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2026:CGHC:2132-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 7 of 2026
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Chief Secretary, Chhattisgarh
Govt. Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Principal Secretary Chhattisgarh Govt. Koshal Vikas Technical
Education And Rojgar Department Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya, New
Raipur, Chhattisgarh, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Principal Secretary Chhattisgarh Govt. Man Power And Planning
Department Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya, New Raipur, Chhattisgarh,
Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
4 - Secretary Chhattisgarh Govt. Koshal Vikas Technical Education And
Rojgar Department Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya, New Raipur,
Chhattisgarh, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
5 - Commissioner Directorate Employment And Training Indrawati
Bhawan, New Raipur, Chhattisgarh, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
6 - Joint Director Directorate Of Employment And Training Indrawati
Bhawan, New Raipur, Chhattisgarh, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
7 - Joint Director Training Industrial Training Institute, Ambikapur Zone,
Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh.
8 - Principal/training Superintendent/institute In Charge Industrial
Training Institute, Chirmiri, Ambikapur Zone, Chhattisgarh,
Chhattisgarh.
... Appellants
versus
VED
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Digitally signed
by VED PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Date: 2026.01.15
10:57:31 +0530
1 - Mahendra Kumar Sharma S/o Shri Ramnath Tiwari Aged About 38
Years R/o I.T.I. Colony, P.S. And Tahsil Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja,
Chhattisgarh.
2 - Snehlata Mishra W/o Nilesh Tiwari Aged About 31 Years R/o G.S.
Tiwari, Shivnandanpur, Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Ashesh Sinha S/o Late B.P. Sinha Aged About 42 Years R/o
Thungunpara, Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh, Distt. Surguja
(Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh.
4 - Abhisarika Singh W/o Dharmendra Singh Aged About 33 Years
Kedarpur, Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh.
5 - Nveen Gupta S/o Shri Jagdish Prasad Gupta Aged About 40 Years
R/o Namnakala, Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh.
6 - Abhishek Mashih S/o Idu Mashih Aged About 39 Years R/o Behind
Surguja University, Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellants
:
For Respondent No.2
:
Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate
General
Ms. Manubha Shankar, Advocate
holding brief of Mr. Harshwardhan
Parganiha, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.
14/01/2026
1.
Heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General
appearing for the appellants on I.A. No. 2 of 2026, which is an
application for condonation of delay of 206 days in preferring the
instant appeal. Also heard Ms. Manubha Shankar, Advocate
holding brief of Mr. Harshwardhan Parganiha, Advocate for the
respondent No.2.
2.
The appellants have filed this writ appeal against an order dated
18.03.2025, passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, in WPS No.
1715/2017 (Mahendra Kumar Sharma and others v. State of
Chhattisgarh and others), by which the learned Single Judge
has allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners.
3.
Learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the appellants/
State submits that the present writ appeal has been preferred by
the appellants/State against the order dated 18.03.2025 passed
in WPS No. 1715/2017, by the Hon’ble Single Bench of this
Court. He would further submit that the State is a multifunctioning body and it has to follow the rules of obtaining
sanction etc. for filing an appeal, which took considerable time
due to administrative procedures and multiple levels of approval.
He also submits that the appellants have a strong case on merits,
therefore, the delay if not condoned, would result in grave
miscarriage of justice.
4.
It has been further contended that the State, after obtaining
necessary documents and information with respect to the case,
some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various
departmental formalities and working of the Government
machinery, because the State Government is a multi functioning
body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities
takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases the State
is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of
limitation, which is bona fide and not deliberate. The instant
appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 206 days from the
prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed upon
the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
“State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others” (1996) 3 SCC
132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned State
counsel prays that the delay of 206 days in preferring the petition
may be condoned.
5.
Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 submits that the writ
appeal is barred by delay and laches and further there is no
cogent reason or explanation has been given in the delay and
laches application filed for condonation of delay. Hence, the
appeal is not liable to be entertained.
6.
On a pointed query being made to the learned for the appellants
as to why they have approached this Court against the impugned
order dated 18.03.2025, after an inordinate delay of 206 days, he
has not offered any plausible explanation or any cogent reason
for delay in filing the writ appeal.
