Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 1495 of 2026
==========================================================
STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
SHAILESH @ AKKIBHAI BHALABHAI PARMAR & ANR.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR ROHAN H RAVAL, APP for the Appellant(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 18/09/2026
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI)
1.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of
acquittal dated 03.09.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Vadodara, in Sessions Case No.182 of 2021, whereby the
respondents-accused, came to be acquitted for the offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of
the Gujarat Police Act, the appellant has preferred the present appeal
under Section 419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
(“BNSS” for short).
2.
The brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are as
under:
2.1.
The respondent-accused and the deceased, Pratikbhai Patel, were
on terms of enmity on account of a prior quarrel. Bearing the said
animosity, and in furtherance of their design to cause the death of the
deceased, the respondent-accused are alleged to have armed themselves
with an iron pipe.
2.2.
On 14.08.2021, at about 18:00 hours, the respondent-accused
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
allegedly went to the open plot of Hemantbhai Patel situated at village
Bajwa and, with the intention of causing death, launched a fatal assault
upon the deceased. They are alleged to have inflicted indiscriminate
blows with the iron pipe on his person, caused grievous injuries and
thereby caused his death. In so acting, and in mutual aid of one another,
they are alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections
302 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Gujarat
Police Act.
2.3.
The complainant thereupon lodged a complaint, which came to be
registered at Jawaharnagar Police Station as C.R. No.1119600921080804
of 2021 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 114 of the
Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act. During the
course of investigation, the alleged complicity of the respondent-accused
surfaced and, they were arrested, and, upon conclusion of investigation, a
charge-sheet was filed before the Court of the learned 2nd Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Vadodara. As the offences were exclusively
triable by the Court of Session, the learned Magistrate, by order dated
30.10.2021, committed the case to the learned Sessions Court, Vadodara,
under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”
for short), where it came to be registered as Sessions Case No.182 of
2021. After due compliance with Section 207 of the Code, charge under
Sections 302 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the
Gujarat Police Act was framed under Section 228 of the Code at Exh.-6.
The pleas of the respondent-accused were recorded at Exhs.-7 and 8.
They pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution
thereupon adduced oral and documentary evidence and closed its case by
filing a closing purshis at Exh.-71.
2.4.
Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence, the
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
learned Sessions Court, by the judgment and order dated 03.09.2025,
acquitted the respondent-accused, namely (1) Shailesh alias Akkibhai
Bhalabhai Parmar and (2) Chandubhai Bhalabhai Parmar, both residing at
Bajwa Road, village Karchiya, Taluka and District Vadodara, of the
offences punishable under Sections 302 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code
and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act, under Section 235(1) of the
Code, for want of evidence. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the
said judgment and order of acquittal, the appellant-State has preferred the
present appeal under Section 419 of the BNSS.
3.
Submissions on behalf of the Learned APP for the State:
3.1.
Learned APP for the State submitted that the judgment of acquittal
recorded by the City Civil and learned Sessions Court, Ahmedabad is
contrary to the weight of the record and does not warrant affirmation even
at the threshold. The learned Sessions Court gravely erred in discarding a
complete and consistent prosecution case merely because one panch
witness did not support the incident in his oral evidence. Mere hostility
cannot, by itself, lead to a finding that the occurrence did not take place.
3.2.
The complaint at Exh.-31 stands fully corroborated by the
complainant and independent witnesses, including Witness No. 10, who
supported the entire sequence of facts. Police witnesses have likewise
supported the prosecution version. There is no reason to disbelieve them,
police officers have no motive to depose falsely. The investigation,
including the presence of the Investigating Officer (Exh.-54) and the FSL
officer at the scene, find credence despite it, the same was improperly
brushed aside. Even if the panchas turned hostile, the remaining evidence
is not liable to be discarded. The chain stands completed by the ocular
account of the complainant, the independent witnesses, the Investigating
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
Officer and the scientific material. No contradiction creating a reasonable
doubt has emerged.
3.3.
Learned APP has placed reliance is placed on the FSL report
received in pursuance of the forwarding note at Exh.-56. The blood group
of the deceased was “O” Positive, the same blood group was detected on
the clothes of the accused, establishing a direct link. The muddamal
article pipe identified as Article No. 10, read with the oral evidence of
Witness No. 10, the complaint at Exh.-31 and the evidence of the
Investigating Officer at Exh.-54, have nexus which the accused to the
scene and the weapon. The incident was the outcome of old enmity,
which motive has not been displaced.
