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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Crl. A. No. 28 of 2018
State of Sikkim.
…
Appellant
…
Respondent
Versus
Tenzing Bhutia,
S/o- late Phu Tshering Bhutia
R/o Ben, Nambong, South Sikkim
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUP KUMAR GOSWAMI, CJ.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BHASKAR RAJ PRADHAN, J.
For the appellant :
Mr. Vivek Kohli, Public Prosecutor, Sikkim
For the respondent:
Ms. Gita Bista, Advocate (Legal Aid Counsel)
Date of hearing
:
04.11.2020
Date of judgment :
12.11.2020
JUDGMENT
(Arup Kumar Goswami, CJ)
This appeal by the State is against the judgment dated 30.11.2017
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, South Sikkim at Namchi, acquitting
the accused of the offences under Section 302/449 IPC on benefit of doubt.
2.
Sonam W. Bhutia (PW-1), Ward Panchayat of 02-Nambong Ward
had lodged a first information report (FIR)before the Station House Officer,
Temi Police Station on 13.08.2016 stating that she had received information
to the effect that wife of Santosh Rai (PW-16) was murdered. Accordingly,
Temi Police Case No.20(8)/16 under Section 302 IPC was registered.
3.
Evidence on record discloses that the deceased, namely, Durga Rai
was found dead in the courtyard of her house with blood all over her body. A
sickle was found near the dead body.
Crl. A. No.28 of 2018
(State of Sikkim vs Tenzing Bhutia)
4.
Evidence of PW-14 goes to show that the accused was living with
him since four months prior to the date of the incident. After returning from
a Ben Gompa, PW-14 was watching TV along with the accused. The accused
had gone out to the nearby jungle to collect fodder. However, after few
minutes he came back running in a nervous state and told him that wife of
Santosh Rai (PW-16) was lying in a pool of blood and the people from
Gompa had gathered there. The house of the PW-14 is located below the
house of PW-16.
5.
The accused came to be arrested on 17.08.2016.
6.
It is relevant to note at this juncture that the Investigating Officer,
(PW-18), in her cross-examination had admitted that apart from the
disclosure statement, Exhibit-10, there is no other evidence or material to
connect the accused with the offence.
7.
The learned Trial Court had held that Exhibit-10 was not recorded in
presence of PW-5 and PW-6, who were witnesses to Exhibit-10. It was held
that when the disclosure statement was recorded the accused was not in the
custody of the police, he having not been arrested and therefore,
requirement of Section 27 of the Evidence Act being not satisfied, Exhibit-1
was inadmissible in evidence. The learned Trial Court further held that
prosecution failed to prove that Material Objects (MO)s were recovered as
per the disclosure statement and at the instance of the accused from his
house. Such conclusion was derived on appreciation of the evidence of PW-5
and PW-6 who
were also witnesses to Exhibit-11, a Seizure Memo,
by
which (i) green slipper with blood stains (MO-VII), (ii) white T-shirt
(checked) with blood-stains (MO-VIII), (iii) green and black full shirt with
blood- stains (MO-VI) and (iv) blood sample were stated to be recovered at
the instance of the accused from his house. It was also held that there was
Crl. A. No.28 of 2018
(State of Sikkim vs Tenzing Bhutia)
no evidence that the seized slippers and wearing apparels belonged to the
accused.
8.
Mr. Vivek Kohli, learned Public Prosecutor, Sikkim has submitted
that the learned Trial Court was not correct in holding that Exhibit-10 is not
admissible in evidence on the ground that the accused was not in police
custody when he had made the disclosure statement. It is submitted that it
is not necessary that an accused must be under arrest when a disclosure
statement is made. He had drawn the attention of the Court to the crossexamination of PW-5 to contend that PW-5 was asked by PW-18 to ask the
accused about the incident in Bhutia language and when so asked, the
accused had confessed about the incident and therefore, even if it is
accepted that Exhibit-10 was prepared, as held by the learned Trial Court,
before PW-5 had reached the police station, he signed as a witness only
after he had asked the accused about the incident and therefore, there is no
infirmity in Exhibiit-10.
9.
Mr. Kohli submits that even if Exhibit -10 is discarded, then also,
seized articles under Exhibit-11 having being recovered from the house of
the accused, in terms of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it was his burden
to discharge how his clothes had blood-stain of the deceased but the
accused had not been able to offer any explanation. In this connection, he
relies on a decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Ranjit
Kumar Haldar vs. State of Sikkim, reported in (2019) 7 SCC 684. He
submits that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence in its
correct perspective in coming to the conclusion that prosecution witnesses
failed to prove seizure of articles under Exhibit-11 and that such articles
belong to the accused and that the same were seized from the house of the
accused. On the above premises, he contends that the appeal deserves to be
allowed. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places reliance on
Crl. A. No.28 of 2018
(State of Sikkim vs Tenzing Bhutia)
the following judgments: Niranjan Singh and Anr. Prabhakar Rajram
Kharote and Ors., reported in (1980) 2 SCC 559 and (ii) Sundeep
Kumar Bafna vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., reported in (2014) 16
SCC 623 .
