
Kashyap and Smt. Rameshwari Devi and Sanjay Kumar, the brother of
DW1, Ajay Kumar Arora.
38.
Though, at two stages, PW1, Pal Singh Kashyap, has
stated that after setting off of Rs. 3,92,000/-, the license was to be
revoked, but it is not pleaded as such. In totality, if the statement of
PW1, Pal Singh Kashyap, is read, in Para No.8 of his examination in
chief, he has stated that after the death of Smt. Rameshwari Devi in
the year 2010, the appellants continued as licensee, which means the
license was not to be over after setting off of Rs. 3,90,000/- that was
advanced by appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora, to the respondent
no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap and Smt. Rameshwari Devi.
39.
The plaint case is categorical that Rs. 3,95,000/- were
given by the appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora, to the respondent
no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap and his wife Smt. Rameshwari Devi, and he
demanded the shop for his employment. According to Para No.4 of the
plaint, the shop was given for some time to the appellant no.1,
Subhash Chand Arora, for Rs. 10,000/-, as license fees. It does not
speak of license for a limited period.
40.
It is being argued on behalf of the respondents is that the
appellants, in their written statements, have not pleaded that the
license was for 39 months.
41.
Here, it is being argued that the license has been deemed
revoked under Section 62(c) of the Easements Act. Section 62(c) of the
Easements Act is as follows:“62.
License when deemed revoked.- A
license is deemed to be revoked—
(a) …………………….
(b) ……………………
(c) Where it has been granted for a limited
period, or acquired on condition that it
shall become void on the performance or nonperformance of a specified act, and the period
expires, or the condition is fulfilled;
(d) …………………..
(e) …………………..
(f) ……………………
(g) …………………..
(h) ………………….
(i) …………………..”
42.
In order to attract the provisions of Section 62(c) of the
Easements Act, first and foremost, it has to be established that the
license was granted for a limited period.
43.
In the instant case, as stated hereinabove, it is not the
pleaded case of the respondents in their plaint that the license was for
a limited period. Instead, according to the plaint’s case, the shop was
given on license to the appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora, for some
time on Rs.10,000/- as license fee, and Rs. 3,95,000/-, which was
advanced by the appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora, to the
respondent no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap and his wife Smt. Rameshwari
Devi, was to be set off in the license fee. It does not mean that the
license was for 39 months. If the statement of PW1, Pal Singh
Kashyap, is read in totality, it supports the version in the plaint.
Moreover, as stated, it has never been the case of the appellants that
they were given license for 39 months. Therefore, this Court is of the
view that, in fact, the license that was given to the appellant no.1,
Subhash Chand Arora, was not for limited period, and it has not been
revoked by the operation of Section 62(c) of the Easements Act after 39
months of license.
44.
The license of the appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora,
was revoked on 15.04.2015, and the suit has been filed on
22.02.2016. It is not barred by limitation.
45.
There is another aspect of the matter. The appellants did
not take the plea of deemed revocation of the license. They also did not
take the plea that the suit is barred by limitation, therefore, the plaint
is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
46.
Para 9-A was incorporated by way of amendment in the
written statement by the appellants, and according to it, since the day
when the license commences was not clarified by the respondents, no
cause of action arises and the suit is barred by Order 7 Rule 1 CPC.
47.
At the time of hearing of the suit also, on behalf of the
appellants, based on the pleadings, it could not be clarified as to how
the suit is barred by Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, as has been recorded in
Para No.36 of the impugned judgment, and this Court is of the view
that it has rightly been recorded. Therefore, this Court records the
finding as follows:(i)
The license was not for a limited period;
(ii)
The license has not been revoked by the
operation of Section 62(c) of the Easements Act;
(iii)
The suit is not barred by limitation; And;
(iv)
The suit is not barred by Order 7 Rule 11
CPC.
48.
Point for determination no.1 is decided accordingly.
49.
Point No.2:This point relates to applicability of Section 53-A of the
T.P. Act. The point is as below:-
Whether the appellants are entitled to get the benefit of Section
53-A of the T.P. Act?
