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R/CR.A/479/2008
(GJHC240417232008)
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 479 of 2008
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
==========================================
Approved for Reporting
Yes
No
√
==========================================
STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
RAJESHKUMAR DHULAJI MAKVANA & ANR.
==========================================
Appearance:
MS JYOTI BHATT APP for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR CR ABICHANDANI(2421) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
MR VO JOSHI(5883) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
==========================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 09/10/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
CHALLENGE:
1.
The appellant- State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal under
Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the
judgment and order of acquittal dated 05.05.2007 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Ahmedabad
(hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial Court”) in Special [NDPS] Case
No.03 of 2006, whereby the Trial Court has acquitted the respondent
accused from the charges under Sections 8(c), 21 and 29 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter be
referred to as the “Act”) .
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(GJHC240417232008)
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FACTS :
2.
The accused No.2, Sharifabibi, was previously engaged in the
clandestine sale of brown sugar and in connection with the same,
offences were registered against her at Madhavpura Police Station
vide Prohibition / NDPS Crime Register No. 5208/99 under Sections
8(c), 21 and 22 of the NDPS Act, and at Sabarmati Police Station vide
Crime Register No. 3128/04 under Sections 8(c), 21, 22 and 29 of the
NDPS Act. Upon being convicted and sentenced in the said offences,
she was undergoing her sentence at Sabarmati Central Jail. During
that period, accused No.1, Rajeshkumar Dhulaji Makwana, was
serving as a Police Constable and was posted at Sabarmati Central
Jail. Since Sharifabibi's son and husband used to visit her in jail,
accused Rajesh became acquainted with Sharifabibi. After Sharifabibi
was released from jail, accused Rajesh used to meet her and in this
manner, they remained acquainted with each other. From 04.06.2006
onwards, Sharifabibi was in contact with accused Rajesh Dhulaji
Makwana. As per the telephonic conversation between them, a person
known to Sharifabibi as “Nazir Chacha” was to meet Rajesh at around
9:00 a.m. on 08.06.2006 at Naroda Patiya, where auto-rickshaws
usually stand, and was to hand over a quantity of brown sugar to him.
The accused Rajesh was instructed to take the said quantity and
deliver it near the Ranip Police Lines, at the three-way junction near
the Ranip Octroi Naka. Accordingly, on 08.06.2006, in the early
morning, accused Rajesh Dhulaji Makwana went to the place at
Naroda Patiya where auto-rickshaws usually stand and there, he met
a person aged about 45 years, who handed over to him a quantity of
contraband article and Rajesh then took the said quantity for delivery
to Sharifabibi and proceeded on his motorcycle bearing Registration
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No. GJ-18-M-9559 towards the three-way junction near the Ranip
Police Lines and Ranip Octroi Naka. During this process, at about
18:00 hours, accused Rajesh was apprehended by the police
personnel of the Narcotics Cell along with 102 grams of contraband
article valued at Rs.20,000/-, the motorcycle bearing registration No.
GJ-18-M-9559 allegedly used in the commission of the offence, two
Nokia mobile phones, and cash amounting to Rs. 13,573/-. The
accused Sharifabibi was subsequently apprehended during the course
of the investigation. It is alleged that both the accused persons
assisted each other in the commission of the offence, thereby
committing an offence under the NDPS Act.
2.1
The charge against the accused came to be framed by the trial
Court for the aforesaid offences against the accused. On being
explained it to them, the accused have denied having committed any
offence. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and pleaded for
trial and hence, the case was tried by the trial Court.
3.
It appears from the records that to prove the case, the
prosecution has examined the following witnesses:P.W.
No.
Name of Witnesses
Exhibit
Kalubhai Tapubhai Manjariya
Complainant
Gautambhai Prabhatbhai Bharwad Panch Witness
hostile
Pravinbhai Ramanbhai Chauhan
Panch Witness
Dharmendrasinh Anopsinh Jadeja
Witness
Sanjakumar Shankarlal Shah
Witness
Manedrasinh Shivaji Kher
Witness
Ismailbhai Musabhai Patel
Witness
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Sanjaybhai Tribhovansinh Thakur
Witness
Ashishbhai Premnarayan Kher
Witness
Dhirenbhai Jayantilal Lariya
Witness
Prabhudas Vechatji Kotwal
Investigating
Officer
Hanifbhai Ishakbhai Kureshi
Witness
4.
In addition to this, the prosecution has also produced the
following documentary evidence.
Sr. No.
Particulars
Exhibit
Original complaint
Fact of information
For giving information to Deputy Superintendent of
Police, M.D.P.L.L.
Resolution under Section 42 of the NDPS Act
Accused was given an explanation as per Section
50 of the NDPS Act
Copy of letter of understanding
Scientific Officer to test quantity of narcotics on
site
Certificate issued by FSL Officer
Sanjay Shankarlal Shah was ordered to weigh the
quantity of narcotics
Certificate issued by the weighbridge
Letter under Section 52(1) of the NDPS Act
Seizure Memo
Letter written to the District Collector
With regard to information to the Superintendent
of Police (NDPS) about the raid
Forwarding Form filled for material inspection in
FSL
Signature Slip of Panchas
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5.
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2026
Signature Slip of Panchas
Signature Slip of Panchas
Signature Slip of Panchas
Panchnama
Receipt of muddamal
List of receipt of muddamal
Print called from the Airtel Company
Copy of the report written to Airtel Company
Copy of the report written to Hutch Company
Telecom print from Hutchison India
Print called for from the Hutch Company
With regard to sending the muddamal
investigation to the Deputy Director, FSL
Letter from FSL
Letter and
Gandhinagar
Authority to take muddamal from the FSL
for
analysis
certificate
from
FSL
After closure of the evidence, the statements of the accused
under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 have been
recorded wherein they denied of having committed any offence and
have stated that they are innocent.
6.
After hearing both sides and considering the evidence on
records, the trial Court by impugned judgment and order has
acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled against them.
7.
Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment
and order of acquittal the appellant has preferred this appeal.
8.
Heard Ms.Jyoti Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for
the appellant – State of Gujarat, Mr.P. R. Abichandani, learned counsel
for respondent No.1 and Mr.VO Joshi, learned counsel for the
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respondent No.2 at length.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
9.
Ms.Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant
has submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court is contrary to law and the evidence available
on record. She has submitted that the Trial Court erred in holding that
the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
She has submitted that the present respondent accused is also
involved in other offence of Indian Penal Code as well.
9.1
Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant has
submitted that the prosecution examined several witnesses in support
of its case and produced various documentary pieces of evidence on
record however, without properly appreciating the oral as well as
documentary evidence in its correct perspective, the Trial Court
erroneously acquitted the accused of the offences with which they
were charged. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order deserve
to be quashed and set aside.
9.2
Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant has
submitted that the Trial Court erred in holding that the prosecution
had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, being
public servants, had committed the offence of criminal misconduct by
indulging in the aforesaid activities.
9.3
Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the
prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt by
producing
cogent,
reliable
and
trustworthy
oral
as
well
as
documentary evidence. She has submitted that the prosecution
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examined 12 witnesses and produced 31 documentary evidences in
support of its case. However, the Trial Court failed to properly
appreciate the evidence on record in its true and proper perspective
and thereby committed a grave error in acquitting the accused. She
has submitted that the Trial Court erred in holding that the search
was not carried out in the presence of Magistrate and/or Gazetted
Officer and hence, the Investigating Officer has not complied with
mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the Act. She has submitted that
there is direct and indirect evidence connecting the accused with
implanting of the opium and the prosecution has established the case
against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and also proved the
charges levelled against the accused, however, the trial Court has not
considered such fact and acquitted the accused, which is unjust and
illegal.
9.4
Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the
Trial Court erred in holding that the accused could not be convicted
for the offences punishable under Sections 8(c), 21 and 29 of the Act,
despite sufficient evidence establishing their conscious and illegal
possession of the contraband. She has submitted that the Trial Court
has not properly appreciated the version of P.W.1 – Kalubhai Tapubhai
Manjariya examined at Exhibit 9 and P.W.11 Prabhudas Vechatji
Kotval examined at Exhibit 57. She has submitted that there are
several offences registered against accused No.2 and accused No.1
was caught red handed with brown sugar.