3.4.
The learned Sessions Court failed to appreciate the evidence in its
proper perspective. Turning hostile of a panch cannot eclipse the
consistent ocular evidence, the official acts of the Investigating Officer
and the FSL finding linking the deceased’s blood to the accused’s
garments. The prosecution has established the chain of circumstances
beyond reasonable doubt. The view taken is not a possible view on this
record, it ignores material particulars and results in miscarriage of justice.
The appeal therefore deserves to be admitted. Notice be issued to the
accused, the Record and Proceedings be called for, and upon hearing the
judgment of acquittal deserves to be set aside on account of the nature of
the occurrence and the scientific link of the deceased’s blood with the
person of the accused.
4.
We have heard the learned APP for the State, at the stage of
admission and carefully examined the oral and documentary evidence
adduced before the learned Sessions Court.
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
5.
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
From the deposition of Irfanbhai Mehmudbhai Diwan (PW-11,
Exh.-32), it transpires that he was employed on contract at G.S.F.C., with
duty hours from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., that on the day in question
powder had settled on his boots and he therefore went to the open plot to
wash them, that he left work at noon and did not return, that when he
went there a quarrel was going on among Sanju, Pratik and Akki, that two
brothers struck Pratik with an iron pipe, that persons present called the
108 ambulance, and that thereafter a complaint was given at
Jawaharnagar Police Station. He identified his signature on Exh.-33,
claimed to identify the accused present in Court, and stated that the
muddamal pipe shown to him was the same pipe.
6.
In cross-examination, he admitted that the police obtained his
signature on a complaint already prepared by them, that he did not dictate
any part of it, that he could neither read nor write except his name, that he
did not read the complaint, that he had not gone to the police station that
day but went there at the instance of the police and signed the paper, that
washing facilities were available at the company itself, that after noon he
did not go to work, that he had an eye complaint since childhood, that the
complaint contains no description of the pipe, that the pipe shown in
Court was bent, and that the complaint does not state where the blows
were inflicted.
7.
The learned Sessions Court held that this witness did not see the
incident, that at the relevant time he had gone to wash his boots, that he
left duty at noon and did not return, that the first information places the
occurrence at about 6:00 p.m. whereas his duty ended at 5:00 p.m. and his
deposition states that he left at noon, that the first information states that
the accused came into the open plot and beat Pratik, whereas his
deposition speaks of a quarrel among Sanju, Pratik and Akki and of two
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
brothers using a pipe, and that although two brothers appear to have
beaten the deceased, the record does not show that they were the present
accused.
8.
We find no reason to interfere with that finding. A witness who left
work at noon, went to wash his boots, had an untreated eye problem since
childhood, did not read the complaint he signed, did not dictate it, and
went to the police station only because the police asked him to sign a
prepared paper, cannot be treated as an eye-witness to an incident alleged
to have occurred in the evening. His identification of the accused in Court
and of the bent muddamal pipe, when the first information contains no
description of the pipe, has no value when he himself is not shown to
have seen the assault. The difference between the first information, which
states that the accused came into the plot and beat Pratik, and his
deposition, which speaks of a quarrel among three persons and two
brothers using a pipe, further shows that the accusation against the
present accused was not based on what this witness actually saw. The
learned Sessions Court was, therefore, right in holding that Exh.-32 does
not connect the assault with the present accused.
9.
The deposition of Hansaben Pravinbhai Dhamechiya (PW-13,
Exh.-53) shows that Pratik lived in the neighbourhood, and that Pratik
said he would eat bhajiya and went to the upper floor, that thereafter two
boys came, called Pratik down and severely beat him, that one of them
pressed his mouth, that the two boys were relatives of Pratik and used to
eat and drink with him, that she did not know or identify anyone, that
they first beat him with a wooden stick which broke and thereafter used
an iron pipe, that a bucket of water was thrown and blood flowed, and
that the incident took place at 3:00 p.m. She further stated that when the
police showed her the accused and asked her, she said that she did not
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
recognise anyone among them, and she did not identify anyone in Court
either.
10.
In cross-examination, she admitted that she could not identify the
accused either before the police or on the day of her deposition, that her
police statement was not given to her to read, that she could not identify
the pipe, and that the breaking of the wooden stick was not mentioned in
her police statement.
11.
The learned Sessions Court held that although the fact that two
boys beating the deceased was on record, there was no identification, that
her deposition placed the incident at 3:00 p.m. whereas the police
statement placed it at about 6:00 p.m., that there was doubt regarding
both the time and identity, and that the accused could not be convicted on
this evidence.