Before proceeding further, it would be apt to
reproduce Section 53-A of the T.P. Act. It reads as below:“53A. Part performance.—Where any person contracts to
transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed
by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute
the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the
transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession
of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in
possession, continues in possession in part performance of the
contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and
the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the
contract, then, notwithstanding that, or, where there is an
instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in
the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force,
the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred
from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under
him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has
taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly
provided by the terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this
section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who
has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.”
50.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants
submits that the agreement to sale of the shop was executed in favour
of Sanjay Kumar, the son of appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora,
and the brother of appellant no.2, Ajay Kumar Arora, on 01.02.1995,
and the possession was given. Therefore, the appellants are entitled to
protection under Section 53-A of the T.P. Act. He submits that the
application under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC and Section 151 CPC was
moved by the appellants in the suit for framing of two issues relating
to the agreement dated 01.02.1995, and the applicability of provisions
under Section 53-A of the T.P. Act. He submits that the court below
did not frame the issues and it has caused prejudice to the appellants.
51.
In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel for
the appellants has placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid
down in the cases of A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula
Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam Represented by
its President and others, (2012) 6 SCC 430 and Vasanthi v. Venugopal
(Dead) through Legal Representatives, (2017) 4 SCC 723.
52.
In the case of A. Shanmugam (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, inter alia, observed that framing of issue is a very
important stage of a civil trial, and if issues are properly framed,
controversy can be clearly focused. In Para Nos.30 and 32 of the
judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:“30. Framing of issues is a very important stage of a civil
trial. It is imperative for a Judge to critically examine the pleadings of
the parties before framing of issues. Rule 2 of Order 10 CPC enables
the court, in its search for the truth, to go to the core of the matter
and narrow down, or even eliminate the controversy. Rule 2 of Order
10 reads as under:
“2.Oral examination of party, or companion of party.—(1)
At the first hearing of the suit, the court—
(a) shall, with a view to elucidating matters in controversy in
the suit, examine orally such of the parties to the suit
appearing in person or present in court, as it deems fit; and
(b) may orally examine any person, able to answer any
material question relating to the suit, by whom any party
appearing in person or present in court or his pleader is
accompanied.
(2)-(3)***”
It is a useful procedural device and must be regularly pressed into
service.”
“32. If issues are properly framed, the controversy in the case
can be clearly focused and documents can be properly appreciated in
that light. The relevant evidence can also be carefully examined.
Careful framing of issues also helps in proper examination and
cross-examination of the witnesses and final arguments in the case.”
53.
In the case of Vasanthi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court referred to the earlier judgments, and observed as follows:“25. This Court in Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Pralhad
Bhairoba Suryavanshi, (2002) 3 SCC 676 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 469, while
tracing the incorporation of Section 53-A in the TP Act, vide 1929
Act, acting on the recommendations of the Special Committee on the
issue, had ruled that mere expiration of the period of limitation for
bringing a suit for specific performance would not debar a person in
possession of an immovable property by way of part-performance
from setting up a plea, as contemplated therein in defence to protect
his possession of the property involved. It was however underlined
that if the conditions precedent, as enumerated, in Section 53-A of
the Act, are complied with, the law of limitation would not come in
the way of the said person to avail the benefit of the protection to his
possession as extended thereby even though a suit for specific
performance of a contract by him had gone barred by limitation.
Explicitly therefore, though mere expiry of the period of limitation for
a suit for specific performance may not be a bar for a person in
possession of an immovable property in part-performance of a
contract for transfer thereof for consideration to assert the shield of
Section 53-A of the TP Act, it is nevertheless imperative that to avail
the benefit of such protection, all the essential prerequisites therefor
would have to be obligatorily complied with.
26. In A. Lewis v. M.T. Ramamurthy, (2007) 14 SCC 87, it
was propounded that the right to claim protection under Section 53A of the TP Act would not be available, if the transferee remains
passive without taking effective steps and abstains from performing
his part of the contract or conveying his readiness and willingness to
that effect.”
54.
Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that
failure to framing issues is not an omission. In fact, it has affected the
defence of the appellants because had the issue been framed, the
appellants would have been in a position to know as to what they have
to prove.
