The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
29. In view of the foregoing discussion and the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, it is evident that the respondent-petitioner had rendered about 38 years of service and had attained the age of 58 years at the time of his compulsory retirement. He was also extended the admissible pensionary benefits, except the benefit of further increments consequent upon his retirement. It was reported by the department that the Annual Performance Reports (APRs) of the official for the period 2011-12, 201213, 2013-14, 2014-15 rate his performance as satisfactory in the most of the parameters of assessment except in the APR of 2014-15 where his rating varied from satisfactory to excellent on different parameters. Further, as is borne out from the Annual Performance Reports (APRs) forming part of the record, the performance of the petitioner-respondent was assessed as satisfactory/average and was not of such an exceptional or extraordinary nature as would warrant his continued retention in service as a matter of right. The competent authority, upon consideration of the relevant service record and the material placed before it, had accordingly formed the requisite opinion in the public interest for his premature retirement.
30. Accordingly, keeping in view the settled legal position that an order of compulsory/premature retirement is neither punitive in nature nor does it entail any civil consequences by way of stigma, and that the scope of judicial review in such matters is limited, the impugned order of compulsory retirement cannot be interfered with merely because another view may be possible on the same material. Consequently, the judgment dated 05/10/2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in SWP No. 2166/2016 is set aside, and Government Order No. 1264-GAD of 2016 dated 21.11.2016, whereby the petitioner-respondent was prematurely/compulsorily retired from service, is upheld.
31. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Full Judgment Text
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
Reserved on:
10.09.2026
Pronounced on:
28.09.2026
Uploaded on:
29.09.2026
Whether the operative part
or full judgment is
pronounced:
Full.
LPASW NO.189/2018
IA NO.1/2018
State
of
Jammu
&
Kashmir
through
Commissioner/Secretary
to
Government
General
Administration Department, Civil Secretariat, Srinagar.
…Appellant.
Through:
Mr. Hakim Aman Ali, Dy.AG.
Vs.
Ghulam Mohammad Lone Age 60 years S/o Kh.
Mohammad Maqbool Lone R/o Lawaypora, District
Srinagar.
….Respondent
Through:
Mr. Imtiyaz A. Sofi, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEVKUMAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, CJ
I.
Nature of the challenge:
01.
The present Letters Patent Appeal (LPASW No. 189/2018) arises
out of the judgment dated 05.10.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in
SWP No. 2166/2016, titled Ghulam Mohammad Lone v. State of J&K. By
the said judgment, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and
quashed Government Order No. 1264-GAD of 2016 dated 21.11.2016,
whereby the respondent–writ petitioner had been prematurely/compulsorily
retired from Government service in exercise of the power contained in
Article 226(2) of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services Regulations, 1956
(hereinafter referred to as ‘JKCSR’ for brevity). The State, being aggrieved
LPASW No.189/2018
of the said judgment, preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal seeking
setting aside of the judgment of the learned Single Judge and dismissal of
the writ petition. The impugned order of compulsory retirement had been
passed after consideration by a committee constituted for examining cases
of premature retirement, and that the Committee had taken into account the
service record, the petitioner's alleged involvement in a vigilance case and
his general reputation.
02.
The controversy, therefore, essentially concerns the scope of judicial
review of an order of premature/compulsory retirement, the extent to which
the Court can examine the material considered by the Screening/Review
Committee, and whether the learned Single Judge was justified in
interfering with the decision of the competent authority on the ground that
the material relied upon was insufficient to form a reasonable opinion
regarding the petitioner's continuance in service.
03.
The record discloses that the respondent had rendered about 38
years of service and had attained the age of 58 years when the order of
premature retirement was issued. The State had relied upon Article 226(2)
of the JKCSR, under which a Government servant could be required to
retire in the ‘public interest’ after completion of the prescribed qualifying
service or on attaining the prescribed age. The impugned order was
consequently founded upon the satisfaction of the competent authority that
the respondent's further continuance in service was not in public interest.
04.
The case set up by the appellant before the learned Single Judge was
that compulsory retirement is a mechanism intended to ensure efficiency
and integrity in public administration and to weed out persons who have
become deadwood or whose continuance is considered detrimental to public
interest. It was specifically pleaded that the Committee had considered the
respondent's service record, including the vigilance case registered against
him for allegedly demanding and accepting a bribe of Rs.9,000/-, his
general reputation and other relevant material before recommending his
compulsory retirement.