12.
We find that a witness who refuses to identify the persons standing
trial both before the police and in Court, and who cannot identify the
alleged weapon, does not connect the assault with the present accused.
The difference between 3:00 p.m. in Court and about 6:00 p.m. in the
police statement, and the fact that she stated in Court that a wooden stick
broke, although this was not stated in the police statement, further show
that her account is not consistent. The fact that two unidentified boys,
described only as relatives who used to eat and drink with the deceased,
caused injuries does not prove that the two accused before the Court were
those boys. The learned Sessions Court was, therefore, right in not relying
upon Exh.-53.
MEDICAL EVIDENCE:
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
13.
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
Dr. Dikshit Sharishbhai Patel (PW-10, Exh.-28) was examined as
the said doctor conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased.
In cross-examination, he admitted that the age of the injuries was not
recorded in the post-mortem notes, that the injuries found on the deceased
could have been caused by any other hard and blunt object besides the
muddamal pipe, that no treatment papers of the deceased were available
at the time of the post-mortem, that if the deceased had received proper
and timely treatment there was a possibility of survival, that there were
no stitches on the body to stop bleeding, and that rigor mortis ordinarily
continues for about 30 hours. On considering this evidence, the learned
Sessions Court recorded that the doctor had conducted the post-mortem
and opined that the death occurred due to shock following haemorrhage
from the many injuries on the body, but there was no evidence that
attribute present accused persons with those injuries, and therefore the
evidence of the post-mortem doctor did not assist the prosecution in
proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
14.
The Medical evidence can establish the nature of injuries and the
cause of death, but by itself it cannot identify the assailant. When the
same injuries could have been caused by any other hard and blunt object,
and the two material witnesses have failed to identify the present accused
as the persons who used a pipe, the post-mortem opinion only proves that
the deceased died of shock and haemorrhage from multiple injuries. It
does not prove that the injuries were caused by the two accused standing
trial or by the particular muddamal pipe. The fact that the age of the
injuries was not recorded and that treatment papers were not available at
the time of the post-mortem also leaves the medical evidence
unconnected with any proved act of the accused. The learned Sessions
Court was, therefore, justified in holding that Exh.-28 does not complete
the prosecution case against the present accused.
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS THEREOF:
15.
Siddharaj Shailendrabhai Anand (PW-14, Exh.-54) stated that in
August 2021 he was working as Police Inspector at Jawaharnagar Police
Station, that on 14.08.2021 Irfanbhai Mehmudbhai Diwan gave a
complaint in his presence against the accused, that according to the
complaint, on 14.08.2021 at about 6:00 p.m., in the fali of Hemantbhai
Patel at village Bajwa, the accused assaulted the deceased with an iron
pipe, gave incriminate blows, caused injuries and caused his death, that
the complaint is Exh.-33, and that he directed the PSO to register the
offence by Exh.-40.
16.
He further stated that he prepared the scene-of-offence panchnama,
inquest panchnama, panchnama of the clothes of the accused, panchnama
of the clothes of the deceased, and panchnama for seizure of the weapon
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, that accused Shailesh was wearing
a black pant and a half-sleeved T-shirt with blood stains, that accused
Chandubhai was wearing light pink jeans pant and a yellow T-shirt with
blood stains, that accused Shailesh voluntarily pointed out the pipe from
the bushes in the open plot of Hemant Patel, and that the identificationparade panchnama is Exh.-26.
17.
He stated that the injured was unconscious and therefore his
statement could not be recorded (Exh.-55), that the post-mortem
requisition is Exh.-29, the post-mortem form is Exh.-30 and the postmortem notes are Exh.-31, that the muddamal was sent to the F.S.L., that
the notification pertaining to weapon is Exh.-68, and that a charge-sheet
was filed after completion of the investigation.
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
18.
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
In cross-examination, he admitted that the offence was registered 7
hours after the occurrence, that no evidence was collected regarding the
complainant’s duty hours and no further statement of the complainant
was recorded, that the statement of the person who dialed 108 was not
taken, that a telephonic vardhi was given at 17:59 hours on 14.08.2021,
that the vardhi at Exh.-43 mentions the name of only 1 accused, that the
first information does not state how the complainant knew or identified
both accused, and that the investigation did not show that accused No. 2
Chandubhai was mentally ill.
19.
