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MANPREET
KAUR
2026:CGHC:2921-DB
Digitally signed
by MANPREET
KAUR
Date: 2026.01.20
11:29:36 +0530
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 192 of 2026
State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Police Station - Darbha, District Bastar (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Rahul Lambhade S/o Mahadev Lambhade Aged About 23 Years R/o
- Selubaazar Ward No. 1, Police Station - Mangrur, District - Vasim
(Maharashtra)
2 - Sheikh Rajik S/o Sheikh Mohammad Aged About 22 Years R/o Selubaazar Ward No. 1, Police Station - Mangrur, District - Vasim
(Maharashtra)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Dy. G.A.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
19.01.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, learned Deputy Government Advocate
for the appellant/State on I.A. No.01 of 2026, which is an
application for condonation of delay of 108 days.
2.
The State/appellant has preferred the instant application for grant
of leave to appeal and appeal against the findings and judgment
of acquittal dated 24.05.2025, passed in Special Criminal Case
(NDPS Act) No. 65/2024, by the Court of learned Special Judge
constituted
under
the
Narcotic,
Drugs
and
Psychotropic
Substances Act (C.G.) whereby acquitting the respondents from
the offence punishable under under Sections 20 B (ii) (C) of the
NDPS Act.
3.
Learned counsel for the appellant / State submits that though the
scope of interference with an order of acquittal is limited, the
appellate Court nonetheless possesses wide powers of reappreciation of evidence, and where such reappraisal reveals that
the findings of acquittal are unjust, perverse or against the weight
of evidence, the appellate Court is fully empowered to reverse the
same. Learned State counsel submits that the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is patently erroneous,
perverse, and contrary to the settled principles of law. Despite
there being ample, cogent, and reliable evidence available on
record establishing the guilt of the accused/respondents, the
learned Trial Court has erroneously acquitted them on wholly
insignificant, unreasonable, and legally unsustainable grounds.
The Court failed to appreciate that, the charges leveled against
the respondents are very serious in nature like dealing with
narcotic drugs and because of this reason the appellants are not
entitled for any sympathy by this Court. The learned Trial Court
has failed to appreciate that all the parameters and provisions of
N.D.P.S, Act were duly followed during the course of investigation.
The respondents were in possession of contraband in an illegal
manner, which is evident from FSL Report (Ex. P-70), youths are
targeted, which is adversely affecting the society & its future.
Learned trial Court failed to appreciate the circumstances and
acquitted the respondents on account of minor omissions and
contradictions.
4.
It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary
documents and information with respect to the case preferred the
present petition, however, some delay was occurred due to
fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the
Government machinery because the State Government is a multi
functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental
formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases
the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed
period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The
instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 108 days
from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed
upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, (1996)
3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned
State counsel prays that the delay of 108 days in preferring the
petition may be condoned.
5.
The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for
leave to appeal from an order of acquittal.
6.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General
and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3
SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues
involved including the prescribed period of limitation
for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have
a separate period of limitation when the Department
was possessed with competent persons familiar with
court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a question
why the delay is to be condoned mechanically
merely because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot
take advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and
inherited bureaucratic methodology of making
several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available.
The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody
including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government
bodies,
their
agencies
and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and
acceptable explanation for the delay and there was
bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual
explanation that the file was kept pending for several
months/years
due
to
considerable
degree
of
procedural red-tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to ensure
that they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception
and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for
government departments. The law shelters everyone
under the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper
explanation offered by the Department for the delay
except mentioning of various dates, according to us,
the Department has miserably failed to give any
acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone
such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable
to be dismissed on the ground of delay.”
7.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932,
while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed
as follows:-
“5. The legal position is that where a case has been
presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner
has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the Court within
limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021
SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that
even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a
party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the
decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023
SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC
81] while rejecting an application for condonation
of delay for lack of sufficient cause has
concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented
in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has
to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the
court within limitation. In case a party is found to
be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or
found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing
any condition whatsoever. The application is to
be decided only within the parameters laid down
by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court did not commit any mistake in
dismissing the delay condonation application of
the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone
the
delay
has
to
be
exercised
judiciously based on facts and circumstances of
each case and that, the expression 'sufficient
cause'
cannot
be
liberally
interpreted,
if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is
attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC
262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a
member, after referring to various decisions on
the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed
by this Court that delay should not be excused as
a matter of generosity and rendering substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it
very clear that we are not going to look into the
merits of the matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has been made
out for condonation of such a long and inordinate
delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it comes
to condoning the gross delay of more than 12
years. If the litigant chooses to approach the
court long after the lapse of the time prescribed
under the relevant provisions of the law, then he
cannot turn around and say that no prejudice
would be caused to either side by the delay
being condoned. This litigation between the
parties started sometime in 1981. We are in
2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However,
till date the respondent has not been able to reap
the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of
justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and
158 days and once again ask the respondent to
undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration
while considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach
of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix
their own period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a party
has lost his right to have the matter considered
on merits because of his own inaction for a long,
it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay
and in such circumstances of the case, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering the
plea for condonation of delay, the court must not
start with the merits of the main matter. The court
owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of
the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration.
The rules of limitation are based on the principles
of sound public policy and principles of equity.
We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’
hanging over the head of the respondent for
indefinite period of time to be determined at the
whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to
the conclusion that the High Court committed no
error much less any error of law in passing the
impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court
was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has
been said that delay should not be excused as a
matter of
generosity.
Rendering
substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The appellants have failed to prove that
they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning the delay
is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails
and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order
as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the
present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court
correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the
appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not
explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown
for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by
the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition
at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside
the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal,
due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part
of the officials functioning in the State machinery.
Though the Government adopts systematic approach
in handling the legal issues and preferring the
petitions/applications/appeals well within the time,
due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely
communicating
the
information
on
time,
huge
revenue loss will be caused to the Government
exchequer. The present case is one such case,
wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on
the part of the officials functioning under the State,
though valuable Government lands were involved.
Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the
machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal
opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts,
etc.,
fix
the
responsibility
on
the
officer(s)
concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are
responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any,
to the value of the loss caused to the Government.
Such direction will have to be followed by all the
States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we
must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we
have noticed that whenever there is a plea for
condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private
litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right
from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay
of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the
same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days
then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it
was unable to institute the proceedings within that period
of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till
the last is of no consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the party that it was
unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It
is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of
limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the
limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not
filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must
establish that because of some event or circumstance
arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to
file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance
arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such
sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances
subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further
delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has
been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed
must be traced to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”
8.
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra)
and
Ramkumar
Choudhary
(supra),
it
is
evident
that
Government departments are under a special obligation to
discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be
claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all
litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon
a select few.
9.
Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State
has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the
delay in filing the present petition. The only reason cited is that the
Law
&
Legislative
Affairs
Department,
Government
of
Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had forwarded a proposal
to the Office of the Advocate General for initiating an appeal
against
the
impugned
acquittal
order
dated
24.05.2025.
Thereafter, the case was processed, and the present petition was
ultimately filed. However, this sequence of events, lacking in
specificity or justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or
acceptable explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to
demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an
inordinate delay of 108 days.
10.
Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary
power under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The
learned counsel for the State has not been able to establish any
convincing or bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is
no justification for condoning the delay of 108 days in filing the
petition against acquittal.
11.
In view of the above, the instant petition seeking leave to appeal is
hereby rejected on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Manpreet
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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