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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 17th August, 2026
Pronounced on: 17th September, 2026
Uploaded on: 17th September, 2026
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CNR No. DLHC011094262025
FAO(OS) (COMM) 17/2026 & CM APPL. 6374/2026
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LIMITED
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Ajay Sabharwal, Mr. Sidhartha
Sharma, Ms. Priyanka Tibrewal, Mr.
Rishav Dutt, Mr. Aman Katrina, Mr
Anirudh Pandit and Ms Neelakshi
Singhal, Advocates (M) 9643017972
versus
BRITISH MARINE PLC
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Ramesh Singh, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Sumit K. Batra, Mr. Anupam Dighe,
Mr. Manish Khurana & Ms. Chandini
Tanna, Advs. (M) 9911100900.
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGEMENT
Prathiba M. Singh, J.
1.
The present appeal has been filed by the Appellant under Section 37 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Section 10 of the Delhi
High Court Act, 1966 read with Section 13 of Commercial Courts Act, 2015,
inter alia, assailing the judgment dated 13th October, 2025 passed by a ld.
Single Judge of this Court in O.M.P. (COMM) 20/2023 titled ‘Steel Authority
of India Limited v. British Marine PLC’ and OMP (ENF.) (COMM.)
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50/2023 titled ‘British Marine PLC v. Steel Authority of India’.
2.
Vide the impugned judgment, the petition filed by the Appellant under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, ‘the
Act’) was dismissed and the Arbitral Award dated 13th September, 2018 was
upheld.
Brief background
3.
The Appellant-Steel Authority of India (hereinafter ‘SAIL’), a Public
Sector Undertaking, is India’s largest steel producer and regularly imports
coking coal from various locations for the purpose of manufacturing steel.
4.
The Respondent-British Marine PLC is an International Ocean Freight
Transportation Company based out of the United Kingdom. It operates and
manages various types of chartered-in vessels of Supramax, Handymax (HMAX) and Panamax (P-MAX).
5.
The Ministry of Shipping, Government of India has a division called
‘Transchart’ which operates a centralized framework for arranging of ships
for transportation of coking coal. Transchart floated an enquiry on 27th
November, 2007 for shipping of coking coal for a period of three years for a
total quantity of 45 lakhs MTs by 30th September, 2012 or for a period of five
years for a total quantity of 50 lakhs MTs by 30th September, 2012 subject to
certain conditions. The said shipments were to be sent from Australia/New
Zealand to various ports in India including Vishakhapatnam.
6.
The Respondent had expressed its interest to the enquiry floated by
Transchart which led to the execution of a Contract of Affreightment
(hereinafter, ‘CoA’) dated 5th December, 2007. The broad agreement under
the CoA was for shipment of 3 million MTs (+ or - 5%) for a period of five
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FAO(OS) (COMM) 17/2026
years through Handymax Vessels. The detailed terms of the contract were set
out in the CoA. The period for shipment was from June, 2008 to December,
2012. The manner in which the STEM1 (booking/order) was to be declared
and tonnage was to be nominated was agreed upon in the CoA.
7.
The CoA also contains an Arbitration clause which reads as under:
“60.
Arbitration Clause: All disputes arising under
this Charter Party shall be settled in India in
accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, (No.26 of 1996) or any further
amendments thereof, and under the Maritime
Arbitration Rules of the Indian Council of Arbitration.
The Arbitrators to be appointed from out of the Maritime
Panel of Arbitrators of the Indian Council of
Arbitration. The Arbitrators shall be commercial men.”
8.
The CoA also contained a default clause which reads as under:
“62. DEFAULT
Should Suppliers/Charterers fail to provide materials
for shipment or to ship the materials by the time or times
agreed upon or should Suppliers/Charterers in any
manner or otherwise fail to perform the contract or
should a receiver be appointed on its assets or make or
enter into any arrangements or composition with
creditors or suspend payments (or being a company
should enter into liquidation either compulsory or
Voluntary), the Suppliers/Charterers shall be entitled to
declare the contract as at an end without any liabilities
on either side.”
9.
Various STEMS were issued by SAIL in the year 2008 and more than
8 lakhs MTs of shipment was made by the Respondent from different ports in
STEM is an acronym of Subject to Enough Merchandise which is in the nature of a booking or
an agreement to load cargo which is conditional upon the actual availability of goods at the port on
the loading date.
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Australia to India. Sometime in November, 2008, SAIL informed the
Respondent that it would not be in a position to declare any more STEMS in
view of the global economic situation and unpredictable market conditions.
At that stage, the Respondent informed the Appellant that it would take steps
to mitigate its losses for such shipments.
10.
On 10th March, 2010, intimation was given by SAIL to Transchart to
inform the Respondent that it would not be able to meet its commitments
under the CoA and was invoking the Default Clause i.e., Clause 62 to
terminate the contract without liability on either side. Thereafter negotiations
were undertaken and an Addendum-2 was signed on 20th April, 2011. Certain
further quantities were agreed for shipment between the parties in May, 2011.
However, thereafter no other STEMS were issued.
11.
Subsequently, further correspondence had taken place between the
parties and the Appellant had argued that there was novation of the agreement.
An extension of three years was negotiated and demanded by the Appellant
but the same did not fructify. Finally, on 25th October, 2011, the Appellant
alleged that there was a breach of CoA by the Respondent and a termination
letter was issued on 12th September, 2012.
12.
Disputes arose between the parties which led to the constitution of a
three-member Arbitral Tribunal as under:
13.
1.
Captain S.M. Berry as Presiding Arbitrator.
2.
Mr. Niranjan Chakraborty – Respondent’s Nominee;
3.
Mr. Ashok Sharma – Appellant’s Nominee;
Claims and counter-claims were filed by the parties and issues were
framed by the Arbitral Tribunal on 10th October, 2014. At that stage, the
Appellant objected to the appointment of Captain S.M. Berry and Mr.
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Niranjan Chakraborty on the premise that the said two Arbitrators had served
on another Arbitral Tribunal which had interpreted identical clauses in a
similar dispute between the Appellant-SAIL and M/s SeaSpray Shipping
Company Ltd. This application was rejected on 3rd March, 2015 by the
Maritime Arbitration Committee of Indian Council of Arbitration
(hereinafter, ‘ICA’). The same was then challenged before a ld. Single Judge
of this Court in O.M.P.(T)(COMM) 48/2016 titled ‘Steel Authority of India
v. British Marine PLC’. The ld. Single Judge vide order dated 20th October,
2016 observed as under:
“38. The scheme of the Act and, in particular, Section 5
thereof does not permit interference by the Court in
arbitral proceedings at intermediate stages unless
expressly permitted per se by other provisions of the Act.
The Court is not persuaded to hold that the Petitioner
has been able to make out a case on the alternative
ground viz., that by declining to make a disclosure in
terms of Fifth Schedule of the Act, the arbitrators have
rendered themselves “unable to perform their
functions” in terms of Section 14 (1) (a) of the Act. In
any event, as held in Progressive Career Academy Pvt.
Ltd. v. FIITJEE Limited (supra), once a party has
adopted the challenge procedure under Section 13 of
the Act, it cannot seek to invoke Section 14 of the Act
but will have to wait for the pronouncement of the
Award.”
14.
This order dated 20th October, 2016 was challenged before the
Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.11384/2016 titled ‘Steel Authority of
India v. British Marine PLC’. The Supreme Court disposed of the said
appeal vide order dated 14th September, 2022 in the following terms:
“During the course of hearing, our attention has been
drawn to the judgment of this court in 'HRD
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Corporation (Marcus Oil and Chemical Division)
Versus GAIL (India) Limited' [(2018) 12 SCC 471],
wherein, it has been observed:"12. After the 2016 Amendment Act, a dichotomy is
made by the Act between persons who become
“ineligible” to be appointed as arbitrators, and
persons about whom justifiable doubts exist as to
their independence or impartiality. Since
ineligibility goes to the root of the appointment,
Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule
makes it clear that if the arbitrator falls in any one
of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule,
he becomes “ineligible” to act as arbitrator. Once
he becomes ineligible, it is clear that, under
Section 14(1)(a), he then becomes de jure unable
to perform his functions inasmuch as, in law, he is
regarded as “ineligible”. In order to determine
whether an arbitrator is de jure unable to perform
his functions, it is not necessary to go to the
Arbitral Tribunal under Section 13. Since such a
person would lack inherent jurisdiction to proceed
any further, an application may be filed under
Section 14(2) to the Court to decide on the
termination of his/her mandate on this ground. As
opposed to this, in a challenge where grounds
stated in the Fifth Schedule are disclosed, which
give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's
independence or impartiality, such doubts as to
independence or impartiality have to be
determined as a matter of fact in the facts of the
particular challenge by the Arbitral Tribunal
under Section 13. If a challenge is not successful,
and the Arbitral Tribunal decides that there are no
justifiable doubts as to the independence or
impartiality of the arbitrator/arbitrators, the
Tribunal must then continue the arbitral
proceedings under Section 13(4) and make an
award. It is only after such award is made, that the
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party challenging the arbitrator's appointment on
grounds contained in the Fifth Schedule may make
an application for setting aside the arbitral award
in accordance with Section 34 on the aforesaid
grounds. It is clear, therefore, that any challenge
contained in the Fifth Schedule against the
appointment of Justice Doabia and Justice Lahoti
cannot be gone into at this stage, but will be gone
into only after the Arbitral Tribunal has given an
award. Therefore, we express no opinion on items
contained in the Fifth Schedule under which the
appellant may challenge the appointment of either
arbitrator. They will be free to do so only after an
award is rendered by the Tribunal."
