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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
…
CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
Reserved on:
Pronounced on:
Uploaded on:
10.09.2026
28 .09.2026
29.09.2026
Whether the operative part or
full judgment is pronounced: Full
CRA no.01/2007:
1. Shakeel Ahmad Hajam
2. Khurshid Ahmad Hajam
Sons of Abdul Gani Hajam
Residents of Padpawan Shopian
…….Appellant(s)
Through: Mr. S.T. Hussain, Sr. Advocate with
Ms. Nida Nazir, Advocate
Versus
1. State of J&K through Financial Commissioner, Home Department,
Civil Secretariat, Jammu/Srinagar
2. Superintendent of Police, Central Jail, Srinagar
3. Station House Officer (SHO) Police Station Shopian
……Respondent(s)
Through: Mr Alla ud din Ganai, AAG
CRAA no.02/2007:
State of J&K through SHO Police Station Shopian
…….Appellant(s)
Through: Mr Alla ud din Ganai, AAG
Versus
1. Shakeel Ahmad Hajam
2. Khurshid Ahmad Hajam
Sons of Abdul Gani Hajam
3. Muzaffar Ahmad Thoker
4. Imtiyaz Ahmad Thoker
Sons of Bashir Ahamd Thoker
All residents of Padpawan
5. Mst. Shabnam Akhter W/o Shakeel Ahmad Thokar R/o Padpawan
Shopian
6. Mst. Kulsuma Bano W/o Gh. Nabi Thokar R/o Padpawan Shopian
Page 1
CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
7. Shamim Ahmad Hajam S/o Abdul Gani Hajam R/o Padpawan
Shopian
…..Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. S.T. Hussain, Sr. Advocate with
Ms. Nida Nazir, Advocate
CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE
JUDGEMENT
Sanjeev Kumar J
1. Judgment of conviction dated 20th January 2007 and Order of
sentence dated 24th January 2007, passed by the Court of learned
Sessions Judge, Pulwama [“Trial Court”] in File no.13/Sessions titled
State v. Shakeel Ahmad Hajam and others, are subject-matter of
challenge in these two appeals, i.e., CRA no.01/2007 filed by
convicts, Shakeel Ahmad Hajam and Khurshid Ahmad Hajam, and
CRAA no.02/2007 filed by the State of J&K.
2. In terms of the impugned judgment, the Trial Court has acquitted the
accused, namely, Muzaffar Ahmad, Imtiyaz Ahmad, Mst. Shabnum
Akhter and Mst. Kulsuma Bano, respondents 3 to 6 in Criminal
Acquittal Appeal no.02/2007, and has convicted Shakeel Ahmad
Hajam and Khursheed Ahmad Hajam, for commission of offence
punishable under Sections 447/304 (II) of Ranbir Penal Code (RPC)
and under Sections 447/325 RPC respectively. The two have filed the
Criminal Appeal no.01/2007. The accused, Shamim Ahmad Hajam,
too has been convicted for commission of offence punishable under
Sections 447 and 325 RPC. The appellants 1&2 and accused, Shamim
Ahmad Hajam, have, thus, been acquitted of the charge under Section
302 RPC.
Page 2
CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
3. The Criminal Acquittal Appeal no.02/2007 as against convicts,
Shakeel Ahmad Hajam, Khurshid Ahmad Hajam, and Shamim
Ahmad Hajam, is only to the extent of their acquittal under Section
302 RPC, albeit they have been convicted for lesser offences.
CRA no.01/2007
4. Before we advert to the grounds of challenge exhorted by Mr. S. T.
Hussain, learned senior counsel appearing for appellants, to assail the
judgment impugned, we deem it appropriate to set out briefly the
prosecution case as was put up before the Trial Court.
5. On 26th August 2001, Police Station, Shopian received a complaint in
writing from one, Mushtaq Ahmad Lone, alleging therein that at
about 10.00 AM, the accused persons, seven in number, who were
armed with lathis, axes, spade and dajee, trespassed into the
compound of the complainant after dismantling the pacharbandi and
in pursuit of common object, administered beating to Gull Lone,
father of complainant; Mst. Khatiji, mother; and Ali Mohd Dar,
maternal uncle and caused them serious injuries. The accused,
Shakeel Ahmad Hajam, with an intention to kill his father, Gull Lone,
gave an axe blow on his head, causing him serious injury. The
condition of Gull Lone worsened and he fell unconscious. The uncle,
Ali Mohd. Dar, was inflicted a bailcha blow on his nose and that
three teeth of mother of complainant were also broken in the scuffle.