05.
The learned Single Judge, however, took the view that the material
relied upon by the respondents did not justify the formation of a reasonable
LPASW No.189/2018
opinion that the respondent had outlived his utility as a Government servant
or that his continuance in service would be prejudicial to public interest.
The learned Single Judge accordingly quashed the Government order and
directed reinstatement with consequential benefits. It is this conclusion
which constitutes the principal subject matter of challenge in the present
appeal.
II.
Contentions of the Appellant–State
06.
The appellant–State has assailed the judgment of the learned Single
Judge principally on the ground that the learned Single Judge failed to
appreciate the limited scope of judicial review in matters relating to
premature or compulsory retirement.
07.
It has been contended that the power under Article 226(2) of the
JKCSR is exercised in the public interest and is intended to enable the
Government to remove deadwood and persons whose continued presence in
service may adversely affect the efficiency and integrity of administration.
The State submits that the purpose of such power is not to impose a
punishment upon the employee but to maintain an efficient and effective
administration.
08.
The State further contends that the learned Single Judge ought not to
have undertaken an elaborate examination of the adequacy or sufficiency of
the material which had weighed with the Screening/Review Committee.
According to the appellant, the Court exercising judicial review is not sitting
as an appellate authority over the subjective satisfaction of the competent
administrative authority. The Court can interfere only where the decision is
shown to have been actuated by mala fides, is based on no material, is
arbitrary or perverse, or suffers from non-application of mind.
09.
It is specifically urged that the Committee consisted of senior
officers of the Government and had considered the entire service record
and relevant circumstances before recommending premature retirement.
The State has relied upon the fact that the respondent had been caught
allegedly demanding and accepting a bribe of Rs.9,000/- while holding a
responsible post in the School Education Department, resulting in
registration of FIR No.18/2010 by the Vigilance Organization. The
LPASW No.189/2018
Committee also considered the respondent's reputation and other servicerelated material.
10.
The appellant has further submitted that the learned Single Judge
erred in treating the vigilance case as though the respondent had been
subjected to a punitive order on the basis of a proved misconduct.
According to the State, the existence of the vigilance case and the
circumstances surrounding it constituted relevant material for the purpose of
determining whether the respondent had outlived his utility and whether his
continued retention was in public interest. The State has also contended that
the fact that criminal proceedings were pending did not, by itself, render the
material irrelevant for the purpose of premature retirement.
11.
Another important contention of the appellant is that the Committee
had not mechanically acted upon the FIR alone. The State asserts that the
case was considered in the context of the respondent's service record and
general reputation and that the Committee, after deliberation, formed the
opinion that it would not be in public interest to retain the respondent in
service. The appellant therefore submits that the learned Single Judge
substituted his own assessment of the material for that of the competent
authority, which was impermissible within the limited scope of judicial
review.
12.
The State has also specifically pleaded that the order of compulsory
retirement is neither punitive nor stigmatic. It is an administrative measure
adopted in public interest and does not amount to a penalty under Article
311 of the Constitution. The appellant accordingly contends that the learned
Single Judge fell into error in subjecting the decision to a standard of
scrutiny applicable to disciplinary punishment.The appellant has further
relied upon the principle that while considering compulsory retirement, the
entire service record of an employee has to be kept in view and the authority
is required to form an overall opinion regarding the employee's utility and
efficiency. It has been argued that the Committee in the present case was
constituted precisely for this purpose and had undertaken the requisite
exercise.
LPASW No.189/2018
III.
Contentions of the Respondent–Writ Petitioner
13.
The respondent, on the other hand, has supported the judgment of
the learned Single Judge and contended that the Government order of
compulsory retirement was arbitrary, unreasonable and unsupported by
legally sustainable material.The respondent's principal contention was that
his entire service career had been satisfactory and that he had discharged his
duties honestly and diligently. It was asserted that he had received
promotions during his service on account of his suitability, merit and
satisfactory service record. The respondent therefore maintained that there
was no legitimate basis for concluding that he had become deadwood or had
outlived his utility as a government servant.
14.
The respondent disputed the allegations concerning the vigilance
case and contended that the allegations of demanding and accepting a bribe
were incorrect. It was pointed out that the FIR had resulted in criminal
proceedings which were still pending before the competent Court and that
no final finding of guilt had been recorded against him. The respondent
accordingly argued that an unproved allegation could not be treated as
conclusive proof of misconduct or corruption.
15.
