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2025:MLHC:480
Serial No.01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP (C) No.370/2024
Date of Decision: 09.06.2025
….. Petitioner
Sterlite Interlinks Limited
Vs.
1. The State of Meghalaya represented by its Principal Secretary, Energy
Government of Meghalaya, Shillong-793001.
2. Meghalaya Power Transmission Corporation Limited, through its
Chief Engineer (Transmission) having office at Lumjingshai, Short
Round Road, Shillong-793001.
3. Meghalaya Power Transmission Corporation Limited, through its
Director (Transmission) having office at Lumjingshai, Short Round
Road, Shillong-793001.
….. Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S. Thangkhiew, Chief Justice (Acting)
Appearance:
For the Petitioner :
For the Respondents:
Mr. R. Jain, Sr. Adv with
Mr. S.K. Hassan, Adv
Ms. M. Rahman, Adv
Mr. A. Kumar, AG with
Mr. A. Kharwanlang, Addl.Sr.GA
Ms. S. Laloo, GA
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner a public limited
company is assailing the letter dated 03.04.2024 issued by the
respondent No.3 whereby, a Letter of Award dated 29.11.2023 issued in
favor of the petitioner had been cancelled. The cancellation had been
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impugned as being wholly arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
2.
The brief facts are that the petitioner was the highest bidder for
selecting the exclusive operating partner for the Optical Ground Wire
(OPGW) Passive Fibre Infrastructure of MePTCL pursuant to a tender
dated 25.09.2023 and a Letter of Award (LOA) dated 29.11.2023, was
issued in favour of the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that once
the LOA had been issued in his favour, the same constituted a formation
of a contract and the parties therefore, are understood to have entered
into a binding contract as per the terms contained therein. The
cancellation of the LOA is thus being assailed on the ground that it is
arbitrary, irrational and illegal.
3.
Mr. R. Jain, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S.K. Hassan,
learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that clause 5.1.
of the LOA itself, has amounted to a formation of contract by the
parties, inasmuch as, the clause has specifically provided that
notwithstanding anything stated in the bidding documents, the LOA
would constitute the formation of the contract. The learned senior
counsel submits that it is well settled law, that a tender is an invitation to
offer, the bid is an offer and a Letter of Intent is an acceptance, and
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these factors being satisfied it was not open to the respondent No.3 to
cancel the said LOA. He further submits that as per clause 5.2 of the
LOA, the parties were required to enter into a formal contract agreement
within 15 days of issuance of the LOA, and an Infrastructure Asset
Management Agreement (IAMA) as per the proforma given in the
schedule to the tender was required to be executed between the parties.
4.
At that stage, he submits though some issues with regard to the
amendment to the draft of the IAMA, which was to do with the
maintenance of all optical fibre assets of the Corporation had arisen the
same, was agreed to by the petitioner by way of a letter dated
11.12.2023, along with a request to close the agreement and to proceed
with the execution of the IAMA.
5.
Learned senior counsel submits that even though the petitioner
had completed all formalities under the bidding documents and the
LOA, the respondent No.3 failed to execute the IAMA for a long time
and inspite of further oral request, there was no response from the
respondent No.3. It is submitted that though meetings were held with the
Chairman of the respondent No.3 on revenue/billing sharing process,
however, the signing of the IAMA was not done, and instead the
impugned communication was received whereby, the unilateral decision
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of the respondent No.3, for cancellation of the LOA was intimated to the
petitioner. Learned senior counsel has reiterated the submission that
clause 5.1 of the LOA creates a binding contract on the acceptance of
the petitioner’s bid by the respondent No.3. The cancellation it has been
urged, is in violation of the tender terms as given in clause 3.25.1 which
make it incumbent upon the respondent No.3, to award a contract to the
successful bidder and also clause 3.28 which designates the LOA as a
contract document, making its unilateral cancellation impermissible.
6.