10.
Ms. Gita Bista, learned Legal Aid Counsel submits that the learned
Trial Court was justified in holding that the prosecution miserably failed to
prove the case against the accused. It is submitted that there is no infirmity
in the impugned judgment and therefore, the appeal deserves to be
dismissed.
11.
We have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the
parties and have perused the materials on record.
12.
At the outset, it will be appropriate to consider as to whether
Exhibit-10 is inadmissible as held by the learned Trial Court. It is also
required to be noted at this juncture that though the same was held to be
inadmissible, the learned Trial Court had considered the evidence of PW-5
and 6 qua Exhibit-10.
13.
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, reads as follows:
“27. How much of information received from accused may be
proved.—Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as
discovered in consequence of information received from a person
accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so
much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or
not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be
proved”.
14.
A perusal of the provision goes to show that that the person from
whom the information is received has to be an accused of any offence and
he has to be in the custody of a police officer.
Crl. A. No.28 of 2018
(State of Sikkim vs Tenzing Bhutia)
15.
In Niranjan Singh (supra), in the context of Section 439 Cr.P.C,
which provides “that any person accused of any offence and in custody be
released on bail.....”, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that he who is under
control of the court or in the physical hold of a police officer with coercive
power can be said to be in police custody.
16.
In Sandeep Kumar Bhatna (supra), after considering various
dictionaries to appreciate the contours of the terms „custody‟, „detention‟ or
„arrest‟ in ordinary and legal parlance and also considering various decisions,
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that „custody‟, „detention‟ and „arrest‟ are
sequentially cognate concepts. On the occurrence of a crime, the police is
likely to carry out the investigative interrogation of a person, in the course of
which the liberty of that individual is not impaired, suspects are then not
preferred by the police to undergo custodial interrogation during which their
liberty is impeded and encroached upon. If grave suspicion against the
suspect emerges, he may be detained in which event his liberty is seriously
impaired. Where the investigative agency is of the opinion that the detainee
or person in custody is guilty of the commission of a crime, he is charged of
it and thereupon arrested. Reliance was placed on an earlier decision in the
case of Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, reported in
(1994) SCC 3 SCC 440, wherein it was held that in every arrest, there is
custody but not vice- versa and that the words „custody‟ and „arrest‟ are not
synonymous terms.
17.
In this context, it is also relevant to take note of the decision of
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Vikram Singh and ors. vs. State of
Punjab, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 56, wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in the context of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, at paragraph 39, held that
for the application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it is not essential that
such an accused must be under formal arrest. The aforesaid judgment in
Crl. A. No.28 of 2018
(State of Sikkim vs Tenzing Bhutia)
Vikram Singh (supra) was referred to in Chandra Prakash vs. State of
Rajasthan, reported in (2014) 8 SCC 340.
18.
Thus, merely because a person was not under arrest while making a
disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act will not render
such disclosure statement inadmissible in evidence and to that extent the
learned Trial Court was not correct in holding otherwise. That the accused
was in the custody of the police is not in dispute. Immediately after 10
minutes of making of the said disclosure statement, the accused came to be
arrested.
19.
If Exhibit-10 passes judicial scrutiny, the only portion that would be
admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the portion where he
stated that he could show the things which he was wearing on the date of
the occurrence and the checked shirt that he had used to swipe blood and
that they were kept in his house.
20.
It is deposed by PW-5 in his evidence-in-chief that the accused had
made the disclosure statement in his presence and his statement was
recorded by the Officer-In-Charge of Temi Police Station and accordingly, he
had signed as a witness in Exhibit-10. After Exhibit-10 was recorded, they
were taken to the place of occurrence (P.O) where the accused showed his
blood-stained wearing apparels. In cross-examination, he conceded that
Exhibit-10 was already prepared by the police before he had reached the
police station. The alleged confession made in Bhutia language by the
accused to PW-5 cannot be proved against him as the accused was in
custody of the police and thus, hit by Section 26 of Evidence Act. PW-6, the
other witness in Exhibit-10, even in his examination-in-chief stated that he
did not know if the accused had made any statement regarding the incident
to police and that Exhibit-10 was already prepared before he had signed on
it. He further stated that he signed on the same as PW-1 and PW-5 had told
Crl. A. No.28 of 2018
(State of Sikkim vs Tenzing Bhutia)
him that Exhibit-10 was prepared in their presence as per the version of the
accused. In view of such evidence of PW-5 and PW-6 as noted above, it is
manifest that disclosure statement was not recorded in their presence and
therefore, no reliance can be placed on Exhibit-10.