It was further contended that an FIR is merely the starting point of
criminal law and contains allegations which have yet to be established in
accordance with law. According to the respondent, the mere registration of
an FIR could not constitute a valid foundation for prematurely terminating
his long-standing Government service. The respondent also challenged the
reliance placed upon his Annual Confidential/Performance Reports. He
contended that the maintenance and completion of the ACRs/APRs was not
his responsibility and that the reports which were actually available
reflected satisfactory performance. He therefore argued that the Committee
had failed to properly appreciate the positive aspects of his service record.
16.
The respondent further alleged that the Government had failed to
establish that his case fell within the parameters of Article 226(2) of the
JKCSR or the relevant Government instructions. It was urged that the
Committee had relied upon vague and superficial allegations and had not
produced sufficient material demonstrating that his further continuance in
LPASW No.189/2018
service would be prejudicial to public interest.The respondent also relied
upon the principle that although the power of compulsory retirement is
wide, it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or as a substitute for disciplinary
proceedings. The respondent thus sought to sustain the judgment of the
learned Single Judge whereby the order of premature retirement was
quashed.
IV.
Legal Position Governing Premature/Compulsory Retirement
17.
The controversy has to be examined against the settled distinction
between compulsory retirement as an administrative measure and
dismissal/removal as a punitive consequence. The jurisprudence on
compulsory retirement has consistently recognized that the power is
conferred upon the Government in public interest to ensure that a
Government servant who has become inefficient, ineffective, or whose
continuance is otherwise not considered beneficial to administration, may be
retired in accordance with the applicable service rules. At the same time, the
power is not absolute. The opinion of the competent authority must be
formed on relevant material, and judicial review remains available where
the decision is mala fide, arbitrary, based on no evidence, perverse, or where
relevant material has been ignored. The distinction is therefore between
reviewing the decision-making process and substituting the Court's own
opinion for that of the competent authority. This distinction assumes
particular importance in the present case because the learned Single Judge
interfered with the order of compulsory retirement notwithstanding the fact
that the decision had emanated from a duly constituted Committee and had
subsequently been accepted by the competent authority. The State's case is
that the learned Single Judge effectively re-appreciated the material and
substituted his assessment for the subjective satisfaction of the competent
authority.
18.
The legal position has now been authoritatively reiterated by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in
State of Jammu and Kashmir through Commissioner/Secretary to
Government, GAD v. Ahsan-ul-Haq Khan, LPASW No.171/2018, decided
LPASW No.189/2018
on 30.12.2025. The said judgment is particularly significant because it
directly considers the law governing premature retirement under Regulation
226(2) of the J&K Civil Services Regulations and the scope of judicial
review in such matters. The Court, after noticing the statutory framework,
observed in paragraph 9 as under:
“9 The premature retirement of a Government servant in the
then State of Jammu and Kashmir (now UT of Jammu and
Kashmir) is governed by Regulation 226(2) of the J&K Civil
Services Regulations ("CSR"), which authorizes the
Government to retire a government servant at any time after
he has completed 22 years of service or attained the age of 48
years, in public interest. This power is exercised by the
Government to weed out such Government servants who have
turned deadwood and are inefficient and persons with
doubtful integrity.”
The above paragraph makes it clear that premature retirement is not
conceived as a disciplinary penalty. Its underlying purpose is to secure the
efficiency and integrity of the public administration by enabling the
Government to remove from service persons whose continued retention is
no longer considered to be in public interest. More importantly, the Division
Bench in paragraph 11 has expressly stated:
“11 The power of premature retirement, also known as
compulsory retirement, is intended to be exercised in public
service to maintain efficiency and integrity in Government
service and to weed out those whose continuance has become
a liability to the administration. Such power is neither
punitive in nature nor does it entail any civil consequences by
way of stigma. The satisfaction of the authority that the
premature retirement of a particular Government servant is in
public interest is, though subjective in nature, yet it must be
based on cogent material derived from the employee's entire
service record, with greater emphasis on the later years of
service. Doubtful integrity is a relevant factor for arriving at
such satisfaction. Even un-communicated adverse entries can
also be considered. The satisfaction arrived at by the
competent authority that weeding out an inefficient
Government servant or a Government servant having doubtful
integrity is necessary must be based on cogent material and
must not rest on irrelevant, extraneous, or mala fide grounds.