7.
The question for determination before this Court, is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for
condonation of delay.
8.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Union of India and
others v. Tarsem Singh” (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the
settled principles in the following manner:-
“7. To summarise, normally, a belated service
related claim will be rejected on the ground of
delay and laches (where remedy is sought by
filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy
is sought by an application to the Administrative
Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is
cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a
service related claim is based on a continuing
wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long
delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the
date on which the continuing wrong commenced,
if such continuing wrong creates a continuing
source of injury. But there is an exception to the
exception. If the grievance is in respect of any
order or administrative decision which related to
or affected several others also, and if the
reopening of the issue would affect the settled
rights of third parties, then the claim will not be
entertained. For example, if the issue relates to
payment or re fixation of pay or pension, relief
may be granted in spite of delay as it does not
affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim
involved
issues
relating
to
seniority
or
promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would
render
the
claim
stale
and
doctrine
of
laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the
consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a
past period is concerned, the principles relating
to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a
consequence, the High Courts will restrict the
consequential relief relating to arrears normally to
a period of three years prior to the date of filing of
the writ petition.”
9.
The Supreme Court in the matter of “C. Jacob v. Director of
Geology and Mining and others” (2008) 10 SCC 115, having
found that the employee suddenly brought up a challenge to the
order of termination of his services after 20 years and claimed all
consequential benefits, held that the relief sought for was
inadmissible. The legal position in this regard was laid out in the
following terms:-
“10. Every representation of the Government for
relief,
may
not
be
applied
on
merits.
Representations relating to matters which have
become stale or barred by limitation, can be
rejected on that ground alone, without examining
the
merits
of
the
claim.
In
regard
to
representations unrelated to the Department, the
reply may be only to inform that the matter did not
concern
the
Department
or
to
inform
the
appropriate Department. Representations with
incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking
relevant
particulars.
The
replies
to
such
representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of
action or revive a stale or dead claim.
11. When a decision is issued by a court/tribunal
to consider or deal with the representation,
usually the directee (person directed) examines
the matter on merits,being under the impression
that failure to do so may amount to disobedience.
When an order is passed considering and
rejecting
the
claim
or
representation,
in
compliance with direction of the court or tribunal,
such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor
amount to some kind of “acknowledgement of a
jural relationship” to give rise to a fresh cause of
action.
12. When a government abandons service to take
alternative employment or to attend to personal
affairs, and does not bother to send any letter
seeking leave or letter of resignation or letter of
voluntary retirement, and the records do not show
that he is treated as being in service, he cannot
after two decades, represent that he should be
taken back to duty. Nor can such employee be
treated as having continued in service, thereby
deeming the entire period as qualifying service
for the purpose of pension. That will be a travesty
of justice.
13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents
himself and suddenly appears after 20 years and
demands that he should be taken back and
approaches the court, the department naturally
will not or may not have any record relating to the
employee at that distance of time. In such cases,
when the employer fails to produce the records of
the enquiry and the order of dismissal/removal,
court cannot draw an adverse inference against
the employer for not producing records, nor
direct reinstatement with back wages for 20
years, ignoring the cessation of service or the
lucrative alternative employment of the employee.
Misplaced
sympathy
in
such
matters
will
encourage discipline, lead to unjust enrichment of
the employee at fault and result in drain of public
exchequer. Many a time there is also no
application of mind as to the extent of financial
burden, as a result of a routine order for back
wages.”
10.
In the light of the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments (supra), and
upon due consideration of the grounds urged in I.A. No. 2, we
find that the delay of 206 days in preferring the writ appeal has
not been satisfactorily explained with any cogent or plausible
reason. The appellants have failed to demonstrate sufficient
cause so as to justify condonation of such delay. Therefore, no
ground is made out to exercise our discretion in favour of the
appellants for condoning the delay.
11.
Consequently, I.A. No. 2 seeking condonation of delay is hereby
rejected. As a natural corollary thereto, the writ appeal also
stands dismissed.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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