The appellant before us viz. Steel Authority of India
Limited has relied upon Item No. 24 of the Fifth
Schedule, which, it believes, is applicable in view of the
arbitration clause (paragraph 60) in the agreement
dated 05.12.2007 (Annexure P-1) read with the Indian
Council of Arbitration Maritime Arbitration Rules, as
amended on and with effect from 1st October, 2012.
In view of the aforesaid submissions, and the dictum
of this Court in HRD Corporation (Marcus Oil and
Chemical Division), we are in agreement with the
impugned judgment that the appellant would be
entitled to raise all grounds and contentions in the
proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “A&C Act”) and not
at the intermediate stage.
Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the
appellant, however, submits that the impugned order
makes some observations and comments on the merits
of the plea raised by the appellant, predicated on Item
No. 24 of the Fifth Schedule. Learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondent viz. British Marine PLC
fairly states that the said observations may be treated as
erased and not made. If the appellant files any
objections under Section 34 of the A&C Act, the same
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would be considered on merits, including the assertion
relying upon Fifth Schedule. Learned senior counsel for
the respondent, however, clarifies that the aforesaid
statement should not be construed as admitting the case
of the appellant; that the arbitrators were disqualified
in terms of Item No. 24 of the Fifth Schedule or
otherwise in terms of Section 12, pre and post
amendment vide Act No. 3 of 2016. Learned senior
counsel for the respondent also reserves his right to
argue that the Fifth Schedule would not be applicable.
The statement and concession made by the respondent
is taken on record.
In view of the aforesaid position, we dispose of the
present appeal with liberty to the appellant to file
objections, on all grounds as are available to them
under the law and in terms of the dictum in HRD
Corporation (Marcus Oil and Chemical Division),
before the High Court having jurisdiction to entertain
such application.
The award, a copy of which has not been made available
to the parties, and is kept in a sealed cover, would be
made available to the learned counsel for the parties.
For this purpose, the parties/their representatives would
appear before the Registrar concerned and obtain a
copy of the said award on 20th September, 2022 at 3:00
p.m. Service of the copy of the award to the learned
counsel/authorised representatives of the parties will be
treated as service on the parties.
We have consciously not made any observations on the
merits of the matter in view of the order passed. The
present order would not be treated as an expression of
opinion on any aspect relating to disqualification of the
arbitrators in terms of Item 24 of the Fifth Schedule or
otherwise under the pre and post amendment Section 12
of the A&C Act. The appeal is accordingly, partly
allowed and disposed of without any order as to costs.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
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15.
However, SAIL continued to raise challenges in respect of the said
Arbitrators and filed applications seeking disclosures from them on forms
specified in the Sixth Schedule of the Act. These applications were not
acceded to by the Arbitral Tribunal on the ground that the disclosures were
already made by the two Arbitrators in terms of ICA Rules.
The Arbitral Award was, thereafter, pronounced on 13th September,
16.
2018 which was initially placed before the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court vide its order dated 14th September, 2022 as extracted above, observed
that SAIL was free to take all its objections against the said award in terms of
the dictum in HRD Corporation v. GAIL (India) Ltd., (2018) 12 SCC 471.
The Supreme Court also clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the
aspect of disqualification of the Arbitrators in terms of Item no.24 of the Fifth
Schedule or under Section 12 of the Act - pre and post amendment.
17.
Thereafter, the petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed by the
Appellant. The primary grounds alleged therein were that the Award was
vitiated by patent illegality and the award is in conflict with public policy as
also contrary to fundamental policy of law in India. The ld. Single Judge of
this Court considered the various objections which were raised before the
Court.
18.
Broadly, the grounds raised before the ld. Single Judge and her findings
are as under:
A. Issue of conflict of interest qua members of the Arbitral Tribunal, namely,
Captain S.M. Berry and Mr. Niranjan Chakraborty.
i)
The ld. Single Judge, on this issue, analysed various rules of ethics
including International Bar Association Rules of Ethics for
International Arbitrators, 1987, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2013
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and Section 12 of the Act. Ld. Single Judge came to the conclusion that
the dispute relates to Charter Party Agreement which requires
specialized Arbitrators owing to the restricted pool of Arbitrators who
are available. Ld. Single Judge also came to the conclusion that the
possibility of the same legal issues recurring in different disputes
cannot be ruled out.
ii)
The Court then analysed Item No. 24 of the Fifth Schedule as also the
decision in HRD Corporation (Supra) and various other judgments
rendered in similar cases. The finding of the ld. Single Judge on this
issue is captured in paragraphs 52 to 54 of the impugned judgment
which reads as under:
“52. From a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments, it is
palpably clear that merely because an Arbitrator has
decided an issue in another arbitration where one party
may be common to the arbitration in question, is by itself
not a ground to hold that there are justifiable doubts on
the impartiality of the Arbitrator rendering him
ineligible under Section 12 of the 1996 Act. It must be
shown that Arbitrator’s ability to decide the issue
arising in the second case is clouded and that he will not
be able to approach the issue with an open mind so as
to do justice to the party. It is not uncommon in
arbitration regime for same Arbitrators to be appointed
in multiple references involving same or common
parties with same or similar questions of law. It is
equally not uncommon that parties prefer to appoint
same Arbitrators for different contracts involving
similar questions or in fresh arbitrations, where there
are pending arbitrations involving similar issues. The
reason to make such a choice is the familiarity of the
Arbitrator with the background, technical details and
nuances as also complicated legal issues, which in turn
leads to more informed, efficient and expeditious
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adjudication. In many International Institutional
arbitrations under ICC, SIAC etc., it is a common
practice for Arbitrators to preside over multiple related
disputes involving the same issues and parties,
particularly, where Arbitrator is chosen for its subjectmatter expertise or where the disputes arise in related
contracts where arbitrations are ongoing in respect of
master contracts. Illustratively, in a number of standard
format contracts or contracts arising under framework
agreements such as Franchise Agreements, EPC
Contracts, Power Purchase Contracts, invariably
Arbitrators rule on aspects of delay, force majeure,
liquidated damages etc., and in my view, the mere fact
that an Arbitrator has rendered a particular
interpretation on any of these aspects, cannot
automatically lead to his disqualification to decide a
similar issue in a subsequent arbitration, unless it is
substantially demonstrated that the Arbitrator will be
unable to decide objectively, impartially or
independently. Law does not treat mere prior knowledge
of a subject or decision on the issue as per se bias,
unless it is coupled with proof that having prejudged the
issue, the Arbitrator will decide the same with closed
mind and subjectively or that on an earlier occasion the
Arbitrator was not impartial or independent.
53. The judgment in CC/Devas (Mauritius) (supra), in
fact, supports the argument of the Respondent. In the
said case, Respondent claimed that there were
justifiable doubts on the impartiality of the Presiding
Arbitrator and Professor Orrego Vicuna, not owing to
lack of independence or inappropriate action, but on
issue conflict i.e., pre-existing views held by Professor
Orrego Vicuna and Mr. Lalonde regarding an issue in
dispute between the parties. It was argued that the two
Arbitrators had strongly articulated their positions on
interpretation of the “Essential Security Interests”
provision in two cases i.e. CMS and Sempra and
Professor Orrego Vicuna repeated this view in Enron.
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Overruling the challenge, it was held that to sustain any
challenge, one would require to demonstrate more than
simply showing a prior view or opinion, such that the
Arbitrator will not be able to decide the issue again
objectively or with an open mind. The fact that both
Arbitrators in two cases adopted a consistent view on
the concept of “essential security interests” was not
surprising, as those Tribunals applied the same
provisions to similar facts.
54. Applying the aforementioned judgements to the
present case and tested on the anvil of the law laid
down and observations made, in my view, Capt. Berry
and Mr. Chakraborty were not de jure ineligible on the
touchstone of doctrine of issue conflict. No doubt both
had dealt with interpretation of Clause 62 in the
SeaSpray arbitration and taken a particular view, but
as elucidated in the aforesaid judgments, this by itself
is not a disqualification sans any evidence that the
Arbitrators will decide the issue with a closed mind and
without any objectivity or were not impartial in the
earlier arbitration involving the Petitioner, which I
may note, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate.
Objection of the Petitioner is mere presence based and
no cogent material has been placed which shows that
the two Arbitrators were partial or decided with a
predetermined disposition. This contention is thus
rejected.”
B. Declaration by the Arbitrators under the Sixth Schedule of the Act
i.
On the question of declaration under the Sixth Schedule of the Act, the
ld. Single Judge held that the disclosure was given prior to the
amendment to Section 12 of the Act, though in a different format and
that the same was sufficient. The relevant portion of the impugned
judgment is set out below:
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“55. Insofar as the contention that the two Arbitrators
did not give a declaration in the format prescribed
under Sixth Schedule of the 1996 Act is concerned, be it
noted that as a matter of fact, disclosure was given
albeit not in the format given in Sixth Schedule since the
disclosure was given prior to the amendment in Section
12.
……….”
C. Interpretation of Clause 62 of the CoA
i.
According to the ld. Single Judge, the Arbitral Tribunal had held
categorically that if the interpretation of the Appellant is accepted, it
could lead to a situation wherein the Appellant would be able to put an
end to the CoA for its own breach - thereby, benefiting from its own
wrongs.
ii.
Insofar as Clause 62 of the CoA is concerned, the Arbitral Tribunal had
concluded that there was no breach by the Respondent to ship the
product if the STEM was not provided by the Appellant. There were no
justifiable reasons for not providing the STEM for the entire period. In
fact, the Respondent had established that SAIL had shipped coal from
Australia to India during the relevant period in the spot market. Thus,
the termination was held to be extraneous to Clause 62 and not
sustained by the Arbitral Tribunal.
iii.