It was also alleged that other family members of the complainant,
namely, Mst. Ruqaya, Mst. Rafiqa and Mst. Hajra, were also given
beating and their modesty outraged. The accused also hurled stones
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CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
on the complainant party. As a result of this written information, the
police registered a case under Section 307, 148, 447, 427 RPC. The
investigation was entrusted to PW Ab. Rashid Head Constable. The
injured were rescued to Shopian Hospital wherefrom father of
complainant, Gull Lone, was referred to Soura Hospital for further
treatment. Later, Gull Lone succumbed to his injuries in Soura
Institute. The postmortem of deceased was conducted. The weapons
of offence were seized and sent to FSL for examination. Thereafter,
the investigation was also conducted by SHO and PSI, Shabir Ahmad
Dar.
6. Upon completion of investigation, the police presented the final
report in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shopian, alleging all
the accused guilty of offences punishable under Sections 307, 302,
148, 149, 447 427, 336, 354, 325 RPC. One of the accused, Shamim
Ahmad Hajam, was absconding and could not be arrested by the
police, and therefore, a prayer was made to the Court to initiate
proceedings under Section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Cr.P.C.) against him. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shopian, after
initiation of proceedings under Section 512 Cr.P.C. against accused,
Shamim Ahmad Hajam, committed the case to the Trial Court.
7. The Trial Court, after hearing the prosecution and defence and having
gone through the final report/challan, vide its order dated 2nd April
2002, framed the charge against all the accused under Section 302,
307, 325, 148, 447, 354, 149 RPC. The charge was denied by the
accused. They pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. With a view to
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c/w CRAA no.02/2007
bring home the charge against the accused, the prosecution examined
thirteen out of sixteen listed prosecution witnesses, i.e., PW1
Mushtaq Ahmad Lone, complainant; PW2 Mst. Khatji; PW3 Ali
Mohammad Dar; PW4 Ghulam Qadir Najar; PW5 Manzoor Ahmad
Bhat; PW6 Mohd Aslam Khan; PW7 Shabir Ahmad Wani; PW8 Dr.
Abdul Rashid; PW9 Dr. Nazir Ahmad Bhat; PW10 Dr, Suhail Ahmad
Kanth, Scientific Assistant Serology FSL; PW11 Abdul Rashid;
PW12 Feroz Ahmad Qadri, Inspector/IO; PW13 Shabir Ahmad Dar,
Sub Inspector.
8. On conclusion, all the incriminating circumstances and evidence was
put to the accused. Their statement was recorded under Section 342
Cr.P.C., in which they stated that the witnesses examined by
prosecution were all related to complainant and that they had been
falsely implicated in the case due to enmity. The accused, Shakeel
Ahmad Hajam, appellant no.1, however, further stated that deceased,
Gull Lone, had a property dispute with him and was, with the help of
his family members, forcibly constructing bathroom on the disputed
site, which resulted in heated exchange of words between the parties.
He further stated that the complainant and his family members pelted
stones, as a result of which, the deceased, Gull Lone, sustained fatal
injury. He stated that he too received an injury in the fight. He also
stated that since his right hand was incapacitated due to bullet shot,
the allegation of hurling of an axe blow on deceased was totally false
and baseless.
Page 5
CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
9. The accused no.2, Khurshid Ahmad Hajam, i.e., appellant no.2
herein, and Imtiyaz Ahmad pleaded alibi, and stated that they were
not at the place of occurrence and were arrested in the next morning
by the police without any reason. The defence also led its evidence
and examined DW1 Bashir Ahmad Wagay, DW2 Mohd Lateef
Malik. The statement of DW3, namely, Dr.Wali Mohd was partly
recorded and his evidence was closed at the request of defence.
