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2026:CGHC:1856-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 984 of 2025
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Government of General
Administration, Mahanadi Bhawan, Village Rakhi, Atal Nagar, Naya
Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
2 - The Principal Secretary Department of Forest, State of Chhattisgarh,
Naya Raipur, Mantralaya, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA
3 - The Principal Chief Conservator Of Forests Aranya Bhawan, Medical
College Road, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.), Presently Aranya Bhawan,
North Block, Sector 19, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.)
Digitally signed
by ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA
... Appellants
versus
1 - Abhay Kumar Pandey S/o Late Shri B.L. Sharma Aged About 56
Years Resident Of Nehru Nagar, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.)
2 - Anand Kudarya S/o Late Shri J. P. Kudarya Aged About 48 Years
Resident Of G-8, Maruti Residency, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
3 - Udai Singh Thakur S/o Shri Komal Singh Thakur Aged About 59
Years Resident Of E-178, Sector 5, Devendra Nagar, Raipur, District
Raipur (C.G.)
4 - P. Narsingh Rao S/o Late Shri P.K. Naidu Aged About 59 Years
Resident Of 18/773, Baila Bazar Road, Jagdalpur, District Bastar (C.G.)
... Respondents
For State/Appellants
: Mr. Praveen Das, Addl. Advocate General
For Respondents
: Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate assisted
by Mr. Akash Pandey, Advocate
For Intervenor
: Mr. P. Acharya, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
13.01.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General,
appearing for the State/appellants.
Also heard Mr. Prafull N.
Bharat, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Akash Pandey,
learned counsel, appearing for the respondents/ writ petitioners
as well as Mr. P. Acharya, learned counsel, appearing for the
intervenor on I.A. No.02 of 2025, which is an application for
condonation of delay of 72 days in preferring the instant appeal.
2.
Learned
Additional
Advocate
General
appearing
for
the
State/appellants submits that after passing of the impugned order
on 07.08.2025, for filing of the present appeal, a permission has
been granted by the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs,
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District
Raipur vide order dated 24.11.2025 and the Officer-In-Charge
has been appointed by the Department concerned in the matter
for filing of the instant Writ Appeal on behalf of the
Appellants/State by vide order dated 17.10.2025 and after
obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to
the case the instant appeal has been prepared and filed before
this Hon'ble Court, however, some delay was occurred due to
fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the
Government machinery.
He further submits that the State
Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the
fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected delay,
therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing the
case within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bonafide
and not deliberate nor intentional.
3.
The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for
condonation of delay.
4.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster
General and others v. Living Media India Limited and
another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue
and held as under:“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues
involved including the prescribed period of limitation
for taking up the matter by way of filing a special
leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of
plausible and acceptable explanation, we are
posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a
party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the view that
in the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions. The claim on account of impersonal
machinery
and
inherited
bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government
bodies,
their
agencies
and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable
and acceptable explanation for the delay and there
was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the
usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red-tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to
ensure that they perform their duties with diligence
and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated
benefit for government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper
explanation offered by the Department for the delay
except mentioning of various dates, according to us,
the Department has miserably failed to give any
acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the
appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of
delay.”
5.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932 ,
while considering the delay, issued some directions and
observed as follows:-
“5. The legal position is that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the
petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was
the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the Court within limitation. In Majji
Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online
SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even
though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a
party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. A reference was also made
to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v.
Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was
held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found
to be negligent, or for want of bona fide
on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court
could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is
to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was
no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning
the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever,
amounts to passing an order in violation
of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard
to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not commit
any mistake in dismissing the delay
condonation application of the present
appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the
discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based on facts and
circumstances of each case and that, the
expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be
liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction
or lack of bona fides is attributed to the
party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC
262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a
member, after referring to various decisions on
the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed
by this Court that delay should not be excused as
a matter of generosity and rendering substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going
to look into the merits of the matter as
long as we are not convinced that
sufficient cause has been made out for
condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is
a private party or a State or Union of
India when it comes to condoning the
gross delay of more than 12 years. If
the litigant chooses to approach the
court long after the lapse of the time
prescribed under the relevant provisions
of the law, then he cannot turn around
and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the
parties started sometime in 1981. We
are in 2024. Almost 43 years have
elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap
the fruits of his decree. It would be a
mockery of justice if we condone the
delay of 12 years and 158 days and
once again ask the respondent to
undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether
the delay should be condoned or not.
From the tenor of the approach of the
appellants, it appears that they want to
fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation.
Once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a
long, it cannot be presumed to be nondeliberate
delay
and
in
such
circumstances of the case, he cannot
be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations.
While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not
start with the merits of the main matter.
The court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered
by the party seeking condonation. It is
only if the sufficient cause assigned by
the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the
court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
27. We are of the view that the question
of limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the ‘Sword of
Damocles’ hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time
to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less any
error of law in passing the impugned
order. Even otherwise, the High Court
was
exercising
its
supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this
Court, it has been said that delay should
not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice
is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The appellants have failed to
prove that they were reasonably diligent
in prosecuting the matter and this vital
test for condoning the delay is not
satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to
the facts of the present case, we are of
the opinion that the High Court correctly
refused to condone the delay and
dismissed the appeal by observing that
such inordinate delay was not explained
satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was
shown for the same, and no plausible
reason was put forth by the State.
Therefore, we are inclined to reject this
petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the
second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery.
Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/applications/appeals
well within the time, due to the fault on the
part of the officials in merely communicating
the information on time, huge revenue loss
will be caused to the Government exchequer.
The present case is one such case, wherein,
enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to the lapses
on the part of the officials functioning under
the State, though valuable Government lands
were involved. Therefore, we direct the State
to streamline the machinery touching the legal
issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the
responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and
penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible
for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the
value of the loss caused to the Government.
Such direction will have to be followed by all
the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that whenever
there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the
instance of a private litigant or State the delay is
sought to be explained right from the time, the
limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2
years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the
same. For example if the period of limitation is 90
days then the party seeking condonation has to
explain why it was unable to institute the
proceedings within that period of limitation. What
events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of
no consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the party that it
was unable to file it between the 1st day and the
90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait
until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal.
But when it allows the limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal
earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising
before the limitation expired it was not possible to
file the appeal within time. No event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation
can constitute such sufficient cause. There may
be events or circumstances subsequent to the
expiry of limitation which may further delay the
filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has
been allowed to expire without the appeal being
filed must be traced to a cause arising within the
period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh
and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC
733).”
6.
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra)
and
Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that
Government departments are under a special obligation to
discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot
be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon
all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage
upon a select few.
7.
Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of
Shivamma (dead) by LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of
State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity
and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of
the apathy and pangs of a private litigant.
8.
Upon considering the matter in its entirety and also applying the
well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case, we
find that the State has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory
explanation for the delay in filing the present appeal. The only
reason cited is that after passing of the impugned order on
07.08.2025, for filing of the present appeal, a permission has
been granted by the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs,
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District
Raipur vide order dated 24.11.2025 and the Officer-In-Charge
has been appointed by the Department concerned in the matter
for filing of the instant Writ Appeal on behalf of the
Appellants/State by vide order dated 17.10.2025 and after
obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to
the case the instant appeal has been prepared and filed before
this Hon'ble Court, however, some delay was occurred due to
fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the
Government machinery. Thus, the State has miserably failed to
demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an
inordinate delay of 72 days.
9.
Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary
power under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The
learned counsel for the State has not been able to establish any
convincing or bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is
no justification for condoning the delay of 72 days in filing the
writ appeal.
10.
In view of the above, the writ appeal is hereby dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Chandra
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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