Further, the Arbitral Tribunal’s finding was also recorded to the effect
that the Force Majeure Clause i.e., Clause 61 was not invoked by the
Appellant.
iv.
These findings of the Arbitral Tribunal were upheld by the ld. Single
Judge who came to the conclusion that the scope of interference against
an award of an Arbitral Tribunal being limited, there was no
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justification to interfere in the present case.
D. Award of damages
i.
Insofar as the aspect of damages is concerned, the award of damages
was tested on the anvil of Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
ii.
The allegation of SAIL that no evidence was produced by the
Respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal was rejected by the ld. Single
Judge.
iii.
While, on the one hand, the Arbitral Tribunal held that damages could
not be awarded on the basis of the difference between the rates
stipulated in the agreement and the rates prevailing in the spot market,
it nevertheless held that damages were liable to be granted on account
of the non-declaration of STEM, which constituted a breach on the part
of the Appellant. The Arbitral Tribunal further held that the grant of
damages, calculated on the basis of the difference between the
contractual rate and the rate paid by the Appellant for similar ships,
constituted an adequate measure of damages. In fact, the Arbitral
Tribunal observed that, had the contractual rates been higher than the
prevailing spot market rates, the Appellant may not have been entitled
to any damages.
iv.
Ld. Single Judge came to the conclusion that the methodology adopted
by the Arbitral Tribunal was not erroneous. The difference between the
average spot rate and the contractual rate was the basis of award of
damages and hence, the Arbitral Tribunal came to the conclusion that
no further evidence would be required to prove damages.
v.
Insofar as the quantum of damages is concerned, the same was also
upheld by the ld. Single Judge.
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vi.
The interest in the present case has been awarded at the rate of 6% from
the date of breach till date of award. Three months’ time was granted
for payment of the amount and in the event of non-payment, 9% interest
was directed to be paid from the date of award till payment. The ld.
Single Judge notes that this award of interest was fully covered by the
decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Nobel Chartering Inc.
v. Steel Authority of India Limited, 2024: DHC: 5183-DB.
19.
On all these grounds, the ld. Single Judge of this Court had upheld the
award dated 13th August, 2018.
Submissions of behalf of the parties
20.
According to Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, ld. Senior Counsel for the Appellant,
Item No.24 of the Fifth Schedule makes it clear that in the past three years if
the Arbitrator has served on a Tribunal on a related issue involving one of the
parties, the same would give rise to justifiable doubt as to the independence
or impartiality of the Arbitral Tribunal in terms of Section 12 of the Act.
21.
Ld. Senior Counsel for the Appellant further submits that though the
Appellant was aware of the previous Arbitral Award, the two arbitrators still
had a duty to disclose the view they had taken in the previous award dated
20th August, 2014 with M/s Seaspray Shipping Co. Ltd.
22.
According to Mr. Rao, ld. Senior Counsel, the Appellant had filed an
application before the ICA on 6th January, 2015 which referred the same to
the Maritime Arbitration Committee. This objection was also raised on 7th
January, 2015 before the Arbitral Tribunal which was, however, not acceded
to. On 3rd March, 2015, ICA dismissed the objections raised by SAIL under
Section 12 of the Act. According to the Appellant, no hearing was given
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before dismissing the said application. The observations in the order rejecting
the challenge are set out below:
“For resolution of the dispute raised by the Respondent
in the present arbitration the matter was referred to the
Maritime Arbitration Committee. In consideration of
the submissions made by both parties and after carefully
going though the relevant facts and circumstances of the
objection raised by the Respondent, the said Committee,
at its meeting dated 4th February, 2015, decided to
dismiss Respondent's application by a speaking order
on the ground of delay.”
23.
Mr. Rao, ld. Senior Counsel further submits that the Arbitral Tribunal
having not disclosed their interest in the present case, there exists a possibility
of bias. Ld. Senior Counsel submits that under Section 12 of the Act, even a
possibility of bias needs to be avoided and the challenge, though belated by a
few days, cannot lead to a situation where the serious doubt raised to the
impartiality of the Arbitral Tribunal can be ignored.
24.
According to Mr. Rao, ld. Senior Counsel under Section 12 of the Act,
the fact that the Arbitrators had taken a view on Clause 62 of the CoA would
have a direct bearing on the decision in the present case as well and since there
was no disclosures by the Arbitrators, which duty was incumbent upon them,
the award is vitiated.
25.
In addition, it is submitted on behalf of the Appellant that insofar as
Clause 62 of the CoA is concerned, the said clause makes it clear that there
would be no liabilities on either of the parties. The CoA was merely in the
nature of an assurance to use the services of the Respondent for a particular
quantum and the obligation did not kick-in unless and until the STEM was
declared. According to Mr. Rao, ld. Senior Counsel since the declaration was
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to be in parts over a longer period of time, it could not be held that there was
any breach as there was no minimum guarantee which was agreed in the CoA.
In addition, it is submitted that no compensation including interest was liable
to be granted as no losses were even proved by the Respondent.
26.
On the other hand, Mr. Ramesh Singh, ld. Senior Counsel for the
Respondent has submitted that there is a distinction between the Fifth
Schedule and Seventh Schedule of the Act. The view taken by an Arbitrator
in a different arbitral proceeding between different parties, even if one party
is common, would not constitute a justifiable doubt under Section 12 of the
Act. Reliance has been placed on the decision in HRD Corporation (Supra).
27.
In addition, it is argued that under Section 4 of the Act, if a prompt
objection is not raised, the same would constitute waiver. In this regard,
reliance is placed on ‘Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration’.
28.
Finally, insofar as Clause 62 of the CoA is concerned, Mr. Singh, ld.
Senior Counsel has relied upon the two decisions of the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court being M/s Seaspray Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Steel Authority of India
Ltd. & Connected Matter, 2025: DHC: 2238-DB and Noble Chartering Inc.
(Supra).
Analysis and Findings
A. Grounds of challenge raised in this appeal
29.
In this appeal, the challenge is to the judgment dated 13th October, 2025
passed by the ld. Single Judge and in effect, to the Arbitral Award dated 13th
September, 2018 which has been upheld by the ld. Single Judge. The facts set
out above are not in dispute. The three issues that have been raised before this
Court in this appeal are:
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i)
Whether the two Arbitrators i.e., Captain S.M. Berry and Mr.
Niranjan Chakraborty were disqualified in view of Section 12 read
with the Fifth and Sixth Schedule of the Act or not;
ii)
Whether the interpretation given to Clause 62 of the CoA is correct
in law?;
iii) Whether the award of damages/compensation and interest is
justified?
30.
At the outset, it is relevant to point out that the Arbitration Clause in
the CoA i.e., Clause 60 contemplates that the disputes arising out of the CoA
shall be referred to an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the Indian Council
of Arbitration and shall be in accordance with the Act. Moreover, as per the
said clause, the Arbitrators for the said Tribunal shall be appointed from the
Maritime Panel of Arbitrators of the ICA and the rules governing the
arbitration are Maritime Arbitration Rules of the ICA.
31.
The Respondent being a United Kingdom based company, this is an
international commercial arbitration under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act and not
a domestic arbitration. The grounds of challenge in respect of Awards passed
in such arbitration proceedings are very limited in nature. The ld. Single
Judge, in the impugned judgment, has also rightly treated the present case as
one arising out of an international commercial arbitration and held that the
scope of interference is limited.
32.
A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in M/s Seaspray Shipping Co. Ltd.
(supra), while considering a dispute between the Appellant herein and M/s
SeaSpray Shipping Co. Ltd. arising from an identical agreement, also held
that the dispute constituted an international commercial arbitration and
observed as under:
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“62. There can be no cavil as to the scope of
interference with an arbitral award rendered in the
context of an international commercial arbitration. An
international award can be set aside only on ground of
contravention of public policy. The concept of patent
illegality applies exclusively to domestic awards and as
such, is not relevant in this case. The confines of the
jurisdiction of this Court in respect of an award
rendered in the context of “international commercial
arbitration” has been reiterated and restated time and
again and most recently by the Supreme Court in OPG
Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling
Solutions India (P) Ltd.13, wherein the Supreme Court
has observed as under— (SCC pp. 464-467, paras 4748 and 53-55)
“47. The Amendment Act, 2015 by inserting subsection (2-A)14 in Section 34, carves out an
additional ground for annulment of an arbitral
award arising out of arbitrations other than
international commercial arbitrations. Sub-section
(2-A) provides that the court may also set aside an
award if that is vitiated by patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award. This power of
the court is, however, circumscribed by the
proviso, which states that an award shall not be set
aside merely on the ground of an erroneous
application of the law or by reappreciation of
evidence.
48. Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii), specifies
that an arbitral award is in conflict with the public
policy of India, only if,:
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected
by fraud or corruption or was in violation of
Section 75 or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental
policy of Indian law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of
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morality or justice.
∗∗∗
51. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v.
NHAI15, this Court dealt with the effect of the
Amendment Act, 2015. While doing so, it took note
of a supplementary report of February 2015 of the
Law Commission of India made in the context of
the proposed 2015 amendments. The said
supplementary report has been extracted in para
30 of that judgment. The key features of it are
summarised below:
(a) Mere violation of law of India would not
be a violation of public policy in cases of
international commercial arbitrations held in
India.
(b) The proposed 2015 Amendments in 1996
Act (i.e. in Sections 34(2)(b)(ii) and 48(2)(b)
including insertion of sub-section (2-A) in
Section 34 were on the assumption that the
terms, such as, ‘fundamental policy of Indian
law’ or conflict with ‘most basic notions of
morality or justice’ would not be widely
construed.
(c) The power to review an award on merits is
contrary to the object of the Act and
international practice.