10.The Trial Court, having considered the rival contentions and evidence
brought on record by prosecution and defence, came to the conclusion
that the charge against the accused for heinous offence punishable
under Section 302 RPC was not made out and, thus, acquitted them of
the said charge. The Trial Court also gave benefit of doubt to accused,
namely, Muzaffar Ahmad, Imtiyaz Ahmad, Mst. Shabnum Akhter
and Mst. Kulsuma Bano, and they were, accordingly, acquitted of all
the charges. The charge under section 447 and 304 (II) RPC was,
however, held proved beyond reasonable doubt against accused,
Shakeel Ahmad Hajam, appellant no.1 herein, and he was sentenced
to simple imprisonment of ten years and fine of Rs.20,000/- with a
further stipulation that in the event of default in payment of fine, he
shall undergo further imprisonment of six months. Appellant no.2,
Khurshid Ahmad Hajam, was convicted for commission of offence
punishable under Section 325 and 447 RPC and was sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment of five years with fine of Rs.500/- and
two months respectively. It was also stipulated that in default of
Page 6
CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
payment of fine, he would undergo further imprisonment of fifteen
days and the punishment would run concurrently.
11.Feeling dissatisfied and aggrieved by their conviction and sentence
handed down by the Trial Court in terms of impugned
judgment/order, the appellants are before us in this Criminal Appeal.
12.Impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are
challenged by appellants primarily on the following grounds:
(i)
That even if entire prosecution story is accepted on its face
value, yet the charge under Section 304 (II) RPC cannot be said
to have been made out against them. It is urged that medical
evidence does not support the charge, in that, PW Dr. Abdul
Rashid in his report, Exhibit EXPW 9/4, has clearly certified
that the fatal injury on the deceased could have been caused by
the blunt side of axe. It is, thus, argued that having regard to
the make of weapon, the force used, the target chosen and the
nature of injury inflicted, it cannot be said that the blow from
the blunt side of axe allegedly inflicted on deceased was with
an intention to cause death or with a knowledge that such
injury was likely to cause death. It is, therefore, argued that the
learned Trial Court has misdirected itself in appreciating the
evidence on record and erroneously come to the conclusion that
offence punishable under Section 304 (II) RPC was made out.
(ii)
That the Trial Court has not appreciated that when, on the basis
of a set of evidence before it, it had given the benefit of doubt
to accused, Muzaffar Ahmad, Imtiyaz Ahmad, Mst. Shabnam
Page 7
CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
Akhtar, and Mst. Kulsuma Bano, it was not legally permissible
to convict the appellants on the basis of the same evidence
more particularly when the charge was common, evidence was
common and sequence of prosecution case was common. It is,
thus, argued that if evidence was not found acceptable against
four acquitted accused, it ought to have been rejected vis-à-vis
appellants also.
(iii)
That the medical evidence did not prove that the alleged fatal
injury caused on the head of deceased was such as was likely to
cause death. It was, thus, urged that even if entire prosecution
case were to be accepted, at best an offence under Section 324
RPC could be said to be made out and appellants have already
undergone punishment more than prescribed under Section 324
RPC and they are, thus, entitled to be let off.
13.Per contra, Mr. Alla ud din Ganai, learned Dy.AG, would argue that
though Trial Court has discussed the evidence in detail and held
appellants guilty of commission of offence punishable under Section
304 (II)/447 RPC and under Section 325/447 RPC respectively, yet
the Trial Court has not appreciated the conduct of appellants postcommission of offence which unequivocally proves that the intent
with which the injury was inflicted was only to kill the deceased. He
would submit that it has amply come in the evidence of prosecution
that appellants, after inflicting injury on the deceased and others, did
not allow complainant party to shift the injured, in particular Gull
Page 8
CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
Lone, to the hospital so that he succumbed to injuries without
receiving medical intervention.