The learned Sessions Court, having already found that the two
material witnesses did not identify the present accused as the assailants,
treated this police evidence as proof only of the steps taken during
investigation and not as proof of the charge. Registration of the first
information, preparation of panchnamas, seizure of stained clothes, a
Section 27 pointing-out, an identification-parade paper, and sending the
muddamal to the F.S.L. are steps of investigation. They do not become
substantive proof that these two accused caused the fatal injuries,
particularly when the complainant signed a complaint which he had not
read, Hansaben (Exh.-53) refused to identify the accused before the
police and in Court, and the first information itself does not explain how
both accused were named. The 7-hour delay in registration, failure to
verify the complainant’s duty hours, failure to record the 108 caller, the
vardhi naming only 1 accused, and the absence of any explanation in the
first information as to the source of identification show that the
investigation cannot fill the lacuna left by the hostile and non-identifying
ocular evidence. Recovery of a pipe from bushes at the instance of 1
accused, without a reliable witness identifying the assailants, does not
prove that the pipe was used by the present accused to cause the death.
The evidence of Exh.-54, therefore, does not support the prosecution
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
case.
20.
On considering the oral and documentary evidence produced by the
prosecution, the first question is whether it is proved that the present
accused intended to cause the death of the deceased. Hansaben (Exh.-53)
stated that the accused and the deceased were friends and used to eat and
drink together. The complainant (Exh.-32) was washing his boots at the
time when he claimed to have been in the plot, and the record does not
show that he saw the assault. There is no evidence that the present
accused had an intention to kill the deceased. The medical witness proved
that death was caused by shock following haemorrhage from many
injuries. This does not prove that the present accused caused those
injuries or that the death resulted from any act proved against them.
Nothing useful to the prosecution comes from the deposition of
Hansaben.
21.
The police witnesses do not get support from the complainant or
Hansaben. All the panch witnesses only identified their signatures on the
panchnamas. Identifying a signature, by itself, does not prove the
contents of the panchnama. There are material contradictions between the
first information and the depositions. The F.S.L. report at Exh.-80 was
not proved by examining the F.S.L. officer, and the Exh. was brought on
record after examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The panch witnesses did not support the seizure of
the clothes or the weapon. The learned Sessions Court, therefore, held
that although an occurrence of the kind stated in the first information may
have taken place, the prosecution had not produced any evidence showing
the involvement of the present accused, consequently extended the
benefit of this failure to the accused persons.
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
22.
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
The prosecution also sought to rely upon circumstantial evidence.
The record does not show that anyone saw the present accused beating
the deceased. The complainant spoke of two brothers using an iron pipe,
but he did not state that the present accused were those brothers. There is
a material contradiction regarding the time of the occurrence. The
complainant was washing his boots and, after leaving work at noon, did
not return. There is no evidence of last-seen-together, the prosecution has
not produced any evidence on this point. An identification parade could
not be held. At no stage did the involvement or identity of the present
accused emerge, even as a suspicion. The prosecution has not produced
sufficient and reliable evidence to conclude that the present accused, with
an intention to cause death, struck the deceased with a pipe and caused
his death. The medical opinion alone cannot be treated as conclusive
without independent and consistent ocular or circumstantial evidence. At
the highest, the evidence shows the possibilities of two unknown persons
having caused injuries. This does not prove the case against the two
accused who stood on trial.
23.
It transpires that there is no reliable direct witness. The two
material witnesses have not identified the accused as the assailants. There
is no proved last-seen-together circumstance involving the present
accused. The medical evidence proves the cause of death and not the
identity of the assailants. The investigation, panchnamas proved only
through signatures, and an F.S.L. report which was not duly proved
cannot fill these lacuna. The prosecution has failed to prove the charge
against the present accused.
24.
The learned Sessions Court recorded that the complainant and the
other witness did not, in their depositions, support the offence alleged by
the prosecution. When the prime evidence itself does not support the
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
prosecution case, the case cannot be proved only on the basis of
supporting or investigative material. It is a settled principle that an
accused is presumed innocent until the alleged offence is proved against
him by legal evidence, and mere preliminary or supporting material does
not remove that presumption.
25.
We find no error in that approach. Once Irfanbhai Mehmudbhai
Diwan (Exh.-32) is not shown to have seen the assault and does not state
that the present accused were the two brothers who used a pipe, and once
Hansaben Pravinbhai Dhamechiya (Exh.-53) refuses to identify them
both before the police and in Court, the foundation of the prosecution
case fails. The police panchnamas proved only by signatures, seizure of
stained clothes, a Section 27 pointing-out, and medical evidence
regarding the cause of death are only supporting material. They cannot,
by themselves, replaced and take place of evidence to substantiate the
charge that the accused persons committed the offence. The presumption
of innocence, therefore, continues.