(d) The judgment in ONGC v. Western Geco
International Ltd.16 would expand the court's
power, contrary to international practice.
Hence, a clarification needs to be
incorporated to ensure that the term
‘fundamental policy of Indian law’ is
narrowly construed. The applicability of
Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v.
Wednesbury Corpn.17 principles to public
policy will open the floodgates. Hence,
Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) has been
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proposed.
After taking note of the supplementary report, the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Amendment Act, 2015 and the amended provisions
of Sections 28, 34 and 48, this Court held:
(Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. case15,
SCC pp. 169-171 and 194, paras 34, 37-41 and 69)
‘34. What is clear, therefore, is that the
expression public policy of India, whether
contained in Section 34 or in Section 48,
would now mean the fundamental policy of
Indian law as explained in paras 18 and 27 of
Associate Builders v. DDA10 i.e. the
fundamental policy of Indian law would be
relegated to Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v.
General Electric Co.18 understanding of this
expression. This would necessarily mean that
Western Geco International Ltd. case16
expansion has been done away with. In short,
Western Geco International Ltd. case16, as
explained in paras 28 and 29 of Associate
Builders case10, would no longer obtain, as
under the guise of interfering with an award
on the ground that the arbitrator has not
adopted a judicial approach the court's
intervention would be on the merits of the
award, which cannot be permitted post
amendment. However, insofar as principles of
natural justice are concerned, as contained in
Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1996 Act,
these continue to be the grounds of challenge
of an award, as is contained in para 30 of
Associate Builders case10.
∗∗∗
37. Insofar as domestic awards made in India
are concerned, an additional ground is now
available under sub-section (2-A), added by
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the Amendment Act, 2015 to Section 34. Here,
there must be patent illegality appearing on
the face of the award, which refers to such
illegality as goes to the root of the matter, but
which does not amount to mere erroneous
application of the law. In short, what is not
subsumed within the fundamental policy of
Indian law, namely, the contravention of a
statute not linked to public policy or public
interest, cannot be brought in by the back
door when it comes to setting aside an award
on the ground of patent illegality.
38. Secondly, it is also made clear that
reappreciation of evidence, which is what an
appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be
permitted under the ground of patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award.
39. To elucidate, para 42.1 of Associate
Builders case10, namely, a mere contravention
of the substantive law of India, by itself, is no
longer a ground available to set aside an
arbitral award. Para 42.2 of Associate
Builders case10, however, would remain, for if
an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award
and contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996
Act, that would certainly amount to a patent
illegality on the face of the award.
40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the
Amendment Act really follows what is stated
in paras 42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders
case10, namely, that the construction of the
terms of a contract is primarily for an
arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator
construes the contract in a manner that no
fair-minded or reasonable person would; in
short, that the arbitrator's view is not even a
possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator
wanders outside the contract and deals with
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the matters not allotted to him, he commits an
error of jurisdiction. This ground of challenge
will now fall within the new ground added
under Section 34(2-A).
41. What is important to note is that a
decision which is perverse, as understood in
paras 31 and 32 of Associate Builders case10,
while no longer being a ground for challenge
under ‘public policy of India’, would
certainly amount to a patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a
finding based on no evidence at all or an
award which ignores vital evidence in
arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liable to be set aside on the ground of patent
illegality. Additionally, a finding based on
documents taken behind the back of the
parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as
a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as
such decision is not based on evidence led by
the parties and therefore, would also have to
be characterised as perverse.
∗∗∗
69. We therefore hold, following the aforesaid
authorities, that in the guise of
misinterpretation of the contract and
consequent errors of jurisdiction, it is not
possible to state that the arbitral award would
be beyond the scope of submission to
arbitration if otherwise the aforesaid
misinterpretation (which would include going
beyond the terms of the contract), could be
said to have been fairly comprehended as
disputes within the arbitration agreement or
which were referred to the decision of the
arbitrators as understood by the authorities
above. If an arbitrator is alleged to have
wandered outside the contract and dealt with
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matters not allotted to him, this would be a
jurisdictional error which could be corrected
on the ground of patent illegality, which, as
we have seen, would not apply to
international commercial arbitrations that
are decided under Part II of the 1996 Act. To
bring in by the back door grounds relatable to
Section 28(3) of the 1996 Act to be matters
beyond the scope of submission to arbitration
under Section 34(2)(a)(iv) would not be
permissible as this ground must be construed
narrowly and so construed, must refer only to
matters which are beyond the arbitration
agreement or beyond the reference to the
Arbitral Tribunal.’
55. The legal position which emerges from the
aforesaid discussion is that after the ‘2015
Amendments’ in Sections 34(2)(b)(ii) and
48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase ‘in
conflict with the public policy of India’ must
be accorded a restricted meaning in terms of
Explanation 1. The expression ‘in
contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law’ by use of the word ‘fundamental’
before the phrase ‘policy of Indian law’
makes the expression narrower in its
application than the phrase ‘in contravention
with the policy of Indian law’, which means
mere contravention of law is not enough to
make an award vulnerable. To bring the
contravention within the fold of fundamental
policy of Indian law, the award must
contravene all or any of such fundamental
principles that provide a basis for
administration of justice and enforcement of
law in this country. Without intending to
exhaustively enumerate instances of such
contravention, byway of illustration, it could
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be said that: (a) violation of the principles of
natural justice; (b) disregarding orders of
superior courts in India or the binding effect
of the judgment of a superior court; and (c)
violating law of India linked to public good or
public interest, are considered contravention
of the fundamental policy of. Indian law
However, while assessing whether there has
been a contravention of the fundamental
policy of Indian law, the extent of judicial
scrutiny must not exceed the limit as set out in
Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii).”
(emphasis supplied)”
33.
Similarly, in the decision in Noble Chartering Inc. (Supra), a Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court held as under:
“96. The learned Single Judge had also erred in not
considering the scope of examination in the present
case. The learned Single Judge failed to note that the
impugned award was rendered in an international
commercial arbitration as defined under Section
2(1)(f) of the A&C Act. Concededly, the impugned
award cannot be assailed on the ground of patent
illegality as in terms of Section 34(2A) of the A&C Act,
the challenge to an arbitral award on the ground of
patent illegality is not available in respect of arbitral
awards in an international commercial arbitration.
Thus, SAIL's challenge to the impugned award was
required to be tested solely on the anvil whether the
impugned award is in conflict with the public policy of
India.
97. The Explanations to Section 34(2) of the A&C Act
clarify the scope of an arbitral award being in conflict
with the public policy of India and states that an arbitral
award would be considered in conflict with the public
policy of India if there was fraud or corruption in the
making of the award; if it falls foul of the fundamental
policy of India; or offends the most basic notions of
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morality and justice.
xxxx
99. In Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co.
Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India18, the
Supreme Court held that the expression “fundamental
policy of Indian law” would necessarily have to be
understood as explained in paragraphs 18 and 27 of its
decision in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development
Authority19 and, its earlier decision in Renusagar
Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company20. The
relevant extract of the said decision21 is set out below:
“34. What is clear, therefore, is that the expression
“public policy of India”, whether contained in
Section 34 or in Section 48, would now mean the
“fundamental policy of Indian law” as explained
in paras 18 and 27 of Associate Builders
[Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] i.e. the fundamental
policy of Indian law would be relegated to
“Renusagar” understanding of this expression.
This would necessarily mean that Western Geco
[ONGC v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014)
9 SCC 263 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12] expansion has
been done away with. In short, Western Geco
[ONGC v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014)
9 SCC 263 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12], as explained
in paras 28 and 29 of Associate Builders
[Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204], would no longer obtain,
as under the guise of interfering with an award on
the ground that the arbitrator has not adopted a
judicial approach, the Court's intervention would
be on the merits of the award, which cannot be
permitted post amendment. However, insofar as
principles of natural justice are concerned, as
contained in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the
1996 Act, these continue to be grounds of challenge
of an award, as is contained in para 30 of Associate
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Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3
SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204].
35. It is important to notice that the ground for
interference insofar as it concerns “interest of
India” has since been deleted, and therefore, no
longer obtains. Equally, the ground for
interference on the basis that the award is in
conflict with justice or morality is now to be
understood as a conflict with the “most basic
notions of morality or justice”. This again would
be in line with paras 36 to 39 sof Associate
Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3
SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204], as it is only
such arbitral awards that shock the conscience of
the court that can be set aside on this ground.
36. Thus, it is clear that public policy of India is
now constricted to mean firstly, that a domestic
award is contrary to the fundamental policy of
Indian law, as understood in paras 18 and 27 of
Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA,
(2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204], or
secondly, that such award is against basic notions
of justice or morality as understood in paras 36 to
39 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v.
DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204].
Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and
Explanation 2 to Section 48(2)(b)(ii) was added by
the Amendment Act only so that Western Geco
[ONGC v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014)
9 SCC 263 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12], as understood
in Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA,
(2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204], and
paras 28 and 29 in particular, is now done away
with.”
xxxx
101. In HRD Corporation (Marcus Oil and Chemical
Division v. GAIL (India) Limited (Formerly Gas
Authority of India Limited)23, Ssangyong Engineering
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and Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways
Authority of India24 and Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi
E Sistemi SRL25, the Supreme Court explained that
after the amendment in the A&C Act introduced by the
Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015,
Section 48 of the A&C Act, which concerned the
enforcement of a foreign award is amended to delete the
provision for declining enforcement of the foreign
award on the ground of “contrary to interest of India”.
Further, Explanation 2 to Section 48 of the A&C Act
was added clarifying that the question whether there is
contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law,
shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.