14.Having heard learned counsel for parties and perused the material on
record, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment
of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court are
perfectly in consonance with law and compatible with the evidence
on record. Indubitably, the occurrence has taken place due to a
property dispute between complainant party and accused. During
exchange of stones, which were seemingly pelted from both sides,
appellant no.1, Shakeel Ahmad Hajam, who was carrying an axe, hit
on the head of deceased Gull Lone. He had an opportunity to hit
deceased on his head by using the sharp edge of axe but instead he hit
him on head by using its blunt side. As is evident from medical
evidence, deceased received only single injury that too an internal
one. The skull was not fractured nor was there any laceration wound
on head. The medical report reveals that only some blood had oozed
out of the ear of the deceased. In these circumstances, it is very
difficult to conclude with certainty that appellant no.1, who was
armed with an axe and caused injury to deceased by using blunt side
of it, had an intention to cause death or a bodily injury as would be
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. There is,
however, ample evidence to show that appellant no.1, when inflicted
an injury on the head of deceased by using blunt side of the axe, had
knowledge that the injury, he was causing, was likely to cause death
but without any intention to cause death or to case such bodily injury
Page 9
CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
as is likely to cause death. It is amply proved that the scuffle between
two parties took place due to land dispute which got escalated and
resulted in appellant no.1 causing a blunt blow of axe on deceased. It
is also evident that appellant no.1, who had an opportunity to use
sharp edge of axe to inflict injury on deceased and even to repeat the
blow, but he did not do so. It is, however, a different matter that the
injury which was not intended to cause death, ultimately led to death
of deceased. The nature of weapon used, the nature of injury caused,
the impact of injury, infliction of single blow and the circumstances
preceding such blow clearly indicate absence of intention on the part
of appellant no.1 to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death of deceased.
15.Section 300 RPC defines “Murder”, whereas Section 304 RPC deals
with punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Both the provisions are set out below for ready reference:
“300. Murder.- Except in the cases hereinafter excepted,
culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death
is caused is done with the intention of causing death, orSecondly. - If it is done with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause
the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, orThirdly. - If it is done with the intention of causing bodily
injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, orFourthly. - If the person committing the act knows that it
is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability
cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, and commits such act without any excuse for
incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as
aforesaid.
Illustrations
(a)
A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies
in consequence. A commits murder.
(b)
A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a
disease that a blow is likely to cause his death,
strikes him with the intention of causing bodily
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c/w CRAA no.02/2007
injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is
guilty of murder, although the blow might not have
been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause the death of a person in a sound state of
health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring
under any disease, gives him such a blow as would
not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in
a sound state of health, here A, although he may
intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of
murder, if he did not intend to cause death or such
bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature
would cause death.
(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club
wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the
ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence.
Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not
have intended to cause Z's death.
(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon
into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is
guilty of murder, although he may not have had a
premeditated design to kill any particular
individual.
Exception. 1. - When culpable homicide is not
murder. - Culpable is not murder if the offender,
whilst deprived of the power of self control by
grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of
the person who gave the provocation or causes the
death of any other person by mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following
provisos. -First. - That the provocation is not
sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as
an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly. - That the provocation is not given by
anything done in obedience to the law or by a
public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers
of such public servant.
Thirdly. - That the provocation is not given by
anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of
private defence.
Explanation. - Whether the provocation was grave
and sudden enough to prevent the offence from
amounting to murder is a question of fact.
Illustration
(a)
A, under the influence of passion excited by
a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills
y, Z's child. This is murder, inasmuch as the
provocation was not given by the child and
the death of the child was not caused by
accident or misfortune in doing an act
caused by the provocation.
(b)
Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A.
A, on this provocation fires a pistol at Y,
neither intending nor knowing himself to be
likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of
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c/w CRAA no.02/2007
sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed
murder, but merely culpable homicide.
(c)
A, is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is
excited to sudden and violent passion by the
arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, inasmuch
as the provocation was given by a thing
done by a public servant in the exercise of
his powers.
(d)
A appears as a witness before Z, Magistrate.
Z, says that he does not believe a word of
A's deposition, and that A has perjured
himself. A is moved to sudden passion by
these words, and kills Z. This is murder.
(e)
A attempts to pull Z's nose. Z, in the
exercise of the right of private defence, lays
hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A
is moved to sudden and violent passion in
consequence, and kills Z. This is murder
inasmuch as the provocation was given by a
thing done in the exercise of the right of
private defence.
(f)
Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited
to violent rage, A, a bystander, intending to
take advantage of B's rage, and to cause him
to kill Z, puts a knife into B's hand for that
purpose. B, kills Z with the knife. Here B
may have committed only culpable
homicide, but A is guilty of murder.