It has also been contended that the action of the respondent No.3
is a clear breach of its contractual obligations and the failure to execute
the IAMA without justification, and by disregarding the binding terms
and conditions, has resulted in the violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution by a public authority such as the respondent No.3. In
support of his arguments, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on
the following judgments:
(i) Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour v. The Chief Executive
Officer & ors in Civil Appeal No.6741 of 2024
(ii) Mihan India Ltd. v. GMR Airports Ltd & ors in Civil Appeal
No.3699 of 2022
7.
In reply, the learned Advocate General has submitted that the writ
petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed at the threshold
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itself, inasmuch as, the petitioner by seeking to invoke Article 226 of the
Constitution, is asking for a specific performance of the LOA
conditions, when it is a settled law that this Court would not issue a writ
for specific performance. It is then submitted that there exists no
contractual obligation between the parties and there is no violation of
any legal or fundamental rights of the petitioner, as the tender process is
terminable, apart from the fact that the petitioner has raised grounds
which are factual and that such disputed facts cannot be decided in a
writ petition. Learned Advocate General has also submitted that the
tender documents contain an arbitration clause and disputes between the
parties can thus be settled by arbitration. On the grounds raised by the
petitioner, learned Advocate General has taken this Court to the clauses
contained in the LOA and submits that certain pre-conditions were to be
fulfilled before any contractual obligation arises between the parties. In
this context, reference was made to clause 3.25.4 which provides for the
condition for signing of the IAMA, clause 3.2.10 which provides that
the IAMA would be signed and executed between the respondent No.3
and the successful bidder and clause 3.4.2, which provides that the
detailed terms specified in the IAMA shall have an overriding effect.
Other clauses mentioned by the learned Advocate General are clauses
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3.26.2 and 3.26.4 which provide for the submission of performance
guarantee within the time limit of 15 days after the issuance of the LOA.
The project therefore, he submitted, could not proceed without the
signing of the IAMA and the contract between the parties can only arise
from the signing of the IAMA, as this document has spelt out the entire
set of obligations between the parties. He also submits that the fact is
that as no IAMA had been executed between the parties, no contractual
obligation therefore exists.
8.
It is then contended by learned Advocate General that the letter of
award, is a notice of acceptance of the bid of the petitioner and that
clause 3.2.14, provides that the Letter of Award shall mean the official
notice issued by the authority notifying the bidder that their bid has been
accepted and further clause 3.25.2, also gives the respondent No.3 the
right to accept or reject any bid or to annul the bidding process at any
time prior to the award of the contract. It has also been submitted that
unless the essential conditions provided in the contract are fulfilled,
there is no clear unambiguous acceptance of conditions.
9.
The cancelling or the decision to cancel the letter of award it is
submitted, was taken by the Board of Directors of the respondent No.3
after considering the financial viability of the project, where it was
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found that considering the capital expenditure and the break-even period
for recovering such investment, the project would not be financially
viable. It is then submitted that the decision was taken after a complete
financial perspective of the project have been concluded which shows
that monetization of OPGW of respondent No.3 was less favourable and
there being no consensus between the parties on the material aspect of
the contract, no contractual obligation can be said to have taken effect.
10.
Learned Advocate General has also contended that all the alleged
grievances raised in the writ petition are purely contractual in nature
which makes the writ petition not maintainable. He concludes his
arguments by submitting that the Court cannot create or make a contract
but can only interpret a contract between the existing parties and that the
prayers of the writ petitioner if granted, would amount to a formation of
contract when in fact the LOA contemplates execution of a further
agreement. In support of his arguments, learned Advocate General has
relied upon the following judgments:
(i) State of Gujarat vs. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust
(1994) 3 SCC 552
(ii) Kerala SEB vs. Kurian E. Kalathil (2000)6 SCC 293
(iii) M/s RKI India Limited vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors.
passed in WP(C)No. 116 of 2024 decided on 20.08.2024.
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11.