55.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents
submits that it is true that the appellants had filed an application in
the suit for framing two additional issues, including one relating to
Section 53-A of the T.P. Act, but he submits that the court did not
deny framing of the issue, as such. Instead, in its order dated
03.09.2022, the court held that the issues relating to the agreement
dated 01.02.1995, and application of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act are
covered under issue No.7, which is to the effect as to whether Smt.
Rameshwari Devi or the respondents are owner in possession of the
disputed shop. It is argued that the court, on 03.09.2022, in the suit,
observed that the additional issues proposed by the appellants could
be considered under issue no.7 already framed.
56.
Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that
post order dated 03.09.2022, PW1, Pal Singh Kashyap, was further
cross examined by the appellants, and it is only thereafter, they led
evidence. Therefore, it is argued that the appellants knew that they
had to prove the agreement dated 01.02.1995 as well as the
applicability of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act. Therefore, it is argued that
if separate issue with regard to applicability/benefit of Section 53-A of
the T.P. Act has not been made, it does not prejudice, in any manner,
the rights of the appellants.
57.
In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the
respondents has relied on the principles of law, as laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the cases of P. Purushottam Reddy and
another v. Pratap Steels Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 685, Kattukandi Edathil
Krishnan and Others v. Kattukandi Edathil Valsan and Others (2006)
9 SCC 166, and Bachahan Devi and Another v. Nagar Nigam
Gorakhpur and Another (2008) 12 SCC 372.
58.
In the case of P. Purushottam Reddy (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in Para No.12, observed as hereunder:“12. Assuming that there was any deficiency in the pleadings
and also an omission on the part of the trial court to frame a specific
issue, the present one is a case where the applicability of the law laid
down by this Court in Nagubai Ammal v. R. Shama Rao [AIR 1956
SC 593] was squarely attracted. In Nagubai case [AIR 1956 SC 593]
this Court was called upon to examine if the plea of lis pendens was
not open to the plaintiff on the ground that it had not been raised in
the pleadings. Neither the plaint nor the reply statement of the
plaintiff contained any averment that the sale was affected by the
rule of lis pendens. There was no specific issue directed to that
question. However, evidence was adduced by the plaintiff on the plea
of lis pendens and not objected to by the defendants. The question
was argued and tested by taking into consideration the evidence that
the proceedings were collusive in character with a view to avoid
operation of Section 52 of the TP Act. This Court felt satisfied that
the defendants went to trial with full knowledge that the question
of lis pendens was in issue, had ample opportunity to adduce their
evidence thereon and fully availed themselves of the opportunity.
This Court formed the opinion that in the circumstances of the case,
absence of a specific pleading on the question was a mere irregularity
which resulted in no prejudice to the defendants. After having
noticed the rule of pleadings as applicable to civil law that “no
amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never
put forward”, this Court held: (AIR p. 598, para 12)
“The true scope of this rule is that evidence let in on
issues on which the parties actually went to trial should not
be made the foundation for decision of another and different
issue, which was not present in the minds of the parties and
on which they had no opportunity of adducing evidence. But
that rule has no application to a case where parties go to
trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue,
though no specific issue has been framed thereon, and
adduce evidence relating thereto.”
59.
In the case of Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Para No.4, observed as follows:“4. ........................................................................................
..........................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................
The High Court did not itself come to the conclusion that there was
no proof of marriage but was of the view that on the aspect of long
cohabitation, it was necessary to remand the matter back to the trial
court so as to enable the parties to “raise appropriate pleas” and to
adduce additional evidence in the matter. The parties were also
granted the liberty to amend the pleadings, if necessary.”
60.
In the case of Bachahan Devi (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in Para No.11, observed as follows:“11. ......................................................................................
..........................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................
In order to bring in application of Order 41 Rule 25 the appellate
court must come to a conclusion that the lower court has omitted to
frame issues and/or has failed to determine any question of fact
which in the opinion of the appellate court are essential for the right
decision of the suit on merits. Once the appellate court comes to
such a conclusion it may, if necessary, frame the issues and refer the
same to the trial court. In other words there is no compulsion on the
part of the appellate court to do so. This is clear from the use of the
expression “may”. But the further question that arises is whether in
such a case the appellate court is bound to direct the trial court to
take additional evidence required. This is a mandatory requirement
as is evident from the provision itself because it provides that the
lower court shall proceed to try such case and shall return the
evidence to the appellate court together with the findings therein and
the reasons therefor. As noted above, the provision becomes
operative when the appellate court comes to the conclusion about
the omission on the part of the lower court to frame or try any issue.