21.
So far as recovery of the slipper and wearing apparels etc under
Exhibit-11 is concerned, it appears from the cross-examination of PW-5 that
the police had already recovered the MOs before he had reached the P.O.
What is significant is that he had also stated that police had told him about
the place in the house where they were to go and where the MOs could be
found. Even in Exhibit-10, the place where wearing apparels were kept was
not mentioned. PW-6 also stated that police had already recovered the MOs
under Exhibit-11 before he had reached the P.O. In the background of the
above testimony, the learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that the
seizure witnesses had failed to establish that the MOs were recovered at the
instance of the accused as shown by the accused and that they were actually
recovered from the house of the accused. Furthermore, the learned Trial
Court rightly noted that there is no evidence that the seized slippers and
wearing apparels belong to the accused. In this context, it will be apposite to
note that PW-5 had stated that he did not know to whom the MOs belong. In
the circumstances as noted above, Section 106 of the Evidence Act, on
which reliance was placed by Mr. Kohli, is not attracted.
22.
PW-18 stated that during inspection of the house of the accused,
some blood-stain (MO-XXV) was found near the door of the house and the
same was lifted by him after scrapping it and he had seized the same under
Seizure Memo, Exhibit-11. Therefore, the blood sample referred to in
Exhibit-11 is blood-stain. He also stated that he had sent the blood-stain
scrapped from the wall of the house of the accused to Regional Forensic
Science Laboratory (RFSL), Saramsa. PW-5 stated that blood–stain was
Crl. A. No.28 of 2018
(State of Sikkim vs Tenzing Bhutia)
found on the stairs of the house of the accused. He did not say about any
blood-stain having been collected from the wall of the house. PW-6 did not
say that any blood-stain was found near the stairs but he stated that bloodstains found on the wall of the house of the accused were scrapped and
lifted and MO-IX was, accordingly, prepared. But there is no evidence under
which Seizure Memo it was seized. In his evidence, PW-18 also did not say
that he had seized any blood-stain found on the wall of the house of the
accused. From the evidence of PW-16, Deputy Director-cum-Assistant
Chemical Examiner, Tripura State Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), it
appears that one plastic pouch which contained some dust like particles said
to be the blood-stain specimen (MO-XXV) from the house of the accused was
received by him. Thus, two blood-stain samples, MO-IX and MO-XXV, were
sent to two different FSLs. However, there is no evidence regarding
collection of two blood-stain samples and even in respect of seizure of one
sample of blood-stain referred to in the evidence, there are glaring
contradictions in the deposition of witnesses. That apart, as already noted
both PW-5 and PW-6 had stated that the MOs under Exhibit-11 had been
recovered before they had reached P.O.
23.
The green shirt (MO-VI) and the slippers (MO-VII) indicated
presence of human female origin as deposed by PW-16. PW-13 deposed that
blood-stain (MO-XIV), white shirt (MO-VIII) and vaginal swab, necklace and
the vest of the deceased gave positive test for blood group-O. The FSL
reports as deposed by PW-13 and PW-16 have no meaning when prosecution
has failed to prove that above MOs along with other MOs under Exhibit-11
were recovered from the house of the accused and that wearing apparels
belonged to the accused.
24.
In the case of Ghurey Lal vs. State of U.P, reported in (2008) 10
SCC 450, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court enunciated the following principles in
Crl. A. No.28 of 2018
(State of Sikkim vs Tenzing Bhutia)
respect of scope of exercise of power by the Appellate Court against a
judgment of acquittal under 378 and 386 Cr.P.C.:“69. The following principles emerge from the cases above:
1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against
acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court
can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial
court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law.
2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The
accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial
court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is
innocent.
3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the
trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility
is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view
of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling
reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong.
70. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts
should follow the well-settled principles crystallised by number of
judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's
acquittal:
1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the
trial court's acquittal if it has “very substantial and compelling
reasons” for doing so.
A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would
have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard the
trial court's decision. “
“very substantial and compelling reasons” exist when:
Crl. A. No.28 of 2018
(State of Sikkim vs Tenzing Bhutia)
(i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably
wrong;
(ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of
law;
(iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in “grave
miscarriage of justice”;
(iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the
evidence was patently illegal;
(v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and
unreasonable;
(vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the
material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying
declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc.
(vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and
consideration to the findings of the trial court.
3. If two reasonable views can be reached—one that leads to
acquittal, the other to conviction—the High Courts/appellate courts
must rule in favour of the accused.”
25.
In view of our above discussion, we find no infirmity in the judgment
of the learned Trial Court and accordingly, there being no merit in the
appeal, the same is dismissed.
(Bhaskar Raj Pradhan)
Judge
Avi
(Arup Kumar Goswami)
Chief Justice
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