In rejoinder reply to the arguments advanced by the learned
Advocate General, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits
that the writ is not seeking specific performance and even if alternative
remedy is available, constitutional courts can exercise the jurisdiction
when the action of the respondents is arbitrary, unfair and contrary to
the principles of natural justice. It is also submitted that though the
IAMA is an integral part of the contract document however, under the
terms of the bid document at clause 3.28, it has been stated that the term
contract documents shall also include the IAMA. It is also contended
that nowhere in the scheme or tender documents, the Board of the
respondent No.3 is empowered for cancelling the awarded contract or
there are any powers have been vested for the examination of the
evaluation criteria.
12.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
13.
Shorn of all other details, the core issue in the instant writ petition
is with the justifiability and legality of the cancellation of the LOA for
selecting the exclusive operating partner of the OPGW Passive Fibre
Infrastructure of the respondent No.3. As per the facts recorded above, it
is undisputed that the writ petitioner had emerged as the highest bidder
and had been issued the LOA dated 29.11.2023, wherein certain
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conditions had been given which required fulfillment for the work to
commence. Though the bid of the writ petitioner was accepted and it
was given therein at paragraph 5.1 of the LOA itself, that the LOA will
constitute a formation of the contract, what transpired thereafter, has
been assailed by the petitioner on the ground that there was no scope for
the respondent No.3 to retract or to annul the process once the bid has
been accepted and the LOA had been issued. However, to the mind of
this Court before embarking upon examining the details of the dispute
that led to the cancellation of the tender process, what needs to be
examined first, is the nature of dispute, and whether it calls for the
interference by this Court in exercise of extraordinary powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
14.
It is first to be noted that the dispute has emanated from a
commercial transaction that though the petitioner contends is a binding
contract, the respondent No.3 on the other hand, refutes the same by
maintaining that the contract agreement was yet to be executed fully and
as such, it was open to the respondent No.3 to annul the same. At this
stage, it would therefore be expedient to refer to the general conditions
of contract contained in the tender dated 25.09.2023, wherein at clauses
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3.25.1, 3.25.2, 3.25.3, 3.25.4, 3.26.2, 3.26.4 and 3.26.5, it has been
provided as follows:
“3.25.1. Award Criteria
The MePTCL will award the Contract to the Successful Bidder,
whose bid has been determined to be responsive and has been
determined as the highest evaluated bid, complying with the
criteria as set out under this RFP/Tender. The MePTCL’s
evaluation of Bidders and decision to award shall be the final. The
MePTCL shall be the sole judge in this regard. In case the
required price to award the contract is not viable, then MePTCL
may explore auction methods for rationalization of floor price.
3.25.2 MePTCL’s right to accept any bid and to reject any or
all bids
(a) The MePTCL reserves the right to accept or reject any bid,
and to annul the bidding process and reject all bids at any time
prior to award of contract, without thereby incurring any liability
to the affected Bidder or Bidders or any obligation to inform the
affected Bidder or Bidders of the grounds for the MePTCL’s
action.
3.25.3 Notification of award
(a) Prior to the expiration of the period of bid validity and
extended validity period, if any, the MePTCL will notify the
Successful Bidder in writing by registered letter or cable or telex
or FAX, to be confirmed in writing by registered letter, that its bid
has been accepted.
(b) The notification of award will constitute the formation of the
Contract.
(c) Upon the Successful Bidder’s furnishing of performance
guarantee pursuant to relevant Clause the MePTCL will promptly
notify each unsuccessful Bidder and will discharge its bid security
pursuant to Clause 3.13.
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3.25.4 Signing of contract and other documents pursuant
thereto
(a) At the same time as the MePTCL notifies the Successful
Bidder that its bid has been accepted, the MePTCL will send the
Successful Bidder the detail of Award, incorporating all
agreement between the parties.
(b) Within 15 (Fifteen) days of receipt of the details of Award, the
Successful Bidder shall sign the same with date and return it to
the MePTCL along with a clear acceptance letter.
(c) The Successful Bidder will prepare the Infrastructure Asset
Management Agreement as per prescribed proforma and the same
will be signed within fifteen (15) days of notification of Award, or
within such period as extended beyond fifteen (15) days as agreed
amongst the Parties but nor more than thirty (30) days after the
notification of award. Failure to do so may be construed as the
Successful Bidder’s default.