Once the appellate court directs the lower court to do so, it is
incumbent upon the trial court to take additional evidence required.
As has been rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellant,
there may be cases where additional evidence may not be required.
But where the additional evidence is required, then the lower court
has to return the evidence so recorded to the appellate court together
with the findings thereon and the reasons therefor.”
61.
First
and
foremost,
the
question
that
falls
for
consideration is as to whether any prejudice has been caused to the
rights of the appellants by not framing the issues with regard to the
agreement dated 01.02.1995, and with regard to application of Section
53-A of the T.P. Act? At this stage only, it may be noted that in their
written statement filed in the suit, the appellants have, by way of
amendment, incorporated Para 6-A in their written statements. By this
paragraph, the appellants averred that the respondent no.1, Pal Singh
Kashyap, and his wife Smt. Rameshwari Devi executed an agreement
to sale in favour of Sanjay, son of appellant no.1, Subhash Chand
Arora and the brother of appellant no.2, Ajay Kumar Arora, on
01.02.1995,
and
the
possession
was
delivered.
Therefore
the
ownership and possession of the appellants is complete and final, by
virtue of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act.
62.
It is also a fact that an application under Order 14 Rule 5
CPC and Section 151 CPC was filed by the appellants in the suit for
framing the following additional issues:1.
Whether the plaintiff no.1 and his wife Smt.
Rameshwari Devi had executed a written, signed,
and
notarised
agreement
to
sale
along
with
possession dated 01.02.1995, in favour of Sanjay,
son of Subhash Chand Arora, who is son of the
defendant no.1 and the brother of defendant no.2.
2.
Whether due to the possession and ownership of
the defendants on the disputed property having
attained finality under Section 53-A of the Transfer
of Property Act, the defendants are owners in
possession of the disputed property?
63.
The issues were not framed by the court. The court
observed that issue no.7 covers these issues, and under issue no.7,
the issues raised by the appellants could be decided, and for this
purpose, framing of separate issues is not necessary. It makes two
things clear, viz., (i) The appellants were taking benefit of agreement
dated 01.02.1995, and also shelter of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act.
And; (ii) The appellants wanted to have two more issues framed on
those aspects. What is important is that although the Court did not
frame these issues, but observed that these issues are covered under
issue No.7, which is with regard to ownership and possession of the
respondents over the shop, which means that the appellants were
aware that they had to lead evidence with regard to the agreement
dated 01.02.1995, as well as their rights under Section 53-A of the
T.P. Act. It is after 03.09.2022 that the appellants did adduce their
evidence. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the appellants knew
the existence and validity of agreement dated 01.02.1995, and benefit
of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act, which the appellants wanted to take
shelter, was covered under issue no.7 framed in the suit, and,
accordingly, the appellants were required to adduce evidence.
This
Court is of the further view that on 03.09.2022, when in the suit,
separate issues on those aspects were not framed, it did not prejudice
any of the rights of the appellants.
64.
This is one aspect of the matter. The next aspect is with
regard to benefit of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act.
65.
It has been the case of the appellants that the
respondent no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap, and Smt. Rameshwari Devi
executed an agreement to sale in favour of Sanjay Kumar on
01.02.1995, and possession given. Hence, the appellants are entitled
to the benefit of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act.
66.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents
submits that in the instant case, the appellants cannot take benefit of
Section 53-A of the T.P. Act. He submits that first and foremost, the
appellants were required to prove the agreement, and, thereafter, they
were further required to prove that they were ready and willing to
perform their part under the agreement. It is submitted that there is
no pleading with regard to readiness and willingness to perform the
part of appellants in the agreement dated 01.02.1995.
67.
In support of his contention, learned counsel for the
respondents has placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V.R. Sudhakara Rao and
Others v. T.V. Kameswari, (2007) 6 SCC 650.