Exception 2. - Culpable homicide is not murder if the
offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of
private defence of person or property, exceeds the power
given to him by law and causes the death of the person
against whom he is exercising such right of defence
without premeditation, and without any intention of doing
more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such
defence.
Illustration
Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to
cause grievous hurt to A. Z draws out a pistol. A persists
in the assault. A, Believing in good faith that he can by no
other means prevent himself from being horse whipped,
shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only
culpable homicide.
Exception 3. - Culpable homicide is not murder if the
offender being a public servant or aiding a public servant
or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of
public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law,
and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith,
believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge
of his duty as such public servant and without ill will
towards the person whose death is caused.
Exception 4. - Culpable homicide is not murder if it is
committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the
heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the
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c/w CRAA no.02/2007
offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation. - It is immaterial in such cases which party
offers the provocation or commits the first assault.
Exception 3. - Culpable homicide is not murder when the
person whose death is caused, being above the age of
eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death
with his own consent.
Illustration
A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under
eighteen years of age, to commit suicide. Here, on account
of Z's youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his
own death; A has therefore abetted murder.
………………………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………….
“304.Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder.—Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting
to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to ten years and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which
the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or
of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the
knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any
intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely
to cause death.”
16.Section 300 RPC defines “murder’ and prescribes that except in the
cases excepted in the section it is a culpable homicide if the act by
which death is caused is done with an intention of causing death or if
it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as offender
knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom the harm is
caused or if it is done with an intention of causing bodily injury to
any person and such bodily injury inflicted is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death or if the person committing
the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk
of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. There are, however, in as
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c/w CRAA no.02/2007
many as five exceptions to this, whereas the culpable homicide shall
not amount to murder viz. act committed under sudden provocation,
self defence, public servant exceeding powers given to him under law
etc etc. Amongst these Exceptions, Exception no.4, which is relevant
for the purposes reads as under:
“Exception 4. - Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed
without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation. - It is immaterial in such cases which party
offers the provocation or commits the first assault.”
17.Section 304 RPC prescribes punishment for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder. The culpable homicide, not amounting to
murder, is punishable with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten years, if the act
by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death,
or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, that is
called Part-I of Section 304. However, the Part II of Section 304
prescribes that the punishment for culpable homicide not amounting
to murder would be imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is
done with the knowledge that is likely to cause death, but without any
intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death.
This we call Part-II of Section 304 RPC, for which appellant
no.1, Shakeel Ahmad Hajam, has been convicted and sentenced by
the Trial Court.
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c/w CRAA no.02/2007
18.When we examine the evidence on record and undisputed findings of
fact returned by the Trial Court, it is clearly borne out that
undoubtedly the death of deceased was as a result of a single blow
inflicted by appellant no.1 by using blunt side of the axe during a
scuffle which took place on a property dispute.
19.As is discussed above, the nature of injury caused, the type of weapon
used, and the fact that it was only single injury by a blunt object on
the head and that it followed a free fight between two sides, it can
reasonably be inferred that injury inflicted by appellant no.1 was not
with an intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as
was likely to cause death, rather it can be inferred from the evidence
that appellant no.1 inflicted axe blow on the deceased with the
knowledge that such blow inflicted on the head was likely to cause
death or at least cause such a bodily injury as was likely to cause
death but there is no evidence to conclude that appellant no.1 had an
intention to cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause
death.
20.Indisputably, the evidence on record is clear and incontrovertible that
the death of deceased was caused by appellant no.1 by inflicting axe
blow on his head but this act was not premeditated and happened in a
sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. Appellant
no.1, despite having axe in his hand, did not take undue advantage or
acted in cruel or unusual manner. He inflicted injury from the blunt
side of axe by causing a single blow and did not even repeat the blow
that clearly indicates and proves that there was no premeditation or
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c/w CRAA no.02/2007
intention to cause death or bodily injury as is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death etc. etc. Though the
knowledge could be attributed to appellant no.1 to the extent that the
blow he was inflicting could cause death or was likely to cause death.
21.Viewed from any angle, we do not find it a case sufficiently proved
by the prosecution as would warrant the conviction of appellants or
any other accused for commission of offence punishable under
Section 302 RPC. Appellant no.1 has, therefore, rightly been
convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 447
and 304 (II) RPC.