3.26.2. The Performance Guarantee will be given by the
Successful Bidder at the time of signing of the IAMA and the
same shall be kept valid until the termination or expiry of the
IAMA.
3.26.4 The Successful Bidder shall have to submit the
Performance Guarantee within 15 days from the date of issuance
of Letter of Award (LoA). Extension of time for submission of
beyond 15 days and up to 60 days from the date of issue of LoA
may be given by MePTCL, who is competent to sign the contract
agreement. However, a penal interest of 15% per annum shall be
charged for the delay beyond 30 days, i.e. from 31 st day after the
date of issue of LoA. In case the Bidder fails to submit the
requisite Performance Guarantee even after 60 days from the date
of issue of LoA, the contract shall be terminated duly forfeiting
EMD and other dues, if any, payable against the contract. The
failed Bidder shall be debarred from participating in re-tender for
that work.
3.26.5 The Performance Guarantee shall be submitted by the
successful Bidder after the LoA has been issued, but before
signing of the contract agreement. The IAMA agreement should
be signed within 15 days after the issue of LoA and the
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Performance Security shall also be submitted within this time
limit. This Performance Guarantee shall be initially valid up to the
stipulated tenure of the IAMA date plus 60 days beyond that. In
case, the time limit for handing over of assets gets extended, the
contractor shall get the validity of Performance Guarantee
extended to cover such extended time for handing over of assets
plus 60 days.”
15.
A perusal of the above noted clauses clearly shows the steps
necessary that have to be performed or fulfilled, for the execution of
contract agreement and it is relevant to note that the same involves
different stages with the final stage being the submission of performance
guarantee by the successful bidder after the LOA had been issued but
before signing of the contract agreement, and that further the IAMA
agreement should be signed within 15 days after issuance of the LOA.
16.
Coming to the Letter of Award dated 29.11.2023, it is also
important to note the conditions contained therein at clause 5.0 with
regard to the contract agreement. For the sake of convenience, the same
is reproduced hereinbelow:
“5.0 Contract agreement:
5.1 Notwithstanding anything stated anywhere in the bidding
document, this LOA will constitute the formation of the Contract.
5.2 You shall enter into a formal contract agreement with
MePTCL within 15 (fifteen) days of issuance of this Letter of
Award of contract. The Infrastructure Asset Management
Agreement (IAMA) shall be prepared by you in two copies and
completed at your cost as per the proforma given in Schedule 04
of the bidding documents.”
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17.
From what has been noted above, as the Letter of Award had been
issued to the petitioner, the logical progression of the matter would have
been the execution of the IAMA as per the terms contained in the LOA,
which would constitute the finalization of a formal contract agreement
between the parties. However, the same having not crystalized, this
Court has to take into account the fact that the dispute has arisen from a
commercial engagement, wherein, disputed facts have been raised. The
availability of alternative remedy as given in the General Conditions of
Contract (GCC) at clause 3.18.1 by way of arbitration cannot be simply
overlooked. Further, though not admitted by the petitioner, it is apparent
from the pleadings itself, that enforcement of a contract or specific
performance, is being sought for in a writ proceeding. The only aspect to
the mind of this Court to warrant any interference therefore, would be if
the action of the respondent was without jurisdiction, against all set
norms, arbitrary on the face of the record, absurd or has resulted in the
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution or other fundamental rights of
the petitioner.
18.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a series of judgments had laid
down principles for the purposes of judicial review of contractual
disputes and distinction that was to be drawn in appreciating such
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matters, founded on the touchstone of arbitrariness or unreasonableness.
It has also been held that there is no absolute bar to the maintainability
of writ petitions even in contractual matters, but the courts were to
examine the issue as to whether it has some public law character
attached to it. In this context, it is not necessary to underline the fact that
the State is bound to act fairly and reasonably even in matters of
entering into a contract, as has held in the case of Subodh Kumar Singh
Rathour v. The Chief Executive Officer & ors in Civil Appeal No.6741
of 2024 while relying the decision in M.P. Power Management Co.