68.
In the case of V.R. Sudhakara Rao (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court discussed the effect of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act,
and in Para Nos. 15 and 16, observed as follows:“15. First it would be necessary to deal with the effect of
Section 53-A of the TP Act. It is fairly accepted that in the case of an
oral agreement of sale the defence under Section 53-A of the TP Act
is not available to a party who alleges to be in possession of the
property.”
“16. The High Court has rightly concluded that there is no
clear proof relating to the other terms of condition. The relief of
specific performance is discretionary relief and except the oral
evidence, there is no clear evidence to prove several of the essential
terms which have been taken note of by the High Court. The High
Court, on analysing the evidence, has come to hold that except
Exhibit B-1 and the oral evidence of DW 1 and DW 2, there is no
other clear proof relating to the other terms and conditions of the
contract which can be termed as essential conditions like delivery of
possession and also the obtaining of permission from the Urban
Land Ceiling Authorities and therefore, it cannot be said that all the
essential terms and conditions of a well-concluded contract had been
established in the case at hand.”
69.
Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that
the agreement dated 01.02.1995 is not stamped properly, hence, it
cannot be read into evidence. In support of his contention, he would
refer to the principles of law, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra,
(2009) 2 SCC 532.
70.
In the case of Avinash Kumar Chauhan (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the scope of Section 35 of the Stamp
Act, 1899, and in Para No.25 observed as follows:“25. Section 35 of the Act, however, rules out applicability of
such provision as it is categorically provided therein that a document
of this nature shall not be admitted for any purpose whatsoever. If all
purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence
are excluded, we fail to see any reason as to how the document
would be admissible for collateral purposes.”
71.
It
is
also
submitted
by
learned
counsel
or
the
respondents that on the one hand, the appellants have taken plea of
adverse possession in para no.9 of their written statements, and on
the other hand, they have sought protection of Section 53-A of the T.P.
Act by virtue of incorporating Para No.6-A in their written statements.
But, it is argued that both these pleas are self destructive. In support
of his contention, learned counsel for the respondents has placed
reliance on the principles of law, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Roop Singh (Dead) v. Ram Singh (Dead) (2000) 3
SCC 708.
72.
Court,
In the case of Roop Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
in
Para
No.9
of
the
judgment,
observed
that, “...It is also to be stated that the pleas of adverse possession
and retaining the possession by operation of Section 53-A of the
Transfer of Property Act are inconsistent with each other. Once it
is admitted by implication that the plaintiff came into possession
of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain
in possession till the date of the suit, the plea of adverse
possession would not be available to the defendant unless it has
been asserted and pointed out hostile animus of retaining
possession as an owner after getting in possession of the land.”
73.
Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted
that initially, the respondents were the owners of the shop. It is
admitted to the appellants. They claimed that in the Year 1993, it was
purchased by them for Rs. 3,95,000/-, and, subsequently, a case has
been developed by the appellants that on 01.02.1995, the respondent
no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap, and Smt. Rameshwari Devi executed an
agreement to sale along with possession in favour of Sanjay Kumar,
who happens to be the son of appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora
and the brother of appellant no.2, Ajay Kumar Arora. It is argued that
in order to take benefit of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act, it was
incumbent upon the appellants to plead that they came in possession
of the shop pursuant to the agreement. It is not pleaded. It is argued
that if the appellants were in possession of the shop prior to the
agreement dated 01.02.1995, they should have stated that after
execution of agreement to sale on 01.02.1995, their possession
changed. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed
reliance on the principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Nanjegowda and another v. Gangamma and
Others, (2011) 13 SCC 232, Mool Chand Bakhru and another v. Rohan
and Others, (2002) 2 SCC 612, and D.S. Parvathamma v. A.
Srinivasam, (2003) 4 SCC 705.
74.
In the case of Nanjegowda (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court discussed the scope of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act. In Para No.9
of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:“9. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is
evident that a party can take shelter behind this provision only when
the following conditions are fulfilled. They are:
(i) The contract should have been in writing signed by or on
behalf of the transferor;
(ii) The transferee should have got possession of the immovable
property covered by the contract;
(iii) The transferee should have done some act in furtherance of
the contract; and
(iv) The transferee has either performed his part of the contract
or is willing to perform his part of the contract.
