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Civil

State of Rajasthan vs Sher Singh Meena S/O Kalyan Prasad Meena

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Court
Rajasthan High Court
Date
16 September 2026
Case No.
SAW 6/2026
Result
Dismissed
Bench
Arun Monga, Ashutosh Kumar
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14. Though we have dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay, however, in the parting, we may also like to express our opinion on the merits of the impugned judgment, qua which learned counsels for the State did address some arguments. Having heard the same, we are unable to convince ourselves to interfere, as we find neither any irregularity, either in law or on facts, nor any other ground worthy of setting aside the impugned judgment, as has been urged by way of the present appeal.

15. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.

16. The application for condonation of delay and all other pending applications also stand disposed of. (ANUROOP SINGHI),J PRASHANT – JAYANT /46 (ARUN MONGA),J

Full Judgment Text

Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0). The court's own copy is the authoritative text.

[2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 6/2026 CNR: RJHC021040082025 | URN: SAW / 20U / 2026 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department Of Higher Education, Govt. Secretariat, Jaipur. 2. Director, Department Of Higher Education, Jaipur. 3. Principal, Govt. College Lalsot, District Dausa. ----Appellants Versus Sher Singh Meena S/o Kalyan Prasad Meena, R/o Biharipura, Post Lalpura, District Dausa, Presently Working As A Book Lifter, In Govt. College Lalsot, District Dausa. ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Mr. Divyanshu Gupta (AGC) Mr. Jitendra K. Takar Ms. Ritika Nauka for Mr. S.S. Naruka, AAG For Respondent(s) : Mr. Kailash Chander Sharma HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUROOP SINGHI Order(Oral) 16/09/2026 Per: Arun Monga, J. 1. Applicants seek condonation of delay of 191 days in filing the accompanied appeal against the order dated 11.03.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the respondent was granted the benefit of the minimum pay scale on the basis of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” as enunciated in State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh & Ors.1 2. The explanation given in the application for seeking condonation is totally mechanical and there seems to be no application of mind. No 1 (2017) 1 SCC 148 [2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB] (2 of 6) [SAW-6/2026] specific details or day to day explanation have been given as to why the matter remained pending. 3. For ready reference paras No.1 to 6 of the application are as below: “1. That the Appellants have filed the accompanying Special Appeal against the impugned order dated 11.03.2025 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10732/2017. 2. That there has been a delay in filing the present appeal. The delay is entirely procedural and occurred due to the time consumed in the movement of the official file through various channels. Seeking legal opinion and obtaining the necessary administrative approvals from the Department of Higher Education, the Director, and the Principal of Govt. College Lalsot took considerable time. 3. That the subsequent process of assigning the matter, briefing the counsel, and drafting the appeal further contributed to the time taken. The delay is inadvertent, bona fide, and not intentional. 4. That the Appellants have a very strong prima facie case on merits, as the impugned. order incorrectly applies the principle of "equal pay for equal work" without examining the mandatory parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 5. That if the delay is not condoned, the Appellants will be deprived of a hearing on merits, causing grave prejudice to the State exchequer. 6. That the delay in filing the appeal is not intentional or malafide and deserves to be condoned as otherwise grave prejudice would be caused to the humble appellants.” 4. It has been averred that the delay in filing the appeal occurred due to bona fide procedural reasons, as considerable time was consumed in the movement of the official file, obtaining legal opinion and requisite administrative approvals, and thereafter in briefing counsel and preparing the appeal. The delay is neither intentional nor deliberate and deserves to be condoned in the interest of substantial justice, particularly as the appellants have a strong prima facie case and refusal to condone the delay would deprive them of an opportunity to contest the impugned order on merits. 5. No doubt in deserving case, Courts are liberal to grant indulgence but instant is not a case of such kind. [2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB] 6. (3 of 6) [SAW-6/2026] It is a settled position in law that delay confers crystallized rights in favour of a litigant by virtue of law of limitation. Delay and latches since result in freezing of the vested rights in a party, which seeks enforcement of the same, the said right cannot be taken away unless there is a sufficient cause shown by the party seeking condonation of delay. 7. Having gone through the contents of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay, it transpires that not only a completely beaten up stand has been taken therein justifying the delay in the most mechanical and nonchalant manner, but, even otherwise, its lacks the necessary particulars. 8. Qua the law applicable on condonation of delay, reference may be had to Apex Court judgment in Ramlal and others Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.2 Relevant extract of the same is reproduced hereinbelow: “7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in trial behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.” 9. Reference may also be had to another Apex Court judgment in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat 3 wherein it is observed thus: “.....it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal, but when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the 1962 AIR (SC) 361 AIR 1981 SC 733 [2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB] (4 of 6) [SAW-6/2026] sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal, but that the limitations has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay.” 10. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resource Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited4. Hon’ble the Supreme Court once again held as under: “59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.70 "Postmaster General"], as follows: (SCC pp. 573-74. paras 2729). 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances. the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not 2021 SCC OnLine SC 233 [2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB] (5 of 6) [SAW-6/2026] be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 11. In another recent Apex Court judgment in Shivamma (dead) by Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors.5, it is observed thus: (xxxx….xxxx….xxxx) 261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law. 263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.” 12. Aforesaid position in law dissuades us to grant any judicial latitude to the appellant-State. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969 [2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB] 13. (6 of 6) [SAW-6/2026] As an upshot, the appeal is not maintainable on the ground of delay. 14. Though we have dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay, however, in the parting, we may also like to express our opinion on the merits of the impugned judgment, qua which learned counsels for the State did address some arguments. Having heard the same, we are unable to convince ourselves to interfere, as we find neither any irregularity, either in law or on facts, nor any other ground worthy of setting aside the impugned judgment, as has been urged by way of the present appeal. 15. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits. 16. The application for condonation of delay and all other pending applications also stand disposed of. (ANUROOP SINGHI),J PRASHANT – JAYANT /46 (ARUN MONGA),J

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