Ltd., Jabalpur v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India Pvt. Ltd & ors
reported in (2023) 2 SCC 703 with regard to exercise of writ jurisdiction
at a stage prior to the award of contract. It has been held that action
under writ court will lie even at the stage prior to the award of the
contract, when such award is imbued with procedural impropriety,
arbitrariness, favouritism or without any application of mind. For the
purpose of this discussion, it would be expedient to quote paragraphs
55(v) and 56 in Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour’s case (supra) wherein,
the instances and relevant considerations for exercise of writ jurisdiction
are given:
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“55(v) Other relevant considerations for Exercise of Writ
Jurisdiction:- Lastly, this Court held that the courts may
entertain a contractual dispute under its writ jurisdiction where (I)
there is any violation of natural justice or (II) where doing so
would serve the public interest or (III) where though the facts are
convoluted or disputed, but the courts have already undertaken an
in-depth scrutiny of the same provided that it was pursuant to a
sound exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The relevant observations
read as under:“xiii. A lodestar, which may illumine the path of the Court,
would be the dimension of public interest subserved by the
Court interfering in the matter, rather than relegating the
matter to the alternate Forum.
xiv. Another relevant criteria is, if the Court has
entertained the matter, then, while it is not tabooed that the
Court should not relegate the party at a later stage,
ordinarily, it would be a germane consideration, which
may persuade the Court to complete what it had started
provided it is otherwise a sound exercise of jurisdiction to
decide the matter on merits in the Writ Petition itself.
xv. Violation of natural justice has been recognized as a
ground signifying the presence of a public law element and
can found a cause of action premised on breach of Article
14. [See Sudhir Kumar Singh and Others (supra)].
56. What can be discerned from the above is that there has been a
considerable shift in the scope of judicial review of the court
when it comes to contractual disputes where one of the parties is
the State or its instrumentalities. In view of the law laid down by
this Court in ABL (supra), Joshi Technologies (supra) and in
M.P. Power (supra), it is difficult to accept the contention of the
respondent that the writ petition filed by the appellant before the
High Court was not maintainable and the relief prayed for was
rightly declined by the High Court in exercise of its Writ
jurisdiction. Where State action is challenged on the ground of
being arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the State would be under
an obligation to comply with the basic requirements of Article 14
of the Constitution and not act in an arbitrary, unfair and
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unreasonable manner. This is the constitutional limit or their
authority. There is a jural postulate of good faith in business
relations and undertakings which is given effect to by preventing
arbitrary exercise of powers by the public functionaries in
contractual matters with private individuals. With the rise of the
Social Service State more and more public-private partnerships
continue to emerge, which makes it all the more imperative for
the courts to protect the sanctity of such relations.”
19.
In another judgment that has been pressed into service by the
petitioner namely, Mihan India Ltd. v. GMR Airports Ltd & ors in
Civil Appeal No.3699 of 2022, in paragraphs 42, 43 and 46 it has been
held as follows:
“42. Now, as per the material available and discussed
hereinabove, it is clear that the appellants were aware of the
procedure which is being adopted. After completion of the
bidding process, GAL was declared as a selected bidder on
offering highest revenue share and on issuance of LoA, it has
been declared as a concessionaire and at the stage of execution of
Concession Agreement, all these formalities are not relevant and
it amounts to arbitrary exercise of the power by the authorities
which is not permissible under law. The said approach is fortified
with the view taken in the judgment of this Court in Union of
India and others v. Dinesh Engineering Corpn. and another
(2001) 8 SCC 491, wherein while dealing with the rejection of bid
of the respondent therein by Railways in a tender floated for
procurement of certain items of spare parts for use in GE
governors, this Court has held that power to reject bids cannot be
exercised arbitrarily merely because Railways has the power to do
so. Any arbitrary exercise of power to reject bids has been held
violative of Article 14. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the aforesaid
judgment are relevant and reproduced thus:
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“15. Coming to the second question involved in these
appeals, namely, the rejection of the tender of the writ
petitioner, it was argued on behalf of the appellants that the
Railways under clause 16 of the Guidelines was entitled to
reject any tender offer without assigning any reasons and it
also has the power to accept or not to accept the lowest
offer. We do not dispute this power provided the same is
exercised within the realm of the object for which this
clause is incorporated. This does not give an arbitrary
power to the Railways to reject the bid offered by a party
merely because it has that power. This is a power which
can be exercised on the existence of certain conditions
which in the opinion of the Railways are not in the interest
of the Railways to accept the offer. No such ground has
been taken when the writ petitioner's tender was rejected.