9.5
Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, read with the evidence of the
Investigating Officer, clearly establishes that the accused were in
conscious
possession
of
the
contraband
and
the
alleged
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contradictions regarding the manner in which the brown sugar was
kept or seized and do not affect the core of the prosecution case. She
has submitted that the FSL report and other evidence on record
establish that the seized substance was brown sugar and that the
accused had committed offences punishable under Sections 8(c), 21
and 29 of the Act.
9.6
Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the
necessary procedure under the Act was duly complied with and the
evidence on record establishes that the contraband was recovered
from the possession of the accused, however, the Trial Court, without
properly considering the material evidence, committed a grave error
in discarding the prosecution case.
9.7
In view of the cogent and reliable oral and documentary
evidence, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that
the Trial Court ought not to have acquitted the accused. The findings
recorded in the impugned judgment are contrary to the evidence on
record and suffer from serious errors of appreciation. It was,
therefore, submitted that the judgment and order of acquittal
deserves to be quashed and set aside by this Hon’ble Court.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1:
10.
Per contra, Mr.Abichandani, learned counsel for the respondent
No.1 has supported the impugned judgment and order and has
submitted that the Trial Court has not committed any error of law and
fact in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against him.
He has submitted that the ingredients of the offence alleged against
the accused are not proved beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore,
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the trial Court has rightly acquitted the accused as the complainant
has failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused. He has
also submitted that there is no iota of evidence to connect the
accused with the alleged crime in question. He has submitted that the
evidence led by the prosecution suffers from material contradictions,
omissions, and inconsistencies, which create serious doubt about the
veracity of the prosecution case and the prosecution has failed to
establish the essential ingredients of the alleged offences and has not
produced reliable, trustworthy, and corroborative evidence connecting
the respondent with the commission of the alleged offence. He has
submitted that it is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that
the presumption of innocence in favour of an accused is further
strengthened by an order of acquittal. It is submitted that unless the
findings recorded by the trial Court are shown to be perverse, illegal,
or contrary to the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should be
slow in interfering with an order of acquittal. It is submitted that the
appellant has failed to point out any infirmity, illegality, perversity, or
misreading of evidence in the impugned judgment and order and the
findings recorded by the trial Court are based upon proper
appreciation of the evidence and settled legal principles. Learned
counsel for the respondents has submitted that the appeal being
meritless deserves to be dismissed and the impugned judgment and
order of acquittal deserves to be confirmed.
10.1 Over and above the oral arguments, learned counsel for
respondent No.1 has submitted the following written submissions:(1)
It respectfully submitted that PW 1, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 11 are Police
witnesses; PW 2 and 3 are Pancha witnesses who have turned hostile;
PW 5 is the goldsmith who assisted the police in weighing the
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contraband. PW 9 and 10 were involved in printing and providing call
details records. It is submitted that the impugned judgment is flawed
inasmuch as material evidence on record was not duly considered by
the Trial Court. It is, however, the case of respondent No. 1 that the
impugned judgment suffers from no such infirmity and that the
acquittal was rightly recorded, inter alia, on the grounds that there
were serious procedural lapses in the investigation, the independent
panch witnesses turned hostile, and there existed several material
contradictions in the deposition of the witnesses.
(2)
It is respectfully submitted that, as per the depositions of PW-1
and PW-4, PW-4 received secret information from his informant at
around 8:30 a.m. on 08.06.2006 regarding accused No.1 allegedly
intending to deliver brown sugar near Ranip on his motorcycle, which
information was noted down by PW-4 and conveyed to PW-1.
However, instead of first reducing the said information into writing
and communicating the same to the superior officer as contemplated
under Section 42(1) and 42(2) of the NDPS Act, PW-1 and PW-4
proceeded to verify the spot. It was only at around 10:30 a.m. that
PW1 communicated the information to the superior officer and an ASI,
namely one Akshay Kumar, was sent for making the necessary entry
in the information register. Thus, there was an unexplained delay of
approximately
two
hours
in
complying
with
the
statutory
requirements of Section 42.
(3)
In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana,
(2009) 8 SCC 539 more particularly paragraph 17 and Rajender
Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR (2011) SC 414 more particularly
pParagraph 4 and 5, wherein it has been held that compliance with
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(GJHC240417232008)
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Section 42(1) and 42(2) should ordinarily precede the search and
seizure and that delayed compliance is permissible only in genuine
emergent circumstances and where the delay is satisfactorily
explained. In the present case, the prosecution has neither
demonstrated any such emergent circumstance nor provided any
satisfactory explanation for the delay. The fact that the officers had
sufficient time to proceed to the spot for verification before recording
and communicating the information further demonstrates that the
delay was not occasioned by any compelling urgency.
(4)
It is submitted that the evidence of the prosecution establishes
that the mandatory safeguard contained in Section 50 of the Act, i.e.,
the legal right to be searched in front of a Gazetted Officer or a
Magistrate was not duly complied with in the present case. As per the
deposition of PW-1, accused No.1 was informed that the officers
present were Gazetted Officers, yet if he desired to have any other
Magistrate or any other Gazetted Officer present, arrangements could
be made and his search could be conducted in their presence.
Thereafter,
accused No.1 stated to have replied that PW-1 could
conduct his search. The evidence of PW-1 itself demonstrates that the
accused was not merely informed of his statutory right. He was
presented with a choice as to who would conduct his search and one
of the choices presented to him was PW - 1 himself, who was part of
the raiding party.
(5)
In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand &
Anr., AIR 2014 SC 1384 more particularly paragraph 14 and 15,
wherein, in materially similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that offering an accused an additional option of being
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searched before an officer who was himself a member of the raiding
party amounts to a breach of Section 50 (1) of the NDPS Act. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that it was improper for the
officer conducting the search to offer a third alternative to the
accused when Section 50(1) does not provide for such an alternative
and when such option would frustrate the very purpose of the
statutory safeguard. The fact that Accused No. 1 allegedly stated that
PW-1 could conduct his search cannot cure the aforesaid defect, since
the question is not whether the accused ultimately accepted such
option, but whether such an option could lawfully have been offered
to him in the first place. The aforesaid principle has subsequently
been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Himachal
Pradesh Vs. Surat Singh, Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2018 more
particularly paragraphs 17 and 18.
(6)
It is further respectfully submitted that there is a material
discrepancy in the depositions of PW-1 and PW-4 as regards the
manner in which the option under Section 50(1) of the Act was put to
accused No.1. PW-1 and PW-4 have not given a consistent account of
the words used while apprising accused No.1 of his alleged right,
particularly with regard to the option of being searched before PW-1
himself.
(7)
It is submitted that PW-1 and PW-4, both being Gazetted
Officers present at the place of the alleged offence, were themselves
members of the raiding party and were presented to accused No. 1 as
Gazetted Officers before whom his search could be conducted. Thus,
PW-1 and PW-4 acted in a dual capacity, i.e. as members of the
raiding party as well as the Gazetted Officers before whom the search
was offered and conducted. PW-1 and PW-4, though Gazetted Officers,
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were themselves members of the raiding party and therefore could
not be treated as independent officers for the purpose of Section
50(1) of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan
Vs. Parmanand & Anr., AIR 2014 SC 1384, has held that offering
an officer who is part of the raiding party as a third option frustrates
the safeguard contemplated under Section 50(1). The said principle
has also been reiterated in Joseph Achola Ouma v. State of Goa &
Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 1069 of 2024 of the Bombay High Court
(Goa Bench) more particularly paragraph 32, wherein it was held that
a Gazetted Officer forming part of the raiding/investigating team
cannot be regarded as an independent officer. Thus, the mere fact
that PW-1 and PW-4 were Gazetted Officers cannot amount to
compliance with Section 50(1) Act, when they were themselves
members of the raiding party.
(8)
It is submitted that, as per the deposition of PW-1 and the
contents of the Panchnama, accused No. 1 was taken for the purpose
of weighing the contraband / muddamal, and that throughout the said
journey, custody of the contraband remained with Accused No. 1
himself. However, it is submitted that PW-5, the goldsmith, being an
independent witness who weighed the said muddamal / contraband,
has in his deposition, contradicted the aforesaid version of the
prosecution, thereby materially damaging the prosecution's case.