A party can take advantage of this provision only when it satisfies all
the conditions aforesaid. All the postulates are sine qua non and a
party cannot derive benefit by fulfilling one or more conditions.”
75.
In the case of Mool Chand Bakhru (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court further discussed the scope of Section 53-A of the T.P.
Act, and in Para Nos. 11 and 12 observed as follows:“11. Section 53-A provides that where any person contracts
to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing
signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to
constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty
and the transferee has, in part-performance of the contract, taken
possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee,
being already in possession, continues in possession in partperformance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of
the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to
perform his part of the contract then he is entitled to protect his
possession in respect of the property of which he was put in
possession in part-performance of the agreement to sell.
12. This Court in Nathulal v. Phoolchand, (1969) 3 SCC 120
while interpreting Section 53-A culled out the following conditions to
be fulfilled for making out the defence of part-performance to an
action in ejectment by the owner, as under: (SCC p. 123, para 9)
“9. (1) that the transferor has contracted to transfer for
consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him
or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute
the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty;
(2) that the transferee has, in part-performance of the contract,
taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the
transferee, being already in possession continues in possession
in part-performance of the contract;
(3) that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the
contract; and
(4) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform
his part of the contract.”
After culling out the aforesaid conditions, it was held: (SCC p.
123, para 9)
“If these conditions are fulfilled then notwithstanding that the
contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered,
or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not
been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the
time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him
is debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect
of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in
possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the
contract.”
76.
In Para No.15 of the judgment in the case of Mool Chand
Bakhru (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that,
“ ...Written agreement has to precede the putting of the proposed
vendee in possession of the property...”
77.
In the case of D.S. Parvathamma (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, inter alia, observed that, “...When a person already
in possession of the property in some other capacity enters into a
contract to purchase the property, to confer the benefit of
protecting possession under the plea of part-performance, his act
effective from that day must be consistent with the contract
alleged and also such as cannot be referred to the preceding
title...”
78.
Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has also
argued that the trial court did not record any finding with regard to
Section 53-A of the T.P. Act.
79.
To it, learned counsel for the respondents replied that
there is finding with regard to Section 53-A of the T.P. Act. He submits
that if it has not been categorically recorded, this Court, being the first
appellate court, may correct any mistake that has been made.
80.
The appellants have filed an agreement to sale dated
01.02.1995 along with List 88C1. It is 89A1 on record. It is an
agreement to sale. Has it been proved?
81.
On behalf of the appellants, Ajay Kumar Arora has been
examined as DW1. In Para No.15 of his examination in chief, DW1,
Ajay Kumar Arora, has stated that the respondent no.1, Pal Singh
Kashyap, and his wife Smt. Rameshwari Devi, executed an agreement
to sale with possession on 01.02.1995 in favour of Sanjay Kumar, who
is the son of appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora and the brother of
appellant no.2, Ajay Kumar Arora, and, accordingly, possession was
given. He has identified signature of the respondent no.1, Pal Singh
Kashyap, on the agreement to sale.
82.
What is the basis of this identification? DW1, Ajay Kumar
Arora, has not stated that he has ever seen the respondent no.1, Pal
Singh Kashyap, writing and signing before him. The document was not
executed before DW1, Ajay Kumar Arora.
83.
In his cross examination, DW1, Ajay Kumar Arora, has
stated that the agreement to sale was not executed in his presence. It
was notarized by Advocate Ramesh Chand. He could not reveal the
name of the witnesses. In the first paragraph of his cross examination
dated 22.05.2023, he could not reveal much about the agreement. In
the second paragraph of his cross examination dated 22.05.2023,
DW1, Ajay Kumar Arora, has further stated that pursuant to the
agreement dated 01.02.1995, the sale deed was not executed in favour
of the appellant no.1, Subhash Chand Arora, and the appellant no.1,
Subhash Chand Arora, did not pursue any remedy in the competent
court for execution of the sale deed by the respondent no.1, Pal Singh
Kashyap and his wife Smt. Rameshwari Devi. In the same cross
examination, in paragraph no.3, DW1, Ajay Kumar Arora, says that, in
fact, they had received possession in the Year 1993.