Therefore, we agree with the High Court that it is not open
to the Railways to rely upon this clause in the Guidelines to
reject any or every offer that may be made by the writ
petitioner while responding to a tender that may be called
for supply of spare parts by the Railways. Mr. Iyer, learned
senior counsel appearing for the EDC, drew our attention to
a judgment of this Court in Sterling Computers Ltd. etc. v.
M/s. M & N Publications Ltd. (1993 1 SCC 445) which has
held: (SCC p. 455, para 12)
“Under some special circumstances a discretion has
to be conceded to the authorities who have to enter
into contract giving them liberty to assess the overall
situation for purpose of taking a decision as to whom
the contract be awarded and at what terms. If the
decisions have been taken in bona fide manner
although not strictly following the norms laid down
by the courts, such decisions are upheld on the
principle laid down by Justice Holmes, that courts
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while judging the constitutional validity of executive
decisions must grant certain measure of freedom of
“play in the joints” to the executive.”
16. But then as has been held by this Court in the very same
judgment that a public authority even in contractual matters
should not have unfettered discretion and in contracts
having commercial element even though some extra
discretion is to be conceded in such authorities, they are
bound to follow the norms recognised by courts while
dealing with public property. This requirement is necessary
to avoid unreasonable and arbitrary decisions being taken
by public authorities whose actions are amenable to judicial
review. Therefore, merely because the authority has certain
elbow room available for use of discretion in accepting
offer in contracts, the same will have to be done within the
four corners of the requirements of law especially Article
14 of the Constitution. In the instant case, we have noticed
that apart from rejecting the offer of the writ petitioner
arbitrarily, the writ petitioner has now been virtually
debarred from competing with the EDC in the supply of
spare parts to be used in the governors by the Railways,
ever since the year 1992, and during all this while we are
told the Railways are making purchases without any tender
on a proprietary basis only from the EDC which, in our
opinion, is in flagrant violation of the constitutional
mandate of Article 14. We are also of the opinion that the
so-called policy of the Board creating monopoly of EDC
suffers from the vice of non- application of mind, hence, it
has to be quashed as has been done by the High Court.”
43. Bare perusal of the above stated case-law in light of the facts
of the instant case makes it clear that merely having the power of
rejection of bids does not entitle authorities to exercise the said
power arbitrarily. While discussing the applicability of Clauses
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2.16.1, 3.3.1 and 3.3.5, it is made clear that in pre-bid procedure
prior to acceptance, the bidding process may be annulled
otherwise after issuance of LoA, the annulment cannot be done.
The authorities further acted arbitrarily relying upon the GoM’s
letter dated 16.03.2020 in reference to PMIC's meeting dated
14.10.2019 in which re-tendering was directed. Re-tendering was
not possible without ignoring the bid already accepted. Therefore,
the order of annulment has been directed applying Clause 2.16.1
arbitrarily.
46. In view of the above, it is apparent that in government
contracts, if granted by the government bodies, it is expected to
uphold fairness, equality and rule of law while dealing with
contractual matters. Right to equality under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India abhors arbitrariness. The transparent bidding
process is favoured by the Court to ensure that constitutional
requirements are satisfied. It is said that the constitutional
guarantee as provided under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India demands the State to act in a fair and reasonable manner
unless public interest demands otherwise. It is expedient that the
degree of compromise of any private legitimate interest must
correspond proportionately to the public interest. It is specified
that using a ground of public interest or loss to the treasury cannot
undo the work already undertaken by the authority.”