Judicial review in such matters is limited and permissible only
where the decision is shown to be mala fide, arbitrary, or
LPASW No.189/2018
based on no evidence, or where relevant material has been
ignored or extraneous considerations have crept in. Once it is
demonstrated that the competent authority, upon
consideration of the service record, has arrived at a bona fide
satisfaction that premature/compulsory retirement of the
employee is in public interest, the Court would not sit in
appeal and substitute its own opinion for that of the competent
administrative authority.”
The Division Bench has clearly drawn the boundary between a
punitive action and an administrative decision to retire an employee in
public interest. It has simultaneously emphasized that the subjective
satisfaction of the authority is not beyond judicial review; however, the
review is confined to the established grounds such as mala fides,
arbitrariness, absence of evidence, consideration of irrelevant material, or
failure to consider relevant material.Thus, the principle emerging from
Ahsan-ul-Haq Khan is twofold: first, premature retirement is neither
punitive nor stigmatic; and second, although the authority's satisfaction is
subjective, it must be founded upon cogent material and the entire service
record.
19.
The foundational judgment of the Supreme Court remains
Baikuntha Nath Das and another v. Chief District Medical Officer,
Baripada and another, reported in (1992) SCC Online SC 336 at page
315. Para-34 of the judgment being relevant reads as follows:
“34. The following principles emerge from the above
discussion:
(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It
implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour.
(ii) The order has to be passed by the government on
forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a
government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the
subjective satisfaction of the government.
(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context
of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean
that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High
Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an
appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the
order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no
evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary — in the sense that no
reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the
given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order.
LPASW No.189/2018
(iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case
may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service
before taking a decision in the matter — of course attaching
more importance to record of and performance during the
later years. The record to be so considered would naturally
include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls,
both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is
promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse
remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the
promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon
seniority.
(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be
quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing
it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into
consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis
for interference.
Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in
(iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 30 to 32
above.”
V.
Application of the Law to the present case:
20.
Applying the above principles to the present matter, it becomes
evident that the basic character of the impugned order has to be appreciated
correctly. The Government order dated 21.11.2016 was an order of
premature/compulsory retirement under Article 226(2) of the J&K
Civil Services Regulations. It was not an order of dismissal or removal
imposed by way of punishment. The fact that the Committee took note of
the respondent's involvement in a vigilance case, his alleged acceptance of a
bribe and his general reputation does not, by itself, transform the order into
a punitive order. Such material may be relevant to the administrative
assessment whether the employee's continued retention is in public interest,
provided that the competent authority acts upon cogent and relevant
material and does not use the power of compulsory retirement merely as a
substitute for disciplinary proceedings.
21.
This distinction is expressly recognized in Ahsan-ul-Haq Khan,
where the Division Bench held that premature retirement is intended to
maintain efficiency and integrity in Government service and to weed out
employees whose continuance has become a liability to the administration.
The Court specifically declared that such power is “neither punitive in
nature nor does it entail any civil consequences by way of stigma.”The
LPASW No.189/2018
same principle is firmly rooted in Baikuntha Nath Das. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized that compulsory retirement does not amount to
punishment and does not imply misconduct or incapacity. The purpose is
not to punish the employee for a particular act but to assess his continued
utility from the standpoint of public administration.
22.
Consequently, while examining the impugned order, the appropriate
question is not whether the Court itself would have reached the same
conclusion as the Screening Committee, but whether the competent
authority had before it relevant and cogent material upon which a
reasonable opinion regarding the employee's utility and public interest could
be formed.The judicial review jurisdiction in such a case is accordingly
narrow. The Court may examine whether the decision is tainted by mala
fides, whether there is an absence of material, whether irrelevant or
extraneous considerations have been relied upon, whether relevant material
has been ignored, or whether the decision is so arbitrary or perverse that no
reasonable authority could have arrived at it. The Court, however, cannot
ordinarily substitute its own assessment of the employee's utility for that of
the competent authority once a bona fide opinion has been formed in
accordance with the applicable service rules. This is the precise principle
reiterated by the Division Bench in Ahsan-ul-Haq Khan.
VI.
Finding:
23.
In view of the settled legal position, the judgments in State of
Jammu and Kashmir v. Ahsan-ul-Haq Khan, LPASW No.171/2018, and
Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada, (1992)
SCC Online SC 336, continue to hold the field and represent the
governing law on the nature of premature/compulsory retirement.
24.
