The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
14. Though we have dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay, however, in the parting, we may also like to express our opinion on the merits of the impugned judgment, qua which learned counsels for the State did address some arguments. Having heard the same, we are unable to convince ourselves to interfere, as we find neither any irregularity, either in law or on facts, nor any other ground worthy of setting aside the impugned judgment, as has been urged by way of the present appeal.
15. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
16. The application for condonation of delay and all other pending applications also stand disposed of. (ANUROOP SINGHI),J PRASHANT – JAYANT /46 (ARUN MONGA),J
Full Judgment Text
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Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
[2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 6/2026
CNR: RJHC021040082025 | URN: SAW / 20U / 2026
1.
State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department Of
Higher Education, Govt. Secretariat, Jaipur.
2.
Director, Department Of Higher Education, Jaipur.
3.
Principal, Govt. College Lalsot, District Dausa.
----Appellants
Versus
Sher Singh Meena S/o Kalyan Prasad Meena, R/o Biharipura,
Post Lalpura, District Dausa, Presently Working As A Book Lifter,
In Govt. College Lalsot, District Dausa.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Divyanshu Gupta (AGC)
Mr. Jitendra K. Takar
Ms. Ritika Nauka for
Mr. S.S. Naruka, AAG
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Kailash Chander Sharma
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUROOP SINGHI
Order(Oral)
16/09/2026
Per: Arun Monga, J.
1.
Applicants seek condonation of delay of 191 days in filing the
accompanied appeal against the order dated 11.03.2025 passed by the
learned Single Judge, whereby the respondent was granted the benefit
of the minimum pay scale on the basis of the principle of “equal pay for
equal work” as enunciated in State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh & Ors.1
2.
The explanation given in the application for seeking condonation is
totally mechanical and there seems to be no application of mind. No
1 (2017) 1 SCC 148
[2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB]
(2 of 6)
[SAW-6/2026]
specific details or day to day explanation have been given as to why the
matter remained pending.
3.
For ready reference paras No.1 to 6 of the application are as
below:
“1. That the Appellants have filed the accompanying Special Appeal
against the impugned order dated 11.03.2025 passed by the Hon'ble
Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10732/2017.
2. That there has been a delay in filing the present appeal. The delay
is entirely procedural and occurred due to the time consumed in the
movement of the official file through various channels. Seeking legal
opinion and obtaining the necessary administrative approvals from
the Department of Higher Education, the Director, and the Principal
of Govt. College Lalsot took considerable time.
3. That the subsequent process of assigning the matter, briefing the
counsel, and drafting the appeal further contributed to the time taken.
The delay is inadvertent, bona fide, and not intentional.
4. That the Appellants have a very strong prima facie case on merits,
as the impugned. order incorrectly applies the principle of "equal pay
for equal work" without examining the mandatory parameters laid
down by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
5. That if the delay is not condoned, the Appellants will be deprived of
a hearing on merits, causing grave prejudice to the State exchequer.
6. That the delay in filing the appeal is not intentional or malafide and
deserves to be condoned as otherwise grave prejudice would be
caused to the humble appellants.”
4.
It has been averred that the delay in filing the appeal occurred
due to bona fide procedural reasons, as considerable time was
consumed in the movement of the official file, obtaining legal opinion
and requisite administrative approvals, and thereafter in briefing
counsel and preparing the appeal. The delay is neither intentional nor
deliberate and deserves to be condoned in the interest of substantial
justice, particularly as the appellants have a strong prima facie case and
refusal to condone the delay would deprive them of an opportunity to
contest the impugned order on merits.
5.
No doubt in deserving case, Courts are liberal to grant indulgence
but instant is not a case of such kind.
[2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB]
6.
(3 of 6)
[SAW-6/2026]
It is a settled position in law that delay confers crystallized rights
in favour of a litigant by virtue of law of limitation. Delay and latches
since result in freezing of the vested rights in a party, which seeks
enforcement of the same, the said right cannot be taken away unless
there is a sufficient cause shown by the party seeking condonation of
delay.
7.
Having gone through the contents of the application under Section
5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay, it transpires that
not only a completely beaten up stand has been taken therein justifying
the delay in the most mechanical and nonchalant manner, but, even
otherwise, its lacks the necessary particulars.
8.
Qua the law applicable on condonation of delay, reference may be
had to Apex Court judgment in Ramlal and others Vs. Rewa
Coalfields
Ltd.2
Relevant
extract
of
the
same
is
reproduced
hereinbelow: “7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two
important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration
of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise
to a right in favour of decree holder to treat the decree as binding
between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation
prescribed has expired the decree holder has obtained a benefit under
the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge and this
legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time
should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is
shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the
appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court
in order that judicial power and discretion in trial behalf should be
exercised to advance substantial justice.”
9.
Reference may also be had to another Apex Court judgment in
Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat 3 wherein it is observed
thus: “.....it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of
limitation for filing an appeal, but when it allows limitation to expire
and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
1962 AIR (SC) 361
AIR 1981 SC 733
[2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB]
(4 of 6)
[SAW-6/2026]
sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or
circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to
file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the
expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be
events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which
may further delay the filing of the appeal, but that the limitations has
been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced
to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case,
there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the
delay.”
10.
In
Government
of
Maharashtra
(Water
Resource
Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors
Private Limited4. Hon’ble the Supreme Court once again held as
under: “59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different
yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was
felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd.70 "Postmaster General"], as follows: (SCC pp. 573-74. paras 2729).
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of
filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings.
In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are
posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically
merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a
party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has
to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that
in the facts and circumstances. the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless
they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and
there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual
explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years
due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process.
The government departments are under a special obligation to
ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not
2021 SCC OnLine SC 233
[2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB]
(5 of 6)
[SAW-6/2026]
be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments.
The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be
swirled for the benefit of a few.”
11.
In another recent Apex Court judgment in Shivamma (dead) by
Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors.5, it is observed thus: (xxxx….xxxx….xxxx)
261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High
Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this
judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that
administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient
ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic
message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on
frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient
cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish
that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout.
Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts,
and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate
the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the
bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own
lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such
callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should
remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a
State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity
and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees
or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to
reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice,
not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause
exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more
particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its
jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope
for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial
time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means,
who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and
never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be
disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating
against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the
condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the
lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet
again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that
a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic,
much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.”
12.
Aforesaid position in law dissuades us to grant any judicial latitude
to the appellant-State.
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969
[2026:RJ-JP:37255-DB]
13.
(6 of 6)
[SAW-6/2026]
As an upshot, the appeal is not maintainable on the ground of
delay.
14.
Though we have dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay,
however, in the parting, we may also like to express our opinion on the
merits of the impugned judgment, qua which learned counsels for the
State did address some arguments. Having heard the same, we are
unable to convince ourselves to interfere, as we find neither any
irregularity, either in law or on facts, nor any other ground worthy of
setting aside the impugned judgment, as has been urged by way of the
present appeal.
15.
Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed on the ground of
delay as well as on merits.
16.
The application for condonation of delay and all other pending
applications also stand disposed of.
(ANUROOP SINGHI),J
PRASHANT – JAYANT /46
(ARUN MONGA),J
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