(9)
As per the deposition of PW-1, the contraband was handed over
to accused No. 1 and he, along with the panchas and other police
staff, sat in a jeep and was taken to Abhushan Jewellers for the
purpose of weighing the contraband. It is further submitted that, upon
reaching Abhushan Jewellers, accused No. 1 was afforded an
opportunity to search PW-5; however, as deposed by PW-1 himself,
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accused No.1 declined to conduct such search of PW-5. It is further
submitted that, as per the panchnama, the members of the raiding
party, along with the panch witnesses and accused No. 1, reached
Abhushan Jewellers at 16:15 hrs. were presence.
(10) Thus, when the contraband was brought to the shop for the
purpose of weighing, accused No. 1 was not present at the shop and
only PW-1 and PW-4 had arrived there between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00
p.m. with Accused No. 1 being brought to the shop only subsequently,
at around 8:00 p.m. It is submitted that this material contradiction
raises serious doubt not only regarding the presence of accused No. 1
at the shop at the relevant time, but also, more significantly,
regarding the custody of the contraband itself. As per the deposition
of PW-1 the contraband remained in the custody of accused No.1 until
the raiding party reached Abhushan Jewellers; however, it appears
from the deposition of PW-5 that Accused No. 1 was in fact brought to
the shop only at a later point in time, thereby casting serious doubt
on the safe and unbroken custody of the contraband during the
intervening period.
(11) Further, if the members of the raiding party were already
present at the jewellery shop between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. with
the alleged contraband, a serious doubt arises as to the manner in
which the raid was actually conducted and, in particular, as to who
had conducted the alleged raid and from whom the contraband was
allegedly recovered.
(12) It is submitted that as per the depositions of PW-1, the
muddamal samples were not sealed at the Police Station. Further as
per PW-4, the samples were not sealed. It is submitted that this is
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fatal to the prosecution's case in light of the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurbax Singh Vs. State of Haryana AIR
2001 SC 1002 and the Bombay High Court in Koyappakalathil
Ahmed Koya v. A.S. Menon, 2002 CriLJ 4502 more particularly
paragraph No.49, wherein it was observed that the NDPS Act
contemplates that after seizure, the narcotic drug is to be handed
over to the officer in-charge of the nearest police station, who is
required to affix his own seal to the packets in addition to the seals
affixed by the members of the raiding party at the time of seizure.
Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, it is
submitted that as per the deposition of PW-6, PW-7, PW-8, PW-11, PW1 and PW-4 the muddamal kept exchanging hands without there
being any seal by an officer-in-charge of the police station. This falls
squarely within the mischief that the above observations seek to
guard against. Such failure raises a reasonable possibility of
tampering
with
or
substitution
of
the
sample
packets
and
consequently casts serious doubt on the sanctity of the samples. This
also contravenes Section 55 of the Act.
(13) It is respectfully submitted that both the panch witnesses,
namely PW-2 and PW-3, who were sole independent witnesses to the
raid and the procedures conducted thereunder have turned hostile.
(14) It is respectfully submitted that, as per the deposition of PW-1,
the contraband, at the time it was first seized, did not carry any
characteristic smell of brown sugar. It is submitted that it was for this
very reason that an FSL expert was summoned to the spot to certify
that the seized substance was, in fact, brown sugar. It is further
submitted that, although an FSL certificate is stated to have been
issued in this regard, the said FSL officer has not been examined by
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the prosecution in the course of the trial.
(15) It is respectfully submitted that, as per the panchnama, the
panchnama proceedings commenced at 11:00 a.m. and continued till
6:00 p.m. on 08.06.2006. However, as per the deposition of PW-1, the
raiding party reached Sabarmati Police Station only between 9:00
p.m. and 9:30 p.m. Thus, there is an unexplained delay of
approximately three to three and a half hours between the conclusion
of the panchnama proceedings and the arrival at the Police Station.
Considering that the distance between the place of seizure and
Sabarmati
Police
Station
could
ordinarily
be
covered
within
approximately 10-15 minutes, the unexplained delay assumes
significance and raises a serious doubt regarding the safe custody,
handling and movement of the seized contraband during the
intervening period. This unexplained time gap further creates a
serious doubt regarding the prosecution's version of the manner in
which the muddamal was dealt with after the alleged seizure.
(16) It is respectfully submitted that the facts of the present case are
squarely covered by the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Vijay Pandey Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal
Appeal No. 1143 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1273 of 2019)
more particularly paragraph 5 and 6, wherein it was held that the
failure of the prosecution to secure any independent witness from the
locality of seizure, despite the seizure having taken place in a
residential/public locality, casts serious doubt on the prosecution's
case, more so where no explanation is furnished for the nonavailability of independent witnesses and no name of any person who
may have declined to join the investigation is placed on record.
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(17) Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, it is submitted that accused No. 1 was apprehended on a public
road and no independent witness from the locality of the actual
apprehension was associated with the investigation at that stage, the
panchas having been pre-arranged and brought along from the office
of the NDPS Cell itself. It is further submitted that the mandatory
requirements of Section 50 of the NDPS Act have not been duly
complied with in the present case, for the reasons already submitted
hereinabove. In these circumstances, it is submitted that the ratio of
the aforesaid judgment applies with full force to the present case and
the prosecution cannot be said to have discharged its initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case beyond reasonable doubt.
(18) It is respectfully submitted that, in view of the aforesaid
grounds and submissions, it would be in the interest of justice not to
interfere with the judgment of acquittal passed by the Learned
Sessions Court, as the prosecution has failed to establish its case
against accused No.1 beyond reasonable doubt. The various
procedural lapses, material discrepancies in the evidence, and
unexplained delays in the course of the proceedings cast serious
doubt upon the prosecution's case and the manner in which the
alleged recovery and contraband were dealt with. Accordingly, the
impugned judgment of acquittal deserves to be upheld and the
present appeal preferred by the State deserves to be dismissed.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.2:
11.
Mr.Joshi, learned counsel for respondent No.2 has submitted
that accused No.2, who has been arrested by the Police without there
being any shine of evidence and material in the whole track
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connecting her in any manner whatsoever with the alleged
commission of offence, who has been unjustifiably arrested only on
the basis of so called statement of the co-accused persons which is
inadmissible in evidence under the provisions of Section 25 of the
Indian Evidence Act. The respondent No.1 was arrested by the police
and only on the basis of his so called statement said contraband was
delivered to the present respondent No.2. this type of confessional
statement is not admissible as evidence. In support of this contention,
a reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in the case of Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2021(1)
Crimes 208 (SC) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and
observed in para 155 as under:55. We answer the reference by stating:i) That the officers who are invested with powers under
Section 53 of the NDPS Act are " Police Officer" within the
meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of
which any confessional statement made to them would be
barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence
Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict
an accused under the NDPS Act.
(ii) That a statement recorded under Section 67 of the
NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in
the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.
11.1 Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has submitted that the
provision under the NDPS Act are draconian in nature and therefore
the same is required to be complied with strictly because the question
of life and liberty is involved and when it is so, the burden of proof is
on the prosecution to establish the fact and in the case, but the same
is not established by the prosecution as it is clear from the deposition
of complaint, panchnama of seizure, report of FSL, moreover,
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independent witness has not supported the case of the prosecution
and there are huge discrepancies and contradictions in the
statements of the witnesses with regard to the search and seizer,
packing and sealing, affixing seal or number of seal and unauthorized
and without any permission from the superior officer, recording the so
called statements of the accused under Section 67 of the Act and
after recording the statements of one the person under Section 67 of
the Act who was, according to the case of the prosecution, the
contraband had to supply to respondent No.2 but there was no
material to prove the fact that the accused having any connection
with accused no.1, who was in the company of the accused, the
genuineness of the case of the prosecution is doubtful from the very
inception and charge as framed cannot and consequently, the
exclusive and conscious possession of contraband and identity thereof
cannot be said to be proved that respondent no.1 was in conscious
possession. No evidence means no reliable, cogent, convincing,
trustworthy and unimpeachable evidence. It is Submitted that there
was not a single evidence that there was any conspiracy or abetment.
There should be some material against the involvement or conspiracy
hatched by the present accused. There has to be presence of basic
material in the form of evidence so, as to substantiate the case of the
conspiracy against the present accused. The statement of accused
itself cannot be termed as satisfying foundation for invoking
provisions of Section 29 against the accused.