Similarly, Explanation 2 was added to Section 34(2)(b)
of the A&C Act, which clarify that the tests “as to
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental
policy of Indian Law shall not entail a review on the
merits of the dispute”
102. Sub-section (2A) was also introduced in Section
34 of the A&C Act, which would be applicable to
arbitral awards other than those delivered in an
international commercial arbitration. In terms of said
Sub-section, an arbitral award could be set aside if the
same is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the
face of the award.
xxxx
104. A plain reading of the above clearly indicates that
the scope of setting aside an arbitral award on the
ground that it falls foul of public policy of India is
extremely narrow. The grounds that an arbitral award
is perverse or irrational does not necessarily qualify as
a ground to set aside an arbitral award on the ground
that it is in conflict with the public policy of India.
Thus, even if we accept (which we do not) that the
Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of the COA is
erroneous, the impugned award could not be set aside
on the ground of being in conflict with the public
policy of India.”
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Thus, the present dispute being an international commercial arbitration the
only ground available for challenge is whether the Award is contrary to the
public policy of India. The ground of patent illegality is not available for
challenging the Award in question.
B. Conflict of interest
34.
The grievance of the Appellant is that the two Arbitrators i.e., Captain
S.M. Berry and Mr. Niranjan Chakraborty, who had rendered the award in the
present case were also Arbitrators in a dispute between SAIL and M/s
SeaSpray Shipping Company Ltd. and had taken a particular view in respect
of the interpretation of Clause 62 of the CoA. Hence, according to SAIL, the
Arbitrators have dealt with a related issue involving one of the parties in terms
of Item No.24 of the Fifth Schedule of the Act. The submission on behalf of
the Appellant, therefore, is that since the same very Arbitrators had taken a
view on the same issue, the award itself is vitiated.
35.
In order to appreciate this argument, it is necessary to consider the
chronology of events. The CoA is itself dated 5th December, 2007. The dispute
arose between the parties when the Respondent invoked the Arbitration
Clause i.e., Clause 60 of the CoA on 31st March, 2014.
36.
On 29th May, 2014, SAIL appointed its nominee Arbitrator namely, Mr.
Ashok Sharma. On 25th June, 2014, Captain S.M. Berry was appointed as the
Presiding Arbitrator and on the same day the constitution of the Tribunal was
notified by the ICA. The requisite declarations in terms of ICA Rules were
furnished by the Arbitrators. The declarations having been submitted, the
claims and statement of defence were filed before the Tribunal. The Arbitral
Tribunal framed issues on 10th October, 2014. By then, the Arbitral Award in
the matter between the Appellant and M/s SeaSpray Shipping Company Ltd.
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had been rendered on 20th August, 2014.
37.
In the said M/s. SeaSpray award, the Arbitral Tribunal had interpreted
the default clause i.e., Clause 62 of a similar agreement with M/s SeaSpray
Shipping Company Ltd. The Appellant-SAIL was a party to the said dispute
and Award as well. Thus, it was fully aware of the interpretation given in the
said award.
38.
The question in the present case is whether the interpretation of Clause
62 in the Arbitral Award with M/s SeaSpray Shipping Company Ltd. would
operate as a disqualification for the Arbitrators to continue to adjudicate the
disputes with the Respondent – as a corollary, is there any justifiable doubt as
to the independence or impartiality of the Arbitrators or not.
39.
In order to decide this issue, Item No.24 of the Fifth Schedule of the
Act and Explanation 3 of the Fifth Schedule of the Act would be relevant. The
same are extracted below:
“THE FIFTH SCHEDULE
[See section 12(1)(b)]
The following grounds give rise to justifiable doubts as
to the independence or impartiality of arbitrator:
xxxx
Previous services for one of the parties or other
involvement in the case
xxxx
24.
The arbitrator currently serves, or has served
within the past three years, as arbitrator in another
arbitration on a related issue involving one of the
parties or an affiliate of one of the parties.
xxxx
Explanation 3. – For the removal of doubts, it is
clarified that it may be the practice in certain specific
kinds of arbitration, such as maritime or commodities
arbitration, to draw arbitrators from a small,
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specialised pool. If in such fields it is the custom and
practice for parties frequently to appoint the same
arbitrator in different cases, this is a relevant fact to be
taken into account while applying the rules set out
above.”
40.
The above provisions of the Fifth Schedule of the Act are essential to
determine whether the Arbitrators in the present case were in any manner
conflicted in rendering the impugned award or not. In order to appreciate this
issue, the nature of the dispute needs to be considered i.e., it is a dispute
relating to maritime arbitration. It is governed by the Maritime Rules of the
ICA. The explanation in the Fifth Schedule clearly takes into consideration
the limited number of Arbitrators who are available in such specialized areas.
The arbitration rules of the ICA require specialized knowledge and
impartiality required in such arbitrations. Rule 5 of the Maritime Arbitration
Rules of the ICA in this regard is relevant and reads as under:
“5. Panel of Arbitrators:
a) The Committee shall maintain a Panel of Maritime
Arbitrators who should have experience and reputation
in shipping and maritime practice, knowledge in
maritime and shipping law and are persons of integrity.
b) The persons who have attained the age of more than
80 years will automatically cease to be member of the
Panel of Arbitrators. In case of a person, who has been
appointed as Arbitrator before attainment of the age of
80 years his panel membership will continue till the
pronouncement of the Award in pending arbitration
matters referred to him.”
41.
A perusal of the above extracted Rule 5 of the Maritime Arbitration
Rules of the ICA would show that on panel of Arbitrators, persons who have
knowledge and reputation in the maritime world are included. Rule
10(4)(b)(c) of the Maritime Arbitration Rules of the ICA is also relevant in
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the present case as the same is regarding the appointments and
disqualifications of the Arbitrators. The said rule reads as under:
“10. Nomination
Arbitrators:
/
Appointment/Removal
of
xxxx
4) (b) Before accepting his nomination the prospective
arbitrator shall disclose any circumstances such as
financial or personal interest in the outcome of the
award, likely to disqualify him as an impartial or
independent arbitrator. Upon receipt of such
information, the Registrar shall disclose it to the
parties, who if willing to proceed under the
circumstances disclosed, shall advise the Registrar
accordingly. If either party declines to waive the
presumptive disqualification, the prospective arbitrator
shall be disqualified from acting as arbitrator and the
vacancy so created shall be filled, in accordance with
the applicable provision of these Rules.
(c) The arbitrator while making the aforesaid disclosure
should take notice of the grounds enumerated in the
Fifth Schedule of the Act or such other schedule or
amendment as may be made from time to time in respect
thereof. ”
42.
As per these above Rules, a disclosure is to be made by all nominated
Arbitrators, prior to the acceptance of the nomination, of any financial or
personal interest which could disqualify them from being impartial or
independent Arbitrators.
43.
In the present case, the nomination was accepted between March to
June, 2014. In the arbitration between the Appellant and M/s SeaSpray
Shipping Company Ltd., the same two Arbitrators i.e., Captain S.M. Berry
and Mr. Niranjan Chakraborty had already been nominated on 21st May, 2012
i.e., almost two years prior to the nomination in the present dispute. SAIL
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being a party in both the arbitrations was fully aware of these facts. Under
Rule 10(4)(e) of the Maritime Arbitration Rules of the ICA, the challenge to
the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal or to any specific Arbitrator was to
be raised within 15 days from when the appointment was communicated to
the Appellant. The constitution of the Tribunal in the present case was notified
on 25th June, 2014. SAIL had time till 24th July, 2014 to raise a challenge.
However, SAIL filed its statement of defence on 24th June, 2014 i.e., a day
prior to the appointment of the Presiding Arbitrator. The Award in M/s.
SeaSpray dispute was rendered on 20th August 2014. Thereafter, issues were
framed by the Arbitral Tribunal on 10th October, 2014.
44.
After some months, in January 2015, SAIL raised a challenge to the
continuation of the two Arbitrators on the Tribunal which was not allowed by
the Maritime Arbitration Committee on 3rd March, 2015. Thus, any challenge
raised after a period of 15 days, was clearly beyond the period specified Rule
10(4)(e) of the Maritime Arbitration Rules of the ICA.
45.
Now coming to Section 12 of the Act which reads as under:
“12. Grounds for challenge.—[(1) When a person
is approached in connection with his possible
appointment as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in
writing any circumstances,—
(a) such as the existence either direct or indirect,
of any past or present relationship with or interest in
any of the parties or in relation to the subject-matter in
dispute, whether financial, business, professional or
other kind, which is likely to give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his independence or impartiality; and
(b) which are likely to affect his ability to devote
sufficient time to the arbitration and in particular his
ability to complete the entire arbitration within a period
of twelve months.
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Explanation1.—The grounds stated in the Fifth
Schedule shall guide in determining whether
circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable
doubts as to the independence or impartiality of an
arbitrator.
Explanation 2.—The disclosure shall be made by
such person in the form specified in the Sixth Schedule.]
(2) An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment
and throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall, without
delay, disclose to the parties in writing any
circumstances referred to in sub-section (1) unless they
have already been informed of them by him.
(3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if—
(a) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his independence or impartiality, or
(b) he does not possess the qualifications agreed to
by the parties.
(4) A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed
by him, or in whose appointment he has participated,
only for reasons of which he becomes aware after the
appointment has been made.
[(5) Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the
contrary, any person whose relationship, with the
parties or counsel or the subject-matter of the dispute,
falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh
Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed as an
arbitrator:
Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes
having arisen between them, waive the applicability of
this sub-section by an express agreement in writing.]”
46.