22.The contention of Mr. S. T. Hussain, learned senior counsel appearing
for appellants, that most of the witnesses examined were the related
witnesses and, therefore, their testimony ought to have been discarded
by the Trial Court, is without any substance and cannot be accepted.
It is trite law that merely because the witnesses are related or known
to the deceased would not be a ground to discard their evidence. The
only caution the Trial Court is to observe is to carefully scrutinize
such evidence and find out if there is a scope for taking a view about
false implication.
23.It is a settled position of law that the Court cannot ignore the
testimony of witnesses only because they are close relatives of the
victim. A Three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. (2021) 13 SCC 716 notes:
“28…No doubt that, merely because the witnesses are interested and
related witnesses, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve their
testimony. However, the testimony of such witnesses has to be
scrutinized with due care and caution. Upon scrutiny of the evidence
of such witnesses, if the court is satisfied that the evidence is
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c/w CRAA no.02/2007
creditworthy, then there is no bar on the court in relying on such
evidence.”
24.In cases where the crime is committed at or near the place of
residence of the deceased, it is the close relatives who are likely to be
present to witness. They are natural witnesses. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in State of A.P. v. S. Rayappa, (2006) 4 SCC 512, while noting
the difference between interested witness and related witness,
observed as follows:
“6…By now it is a well-established principle of law that testimony
of a witness otherwise inspiring confidence cannot be discarded on
the ground that he being a relation of the deceased is an interested
witness. A close relative who is a very natural witness cannot be
termed as an interested witness. The term interested postulates that
the person concerned must have some direct interest in seeing the
accused person being convicted somehow or the other either
because of animosity or some other reasons.
7. On the contrary it has now almost become a fashion that the
public is reluctant to appear and depose before the court especially
in criminal case because of varied reasons. Criminal cases are kept
dragging for years to come and the witnesses are harassed a lot.
They are being threatened, intimidated and at the top of all they are
subjected to lengthy cross-examination. In such a situation, the only
natural witness available to the prosecution would be the relative
witness. The relative witness is not necessarily an interested
witness. On the other hand, being a close relation to the deceased
they will try to prosecute the real culprit by stating the truth. There
is no reason as to why a close relative will implicate and depose
falsely against somebody and screen the real culprit to escape
unpunished. The only requirement is that the testimony of the
relative witnesses should be examined cautiously…”
25.In the instant case, as sequence of occurrence reveals, there was a free
fight between two groups, i.e., complainant party and accused, over a
piece of land and, therefore, the natural witnesses present on the spot
were the members of the complainant party and obviously related to
deceased member of such party. The presence of persons and the
related witnesses at the occurrence, in the given facts and
circumstances, is thus natural; simply because they are related
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CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
witnesses, their consistent testimony tested on cross-examination
cannot be discarded. The Trial Court has very cautiously and with
circumspection evaluated the evidence and come to the conclusion
that infliction of injury by appellant no.1 by use of axe on the head of
the deceased is amply proved. There was trespass on the property of
the complainant party which fact is also proved by the prosecution
evidence and even learned senior counsel appearing for appellants
does not dispute the said fact. The fight between the two groups over
a piece of land is even admitted by appellant no.1 in his statement
under Section 342 Cr.P.C.
26.This brings us to the argument of Mr. Alla ud din Ganai, learned
AAG, appearing for the State, to the extent that the Trial Court has
not appreciated the post occurrence conduct of appellant, Shakeel
Ahmad Hajam, in that, he prevented shifting of the injured to the
hospital in time. Such conduct, he argues, reflects clearly that the
intention of appellant no.1 was only to cause death of deceased and
nothing more and nothing less.
27.We have given our thoughtful consideration to this aspect of the
matter and gone through the statement of witnesses, i.e., PW1, the
complainant, Mushtaq Ahmad Lone; and PW2 Mst. Khatji, in which
it has come that there was some resistance offered by the appellant,
Shakeel Ahmad Hajam, and others, to the shifting of deceased Gull
Lone to the hospital. The Trial Court has considered the evidence on
record and has come to the conclusion that the resistance offered by
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CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
the accused did not lead to such delay in shifting deceased to the
hospital as could be held to be the cause of death of deceased.