26.
Thus, the whole case of the prosecution rests on the circumstantial
evidence; however the prosecution has failed to place on record any such
circumstances to link the chain so as to surface the implication of the
accused in commission of the crime in question. It is pertinent to note
that even as per the case of the prosecution, in absence of any motive, that
itself is sufficient to dislodge the case of prosecution if other proven
circumstances could form a chain so complete as to indicate that in all
human probability it is accused and no one else who committed crime
yet, in a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important
part.
27.
Now, reverting back to the facts of the present case, nothing sort of
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
any such material seems to be placed on record to indicate as to motive
behind the commission of the offence in question and therefore,
admittedly the whole case rests on the circumstantial evidence and
considering the way in which the entire incident have been described,
followed by the investigation carried out by the IO and to convict the
accused in absence of any direct evidence though dealing with the case
based on circumstantial evidence, the important aspect which requires to
be considered are such as (i) whether circumstances relied by prosecution
have been proved beyond reasonable doubt; (ii) whether those
circumstances are of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt
of accused; (iii) whether those circumstances taken cumulatively form a
chain so far complete that there is no escape from conclusion that within
all human probability crime was committed by accused; (iv) whether they
are consistent only with hypothesis of accused being guilty; and lastly (v)
whether they exclude every possible hypothesis except one to be proved.
28.
In a case of circumstantial evidence, the chain is required to be
completed as mandated under the law so as to indicate the guilt of the
accused while discarding any other theory of the crime. If one of the link
goes missing and not proved, in view of the settled law on the point, the
conviction is required to be interfered with. At this stage, with profit, we
may refer to the decision in case of Laxman Prasad Alias Laxman
(supra) where the Hon’ble Apex Court after referring to Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra [(1984) 4 SCC 116] and
Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan vs. State of Gujarat [(2020) 14 SCC 750] has
quashed the conviction by making observations in paragraph 2 to 4 as
under:
“2.
The present one is a case of circumstantial evidence. The
prosecution led evidence to establish three links of the chain: (i) motive,
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
(ii) last seen, and (iii) recovery of weapon of assault, at the pointing out of
the appellant. The High Court, while dealing with the evidence on record,
agreed with the finding of motive and the last seen, however, insofar as the
recovery of the weapon of assault and bloodstained clothes were
concerned, the High Court in para 18 of the judgment held the same to be
invalid and also goes to the extent to say that the recovery which has been
made does not indicate that the appellant has committed the offence. Still,
it observed that looking to the entire gamut and other clinching evidence
against the appellant of last seen and motive, affirmed the conviction.
3.
We do not find such conclusion of the High Court to be strictly in
accordance with law. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the chain has to
be complete in all respects so as to indicate the guilt of the accused and
also exclude any other theory of the crime. The law is well settled on the
above point. Reference may be had to the following cases:
(i) Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,
(ii) Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan v. State of Gujarat.
4.
Thus, if the High Court found one of the links to be missing and not
proved in view of the settled law on the point, the conviction ought to have
been interfered with.”
29.
At this juncture, it is apt to refer the judgment of the Supreme
Court, in the case of Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. The State of
Karnataka & Ors., 2026 INSC 67, the relevant paragraphs of which read
as under:
“26. At this stage, we would like to refer the decisions rendered by this
Court on the aspect of interference of Appellate Court in the appeal filed
by the State challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the Trial
Court.
27. In the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka
this Court held in paragraphs 39 to 42 as under:
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v.
State of Bihar,(2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31]
encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp.482-83, para
29)
“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled
out the following general principles regarding the powers of the
appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of
acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappacase [Chandrappa
v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC
(Cri)325], SCC p. 432, para 42)
‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the
following general principles regarding powers of the appellate
court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal
emerge:
(1)
An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded.
(2)
The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3)
Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong”
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”,
etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are
more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than
to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to
come to its own conclusion.
(4)
An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial
court.
(5)
If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara
v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this
Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under
Section 378 CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8)
“8..… 8.1.
The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the
presumption of innocence,
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal,
is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence,
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal,
after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the
view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been
taken on the basis of the evidence on record,
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot
overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was
also possible, and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if
it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on
the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was
possible.”