Under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act, an Arbitrator has to disclose in
writing any factor which is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his/her
independence or impartiality. Explanation 1 to Section 12 of the Act clearly
states that guidance as to the circumstances which could rise to such justifiable
doubts can be obtained from the Fifth Schedule of the Act and if an Arbitrator
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feels that there could be a doubt as to his or her independence or impartiality,
the disclosure has to be made in the Forms specified in the Sixth Schedule of
the Act.
47.
Usually, these disclosures and the forms in the Sixth Schedule of the
Act would apply to Arbitration proceedings governed by the Act. In the
present case, the Arbitrators had given their declaration in terms of the
Maritime Arbitration Rules of the ICA. Moreover, the disclosure in this case
has no meaning inasmuch as SAIL was fully aware that these two Arbitrators
i.e., Captain S.M. Berry and Mr. Niranjan Chakraborty were already on the
Arbitral Tribunal adjudicating the dispute between the Appellant and M/s
SeaSpray Shipping Company Ltd. Thus, from the inception itself, SAIL was
aware that these two Arbitrators were serving on another Arbitral Tribunal
involving a similar dispute relating to SAIL and M/s SeaSpray Shipping
Company Ltd.
48.
A conjoint reading of the Maritime Arbitration Rules of the ICA and
the Explanation 3 to Item no.24 of the Fifth Schedule of the Act, would show
that one of the most relevant facts to be taken into account while resolving
issues of conflicts is the required specialization of Arbitrators. Rule 5 of the
Maritime Arbitration Rules of the ICA and Explanation 3 to the Fifth
Schedule of the Act, lend sufficient credence to the fact that such arbitrations
involving technical matters requiring specialization may have a smaller pool
of Arbitrators from which the parties can choose. A maritime contract by its
very nature requires domain knowledge for quick adjudication. Merely
because an Arbitrator has served in another maritime arbitration which
involves interpretation of the same or a similar clause by itself cannot raise
justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of an Arbitrator. The
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manner in which such disputes are resolved through specialized Tribunals is
well entrenched both in India and internationally. If it were to be held that
experts who serve as Arbitrators on such arbitrations, ought to be bound by
such stringent conflicts, it may lead to scarcity of such expert Arbitrators and
also their perpetual disqualification. The interpretation canvassed by SAIL
cannot, therefore, be accepted. In the opinion of this Court, the entire purpose
of invoking arbitration in such cases for expeditious disposal would be
defeated if such specialised Arbitrators are held to be conflicted or
disqualified.
49.
Moreover, the challenge to such Arbitrators has to be raised within the
prescribed period which in this case unfortunately was not done. Even under
Section 13 of the Act, the time prescribed for raising such objections is as
under:
“13. Challenge procedure.—(1) Subject to subsection (4), the parties are free to agree on a procedure
for challenging an arbitrator.
(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section
(1), a party who intends to challenge an arbitrator
shall, within fifteen days after becoming aware of the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal or after becoming
aware of any circumstances referred to in sub-section
(3) of section 12, send a written statement of the
reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal.
(3) Unless the arbitrator challenged under subsection (2) withdraws from his office or the other party
agrees to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall
decide on the challenge.
(4) If a challenge under any procedure agreed upon
by the parties or under the procedure under subsection
(2) is not successful, the arbitral tribunal shall continue
the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award.
(5) Where an arbitral award is made under sub-
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section (4), the party challenging the arbitrator may
make an application for setting aside such an arbitral
award in accordance with section 34.
(6) Where an arbitral award is set aside on an
application made under sub-section (5), the Court may
decide as to whether the arbitrator who is challenged is
entitled to any fees.”
50.
As per the above provision, the time period prescribed for filing a
challenge is 15 days from the date of becoming aware of the constitution of
the Arbitral Tribunal or 15 days from the date when the circumstances giving
rise to justifiable doubts comes to the notice of the party. In the present case,
the Appellant failed to raise the challenge within the prescribed period under
either Sections 12/13 of the Act or Rule 10(4)(e) of the Maritime Arbitration
Rules of the ICA. The Arbitral Award dated 20th August, 2014 in the dispute
with M/s SeaSpray Shipping Company Ltd. was communicated to the
Appellant on 1st September, 2014. However, the Appellant requested
disclosure from the Arbitrators only on 19th November, 2015 which was
belated both under the Maritime Rules of the ICA and under Section 13 of the
Act.
51.
The Arbitral Award of the Arbitral Tribunal dated 13th September,
2018 as also the impugned judgment dated 13th October, 2025 passed by the
ld. Single Judge of this Court, therefore, rightly hold that the Arbitrators in
the present case are not disqualified in any manner from dealing with the
dispute in question. In fact, SAIL having full knowledge of the Tribunal’s
constitution, ought to be held to have waived its right to raise a challenge. In
this regard, the extract from ‘Redfern and Hunter on International
Arbitration’ is relevant and is extracted below:
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“(e) Waiver
A question arises concerning the obligation of a party
to raise promptly any objection concerning the
independence or impartiality of an arbitrator (or any
other ground of challenge), when the facts upon which
the challenge is based come to the attention of the
objecting party. As noted above, such a question may
not arise in the US because there is no procedure
available for challenges to a court until after the award
has been rendered. Nevertheless, even there the
objection should be made in a timely way to the arbitral
tribunal
'for
the
record'.
In the ICSID system Arbitration Rule 27 states clearly
chat a party who fails to 4.133 object promptly to an
alleged violation of a relevant rule is deemed to have
waived its right to object.
Waiver
A party which knows or should have known that a
provision of the Administrative and Financial
Regulations, of these Rules, of any other rules or
agreement applicable to the proceeding, or of an
order of the Tribunal has not been complied with
and which fails to state promptly its objections
thereto, shall be deemed-subject to Article 45 of the
Convention—to have waived its right to object.
Under the Model Law, challenges related to
impartiality or independence must be filed with the
arbitral tribunal within 15 days of the party becoming
aware of the circumstances giving rise to justifiable
doubts as to those issues. Is the objection to be deemed
to be waived if the time limit is not met, or may the
objection be raised in a challenge to the award or on
enforcement proceedings? This question has not been
resolved definitively. The better view is that on policy
grounds a failure to comply with the time limits should
bar any attack of the award on this basis.”
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52.
From the above, it is clear that the timeline for raising challenges for
appointment of Arbitrators has to be strictly adhered to in order to ensure that
belated challenges are not raised leading to delays in the arbitration process.
53.
Now coming to the merits as to whether the Arbitrators were indeed
conflicted at all or was there a justifiable doubt as to their impartiality or
independence. A similar issue was raised in HRD Corporation (Supra)
wherein a challenge was raised to the appointment of an Arbitrator on the
ground that the same very Arbitrator had rendered an award between the same
parties in an earlier arbitration for a different period but concerning the same
disputes. In the context of the said case, the Supreme Court considered various
materials and commentaries and held that merely because the same Arbitrator
has rendered the award in a previous arbitration between the parties, the same
would not be a ground of likelihood of bias so as to render it ineligible. The
Supreme Court also found that there was no reason to hold that the Arbitrator
would be biased in any manner. In the said case, the Supreme Court observed
as under:
“23. Coming to Justice Doabia’s appointment, it has
been vehemently argued that since Justice Doabia has
previously rendered an award between the same parties
in an earlier arbitration concerning the same disputes,
but for an earlier period, he is hit by Item 16 of the
Seventh Schedule, which states that the arbitrator
should not have previous involvement “in the case”.
From the italicized words, it was sought to be argued
that “the case” is an ongoing one, and a previous
arbitration award delivered by Justice Doabia between
the same parties and arising out of the same agreement
would incapacitate his appointment in the present
case. We are afraid we are unable to agree with this
contention. In this context, it is important to refer to the
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IBA Guidelines, which are the genesis of the items
contained in the Seventh Schedule. Under the waivable
Red List of the IBA Guidelines, para 2.1.2 states:
“The Arbitrator had a prior involvement in the dispute.”
24. On reading the aforesaid guideline and reading the
heading which appears with Item 16, namely
“Relationship of the arbitrator to the dispute”, it is
obvious that the arbitrator has to have a previous
involvement in the very dispute contained in the present
arbitration. Admittedly, Justice Doabia has no such
involvement. Further, Item 16 must be read along with
Items 22 and 24 of the Fifth Schedule. The
disqualification contained in Items 22 and 24 is not
absolute, as an arbitrator who has, within the past three
years, been appointed as arbitrator on two or more
occasions by one of the parties or an affiliate, may yet
not be disqualified on his showing that he was
independent and impartial on the earlier two occasions.
Also, if he currently serves or has served within the past
three years as arbitrator in another arbitration on a
related issue, he may be disqualified under Item 24,
which must then be contrasted with Item 16. Item 16
cannot be read as including previous involvements in
another arbitration on a related issue involving one of
the parties as otherwise Item 24 will be rendered largely
ineffective. It must not be forgotten that Item 16 also
appears in the Fifth Schedule and has, therefore, to be
harmoniously read with Item 24. It has also been argued
by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent that the expression “the arbitrator” in Item
16 cannot possibly mean “the arbitrator” acting as an
arbitrator, but must mean that the proposed arbitrator
is a person who has had previous involvement in the
case in some other avatar. According to us, this is a
sound argument as “the arbitrator” refers to the
proposed arbitrator. This becomes clear, when
contrasted with Items 22 and 24, where the arbitrator
must have served “as arbitrator” before he can be
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disqualified. Obviously, Item 16 refers to previous
involvement in an advisory or other capacity in the very
dispute, but not as arbitrator. It was also faintly argued
that Justice Doabia was ineligible under Items 1 and 15.
Appointment as an arbitrator is not a “business
relationship” with the respondent under Item 1. Nor is
the delivery of an award providing an expert “opinion”
i.e. advice to a party covered by Item 15.