11.2 Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has also submitted that if
the evidence adduced by the prosecution is appreciated keeping in
view the principle of appreciated of evidence in criminal trial, then it
becomes crystal clear that the prosecution has miserably failed to
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prove the charge leveled against the accused. Learned counsel has
relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
P. Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. The District Inspector of Police
and Anr., 2015 SAR (Criminal) 1142 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held and observed in para – 25 as under:In reiteration of the golden principle which runs through the
web of administration of justice in criminal cases, this court
in Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam, (2013)12 SCC 406 had
held that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place
of proof and the prosecution cannot afford to rest its case
in the realm of "may be" true but has to upgrade it in the
domain of "must be" true in order to steer clear of any
possible surmise or conjecture. It was held, that the Court
must ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if in
the facts and circumstances, two views are possible, and
then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused."
12.3 Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has further submitted that
it is a well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that more
stringent the punishment, the more burden shifted upon the
prosecution to prove the offence and, therefore, strict proof is
required for proving the search, recovery and seizure. In support of
this contention, learned counsel has relied upon the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Makhan Singh Vs. State of
Haryana, 2015 AIAR (Criminal) 563 more particularly paras – 16
and 17.
12.4 Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has submitted that if the
evidence adduced by the prosecution is taken into consideration
keeping in view the principle of appreciation of evidence in criminal
trial, it becomes crystal clear that there is flagrant violation of
Sections 41, 42, 50, 52, 52(A), 55 and 57 Act and also Section 102(3)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 51 of the Act. In
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support of this contention, learned counsel has relied upon the
decision of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat V/s.
Jabbirsing Ratansing Indra Rajput, 2013(3) G.L.R. 1952. In this
case, the report under Section 102(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 is not made by the prosecuting agency to the
Magistrate having territorial jurisdiction and thus, there is violation of
Section 102(3) of the Code. A reliance is placed upon the decision of
the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shivabhai Gajmalbhai
V/s. State of Gujarat, 1996 (2) G.L.R. 64.
12.5 It is submitted that there is violation of Section 52(2) of the Act.
The Investigating Officer had not given application for inventory
before Magistrate nor application was submitted to him. This
contention is fortified by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Mohammed Khalid and Anothers V/s. The state of
Telangana in Criminal Appeal No. 1610 of 2023. It is also
submitted
that
discrepancies
there
and
are
material
inconsistencies
in
contradiction,
the
omissions,
depositions
of
the
prosecution witnesses and one prosecution witness diametrically
deposed opposite to the other and this type of evidence cannot be
believed in criminal trial at all. In support of this contention, a reliance
is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Bhola Ram Kushwaha V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2001
AIR (SC) 229. It is also submitted that the Standing Instruction
No.1/88 dated 15th March, 1988 and Standing Order No. 2/1988 dated
11th April, 1988 issued by the Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi are
not complied with regarding the drawl, storage and testing and also
regarding the receipt, custody and storage of the samples and
muddamal.
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12.6 It is also submitted that one of the cardinal principles of
Criminal Jurisprudence and also the appreciation of evidence in
criminal trial is that the prosecution has to prove its case against the
accused beyond all reasonable doubt and when from the evidence on
record, a reasonable doubt is created by the defence in the mind of
the Court and when it is so, then the benefit of that doubt is required
to be given to the accused. This contention is fortified by the decision
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Radheyshyam
V/s. Union of India, 2012(2) Criminal 721. It is submitted that
from the evidence on record, safe custody of the seized articles is not
proved by the prosecution and when it is so, then the charges cannot
be said to be proved. This contention is fortified by the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Gujarat V/s.
Ismail U. Haji Patel and Another, (2013)12 SCC 291.
12.7 Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has submitted that the
arrest panchnama of the accused is not prepared, the arrest register
is not proved, grounds of arrested are not supplied. Thus, Section 60A
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not complied with at all by
the prosecution and so also, the genuineness of the case of the
prosecution becomes doubtful. That not a single documentary
evidence is proved by the prosecution as per the provision of the
Indian Evidence Act. Moreover, all the documents are prepared by
the police to suit the prosecution story and the time is also adjusted in
the documents by the police to suit the prosecution story. That the so
called electronic record produced by the prosecution in this case is
not proved as required under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act
and no certificate of its genuineness is produced by the prosecution
as required under Section 65b(4) of the Indian Evidence Act. It is
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submitted that no scientific investigation is done by the prosecuting
agency. Chance prints of the so called accused were not taken from
the bags to be sent for comparison with admitted finger prints of the
accused for Expert opinion. It is also submitted that the prosecution
has failed to prove its case on fact and law also. If the case of the
prosecution is seen, it can only be said that the prosecution has no
case at all and this is clearly as case of ‘no evidence. That the
provisions in the Act being draconian in nature and so, they are
required to be complied with strictly because the question of life and
liberty of the accused is involved. In this case, not a single provision
of the Act or the Cr.P.C. is complied with by the prosecuting agency
and there is flagrant violation of all such provision under the and the
Cr.P.C.
12.8 Learned counsel has further submitted that it is also a settled
principle of Criminal Jurisprudence that more serious the offence,
striker the degree of proof, since higher degree of assurance is
required to convict the accused. Moreover, it is also a cardinal
principle and well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that when
two view are possible, then the view favourable to the accused should
be taken. It is also a well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence
that suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take place of legal
proof. It is also a well settled principle of criminal justice delivery
system that "fouler the crime higher the proof." That almost all the
principle of appreciation of evidence in criminal trial after referring to
the plethora of decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of accused No.1 referred to above reiterated the same and if all
these principle are taken into consideration while appreciating the
prosecution evidence in criminal trial, then it becomes crystal clear or
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as clear as day that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its
case on facts and law. It is submitted that taking the cumulative
effect of all the circumstances and the evidence, it is crystal clear or
as clear as day that the material placed on record by the prosecution
does not bring home the charge against the accused beyond all
reasonable doubt and when it is so, then the accused deserves to be
acquitted of all the charges leveled against him.
ANALYSIS:
13.
On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the trial Court, the following questions are required to be
analyzed:(1)
whether the trial Court has rightly justified in passing the
judgment and order of acquittal.
(2)
whether the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence
led by the prosecution in recording the reasons.
(3)
whether the impugned judgment and order suffers from any
illegality, irregularity and perversity in the impugned judgment
and order of acquittal.
(4)
whether the prosecution has proved the charge levelled
against the accused beyond reasonable doubt whether the oral
evidence of the prosecution witnesses is proved.
(5)
Whether the accused were held guilty for the alleged offence.
CONCLUSIONS:
14.
This Court has perused the relevant documents and material
placed on record and also gone through the judgment and order
passed by the Trial Court as well as the record and proceedings.
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15.
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In light of the aforesaid submissions made by the learned
Additional Public Prosecutor and upon perusal of the impugned
judgment and order of acquittal as well as the evidence recorded by
the Trial Court, the issues framed by the Court for determination are
required to be examined in light of the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
16.
On perusal of the evidence of P.W.1 being raiding officer and
P.W.2 being panch witness, it appears that P.W.2 has not supported
the case of the prosecution. From their cross-examination, the
prosecution is unable to cull out any clinching evidence against the
accused. On perusal of the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.4 being raiding
officers, it appears that there is major inconsistency found in their
depositions. If the Court is considered the evidence of P.W.11 and so
far as the presence of P.W.1 and P.W.4 is concerned, it emerges that
P.W.11 is not referring presence of P.W.1 and P.W.4 at Police Station
whereas P.W.1 and P.W.4 specifically stated before the Court below
that after completing the raid, they went to the Police Station and met
P.W.11. So far as evidence of P.W.11 is concerned, he has not
recorded the statement of the raiding officer along with the police
constable, who were present and there is vital discrepancy in their
evidence. The prosecution is unable to prove the fact with regard to
compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 42(2), 50(1), 53,
55 and 57 of the Act. Whereas, the involvement of accused No.2 in
the alleged offence is only on the basis of the statement of the coaccused made before the police during the course of custody. As per
Section 67 of the Act and the Indian Evidence Act, it cannot be
considered the case against accused No.2 since she was involved in
the alleged crime on the basis of the statement made by accused
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No.1 during the interrogation and in presence of the police witness.
Therefore, there are basic loopholes and defect in the investigation
and the case of the prosecution is that on one Nazir Chacha, however,
there was no any material or evidence with regard to who was Nazir
Chacha; whether he was arraigned as an accused in the alleged
offence or whether there was any investigation, nothing was come on
record.
