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2026:CGHC:1864-DB
Digitally signed
by SAGRIKA
SAGRIKA AGRAWAL
AGRAWAL Date:
2026.01.14
16:33:50 +0530
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 4 of 2026
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Chief Secretary, Chhattisgarh Govt. Mahanadi
Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur Chhattisgarh.
2 - Principal Secretary, Chhattisgarh Govt. Koshal Vikas Technical Education And
Rojgar Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur C.G., District
Raipur C.G.
3 - Principal Secretary, Chhattisgarh Govt. Man Power And Planning Department,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur C.G., District Raipur C.G.
4 - Secretary, Chhattisgarh Govt. Koshal Vikas Technical Education And Rojgar
Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur C.G., District Raipur C.G.
5 - Commissioner, Directorate, Employment And Training Indravati Bhawan, New
Raipur C.G., District Raipur C.G.
6 - Joint Director Training Directorate, Employment And Training Indravati Bhawan,
New Raipur C.G., District Raipur C.G.
7 - Joint Director Training, Industrial Training Institute, Koni, Bilaspur C.G., District
Bilaspur C.G.
8 - Joint Director Training, Industrial Training Institute Pali, District Korba C.G.,
District Korba C.G.
9 - Principal/ Training Superintendent/ Institute In Charge, Industrial Training,
Institute Koni, District Bilaspur C.G., District Bilaspur C.G.
10 - Principal/ Training Superintendent/ Institute In Charge, Industrial Training
Institute Pali, District Korba C.G., District Korba C.G.
... appellant(s)
versus
1 - Shyam Sunder Suryawanshi S/o Late Shri Ram Charan Suryawanshi, Aged
About 48 Years R/o Iti Colony Qr.No. T/97 Koni, Tahsil And District Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh.
2 - Shailendra Kumar Gond S/o Shankar Singh Gond, Aged About 35 Years Kartala
Iti R/o Village Jajang, Post Jajang, District Janjgir Champa C.G., District Janjgir
Champa C.G.
3 - Satish Chandra Dewangan, S/o Fagu Ram Dewangan, Aged About 46 Years R/o
Model Iti Campus Koni, Qr.No. T-21/3 Tahsil And District Bilaspur C.G., District
Bilaspur C.G.
4 - Kamleshwar Prasad Choudhary, S/o Shri Hari Shankar Choudhary, Aged About
39 Years T-46/8 Model Iti Campus Koni, Tahsil And District Bilaspur C.G., District
Bilaspur C.G.
5 - Ram Chandra Sakat, S/o Shri J.R. Sakat, Aged About 42 Years R/o Model Iti
Campus Koni, Tahsil And District Bilaspur C.G., District Bilaspur C.G.
6 - Vishal Gupta, S/o Shri R.S. Gupta, Aged About 37 Years Posted At Model Iti
Campus Koni, Tahsil And District Bilaspur C.G. R/o Nirmala Sadan Centre Koni,
Bilaspur District Bilaspur C.G., District Bilaspur C.G.
7 - Sanjay Kumar Arya, S/o Shri Kishan Chand Arya, Aged About 38 Years R/o
Model Iti Koni, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur C.G., District Bilaspur C.G.
8 - Bhooshan Prasad Karsh, S/o Punwa Ram Karsh, Aged About 39 Years Posted
At Model Iti Koni, R/o H.N. 1315, Ward No. 21, Near Arya Shishu Mandir, Old
Kashinagar, Korba C.G., District Korba C.G.
9 - Sujeet Kumar S/o Shri Shiv Shankar Aged About 44 Years Posted At Iti Pali
District Korba R/o Village Chandipara Post And Tahsil Pamgarh, District Janjgir
Champa C.G., District Janjgir Champa C.G.
10 - Ishwari Sahu S/o Shri Nanki Ram Sahu, Aged About 39 Years Posted At Iti Pali
District Korba Post Kosla, Via- Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G., District
Janjgir Champa C.G.
... Respondent(s)
For appellant (s)/ State
: Mr. Priyank Rathi, Govt. Advocate
For Respondent No.4
: Mr. Harshwardhan Parganiha, Advocate
For Respondent No. 10
: Ms. Deepali Pandey, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
13/01/2026
1. Heard Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Govt. Advocate for the
appellants/State as well as Mr. Harshwardhan Parganiha and
Ms. Deepali Pandey, learned counsel for the respective
Respondents on I.A. No.02 of 2026, which is an application for
condonation of delay of 215 days in preferring the appeal.
2. Learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the State/appellants
submits that the present writ appeal has been preferred by the
appellants/ State against the judgment dated 18.03.2025 passed
in WPS No. 5776 of 2016 (Shyam Sunder Suryawanshi & Ors.
Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others) by the Hon’ble Single Bench
of this Court. He would further submit that the delay is neither
intentional nor willful, but occurred due to bona fide reasons. He
further submits that after receiving the certified copy of the
judgment, the matter required inter-departmental consultations
between the Department of Skill Development and Technical
Education and the Law Department of the State of Chhattisgarh,
which took considerable time due to administrative procedures
and multiple levels of approval. He also submits that the
appellants have a strong case on merits, therefore, the delay if
not condoned, would result in grave miscarriage of justice.
3. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for
condonation of delay.
4. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary
documents and information with respect to the case, however,
some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various
departmental formalities and working of the Government
machinery because the State Government is a multi functioning
body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities
takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases the State
is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of
limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The instant
appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 215 days from
the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed
upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others,
(1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the
learned State counsel prays that the delay of 215 days in
preferring the petition may be condoned.
5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for
condonation of delay.
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster
General and others v. Living Media India Limited and
another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue
and held as under:“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant
with
the
issues
involved
including
the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up
the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with
competent
persons
familiar
with
court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible
and acceptable explanation, we are posing
a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because
the
Government
or
a
wing
of
the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that
in a matter of condonation of delay when
there was no gross negligence or deliberate
inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal
concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions.
The
claim
on
impersonal
machinery
bureaucratic
methodology
account
and
of
of
inherited
making
several notes cannot be accepted in view
of the modern technologies being used
and
available.
The
law
of
limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including
the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all
the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities
that
unless
they
have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for
the delay and there was bonafide effort, there
is no need to accept the usual explanation
that the file was kept pending for several
months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red-tape in the process. The
government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their
duties
with
diligence
and
commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated benefit
for
government
departments.
The
law
shelters everyone under the same light and
should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no
proper explanation offered by the Department
for the delay except mentioning of various
dates, according to us, the Department has
miserably failed to give any acceptable and
cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a
huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are
liable to be dismissed on the ground of
delay.”
7. Recently, a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary,
2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some
directions and observed as follows:“5. The legal position is that where a
case has been presented in the Court
beyond limitation, the petitioner has to
explain the Court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the Court
within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v.
Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC
1260, it was held by this Court that
even though limitation may harshly
affect the rights of a party, it has to be
applied
with
all
its
rigour
when
prescribed by statute. A reference was
also made to the decision of this Court
in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023
SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as
follows:
"13.
This
Court
in
the
case
of
Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition
Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while
rejecting
an
application
for
condonation of delay for lack of
sufficient cause has concluded in
Paragraph 15 as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court
could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application
is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In
case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court
on time condoning the delay without
any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory
provisions
and
it
tantamounts
to
showing
utter
disregard
to
the
we
of
the
legislature.”
14.
Therefore,
are
considered opinion that the High Court
did
not
commit
any
the
delay
dismissing
mistake
in
condonation
application of the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the
discretion to condone the delay has to
be exercised judiciously based on facts
and circumstances of each case and
that, the expression 'sufficient cause'
cannot
be
liberally
interpreted,
if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir
Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his
legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein,
one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a
member, after referring to various
decisions on the issue, it was in
unequivocal terms observed by this
Court that delay should not be excused
as
a
matter
of
generosity
and
rendering substantial justice is not to
cause prejudice to the opposite party.
The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances,
we made it very clear that we are not
going to look into the merits of the
matter
as
long
as
we
are
not
convinced that sufficient cause has
been made out for condonation of such
a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant
is a private party or a State or Union of
India when it comes to condoning the
gross delay of more than 12 years. If
the litigant chooses to approach the
court long after the lapse of the time
prescribed
under
the
relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot
turn around and say that no prejudice
would be caused to either side by the
delay being condoned. This litigation
between the parties started sometime
in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43
years have elapsed. However, till date
the respondent has not been able to
reap the fruits of his decree. It would
be a mockery of justice if we condone
the delay of 12 years and 158 days
and once again ask the respondent to
undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a
relevant matter which the court must
take
into
consideration
while
considering whether the delay should
be condoned or not. From the tenor of
the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings
for
which
law
has
prescribed a period of limitation. Once
it is held that a party has lost his right
to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for
a long, it cannot be presumed to be
non-deliberate
delay
and
in
such
circumstances of the case, he cannot
be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations.