25. The fact that Justice Doabia has already rendered
an award in a previous arbitration between the parties
would not, by itself, on the ground of reasonable
likelihood of bias, render him ineligible to be an
arbitrator in a subsequent arbitration. As has been
stated in H. v. L & others, [2017] 1 W.L.R. 2280 at
2288-2289:
“26. If authority were needed it is to be found in
AMEC Capital Projects Ltd v Whitefriars City
Estates Ltd [2005] 1 All ER 723. An adjudicator
had decided a case without jurisdiction as a result
of defects in the procedural mechanism for his
appointment. His adjudication was set aside and he
was then reappointed to decide the same dispute,
between the same parties, and decided it in the
same way. At first instance it was held that his
second adjudication should be set aside for
apparent bias because, amongst other things, he
had already decided the same issue. The Court of
Appeal reversed the decision. Dyson LJ said:
“20. In my judgment, the mere fact that the
tribunal has previously decided the issue is
not of itself sufficient to justify a conclusion
of apparent bias. Something more is
required. Judges are assumed to be
trustworthy and to understand that they
should approach every case with an open
mind. The same applies to adjudicators, who
are almost always professional persons.
That is not to say that, if it is asked to re-
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determine an issue and the evidence and
arguments are merely a repeat of what went
before, the tribunal will not be likely to reach
the same conclusion as before. It would be
unrealistic, indeed absurd, to expect the
tribunal in such circumstances to ignore its
earlier decision and not to be inclined to
come to the same conclusion as before,
particularly if the previous decision was
carefully reasoned. The vice which the law
must guard against is that the tribunal may
approach the rehearing with a closed mind.
If a judge has considered an issue carefully
before reaching a decision on the first
occasion, it cannot sensibly be said that he
has a closed mind if, the evidence and
arguments being the same as before, he does
not give as careful a consideration on the
second occasion as on the first. He will,
however, be expected to give such
reconsideration of the matter as is
reasonably necessary for him to be satisfied
that his first decision was correct. As I have
said, it will be a most unusual case where the
second hearing is for practical purposes an
exact rerun of the first. 21. The mere fact that
the tribunal has decided the issue before is
therefore not enough for apparent bias.
There needs to be something of substance to
lead the fair-minded and informed observer
to conclude that there is a real possibility
that the tribunal will not bring an open mind
and objective judgment to bear.”
27. Those comments apply with as much force to
arbitrators
in
international
reinsurance
arbitration as they do to adjudicators in building
disputes. Just as an arbitrator or adjudicator can
be expected to bring an open mind and objective
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judgment to bear when redetermining the same
question on the same evidence between the same
parties, it is all the more so where the evidence is
different and heard in a reference between
different parties.
28. The position in Bermuda Form arbitrations is
accurately summarised in a leading textbook,
Liability Insurance in International Arbitration,
2nd ed (2011), at para 14.32 in these terms:
“14.32 Commencing a Bermuda Form
Arbitration The decision in Locabail (UK) Ltd
v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451, and
the foregoing discussion, is also relevant in
the fairly common situation where a loss,
whether from boom or batch, gives rise to a
number of arbitrations against different
insurers who have subscribed to the same
programme. A number of arbitrations may be
commenced at around the same time, and the
same arbitrator may be appointed at the
outset in respect of all these arbitrations.
Another possibility is that there are
successive arbitrations, for example because
the policyholder wishes to see the outcome of
an arbitration on the first layer before
embarking on further proceedings. A
policyholder, who has been successful before
one tribunal, may then be tempted to appoint
one of its members (not necessarily its
original appointee, but possibly the chairman
or even the insurer's original appointee) as
arbitrator in a subsequent arbitration.
Similarly, if insurer A has been successful in
the first arbitration, insurer B may in practice
learn of this success and the identity of the
arbitrators who have upheld insurer A's
arguments. It follows from Locabail and
AMEC Capital Projects Ltd v Whitefriars City
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Estates Ltd [2005] 1 All ER 723 that an
objection to the appointment of a member of a
previous panel would not be sustained simply
on the basis that the arbitrator had previously
decided a particular issue in favour of one or
other party. It equally follows that an
arbitrator can properly be appointed at the
outset in respect of a number of layers of
coverage, even though he may then decide the
dispute under one layer before hearing the
case on another layer.”
26. We were, however, referred to Russell on
Arbitration (23rd edition), in which the learned
author has referred to the ground of bias in the
context of previous views expressed by an
arbitrator. In Chapter 4-124, the learned author
states as follows:
“In certain circumstances, previously
expressed views of an arbitrator, which
suggest a certain pre-disposition to a
particular course of action, outcome or in
favour of a party, can constitute grounds for
removal. One of the Locabail v. Bayfield
applications ([2000] 1 All E.R. 65 at 92-93)
against a judge was successful on this basis.
The judge had written four strongly worded
articles which led the Court to conclude that
an objective apprehension of bias may arise
on the part of one of the parties. However, a
challenge against a sole arbitrator in a trade
arbitration which alleged apparent bias
because the arbitrator had previously been
involved in a dispute with one of the parties
failed. The judge found this on the facts to be
no more than “an ordinary incident of
commercial life” occurring in the relatively
small field of trade arbitrations where it was
thought the parties and arbitrators were quite
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likely to have had prior dealing with each
other (Rustal Trading Ltd. v. Gill and Duffas
SA [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 14). Similarly, the
fact that an insurance arbitrator had
previously given a statement in another
arbitration (and may have been called to give
evidence subsequently) about the meaning of
a standard form clause which might have had
a tentative bearing on the present arbitration
would not give grounds for removal
(Argonaut Insurance Co v. Republic
Insurance Co [2003] EWHC 547).”
27. The judgment referred to in Russell is reported
in Locabail v. Bayfield, (2000) 1 All E.R. 65. In
paragraph 89 thereof, the Court of Appeal stated:
“We have found this a difficult and anxious
application to resolve. There is no suggestion
of actual bias on the part of the recorder. Nor,
quite rightly, is any imputation made as to his
good faith. His voluntary disclosure of the
matters already referred to show that he was
conscious of his judicial duty. The views he
expressed in the articles relied on are no
doubt shared by other experienced
commentators. We have, however, to ask,
taking a broad commonsense approach,
whether a person holding the pronounced
pro-claimant anti-insurer views expressed by
the recorder in the articles might not
unconsciously have leant in favour of the
claimant and against the defendant in
resolving the factual issues between them. Not
without misgiving, we conclude that there was
on the facts here a real danger of such a
result. We do not think a lay observer with
knowledge of the facts could have excluded
that possibility, and nor can we. We
accordingly grant permission to appeal on
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this ground, allow the defendant's appeal and
order a retrial. We should not be thought to
hold any view at all on the likely or proper
outcome of any retrial.”
28. We have not been shown anything to indicate
that Justice Doabia would be a person holding a
pronounced anti-claimant view as in Locabail
(supra). Therefore, we are satisfied that there is
no real possibility that Justice Doabia will not
bring an open mind and objective judgment to
bear on arguments made by the parties in the
fourth arbitration, which may or may not differ
from arguments made in the third arbitration.”
54.
Thus, in HRD Corporation (Supra) the Supreme Court holds that
merely because an Arbitrator has rendered an Award in a previous arbitration
between the same parties would not create a likelihood of bias or render him
ineligible in a subsequent arbitration.
55.
The reliance placed by Mr. Rao, ld. Senior Counsel for the Appellant
upon Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. M/s ECI SPIC
SMO MCML (JV) a Joint Venture Company, 2024 INSC 857 in respect of
the doctrine of bias is slightly different from the issue which is being
considered in the present case. The observation relied upon by Mr. Rao, ld.
Senior Counsel is paragraph 88 in Central Organisation for Railway
Electrification (Supra) which reads as under:
“88. The principle governing the doctrine of bias is that
a member of a judicial body with a predisposition in
favour of or against any party to a dispute or whose
position in relation to the subject matter or a disputing
party is such that a lack of impartiality would be
assumed to exist should not be a part of a tribunal
composed to decide the dispute.
……….”
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56.
The above observation is to be read in the context of deciding the
contours of independence and impartiality of Arbitral Tribunals. It is only
under circumstances where an assumption has to be made that the Arbitrators
would not be impartial, that such a disqualification would arise. The Supreme
Court in the decision in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification
(Supra) was considering the general framework of independence and
impartiality of Arbitral Tribunals. In the present case, except the fact that the
two Arbitrators, against whom the challenge has been raised by the Appellant,
had rendered an Arbitral Award in the dispute with M/s SeaSpray Shipping
Company Ltd, there are no other allegations of lack of impartiality which have
been raised before this Court.
57.
Bearing in mind the specialization required, SAIL’s knowledge of the
two Arbitrators and the delay in raising the objections contrary to the timelines
prescribed under Section 13 of the Act and Rule 10 of the Maritime
Arbitration Rules of the ICA, this Court concludes that the disqualification
under Section 12 read with the Fifth Schedule of the Act is not attracted in the
present case. Further even on merits, the rendering of an earlier Award
deciding a similar issue by the same Arbitrators would also not attract the
disqualification as held in HRD Corporation (supra).
C. Interpretation of Clause 62 of the CoA
58.
Insofar as the interpretation of Clause 62 of the CoA is concerned, a
mere reading of the Default Clause along with the Force Majeure clause i.e.,
Clause 61 of the CoA, would reveal that the manner in which it applies is
completely different to what is being argued by SAIL. Under Clause 61 of the
CoA, SAIL had the option to invoke the Force Majeure clause if any of the
factors named in Clause 61 of the CoA had occurred i.e., arrests or restrain by
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Government or people, war, blockade, revolution, insurrection, mobilization,
strikers, civil commotions, Acts of God, plague or other epidemics,
breakdown of mining, rail, road or port equipment, destruction of material by
fire or flood or other natural calamity. Clause 61 of the CoA permitted the
owners and the charterers to opt for cancellation of the agreement without any
liability for such cancellation, provided that Clause 61 was invoked within 20
days of the occurrence of the Force Majeure event. However, SAIL did not
invoke Clause 61.