The
ratio
emerging
from
these
judgments
is
that
premature/compulsory retirement is an administrative measure taken
in public interest and is neither punitive in nature nor stigmatic. It does
not amount to dismissal or removal by way of punishment and does not,
merely by reason of its character, entail civil consequences by way of
stigma. The power is intended to enable the Government to maintain
efficiency, integrity and effectiveness in public administration and to weed
LPASW No.189/2018
out employees whose continued retention is considered detrimental to
public interest.
25.
At the same time, the power cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The
competent authority must form its opinion on the basis of relevant and
cogent material, having regard to the employee's entire service record,
with appropriate emphasis upon the later years of service. The existence of a
vigilance case, adverse material or doubtful integrity may constitute relevant
material, but the decision cannot be founded upon extraneous considerations
or upon a mere allegation unsupported by material. Ahsan-ul-Haq Khan
makes this limitation explicit by holding that judicial review remains
available where the decision is mala fide, arbitrary, based on no evidence, or
where relevant material has been ignored.
26.
Accordingly, the mere fact that the respondent had challenged the
allegations contained in the FIR, or that the criminal proceedings had not
culminated in conviction, cannot by itself determine the legality of an order
of premature retirement. The relevant enquiry is whether the material before
the Screening Committee and the competent authority was legally relevant
and whether, on consideration of the service record as a whole, a bona fide
opinion could reasonably be formed that the employee's continuance was
not in public interest. This is materially different from determining the
respondent's criminal guilt.
27.
It is, therefore, held that premature/compulsory retirement is
neither punitive in nature nor does it entail any civil consequences by
way of stigma. The order is an administrative measure founded upon the
subjective satisfaction of the competent authority regarding the public
interest involved in retaining or retiring a Government servant. The Court,
while exercising judicial review, cannot substitute its own opinion for that
of the competent authority merely because another view may also be
possible. Interference is justified only when the decision-making process is
vitiated by mala fides, arbitrariness, perversity, absence of material, reliance
upon irrelevant considerations, or non-consideration of relevant material.
28.
In the present case, therefore, the legality of the impugned order has
to be tested against this limited standard of judicial review. The fact that the
LPASW No.189/2018
respondent's case was considered by a duly constituted Committee and that
the Committee took into account material concerning his service record,
vigilance involvement and reputation is relevant to the assessment of
whether the competent authority's satisfaction was bona fide. The Court is
not required to sit as an appellate authority over such subjective satisfaction.
The controlling consideration is whether the statutory power under Article
226(2) was exercised in public interest and on relevant material, and not
whether the Court itself would have preferred a different administrative
conclusion.
VII.
Conclusion
29.
In view of the foregoing discussion and the law laid down in the
aforesaid judgments, it is evident that the respondent-petitioner had
rendered about 38 years of service and had attained the age of 58 years at
the time of his compulsory retirement. He was also extended the admissible
pensionary benefits, except the benefit of further increments consequent
upon his retirement. It was reported by the department that the Annual
Performance Reports (APRs) of the official for the period 2011-12, 201213, 2013-14, 2014-15 rate his performance as satisfactory in the most of the
parameters of assessment except in the APR of 2014-15 where his rating
varied from satisfactory to excellent on different parameters. Further, as is
borne out from the Annual Performance Reports (APRs) forming part of the
record, the performance of the petitioner-respondent was assessed as
satisfactory/average and was not of such an exceptional or extraordinary
nature as would warrant his continued retention in service as a matter of
right. The competent authority, upon consideration of the relevant service
record and the material placed before it, had accordingly formed the
requisite opinion in the public interest for his premature retirement.
30.
Accordingly, keeping in view the settled legal position that an order
of compulsory/premature retirement is neither punitive in nature nor does
it entail any civil consequences by way of stigma, and that the scope of
judicial review in such matters is limited, the impugned order of compulsory
retirement cannot be interfered with merely because another view may be
possible on the same material. Consequently, the judgment dated
LPASW No.189/2018
05/10/2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in SWP No. 2166/2016 is set
aside, and Government Order No. 1264-GAD of 2016 dated 21.11.2016,
whereby the petitioner-respondent was prematurely/compulsorily retired
from service, is upheld.
31.
The appeal is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms.
(SANJEEV KUMAR)
JUDGE
(DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Srinagar
28.09.2026
Abdul Qayoom, Secy.
Whether approved for reporting? : Yes.
Abdul Qayoom Lone
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this document
29.09.2026 14:23
LPASW No.189/2018
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