84.
The person, in whose favour the agreement to sale was
executed, is reported to have died in the Year 2011. Who prepared this
agreement? Who were its witnesses? It has not been proved by the
appellants. In fact, this agreement to sale dated 01.02.1995 is not
proved. It cannot be read into evidence.
85.
It has been the case of the appellants that in the year
1993, the respondent no.1, Pal Singh Kashyap and his wife Smt.
Rameshwari Devi, had sold the shop to the appellant no.1, Subhash
Chand Arora, for Rs. 3,95,000/-, and possession was given. If it is so,
how, by virtue of agreement dated 01.02.1995, possession of the shop
was again given to Sanjay Kumar? It is change of possession. Sanjay
Kumar is a different person. Though, he is son of the appellant no.1,
Subhash Chand Arora and the brother of the appellant no.2, Ajay
Kumar Arora, but he had a distinct identity. It does not record that
pursuant to the agreement dated 01.02.1995, the appellants or any of
them did get possession, or/and it also does not record that the
appellants were already into the possession of the shop, and they
continued in the possession of the shop after execution of agreement
to sale dated 01.02.1995. Although, as stated, the agreement to sale
dated 01.02.1995 is not in favour of the appellants. It is in favour of
Sanjay Kumar, who is a distinct person.
86.
The appellants did not prove the agreement to sale.
Secondly, the agreement to sale was not in favour of the appellants or
any of them. It was in favour of one Sanjay Kumar, who is a distinct
person, though stated to be not alive now.
87.
In the impugned judgment, in Para Nos. 18, 19 and 20,
discussion has been made with regard to agreement to sale and
applicability of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act. In Para 19 of the
impugned judgment, it is recorded that the agreement to sale dated
01.02.1995 is unregistered. Discussion has been made with regard to
Section 53-A of the T.P. Act, and agreement dated 01.02.1995.
88.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court concludes
as follows:(i)
On 03.09.2022, when in the suit separate
issues on the agreement dated 01.02.1995, and
applicability of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act were
not framed, it did not prejudice any of the rights of
the appellants.
(ii)
The agreement to sale dated 01.02.1995 has
not been proved.
(iii)
Even for the sake of arguments, if agreement
dated 01.02.1995 is read into evidence, it is not in
favour of the appellants or any of them. It is in
favour of one Sanjay Kumar, who was a distinct
person in his own capacity.
(iv)
The agreement to sale dated 01.02.1995 does
not record that the appellants were already in the
possession of the shop and pursuant to the
agreement to sale dated 01.02.1995, they further
continued the possession of the shop. This is
important because as per the agreement to sale
dated 01.02.1995, the possession was given to
Sanjay Kumar, and not to the appellants or any of
them.
(v)
The appellants could not even establish that
they were even ready and willing to perform their
part of the agreement dated 01.02.1995. In fact,
the appellants are not party to the agreement dated
01.02.1995.
(vi)
The trial court has discussed the agreement
to sale.
89.
Therefore, on the basis of analysis made above, this
Court is of the view that the appellants are not entitled to get the
benefit of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act.
90.
Accordingly, the Point for determination no.2 is decided.
91.
The court below has framed distinct issues; after having
discussed the oral evidence as well as documents filed by the plaintiff,
finding on each issue has been made.
92.
This Court has already concluded that the suit filed by
the respondents was not barred by the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of
CPC and that the appellants are not entitled to get the benefit of
Section 53-A of the T.P. Act, therefore, this Court is of the considered
view that the trial court has not committed any error in decreeing the
suit filed by the respondents. The judgment and decree passed by the
trial court does not require any interference. Accordingly, the first
appeal deserves to be dismissed being devoid of merit.
93.
The first appeal is dismissed.
94.
The judgment and decree dated 30.07.2024, passed by
the court below in Original Suit No.178 of 2015, Pal Singh Kashyap
and others v. Subhash Chand Arora and another, is affirmed.
(Ravindra Maithani, J)
Ravi Bisht
20.08.2026
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