17.
If this Court is considered the evidence of
P.W.8 being
Goldsmith running a shop of Aabhushan Jewelers in Ranip area, it
emerges that the evidence of this witness is not supported the case of
prosecution and there is serious discrepancy in the evidence of this
witness and the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.4. In light of the facts of
the case and the evidence available on record, the Trial Court has,
while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, not
committed any error of facts and law.
18.
At this stage, it is appropriate to refer Sections 42, 50, 55 and
Section 57 of the NDPS Act which read as under:“42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without
warrant or authorisation.—(l) Any such officer (being an officer
superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of
central excise, narcotics, customs, revenue intellegence or any other
department of the Central Government including para-military forces
or armed forces as is empowered in this behalf by general or special
order by the Central Government, or any such officer (being an
officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the revenue,
drugs control, excise, police or any other department of a State
Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special
order of the State Government, if he has reason to believe from
personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken
down in writing that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, or
controlled substance in respect of which an offence punishable under
this Act has been committed or any document or other article which
may furnish evidence of the commission of such offence or any
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illegally acquired property or any document or other article which
may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which
is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this
Act is kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed
place, may between sunrise and sunset,—
(a) enter into and search any such building, conveyance or
place;
(b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove any
obstacle to such entry;
(c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in the
manufacture thereof and any other article and any animal or
conveyance which he has reason to believe to be liable to
confiscation under this Act and any document or other article
which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the
commission of any offence punishable under this Act or furnish
evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is
liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of
this Act; and
(d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any
person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any
offence punishable under this Act:
[Provided that in respect of holder of a licence for manufacture of
manufactured drugs or psychotropic substances or controlled
substances granted under this Act or any rule or order made
thereunder, such power shall be exercised by an officer not below the
rank of sub-inspector:
Provided further that] if such officer has reason to believe that a
search warrant or authorisation cannot be obtained without affording
opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape
of an offender, he may enter and search such building, conveyance
or enclosed place at any time between sunset and sunrise after
recording the grounds of his belief.
(2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing under subsection (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto,
he shall within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his
immediate official superior.
50. Conditions under which search of persons shall be
conducted.—
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(1) When any officer duly authorised under section 42 is about to
search any person under the provisions of section 41, section 42 or
section 43, he shall, if such person so requires, take such person
without unnecessary delay to nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the
departments mentioned in section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate.
(2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until
he can bring him before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate
referred to in sub-section (1).
(3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such
person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search,
forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that search
be made.
(4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female.
[(5) When an officer duly authorised under section 42 has reason to
believe that it is not possible to take the person to be searched to the
nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate without the possibility of the
person to be searched parting with possession of any narcotic drug or
psychotropic substance, or controlled substance or article or
document, he may, instead of taking such person to the nearest
Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, proceed to search the person as
provided under section100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974).
(6) After a search is conducted under sub-section (5), the officer shall
record the reasons for such belief which necessitated such search
and within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate
official superior.
[50A. Power to undertake controlled delivery.—The Director
General of Narcotics Control Bureau constituted under sub-section (3)
of section 4 or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf, may,
notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, undertake controlled
delivery of any consignment to—
(a) any destination in India;
(b) a foreign country, in consultation with the competent authority of
such foreign country to which such consignment is destined, in such
manner as may be prescribed.
55. Police to take charge of articles seized and delivered.—An
officer-in-charge of a police station shall take charge of and keep in
safe custody, pending the orders of the Magistrate, all articles seized
under this Act within the local area of that police station and which
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may be delivered to him, and shall allow any officer who may
accompany such articles to the police station or who may be deputed
for the purpose, to affix his seal to such articles or to take samples of
and from them and all samples so taken shall also be sealed with a
seal of the officer-in-charge of the police station.
57. Report of arrest and seizure.—Whenever any person makes
any arrest or seizure under this Act, he shall, within forty-eight hours
next after such arrest or seizure, make a full report of all the
particulars of such arrest or seizure to his immediate official superior.
[57A. Report of seizure of property of the person arrested by the
notified officer.—Whenever any officer notified under section 53
makes an arrest or seizure under this Act, and the provisions of
Chapter VA apply to any person involved in the case of such arrest or
seizure, the officer shall make a report of the illegally acquired
properties of such person to the jurisdictional competent authority
within ninety days of the arrest or seizure].”
19.
Now, considering the above referred provision of the Act and
the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respective
respondents, the prosecution miserably failed to establish the
compliance of the above referred provision of the Act.
20.
At this stage, it is appropriate to refer the decision of the
Honourable Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Balbir
Singh reported in AIR 1994 SC 1872, whereby Hon’ble Apex Court
has held as under:“Head Note (D) Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act (61 of
1985), Ss. 50, 41, 42 - Search and Seizure - On prior information
empowered officer acting under S.41(2) of S.42-Should comply with
provisions of S.50-Provisions of S.50 are mandatory.
17. One another important question that arises for consideration is
whether failure to comply with the conditions laid down in Section 50
of the NDPS Act by the empowered or authorised officer while
conducting the search, affects the prosecution case. The said
provision (Section 50) lays down that any officer duly authorised
under Section 42, who is about to search any person under the
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provisions of Sections 41, 42 and 43, shall, if such person so requires,
take him without unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer
of any of the departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest
Magistrate and if such requisition is made by the person to be
searched, the authorised officer concerned can detain him until he
can produce him before such Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate.
After such production, the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate, if sees
no reasonable ground for search, may discharge the person. But
otherwise he shall direct that the search be made. To avoid
humiliation to females, it is also provided that no female shall be
searched by anyone except a female. The words "if the person to be
searched so desires" are important. One of the submissions is
whether the person who is about to be searched should by himself
make a request or whether it is obligatory on the part of the
empowered or the authorised officer to inform such person that if he
so requires, he would be produced before a Gazetted Officer or a
Magistrate and thereafter the search would be conducted. In the
context in which this right has been conferred, it must naturally be
presumed that it is imperative on the part of the officer to inform the
person to be searched of his right that if he so requires to be
searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. To us, it appears
that this is a valuable right given to the person to be searched in the
presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate if he so requires, since
such a search would impart much more authenticity and
creditworthiness to the proceedings while equally providing an
important safeguard to the accused. To afford such an opportunity to
the person to be searched, he must be aware of his right and that
can be done only by the authorised officer informing him. The
language is clear and the provision implicitly makes it obligatory on
the authorised officer to inform the person to be searched of his
right.
21. In Miranda v. Arizona17 the Court, considering the question
whether the accused be apprised of his right not to answer and keep
silent while being interrogated by the police, observed thus :
"At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to
interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal
terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the
privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it the
threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.
More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in
overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere."
It was further observed thus :
"The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by
the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the
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individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him
aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of
foregoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences
that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent
exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make
the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the
adversary system that he is not in the presence of persons acting
solely in his interest."
When such is the importance of a right given to an accused person in
custody in general, the right by way of safeguard conferred under
Section 50 in the context is all the more important and valuable.
Therefore it is to be, taken as an imperative requirement on the part
of the officer intending to search to inform the person to be searched
of his right that if he so chooses, he will be searched in the presence
of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. Thus the provisions of Section
50 are mandatory.
25. The question considered above arise frequently before the trial
courts. Therefore we find it necessary to set out our conclusions
which are as follows :
(1) If a police officer without any prior information as contemplated
under the provisions of the NDPS Act makes a search or arrests a
person in the normal course of investigation into an offence or
suspected offences as provided under the provisions of CrPC and
when such search is completed at that stage Section 50 of the NDPS
Act would not be attracted and the question of complying with the
requirements thereunder would not arise. If during such search or
arrest there is a chance recovery of any narcotic drug or psychotropic
substance then the police officer, who is not empowered, should
inform the empowered officer who should thereafter proceed in
accordance with the provisions of the NDPS Act. If he happens to be
an empowered officer also, then from that stage onwards, he should
carry out the investigation in accordance with the other provisions of
the NDPS Act.
(2-A) Under Section 41(1) only an empowered Magistrate can issue
warrant for the arrest or for the search in respect of offences
punishable under Chapter IV of the Act etc. when he has reason to
believe that such offences have been committed or such substances
are kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or place. When
such warrant for arrest or for search is issued by a Magistrate who is
not empowered, then such search or arrest if carried out would be
illegal.