59.
Insofar as Clause 62 of the CoA is concerned, if the suppliers failed to
provide material for shipment or to ship the materials within the timeline as
agreed or if the suppliers failed to perform the contract, then the suppliers or
charterers shall be entitled to declare the contract as an end without any
liabilities. In respect of this clause, the Arbitral Tribunal has explained in
paragraphs 152 and 154 of the impugned award as under:
“152. It appears to us that the real bone of contention
between the parties is part of the Clause 62, which
entitles the Respondent to declare the Contract (COA)
at an end at will, without any liability to either side when
“Suppliers/Charterers in any manner or otherwise fail
to perform the contract”. The Respondent asserts that
this phase gives it unfettered and absolute freedom to
declare the contract at and end at any time whenever it
wishes without assigning any reason. We are unable to
accept the aforesaid submission for a number of
reasons.
A. Such an interpretation of Clause 62 would be absurd
and vulnerable to being declared void under Section 23
of Indian Contract Act, 1872. Such an interpretation
would also be contrary to Section 73 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 (“The Contract Act 1872”).
b. Such interpretation would also be in violation of
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Section 23 read with Section 28 of The Contract Act,
1872. It is well settled in law that parties cannot
contract against this statute.
xxx
xxx
xxx
154.
The Tribunal has critically analysed the
contention and submissions made by the parties and
hold that the Clause 62 was designed to legislate for
events constituting frustration of the Agreement and is
directed at the supplier in Australia rather than the
Respondent or at events which prevent performance
such as the liquidation/insolvency of the supplier of
coal. Considering the factual matrix in the present
case, Clause 62 could only have been invoked if a
supplier in Australia failed or was unable to supply
material for shipment. It cannot be said to operate if
the supplier provides coal to the Respondent but the
Respondent does not provide the same to the Claimant
for shipment, as argued by the Respondent. The failure
must be a failure by the supplier which in turn leads to
a failure by the Respondent. Clause 62 cannot be
interpreted to mean that the Respondent was within its
rights to put an end to the COA when it was in fact
executing fixtures in the spot market for the shipment
of coal from Australia in the same period as per the
dispute, which should have been given to the Claimant
instead. If one were to accept the Respondent’s
interpretation of Clause 62, it would lead to a situation
where the Respondent would have the right to put an
end to the contract for its own breachers and thus
benefit from its own wrongs. This kind of interpretation
would be absurd as it would render other Clauses in the
Agreement including Clause 61 totally redundant.”
60.
A perusal of the above paragraphs would show that the Arbitral
Tribunal has correctly interpreted Clause 62 of the CoA to mean that if there
were any events that resulted in constituting frustration of the agreement,
leading to a situation where the supplier in Australia is unable to supply, then
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the contract can be terminated. In order to invoke Clause 62 of the CoA, SAIL
would have to show that its suppliers had failed to supply goods to them and
therefore, the same resulted in non-issuance of STEMS to the Respondent.
However, such a situation did not arise and hence, Clause 62 of the CoA could
not have been invoked by SAIL. The interpretation given by SAIL to Clause
62 of the CoA is completely contrary to the bare reading of the clause itself.
61.
In fact, two Co-ordinate Benches of this Court have interpreted and
upheld this very interpretation of Clause 62. In M/s SeaSpray Shipping Co
Ltd. (Supra), the ld. Division Bench of this Court has held as under:
“63. A perusal of the impugned award, reveals that in
respect of the issue of termination, the conclusion drawn
by the Arbitral Tribunal largely turns on the
interpretation accorded by the Arbitral Tribunal to
Clause 62 of the Agreement between the parties.
64. It has been held in the award that (i) Clause 62 must
be read in context with the other provisions of the
Contract of Affreightment; (ii) if there are two possible
constructions of Clause 62 then the one which would
give effect to all the Clauses of the Agreement must be
adopted and not another which would nullify them; (iii)
it was found that the claimant’s interpretation gave
effect to the rest of the provisions of the Agreement, in
contradiction to the interpretation canvassed by the
SAIL; (iv) it was noticed that the construction sought to
be canvassed by SAIL made it impossible to reconcile
with its binding obligation to ship at least 1,900,000 MT
of coal; (v) any interpretation which rendered the
obligation of SAIL to ship the requisite amount of cargo
in the relevant period “optional” would lead to an
absurdity; (vi) reading of the Contract as a whole made
it evident that the SAIL was obliged to ship a minimum
of 1,900,000 MT and maximum of 2,100,000 MT of coal;
(vii) it was noticed that there was nothing optional
and/or non-binding as regards (a) cargo/quantity, (b)
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shipment period, (c) type of vessels, (d) details of vessels
likely to perform COA and (e) Nomination of Vessels.
Even where flexibility was permitted, the limits of that
flexibility were strictly mentioned in the Contract; (viii)
on the basis of the above, it was concluded that SAIL’s
interpretation would practically annihilate the binding
nature of many clauses in the Agreement including
Clauses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, even though they expressly
convey that the parties intended for them to be binding;
(ix) Clause 62 could only have been invoked if a supplier
in Australia failed or was unable to supply material for
shipment. It cannot be said to operate if the supplier
provides coal to SAIL but SAIL does not provide the
same to Seaspray for shipment; the failure must be a
failure by the supplier which in turn leads to a failure by
SAIL.
65. It can be seen that the conclusion drawn and the
findings rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal is based on
an interpretative exercise.”
62.
Similarly, in Nobel Chartering Inc. (Supra), it has been held as under:
“76. Concededly, it was not Noble’s case that construing
Clause 62 of the COA to mean that SAIL had a unilateral
right to terminate the COA at will, would render it void
on the ground of public policy. It was Noble’s case that
on a proper construction of Clause 62 of the COA, it
could not be construed to empower SAIL to terminate the
COA without any reason and on account of its own
default.
77. It is, thus, necessary to carefully examine the Arbitral
Tribunal’s interpretation of Clause 62 of the COA and
the reasons for the same.
xxxx
87. Whilst the Arbitral Tribunal made observations to
the said effect by construing Clause 62 of the COA in
the manner as canvassed by SAIL would render it
vulnerable on the ground of public policy, the Arbitral
Tribunal’s interpretation of Clause 62 of the COA is
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not founded on that reason alone. The Arbitral
Tribunal’s decision is founded on its finding that
Clause 62 of the COA was required to be construed in
accordance with the nature of the contract (COA) and
SAIL’s interpretation of the said clause would render it
inherently conflicting.
88. SAIL’s contention that Arbitral Tribunal’s
interpretation of Clause 62 of the COA was plainly
contrary to the language of the COA and no other view
is possible, is not persuasive. It is settled law that the
deed has to be construed as a whole. The intent of the
parties is to be ascertained by the language of the
written contract read as a whole and not by reading
parts of the clauses of the contract literally dehors their
context. The Arbitral Tribunal undertook precisely the
same exercise.
89. It is well settled that interpretation of a contract falls
within the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, thus, it is
the final adjudicator of the said construction and its
decision cannot be interfered unless it is found that the
Arbitral Tribunal’s view is not a possible one.”
63.
Therefore, reliance on Clause 62 of the CoA being a justification for
SAIL to terminate the agreement is not tenable.
D. Damages and Award of Interest
64.
Coming to the question of damages/compensation and award of
interest, the Arbitral Tribunal has undertaken a complete and detailed factual
analysis as to the manner in which the compensation has been calculated. The
Respondent had already put SAIL to notice that in view of the cancellation by
SAIL, it would take steps towards mitigation.
65.
Under such circumstances, the Arbitral Tribunal has adopted a rational
and logical approach in the calculation of damages by considering the
difference between the contractual rate and the spot rate and applying the
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same to the tonnage. This approach cannot be held to be unreasonable.
Moreover, there is no violation of public policy in the manner in which
damages have been calculated. Accordingly, the view taken by the Arbitral
Tribunal is upheld.
Conclusion
66.
Under these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the Arbitral
Award dated 13th September, 2018 was rightly not interfered with by the ld.
Single Judge of this Court.
67.
Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. Pending applications, if
any, are also disposed of.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 17, 2026
Rahul/Ck
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*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
#
CNR No. DLHC011094262025
+
FAO(OS) (COMM) 17/2026
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LIMITED
.....Appellant
Through:
Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Ajay Sabharwal, Mr. Sidhartha Sharma,
Ms. Priyanka Tibrewal, Mr. Rishav
Dutt, Mr. Aman Katrina, Mr Anirudh
Pandit and Ms Neelakshi Singhal,
Advocates (M) 9643017972
versus
BRITISH MARINE PLC
.....Respondent
Through:
Mr. Ramesh Singh, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Sumit K. Batra, Mr. Anupam Dighe,
Mr. Manish Khurana & Ms. Chandini
Tanna, Advs. (M) 9911100900.
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN
ORDER
%
17.09.2026
1.
This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
2.
Vide detailed judgment pronounced today, the appeal filed by the
Appellant has been dismissed.
3.
Ld. Counsel for the Appellant prays for stay of the judgment dated 17th
September, 2026 in order to enable the Appellant to challenge the same.
4.
Since, this Court has only upheld the Arbitral Award dated 13th
September, 2018, no ground for stay of the judgment is made out.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH, J.
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J.
SEPTEMBER 17, 2026/Rahul/Ck
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