28.It is trite law that post-occurrence conduct is primarily relevant to the
inference of intention or knowledge, but it does not alter the
ingredients of Section 300 RPC, once those ingredients are otherwise
established. The post-occurrence conduct can be a relevant
circumstance from which intention and knowledge could be inferred,
including conduct by which an injured person is prevented from
being taken to the hospital; but it is not in itself a sufficient ground to
infer intention to cause death. We understand that the conduct of the
accused subsequent to the occurrence is not completely irrelevant.
Where the evidence shows that the accused prevented the injured
from being moved to a hospital or receiving medical assistance,
cogent and material inferences can legitimately be drawn regarding
their knowledge of the gravity of the injury and their desire that the
victim should not survive. Such subsequent conduct, however, cannot
by itself be the sole foundation for a conviction for murder. It has to
be established cumulatively alongside the nature and size of the
injuries, the weapon employed, the locality of the body targeted, the
surrounding circumstances, and the medical evidence. Where the
injured ultimately dies because timely treatment was deliberately
prevented, the post-occurrence conduct may establish the connection
between the assault and the death, provided the prosecution proves
this through clear legal and factual evidence.
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CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
29.In the instant case, there is nothing in the medical evidence to suggest
that the death of deceased occurred due to late arrival in the hospital.
There is also lack of convincing evidence on record to show that
resistance offered by appellants and other accused actually delayed
the shifting of the deceased to the hospital to his detriment.
30.We have already deliberated in detail herein above the circumstances
beginning from the fight that ensued between the two sides on
account of a land dispute to the causing of fatal injury on the head of
deceased Gull Lone and concurred with the view taken by the Trial
Court that the occurrence, in particular inflicting injury on the head of
the deceased Gull Lone, was not premeditated, rather was a result of
sudden fight that ensued between the parties. The injury was inflicted
in the heat of passion and thus, was the case of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder. From the nature of injury, it was rightly
inferred by the Trial Court that there was no intention on the part of
appellants to cause death yet there was an ample evidence to indicate
that appellant no.1 had the knowledge that the injury he was inflicting
was likely to cause death, as such, the Trial Court has rightly
convicted appellant no.1 for commission of offence punishable under
Section 304(II) and 447 RPC. Similarly, role of appellant no.2 is
amply proved and the same was not disputed by the learned senior
counsel appearing for him. He, too, has been correctly convicted for
commission of offences punishable under Section 325 and 447 RPC.
The sentences imposed are neither disproportionate to the offences
committed nor can be said to be arbitrary or irrational in any manner.
Page 20
CRA no.01/2007
c/w CRAA no.02/2007
31. We have deliberately not extracted and/or sifted through the evidence
recorded by the Trial Court because Mr. S. T. Hussain, learned senior
counsel, appearing for appellants, did not dispute the findings of fact
recorded by the Trial Court rather stressed more upon the legal
arguments he raised during the course of his arguments.
32.From the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in this appeal and the
same is, accordingly, dismissed.
CRAA no.02/2007
33.In view of aforesaid discussion made, no case is made out for
interfering with the impugned judgment of acquittal recorded against
respondents 3 to 6.
33.As elaborately discussed above, the offence under Section 302 RPC
was not established during trial against any of the accused, and they
were, thus, rightly acquitted by the Trial Court. The conviction of
respondent No.1, Shakeel Ahmad Hajam, under Section 304 (II)/447
RPC and respondent No.2, Khurshid Ahmad Hajam, under Section
325/447 RPC, has already been upheld in CRA No. 01/2007,
therefore, no fresh deliberation on this aspect of the matter is called
for. Otherwise also, the scope of interference by the Appellate Court
in a judgment of acquittal is limited and circumscribed. If, on a given
set of evidence, two views are possible, the Appellate Court must take
the view that benefits the accused. It is a cardinal principle of
criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed innocent until
proven guilty, and this presumption gets fortified by the judgment of
acquittal recorded by the trial Court.
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c/w CRAA no.02/2007
34.Viewed thus, we do not find it a fit case to interfere with the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. The instant appeal
is without any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
(Sanjeev Kumar)
Judge
(Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati)
Chief Justice
Srinagar
28.09.2026
Ajaz Ahmad, Secy
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
Vinod Kumar
2026.09.28 18:20
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
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c/w CRAA no.02/2007
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