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of
interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of
acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be
exercised within the four corners of the following principles:
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity,
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider
material evidence on record, and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view
consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence
available on record.
42. The appellate court, in order to interfere with the judgment of
acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors
if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the
trial court.
28. In the case of Ramesh v. State of Uttarakhand, this Court has
observed and held in para 19 & 20 as under:
“19. In a case like this when the trial court acquitted the accused
persons of their charges, the High Court could not have reversed the
finding merely on the basis that other view, as recorded by the High
Court, appeared to it to be a plausible view. Such an approach by the
High Court, against the judgment of the acquittal, is impermissible. In
this context, we may usefully refer to Kalyan v. State of U.P. [Kalyan v.
State of U.P., (2001) 9 SCC 632 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 780] wherein it was
held : (SCC pp. 640-41, paras 15, 18 & 20)
“15. … The view taken by the trial court could have been
disturbed only if there were compelling reasons. We do not find
any compelling reason noticed [State of U.P. v. Hari Lal, 1998
SCC OnLine All 1216 : 1999 All LJ 142] by the High Court
while setting aside the order of acquittal.
18. Even if another view regarding the occurrence was possible,
as taken by the High Court, the same could not be made a basis
for setting aside the order of the trial court in view of the settled
position of law on the point.
20. Under the circumstances, the appeal is allowed by setting
aside the judgment of the High Court convicting the accused
persons and sentencing them to various imprisonments including
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
life imprisonment. We uphold the order of acquittal passed by
the trial court in favour of the appellants.”
20. In another judgment in Basappa v. State of Karnataka [Basappa
v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 154 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 497] ,
this Court noticed plethora of judgments where this very principle had
been adopted, as can be seen from the following discussion therefrom :
(SCC pp. 158-61, paras 11-12, 14 &, 17-18)
“11. In Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana [Bhim Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2002) 10 SCC 461 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1469] , it has
been clarified that interference by the appellate court against an
order of acquittal would be justified only if the view taken by the
trial court is one which no reasonable
person would in the given circumstances, take.
12. In Kallu v. State of M.P. [Kallu v. State of M.P., (2006) 10
SCC 313 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 546] , it has been held by this
Court that if the view taken by the trial court is a plausible view,
the High Court will not be justified in reversing it merely
because a different view is possible.…
14.In Ganpat v. State of Haryana [Ganpat v. State of Haryana,
(2010) 12 SCC 59 :(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 309] , SCC para 15,
some of the above principles have been restated. To quote :
(SCC p. 62)
‘15. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the
appellate court while dealing with appeals, particularly, against
an order of acquittal:
(iv) An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling
reason for interference.’
17. … It is not the stand of the High Court that there had been
some miscarriage of justice in the way the trial court has
appreciated the evidence. On the contrary, it is the only stand of
the High Court that on the available evidence, another view is
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
also reasonably possible in the sense that the appellant-accused
could have been convicted. In such circumstances, the High
Court was not justified in reversing the acquittal.…
18. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment [State of
Karnataka v. Basappa, 2010 SCC OnLine Kar 5110] is set aside
and that of the trial court is restored.”
29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said
that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal
recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view,
the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground
that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be
kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against
an order of acquittal:
(a)
whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity,
(b)
whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to
consider the material evidence on record,
(c)
an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are
“compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is
“clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for
interference.’
(d)
the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal,
after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether
the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could
have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record,
(e)
if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot
overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view
was also possible, and
(f)
the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only
if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be
recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt
of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no
R/CR.A/1495/2026(GJHC240202812026)
ORDER DATED: 18/09/2026
other conclusion was possible.
30.
In view of the aforesaid appreciation of the material on record, we
are satisfied that the prosecution has failed to prove that the present
accused were the two persons who inflicted the fatal injuries, and that the
view taken by the learned Sessions Court is a plausible view, calling for
no interference at this stage.
31.
The learned Sessions Court has held that the two material
witnesses do not identify the present accused as the assailants, the lastseen-together circumstance is not proved, the medical evidence proves
the cause of death but not the identity of the assailants, and the
investigation papers cannot fill the gap regarding identity. The findings
are not shown to be perverse, contrary to the record, or unsustainable. No
arguable ground for admission is made out. Hence, the present appeal
deserves to be dismissed at this stage.
32.
For the forgoing reasons, the present appeal is dismissed. Record
and proceedings, if any, be remitted to the concerned Court.
(ILESH J. VORA,J)
(R. T. VACHHANI, J)
MVP
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review