20.
The facts of the quoted case though not entirely similar has again
emphasised the requirements or obligations that have to be kept in mind
in such matters of contracts granted by government bodies.
21.
In the backdrop of the decisions aforementioned and principles as
enunciated reverting back to the facts and circumstances of the instant
case. firstly, it is to be noted that though the LOA at clause 5.1 provided
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that the same would constitute the formation of the contract, the same,
however, was contingent upon the fulfillment of other conditions such
as the execution of the IAMA within 15 days of the issuance of the
LOA. In the considered view of the Court, this action of annulment of
the contract, would have to be examined keeping in mind the attendant
circumstances that warranted this action from the part of the respondent
No.3 which however, rested on disputed facts. The issuance of a writ of
mandamus, therefore, to direct issuance of the work order would amount
to granting the prayer for specific performance of the contract by the
petitioner even in the face of the availability of alternative remedy.
22.
Another aspect that is to be noted is that though undeniably the
petitioner was the highest bidder and the cancellation of the contract
being attributed to a decision of the Board of respondent No.3 due to
unviability of financial consideration, it is not a case that there has been
any initiation for re-tendering of the work but in fact it amounts to an
abandonment of the tender process. Further, though the impugned
cancellation has been challenged on the ground of arbitrariness, it must
be kept in mind that a contract is a commercial transaction and award of
contracts are commercial functions, and as held in the case of Jagdish
Mandal v. State of Orissa reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517, at para 22
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thereof which is reproduced hereinbelow, principles of equity and
natural justice stay at a distance.
“22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to
prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and
malafides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is
made ‘lawfully’ and not to check whether choice or decision is
‘sound’. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters
relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features
should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction.
Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially
commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice
stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is
bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of
power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural
aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is
made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to
be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public
interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or
contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil
court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary
grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make
mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural
violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to
interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be
resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up
public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands
and millions and may increase the project cost manifold.
Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual
matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to
itself the following questions:
i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority
is mala fide or intended to favour someone;
OR
Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and
irrational that the court can say: ‘the decision is such that no
responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with
relevant law could have reached;’
2025:MLHC:480
ii) Whether public interest is affected.
If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference
under Article 226. Cases involving black-listing or imposition of
penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of
state largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences,
dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they
may require a higher degree of fairness in action.”
23.
Further, in the case of State of Gujarat v. Meghji Pethraj Shah
Charitable Trust (supra), cited by the respondents at Para 22, it has been
held as follows.
“22. We are unable to see any substance in the argument that the
termination of arrangement without observing the principle of
natural justice (audi alteram partem) is void. The termination is
not a quasi-judicial act by any stretch of imagination; hence it
was not necessary to observe the principles of natural justice. It
is not also an executive or administrative act to attract the duty to
act fairly. It was – as has been repeatedly urged by Shri
Ramaswamy – a matter governed by a contract/agreement
between the parties. If the matter is governed by a contract, the
writ petition is not maintainable since it is a public law remedy
and is not available in private law field, e.g. where the matter is
governed by a non-statutory contract.”
In the considered view of this Court, it cannot be held to be an
action which is arbitrary or unreasonable or otherwise patently illegal to
call for interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
24.
In conclusion, taking into account the entire facts and
circumstances, the instant writ petition is held to be not maintainable on
the grounds as placed and the petitioner, is therefore, at liberty to initiate
2025:MLHC:480
appropriate proceedings and seek alternate remedies as available in the
agreement through arbitration, or before the civil courts for damages or
losses, if any, has been suffered by it.
25.
The writ petition accordingly stands closed and disposed of.
Chief Justice (Acting)
Meghalaya
09.06.2025
“D. Thabah-P.S.”
THABAH
Date: 2025.06.09 04:01:14 IST
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