Likewise only empowered officers or duly authorized officers as
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enumerated in Sections 41(2) and 42(1) can act under the provisions
of the NDPS Act. If such arrest or search is made under the provisions
of the NDPS Act by anyone other than such officers, the same would
be illegal.
(2-B) Under Section 41(2) only the empowered officer can give the
authorisation to his subordinate officer to carry out the arrest of a
person or search as mentioned therein. If there is a contravention,
that would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the conviction.
(2-C) Under Section 42(1) the empowered officer if has a prior
information given by any person, that should necessarily be taken
down in writing. But if he has reason to believe from personal
knowledge that offences under Chapter IV have been committed or
materials which may furnish evidence of commission of such offences
are concealed in any building etc. he may carry out the arrest or
search without a warrant between sunrise and sunset and this
provision does not mandate that he should record his reasons of
belief. But under the proviso to Section 42(1) if such officer has to
carry out such search between sunset and sunrise, he must record
the grounds of his belief.
To this extent these provisions are mandatory and contravention of
the same would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the trial.
(3) Under Section 42(2) such empowered officer who takes down any
information in writing or records the grounds under proviso to Section
42(1) should forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official
superior. If there is total non-compliance of this provision the same
affects the prosecution case. To that extent it is mandatory. But if
there is delay whether it was undue or whether the same has been
explained or not, will be a question of fact in each case.
(4-A) If a police officer, even if he happens to be an "empowered"
officer while effecting an arrest or search during normal investigation
into offences purely under the provisions of Cr. PC fails to strictly
comply with the provisions 'of Sections 100 and 165 Cr. PC including
the requirement to record reasons, such failure would only amount to
an irregularity.
(4-B) If an empowered officer or an authorised officer under Section
41(2) of the Act carries out a search, he would be doing so under the
provisions of Cr. PC namely Sections 100 and 165 Cr. PC and if there
is no strict compliance with the provisions of Cr. PC then such search
would not per se be illegal and would not vitiate the trial.
The effect of such failure has to be borne in mind by the courts while
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appreciating the evidence in the facts and circumstances of each
case.
(5) On prior information the empowered officer or authorised officer
while acting under Sections 41(2) or 42 should comply with the
provisions of Section 50 before the search of the person is made and
such person should be informed that if he so requires, he shall be
produced before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate as provided
thereunder. It is obligatory on the part of such officer to inform the
person to be searched. Failure to inform the person to be searched
and if such person so requires, failure to take him to the Gazetted
Officer or the Magistrate, would amount to non-compliance of Section
50 which is mandatory and thus it would affect the prosecution case
and vitiate the trial. After being so informed whether such person
opted for such a course or not would be a question of fact.
(6) The provisions of Sections 52 and 57 which deal with the steps to
be taken by the officers after making arrest or seizure under Sections
41 to 44 are by themselves not mandatory. If there is non-compliance
or if there are lapses like delay etc. then the same has to be
examined to see whether any prejudice has been caused to the
accused and such failure will have a bearing on the appreciation of
evidence regarding arrest or seizure as well as on merits of the case.
21.
At this stage, it is appropriate to refer the the decision in case
of H.I. Majmudar Intelligence Officer vs. Santosh Pandurang
Setty reported in 2026 (0) AIJEL HC 253136, whereby the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:‘Heard Note (c) Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985, Ss. 42, 50 and 57- Search and seizure Mandatory provisions Non-compliance - At the time of search and seizure, there was clear
violation of S. 42 of the NDPS Act - Held, provision of search and
seizure under S. 42 is mandatory and non-compliance thereof is
impermissible under law - Reliance placed on Boota Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2021) 19 SCC 606; Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana,
(2009) 8 SCC 539; Sukhdev Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC
212; State of Rajasthan v. Jagraj Singh @ Hansa, (2016) 11 SCC 687.
8. Further, re-appreciating the evidence, it appears that, as per the
case of the prosecution, the statements of the witnesses were
recorded and as per the case of the prosecution, the accused Nos. 1
to 3 were engaged in transportation of contraband, and the said fact
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is revealed on basis of statements of the co-accused i.e., accused
Nos. 2 and 3, but nowhere has any evidence supported the said
contention, and in absence of any legal evidence qua involvement of
the accused, more particularly how and from where the contraband
was loaded and shifted to the godown, no evidence on record, and
even no independent witness has supported the case of the
prosecution qua the alleged conspiracy or meeting of minds on the
part of the accused persons. Even as per the complaint, the
prosecution has relied upon the statements of the accused persons
as incriminating evidence, and such inculpatory statements are also
not true which support any evidence and no corroborative piece of
evidence is on record to show that the accused has hatched
conspiracy and engaged in transportation of huge contraband. The
only evidence led before the learned Sessions Court is that the
accused No.2 was present at the time of raid, and it is stated that
contraband was seized from his possession but no evidence qua
accused Nos. 1 and 3 has been collected. Not only that, the
ownership of the godown is also not proved and the owner of the
godown is not cited as a witness. The independent witness, Deepak
Parikh, turned hostile and has not supported the case of the
prosecution. Even based on whatever allegations are levelled against
the accused and evidence led, it clearly reveals that the prosecution
has not followed the mandatory provisions for search and seizure
under the NDPS Act. At the time of search, there was a clear violation
of Section 42 of the NDPS Act and the learned Sessions Judge has
also assigned reason for that qua violation of Sections 42, 50 and 57
of the NDPS Act. The provision of search and seizure under Section
42 is mandatory and in this regard, reference is required to be made
to the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Boota
Singh Vs. The State of Haryana reported in (2021) 19 SCC 606;
Karnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2009) 8 SCC 539;
Sukhdev Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 2 SCC 212,
and State of Rajasthan Vs. Jagraj Singh @ Hansa, reported in (2016)
11 SCC 687. Non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section
42 is absolutely clear from the record and such non-compliance is
impermissible under the law. Hence, the learned Sessions Judge has
not committed any error in recording findings qua non-compliance of
mandatory provisions under the NDPS Act.”
22.
In the decision in case of Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana,
(2009) 8 SCC 539, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:“(6) In the light of the above decisions and the principles enunciated
therein, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 42 of the NDPS Act
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which is relevant for the present purpose as it stood before its
amendment by Act 9 of 2001. It reads as under:"42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or
authorisation.-- (1) Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank
to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of central excise,
narcotics, customs, revenue intelligence or any other department of
the Central Government or of the Border Security Force as is
empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central
Government, or any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to
a peon, sepoy or constable) of the revenue, drugs control, excise,
police or any other department of a State Government as is
empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the State
Government, if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or
information given by any person and taken down in writing that any
narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, in respect of which an
offence punishable under Chapter IV has been committed or any
document or other article which may furnish evidence of the
commission of such offence is kept or concealed in any building,
conveyance or enclosed place, may, between sunrise and sunset,-(a) enter into and search any such building, conveyance or place;
(b)
in case of resistance, break open any door and remove any
obstacle to such entry;
(c)
seize such drug or substance and all materials used in the
manufacture thereof and any other article and any animal or
conveyance which he has reason to believe to be liable to
confiscation under this Act and any document or other article which
he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of
any offence punishable under Chapter IV relating to such drug or
substance; and
(d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person
whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence
punishable under Chapter IV relating to such drug or substance:
Provided that if such officer has reason to believe that a search
warrant or authorisation cannot be obtained without affording
opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape
of an offender, he may enter and search such building, conveyance
or enclosed place at any time between sunset and sunrise after
recording the grounds of his belief.
(2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing under subsection (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto,
he shall forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official
superior."
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Sub-section (2) as replaced by Act 9 of 2001 is extracted below:
"(2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing under
sub-Section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso
thereto, he shall within seventy two hours send a copy thereof to his
immediate official superior."
