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2026:CGHC:5337
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 3735 of 2025
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through - Police Station- Chawani, District- Durg (C.G.)
--- Petitioner
versus
1 - Shahid S/o Abdul Manna, Aged About 37 Years, R/o Durgapara, Near Sapna
Tokij, Bhilai, Police Station Chawani, District- Durg (C.G.)
2 - Asib S/o Md. Jainul, Aged About 30 Years, R/o Near Anil Ata Chakki, Madarsa
Road Goutam Nagar Khursipar, Police Station- Khursipar, Bhilai, District- Durg
(C.G.)
--- Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner/State
: Mr. Vinod Tekam, Govt. Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
Order on Board
30-01-2026
1.
Heard Mr. Vinod Tekam, learned Govt. Advocate for the appellant/State on
I.A. No.01/2025, which is an application for condonation of delay of 272
days.
2.
The State/appellant has preferred the instant application for grant of leave to
appeal and appeal against the findings and judgment of acquittal dated
25.11.2024, passed in Special Criminal Case NDPS No. 31/2023, by the
Court of learned Special Judge constituted under the Narcotic, Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act & 4 th District & Additional Sessions Judge,
MOHAMMED
AADIL KHAN
Date: 2026.02.16
19:11:47 +0530
Durg (C.G.) whereby acquitting the respondent No.1 from the offence
punishable under under Sections 21(A) and respondent No.2 from the
offence punishable under Section 21(B) of the NDPS Act.
3.
Learned counsel for the appellant / State submits that though the scope of
interference with an order of acquittal is limited, the appellate Court
nonetheless possesses wide powers of reappreciation of evidence, and
where such reappraisal reveals that the findings of acquittal are unjust,
perverse or against the weight of evidence, the appellate Court is fully
empowered to reverse the same. Learned State counsel submits that the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is patently erroneous,
perverse, and contrary to the settled principles of law. Despite there being
ample, cogent, and reliable evidence available on record establishing the
guilt of the accused/respondents, the learned Trial Court has erroneously
acquitted
them
on
wholly
insignificant,
unreasonable,
and
legally
unsustainable grounds. The Court failed to appreciate that, the charges
leveled against the respondents are very serious in nature like dealing with
narcotic drugs and because of this reason the accused are not entitled for
any sympathy by this Court. The learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate
that all the parameters and provisions of N.D.P.S, Act were duly followed
during the course of investigation. The respondents were in possession of
contraband in an illegal manner, which is evident from FSL Report (Ex. P58), youths are targeted, which is adversely affecting the society & its future.
Learned trial Court failed to appreciate the circumstances and acquitted the
respondents on account of minor omissions and contradictions.
4.
It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary documents
and information with respect to the case preferred the present petition,
however, some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental
formalities and working of the Government machinery because the State
Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of
departmental formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some
cases the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period
of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The instant appeal is,
therefore, being filed after a delay of 272 days from the prescribed period of
limitation. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and
others, (1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned
State counsel prays that the delay of 272 days in preferring the petition may
be condoned.
5.
The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation
Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal from an order of
acquittal.
6.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and
others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has
dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well
aware or conversant with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way
of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot
claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent persons familiar
with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the
delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party before
us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has
to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the
view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot
be accepted in view of the modern technologies being
used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly
binds everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they
have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and
there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual
explanation that the file was kept pending for several
months/years due to considerable degree of procedural redtape in the process. The government departments are under a
special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with
diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for
government departments. The law shelters everyone under the
same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation
offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of
various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably
failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable
to be dismissed on the ground of delay.”
7.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, while considering the
delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:“5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in
the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the
Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach
the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi,
2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even
though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to
be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A
reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay
Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held
as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an
application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court
as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No
court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of
the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the
High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the
delay condonation application of the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the
delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and
circumstances of each case and that, the expression
'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to
the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)
through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of
us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to
various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very
clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the
matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient
cause has been made out for condonation of such a long
and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party
or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning
the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant
chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the
time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law,
then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice
would be caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the parties started
sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years
have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not
been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a
mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years
and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to
undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the
court must take into consideration while considering
whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that
they want to fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed
a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost
his right to have the matter considered on merits
because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead
that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start
with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty
to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered
by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the
sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the
court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is
not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the
‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined
at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the
conclusion that the High Court committed no error much
less any error of law in passing the impugned order.
Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its
supervisory
jurisdiction
under Article
of
the
Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been
said that delay should not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have
failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning
the delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is
hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present
case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused
to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that
such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient
cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put
forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition
at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay
occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning
in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts
systematic approach in handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the
time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss
will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present
case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788
days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the
lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State,
though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore,
we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the
legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the
Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s)
concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible
for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the
loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to
be followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not
ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that
whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the
instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be
explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a
delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same.
For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party
seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute
the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events
occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The
court is required to consider what came in the way of the party
that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It
is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation
for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or
circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not
possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance
arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient
cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the
expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal.
But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the
appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the
period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”
8.
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the
light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar Choudhary
(supra), it is evident that Government departments are under a special
obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be claimed as
a matter of right or anticipated privilege by Government entities. The law
casts its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to
confer undue advantage upon a select few.
9.
Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State has failed
to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the
present petition. The only reason cited is that the Law & Legislative Affairs
Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had
forwarded a proposal to the Office of the Advocate General for initiating an
appeal against the impugned acquittal order dated 25.11.2024. Thereafter,
the case was processed, and the present petition was ultimately filed.
However, this sequence of events, lacking in specificity or justifiable cause,
does not amount to a cogent or acceptable explanation. Thus, the State has
miserably failed to demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation
of an inordinate delay of 272 days.
10.
Consequently, I am not inclined to exercise our discretionary power under
the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The learned counsel for the
State has not been able to establish any convincing or bona fide reason for
the delay. Therefore, there is no justification for condoning the delay of 272
days in filing the petition against acquittal.
11.
In view of the above, the instant petition seeking leave to appeal is hereby
rejected on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Aadil
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