While
considering
the
plea
for
condonation of delay, the court must
not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain
the
explanation
bona
offered
fides
by
of
the
the
party
seeking condonation. It is only if the
sufficient cause assigned by the litigant
and the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter
for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the
question of limitation is not merely a
technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of
sound public policy and principles of
equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword
of Damocles’ hanging over the head of
the respondent for indefinite period of
time to be determined at the whims
and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less
any error of law in passing the
impugned order. Even otherwise, the
High
Court
was
exercising
its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this
Court, it has been said that delay
should not be excused as a matter of
generosity.
Rendering
substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The appellants have
failed
to
prove
that
they
were
reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning
the delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to
the facts of the present case, we are of
the
opinion
that
the
High
Court
correctly refused to condone the delay
and dismissed the appeal by observing
that such inordinate delay was not
explained satisfactorily, no sufficient
cause was shown for the same, and no
plausible reason was put forth by the
State. Therefore, we are inclined to
reject this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot
simply
brush
aside
the
delay
occurred in preferring the second
appeal,
due
to
callous
and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of
the officials functioning in the State
machinery. Though the Government
adopts
systematic
handling
the
legal
approach
in
issues
and
preferring
the
petitions/applications/appeals
well
within the time, due to the fault on
the part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on
time, huge revenue loss will be
caused
to
the
Government
exchequer. The present case is one
such
case,
wherein,
enormous
delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to
the lapses on the part of the officials
functioning under the State, though
valuable Government lands were
involved. Therefore, we direct the
State to streamline the machinery
touching the legal issues, offering
legal opinion, filing of cases before
the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the
responsibility
on
concerned,
and
the
officer(s)
penalize
the
officer(s), who is/are responsible for
delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any,
to the value of the loss caused to
the Government. Such direction will
have to be followed by all the States
scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the
matter which we must not ignore or
overlook. Over a period of time, we
have noticed that whenever there is a
plea for condonation of delay be it at
the instance of a private litigant or
State the delay is sought to be
explained right from the time, the
limitation starts and if there is a delay
of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till
the end of the same. For example if
the period of limitation is 90 days then
the party seeking condonation has to
explain why it was unable to institute
the proceedings within that period of
limitation. What events occurred after
the 91st day till the last is of no
consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the
party that it was unable to file it
between the 1st day and the 90th day.
It is true that a party is entitled to wait
until the last day of limitation for filing
an appeal. But when it allows the
limitation
to
expire
and
pleads
sufficient cause for not filing the appeal
earlier,
the
sufficient
cause
must
establish that because of some event
or circumstance arising before the
limitation expired it was not possible to
file the appeal within time. No event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of
limitation can constitute such sufficient
cause. There may be events or
circumstances
subsequent
to
the
expiry of limitation which may further
delay the filing of the appeal. But that
the limitation has been allowed to
expire without the appeal being filed
must be traced to a cause arising
within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit
Singh Thakur Singh and Another v.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”
8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra)
and
Ramkumar
Choudhary
(supra),
it
is
evident
that
Government departments are under a special obligation to
discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot
be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon
all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage
upon a select few.
9. Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of
Shivamma (dead) by LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of
State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a Stateauthority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity
and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of
the apathy and pangs of a private litigant.
10.
Upon considering the matter in its entirety and also
applying the well settled principles of law to the facts of the
present case, we find that the State has failed to provide any
proper or satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the
present appeal. The only reason cited is that the Law &
Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh,
Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had forwarded a proposal to the Office
of the Advocate General for initiating an appeal against the
impugned order dated 18.03.2025. Thereafter, the case was
processed, and the present appeal was ultimately filed.
However, this sequence of events, lacking in specificity or
justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or acceptable
explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to demonstrate
sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an inordinate
delay of 215 days.
11.
Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our
discretionary power under the law to condone such extraordinary
delay. The learned counsel for the State has not been able to
establish any convincing or bona fide reason for the delay.
Therefore, there is no justification for condoning the delay of 215
days in filing the writ appeal.
12.
In view of the above, the writ appeal is hereby rejected on
the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
sagrika
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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