15) Under Section 42(2) as it stood prior to amendment such
empowered officer who takes down any information in writing or
records the grounds under proviso to Section 42(1) should forthwith
send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior. If there is total
non-compliance of this provision the same would adversely affect the
prosecution case and to that extent it is mandatory. But if there is
delay whether it was undue or whether the same has been explained
or not, will be a question of fact in each case, it is to be concluded
that the mandatory enforcement of the provisions of Section 42 of
the Act non-compliance of which may vitiate a trial has been
restricted only to the provision of sending a copy of the information
written down by the empowered officer to immediate official superior
and not to any other condition of the Section. Abdul Rashid (supra)
has been decided on 01.02.2000 but thereafter Section 42 has been
amended with effect from 02.10.2001 and the time of sending such
report of the required information has been specified to be within 72
hours of writing down the same. The relaxation by the legislature is
evidently only to uphold the object of the Act. The question of
mandatory application of the provision can be answered in the light
of the said amendment. The non-compliance of the said provision
may not vitiate the trial if it does not cause any prejudice to the
accused.
17. In conclusion, what is to be noticed is Abdul Rashid did not
require literal compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1)
and 42(2) nor did Sajan Abraham hold that the requirements of
Section 42(1) and 42(2) need not be fulfilled at all. The effect of the
two decisions was as follows :
(a) The officer on receiving the information (of the nature referred to
in Sub-section (1) of section
42) from any person had to record it in writing in the concerned
Register and forthwith send a copy to his immediate official superior,
before proceeding to take action in terms of clauses (a) to (d) of
section 42(1).
(b) But if the information was received when the officer was not in
the police station, but while he was on the move either on patrol duty
or otherwise, either by mobile phone, or other means, and the
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information calls for immediate action and any delay would have
resulted in the goods or evidence being removed or destroyed, it
would not be feasible or practical to take down in writing the
information given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as
per clauses (a) to (d) of section 42(1) and thereafter, as soon as it is
practical, record the information in writing and forthwith inform the
same to the official superior .
(c) In other words, the compliance with the requirements of Sections
42 (1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the information received
and sending a copy thereof to the superior officer, should normally
precede the entry, search and seizure by the officer. But in special
circumstances involving emergent situations, the recording of the
information in writing and sending a copy thereof to the official
superior may get postponed by a reasonable period, that is after the
search, entry and seizure. The question is one of urgency and
expediency.
(d) While total non-compliance of requirements of sub-sections (1)
and (2) of section 42 is impermissible, delayed compliance with
satisfactory explanation about the delay will be acceptable
compliance of section 42. To illustrate, if any delay may result in the
accused escaping or the goods or evidence being destroyed or
removed, not recording in writing the information received, before
initiating action, or non-sending a copy of such information to the
official superior forthwith, may not be treated as violation of section
42. But if the information was received when the police officer was in
the police station with sufficient time to take action, and if the police
officer fails to record in writing the information received, or fails to
send a copy thereof, to the official superior, then it will be a
suspicious circumstance being a clear violation of section 42 of the
Act. Similarly, where the police officer does not record the
information at all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then
also it will be a clear violation of section 42 of the Act. Whether there
is adequate or substantial compliance with section 42 or not is a
question of fact to be decided in each case. The above position got
strengthened with the amendment to section 42 by Act 9 of 2001”.
23.
In the decision in case of Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja vs.
State of Gujarat reported in 2011(1) SCC 609, the Hon’ble Apex
Court has held as under:“18.Although the Constitution Bench did not decide in absolute terms
the question whether or not Section 50 of the NDPS Act was directory
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or mandatory yet it was held that provisions of sub-section (1) of
Section 50 make it imperative for the empowered officer to "inform"
the person concerned (suspect) about the existence of his right that
if he so requires, he shall be searched before a gazetted officer or a
Magistrate; failure to "inform" the suspect about the existence of his
said right would cause prejudice to him, and in case he so opts,
failure to conduct his search before a gazetted officer or a
Magistrate, may not vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of
the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and sentence of an
accused, where the conviction has been recorded only on the basis of
the possession of the illicit article, recovered from the person during
a search conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the
NDPS Act. The Court also noted that it was not necessary that the
information required to be given under Section 50 should be in a
prescribed form or in writing but it was mandatory that the suspect
was made aware of the existence of his right to be searched before a
gazetted officer or a Magistrate, if so required by him. We
respectfully concur with these conclusions. Any other interpretation
of the provision would make the valuable right conferred on the
suspect illusory and a farce.
19.As noted above, sub-sections (5) and (6) were inserted in Section
50 by Act 9 of 2001. It is pertinent to note that although by the
insertion of the said two sub-sections, the rigour of strict procedural
requirement is sought to be diluted under the circumstances
mentioned in the sub- sections, viz. when the authorised officer has
reason to believe that any delay in search of the person is fraught
with the possibility of the person to be searched parting with
possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance etc., or
article or document, he may proceed to search the person instead of
taking him to the nearest gazetted officer or Magistrate. However,
even in such cases a safeguard against any arbitrary use of power
has been provided under sub-section (6). Under the said sub-section,
the empowered officer is obliged to send a copy of the reasons, so
recorded, to his immediate official superior within seventy two hours
of the search. In our opinion, the insertion of these two sub-sections
does not obliterates the mandate of sub-section (1) of Section 50 to
inform the person, to be searched, of his right to be taken before a
gazetted officer or a Magistrate. The object and the effect of insertion
of sub-sections (5) and (6) were considered by a Constitution Bench
of this Court, of which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a member, in
Karnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana13. Although in the said decision
the Court did observe that by virtue of insertion of sub-sections (5)
and (6), the mandate given in Baldev Singh's case (supra) is diluted
but the Court also opined that it cannot be said that by the said
insertion, the protection or safeguards given to the suspect have
been taken away completely. The Court observed :Page 38 of 48
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"Through this amendment the strict procedural requirement as
mandated by Baldev Singh case was avoided as relaxation and fixing
of the reasonable time to send the record to the superior official as
well as exercise of Section 100 CrPC was included by the legislature.
The effect conferred upon the previously mandated strict compliance
with Section 50 by Baldev Singh case was that the procedural
requirements which may have handicapped an emergency
requirement of search and seizure and give the suspect a chance to
escape were made directory based on the reasonableness of such
emergency situation. Though it cannot be said that the protection or
safeguard given to the suspects have been taken away completely
but certain flexibility in the procedural norms were adopted only
(2009) 8 SCC 539 to balance an urgent situation. As a consequence
the mandate given in Baldev Singh case is diluted."
22.In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the firm opinion that
the object with which right under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act, by
way of a safeguard, has been conferred on the suspect, viz. to check
the misuse of power, to avoid harm to innocent persons and to
minimise the allegations of planting or foisting of false cases by the
law enforcement agencies, it would be imperative on the part of the
empowered officer to apprise the person intended to be searched of
his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate. We
have no hesitation in holding that in so far as the obligation of the
authorised officer under sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act
is concerned, it is mandatory and requires a strict compliance. Failure
to comply with the provision would render the recovery of the illicit
article suspect and vitiate the conviction if the same is recorded only
on the basis of the recovery of the illicit article from the person of the
accused during such search. Thereafter, the suspect may or may not
choose to exercise the right provided to him under the said provision.
As observed in Re Presidential Poll14, it is the duty of the courts to
get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to
the whole scope of the provision to be construed. "The key to the
opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, it is the
animus imponentis, the intention of the law maker expressed in the
law itself, taken as a whole." We are of the opinion that the concept
of "substantial compliance" with the requirement of Section 50 of the
NDPS Act introduced and read into the mandate of the said Section in
Joseph Fernandez (supra) and Prabha Shankar Dubey (supra) is
neither borne out from the language of sub-section (1) of Section 50
nor it is in consonance with the dictum laid down in Baldev Singh's
case (supra). Needless to add that the question whether or not the
procedure prescribed has been followed and the requirement of
Section 50 had been met, is a matter of trial. It would neither be
possible nor feasible to lay down any absolute formula in that behalf.
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We also feel that though Section 50 gives an option to the
empowered officer to take such person (suspect) either before the
nearest gazetted officer or the Magistrate but in order to impart
authenticity, transparency and creditworthiness to the entire
proceedings, in the first instance, an endeavour should be to produce
the suspect before the nearest Magistrate, who enjoys more
confidence of (1974) 2 SCC 33 the common man compared to any
other officer. It would not only add legitimacy to the search
proceedings, it may verily strengthen the prosecution as well.”
24.
In the decision in case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs.
Surat Singh reported in 2026 (0) AIJEL SC 76708 the Hon’ble
Apex Court has held as under:“18. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Suresh and others versus State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in
(2013) 1 SCC 550, have held that in a case where the accused were
merely asked whether they would offer their personal search to
police officer concerned or to gazetted officer and the appellants
gave their consent for their personal search by police officer
concerned, it will amount to non-compliance of Section 50(1) of the
ND & PS Act. Their lordships have held as follows:
"16) The above Panchnama indicates that the appellants were merely
asked to give their consent for search by the police party and not
apprised of their legal right provided under Section 50 of the NDPS
Act to refuse/to allow the police party to take their search and opt for
being searched before the Gazetted officer or by the Magistrate. In
other words, a reading of the Panchnama makes it clear that the
appellants were not apprised about their right to be searched before
a gazetted officer or a Magistrate but consent was sought for their
personal search. Merely asking them as to whether they would offer
their personal search to him, i.e. the police officer or to gazetted
officer may not satisfy the protection afforded under Section 50 of
the NDPS Act as interpreted in Baldev singh's case.
17. Further a reading of the judgments of the trial Court and the High
Court also show that in the presence of Panchas, the SHO merely
asked all the three appellants for their search by him and they simply
agreed. This is reflected in the Panchnama. Though in Baldev Singh's
case, this Court has not expressed any opinion as to whether the
provisions of Section 50 are mandatory or directory but "failure to
inform" the person concerned of his right as emanating from subsection (1) of Section 50 may render the recovery of the contraband
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suspect and the conviction and sentence of an accused bad and
unsustainable in law. In Vijaysinh Chan Jadeja's case (supra), recently
the Constitution Bench has explained the mandate provided under
sub-section (1) of Section 50 and concluded that it is mandatory and
requires strict compliance. The Bench also held that failure to comply
with the provision would render the recovery of the illicit article
suspect and vitiate the conviction if the same is recorded only on the
basis of the recovery of the illicit article from the person of the
accused during such search. The concept of substantial compliance
as noted in Joseph Fernadez (supra) and Prabha Shankar Dubey
(supra) were not acceptable by the Constitution Bench in Vijaysinh
Chandubha Jadeja, accordingly, in view of the language as evident
from the panchnama which we have quoted earlier, we hold that, in
the case on hand, the search and seizure of the suspect from the
person of the appellants is bad and conviction is unsustainable in
law."
18. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of State of
Rajasthan versus Parmanand and another, reported in (2014) 5 SCC
345, have held that if merely a bag is carried by person is searched
without there being any search of his person, S. 50 will have no
application but if bag carried by him is searched and his person is
also searched, S. 50 would be attracted. Their lordships have also
held that it was improper for PW-10 S.I. "Q" to tell respondents that a
third alternative was available. It has been held as follows:
15. “Thus, if merely a bag carried by a person is searched without
there being any search of his person, Section 50 of the NDPS Act will
have no application. But if the bag carried by him is searched and his
person is also searched, Section 50 of the NDPS Act will have
application. In this case, respondent No.1 Parmanand's bag was
searched. From the bag, opium was recovered. His personal search
was also carried out. Personal search of respondent No.2 Surajmal
was also conducted. Therefore, in light of judgments of this Court
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, Section 50 of the NDPS Act
will have application.”
25.
It is also worthwhile to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in case of State of Rajasthan vs. Jag Raj Singh reported in
2016 (11) SCC 687 and in the case of Boota Singh vs. State of
Haryana reported in 2021 (19) SCC 606 whereby in similar set of
facts the Hon’ble Apex Court has deal with Sections 42, 43 and 50 of
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the NDPS Act.
26.
Thus, the basic requirement under Section 50 of the Act was
also not complied with in the present case at the time of conducting
the search of the present respondents in the presence of the panch
witnesses. There is no evidence on record to establish that the
accused was informed of their right to have their search conducted in
the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, as required under
the said provision. From the evidence of none of the witnesses does it
emerge that the mandatory requirement under Section 50 of the
NDPS Act was duly complied with. Mere denial by the present
respondent cannot dispense with the statutory requirement. The
concerned authority was required to inform the respondents of their
legal right and, if they so desired, to produce them before the nearest
Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the decisions referred to hereinabove.
27.
Even prima facie on perusal of the panchnama of the seizure of
Mudammal and the report of the chemical analyzer also creates a
doubt that whether the actually it was a ganja or not as it is provided
under the provision of Section 2 (3)(iv) of the NDPS Act, which reads
as under:“2. (iii) “cannabis (hemp)” means—
(a) charas, that is, the separated resin, in whatever form, whether
crude or purified, obtained from the cannabis plant and also includes
concentrated preparation and resin known as hashish oil or liquid
hashish;
(b) ganja, that is, the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant
(excluding the seeds and leaves when not accompanied by the tops),
by whatever name they may be known or designated; and
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(c) any mixture, with or without any neutral material, of any of the
above forms of cannabis or any drink prepared therefrom; (iv)
“cannabis plant” means any plant of the genus cannabis;
(iv) “cannabis plant” means any plant of the genus cannabis”
28.
In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the Trial Court recorded
a finding that the prosecution had failed to establish the basic
ingredients of the offence against the present respondents. After
considering the evidence on record and relying upon the decisions
referred to in the impugned judgment, the Trial Court recorded cogent
reasons and ultimately passed the impugned judgment and order of
acquittal. Even, the Trial Court has observed that the prosecution has
not complied with the mandatory provisions namely Sections 42(1)(2),
50, 55 and 57 of the NDPS Act and after referring the decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court and the Hon’ble other High Courts referred to in
paragraph Nos.32 and 33 has rightly passed the impugned judgment
and order of acquittal.
29.
So far as the evidence of P.W.3 along with P.W.1 and P.W.4 is
concerned, it appears that though P.W.1 and P.W.4 being the raiding
officers, however, they have not complied with the provision of
Section 50(1) of the Act as they have not brought the accused before
the Gazetted Officer i.e. Executive Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate.
Even the the Police Station is hardly five minutes away from the
raiding sport, however, they were reaching at the place only after
almost four hours and recorded the FIR and, therefore, the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses creates serious doubt. It appears from
the record that the prosecution has examined the husband of accused
No.2, who denied the relationship with accused No.2. Under the
circumstances, the Trial Court has, after considering the evidence of
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the prosecution witnesses, discussed the evidence of the witnesses
and recorded the discrepancies found in the evidence of the
witnesses and from their evidence, the guilty of the accused is not
proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and come to the
conclusion in paras – 31 onward.
30.
Further, on perusal of the record of the appeal, it transpires that
the respondents-accused have established their innocence before the
Trial Court and that, after due appreciation of the oral as well as
documentary evidence and other material placed on record, the Trial
Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of
acquittal. The findings recorded by the Trial Court are just, proper and
in accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore, no
interference is warranted by this Court.
31.
It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate Court
has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate
Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to them under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
innocent unless they are proved guilty by a competent Court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption
of their innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial Court.
32.
Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while
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exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the
Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of
acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some
manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived
at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the
Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the
judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court
has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the
conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has
committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence
on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such
circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just
decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether
the accused are connected with the commission of the crime with
which he is charged.
33.
The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka
reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, more particularly paragraph Nos.
42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, reported in
[2022] 3 SCC 471, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated
the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in
paragraph No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble
Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court.
Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149,
the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more
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particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, I am in complete
agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court.
34.
It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general
principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others
vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate
Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of
acquittal. The principles read thus:
“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”,
etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of
language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to
interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to
review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his
R/CR.A/479/2008
(GJHC240417232008)
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2026
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of
the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb
the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench
of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High
Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm
and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the
reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a
contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further
observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be
legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view
about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely
imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh
impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This
was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect
of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach
of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the
conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and
well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving
them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”
35.
Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears
that there is no credible evidence to connect the present accused with
the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the
alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the
evidence on record.
36.
On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly
transpires that the trial Court has not committed any error of fact and
law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the
accused from the charges levelled against them. Even on reappreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution
has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused
R/CR.A/479/2008
(GJHC240417232008)
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2026
beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal is liable
to be dismissed.
37.
In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of merits and
it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The
impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is
hereby
confirmed.
Bail
bond
stands
cancelled.
Record
and
proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.
V.R. PANCHAL
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
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