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TRHC010006852024
2026:THC:592
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
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RSA No.20 of 2024
Sri V. Thansanga Darlong,
Sri Lura Darlong,
Sri Suakhama Darlong,
Smt. Sangnguri Darlong,
Smt. B. Vanlalmawii Darlong,
Sri Hmundinga Darlong,
Sri Powl Nei Kunga Darlong,
Smt. Hnampuii Darlong,
Smt. Margaret Darlong,
Smt. H. Theresa Darlong
All are sons and daughters of Late Neidinga Darlong @Neidingalliana Darlong.
Residents of Kathalcherra, Darlong Village, P.O. & P.S. – Nepal Tila, District –
Dhalai Tripura.
–Versus–
............Appellant(s);
1.
Sri Ringliana Darlong,
S/o Late Sanghminthanga Darlong,
2.
Sri Biakthanga Darlong,
S/o Late Ngurniela Darlong, resident of Kathalcherra, Darlong Village, P.O. &
P.S. Nepal Tila, District – Dhalai Tripura.
……..Respondent(s);
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. D. Bhattacharya, Sr. Advocate,
Mr. Samar Das, Advocate,
Mr. Agniva Chakraborty, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. B. N. Majumder, Sr. Advocate,
Mr. Subrata Sarkar, Advocate,
Mr. Aditya Dasgupta, Advocate.
Date of hearing & delivery
of Judgment & Order
:
Whether fit for reporting
:
11.05.2026.
YES
√
NO
√
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. D. Bhattacharya, learned senior counsel assisted by
Mr. S. Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. B.N.
Majumder, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents.
[2]
This appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, 1908 has been filed
challenging the judgment dated 06.09.2023 and the related decree thereof,
passed in Title Appeal No.03 of 2023 by the learned Additional District Judge,
Dhalai Judicial District, Ambassa whereby the learned first appellate court has
held as under:
“21. Secondly, one of the major grounds taken by the Ld. Trial Court
for dismissal of the said suit is the discrepancy in the names of the
grand-father and father of the Appellants/ Plaintiffs in some of the
documents exhibited. This Court has minutely gone through the said
discrepancies and is of the considered view that the said
discrepancies are very minor and inconsequential especially in the
absence of any allegations of fraud or impersonation, etc. by the
other side. This Court fails to understand how the name of the father
of the plaintiffs being mentioned as “Neidinga Darlong” in the cause
title and the plaint, but as “Niedingliana Darlong” in the pleadings can
make any difference specially when the 02 different names appear in
the same document (plaint) and it is not the case of the defendants
that one name was given in the plaint and another in an official
document like the Khatian/ allotment letter, etc. Consequently, the
said conclusions and reasoning of the Ld. Trial court regarding the
discrepancies in the above said names are set aside.
22. With the said observations, this appeal is dismissed and the
Appellants/ Plaintiffs are directed to execute a fresh sale deed qua the
suit land in favour of the Respondents/ Defendants and to get the
same registered within a period of 03 months from today. The fresh
Sale Deed is to be dated and to also contain an accurate description
of the land transferred.
23. Upon perusal of the Decree-Sheet, it seems that the description of
the suit land provided therein is incorrect and not in conformity with
the description provided in the plaint/ Page 2 Para 2 of the impugned
judgement/ Page 18 of the impugned judgment. In fact, on deeper
scrutiny of this inconsistency, it is clear that the description provided
in the Decree-Sheet actually pertains to the suit land qua one of the
connected Appeals, namely T.A 01/2023 (T.S 28/2018).
23A. Situated thus, the LC Record be remanded back to the Ld. Trial
Judge for passing a fresh judgment (with necessary amendments)
ensuring that the description of the suit land across (1) the plaint (2)
Page 2 para 2 of the impugned judgment (3) Page 18 of the impugned
judgment and (4) the Decree Sheet, is uniform. The said objections
arguments, thus stand addressed accordingly.
24. Relief of “mesne profits” cannot be granted in favour of the
plaintiffs for the same reasons that the other two reliefs, (namely
decree of title and recovery of possession) have been denied.
25. This appeal is thus dismissed on merits and the final decision of
the Ld. Trial Court is affirmed. (Dismissal of suit for declaration of
right, title and interest as well as the dismissal of suit for recovery of
possession and mesne profits).
26. Appeal is thus disposed of on contest.
27. No order as to costs.
28. A copy of this judgment be provided to the Ld. Trial Court
[Ld.Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dhalai Judicial District, Ambassa]
for his necessary information and compliance.
29. Decree-sheet be prepared within a week from today.
30. File be consigned to the record room.
31. Send back the L.C Record.
th
32. The judgment and order, as above delivered on this the 06 Day of
September, 2023 under the hand and seal of this Court.”
[3]
The present appellants as the plaintiffs filed the Title Suit No.30 of
2018 praying for declaration of their right, title and interest in the suit land and
recovery of possession evicting the present respondents from the suit land.
The suit land comprises of an area of 0.15 acre consisting of RS plot nos.
2503, and 2502 of Mouja-Kathalcherra, Longtharai Valley.
[4]
The claim of the appellants in the suit are that in 1357 T.E
corresponding to 1947 A.D. around 9[nine] drones of land in that locality was
allotted by the then Tripura Administration in favour of several Darlong families
including late Ziakhama Darlong, the grandfather of the appellants and
thereafter, such allottees partitioned their lands amongst them amicably and
ultimately, the grandfather of the present appellants got 6.96 acres of land with
specific boundary. During first survey and settlement operation, said land was
recorded in the name of Late Neidingliana Darlong, son of said Late Ziakhama
Darlong.
[5]
It is also stated by the appellants that in the last of part of 1950
many Jhumia Darlong families from Saikar village came to Kathalcherra and
they set up a new village which became popularly known as New
Katahalcherra Darlong Village and at that time, on request of social leaders of
the Village Committee, several persons were allowed by the predecessor of
the appellants to stay over their part of land as permissive possessor with a
condition that those persons would vacate their respective portion of land
whenever asked for. The appellants allege that since the lifetime of the
predecessor of the appellants, the predecessor of the respondent was staying
in the suit land as permissive possessor and after the death of said
predecessor, the name of the respondent was recorded in the remark column
of the related record of right as permissive possessor in respect of the suit
land. It is further stated by them that earlier some Jhumia Darlong families and
one missionary primary school were also allowed to occupy the land of the
predecessor of the appellants and lateron some of them vacated the same, but
one Khuma Darlong and one Nurliana Darlong continued to occupy the land of
the predecessor of the appellants and therefore, in the record of right, their
names were reflected as permissive possessor.
[6]
The father of the appellants died on 21.01.2004 and their mother
pre-deceased their father. It is also stated by the appellants that one of their
co-sharer, namely T.N. Martha Darlong was abducted by extremist in the year
2002 and since then she became missing and was not heard of more than
7[seven] years. Said T.N. Martha Darlong was also unmarried and therefore,
her shares devolved upon the present appellants. The appellants requested
the respondent to vacate the suit land on several occasions but such request
went in vain. The last request was made in this regard on 04.08.2008 but at
that time the respondent straightway denied their right, title and interest in the
suit land and therefore, the suit has been filed.
[7]
The respondent stated that the suit land was originally a vacant
land and therefore, in the year 1952 the villagers of Kathalcherra village
started occupying the suit land by constructing their own houses and
cultivating vegetables and other plants without any objection from any corner.
In the year 1992, the father of the appellants, Neidingliana Darlong, claimed
the possession of the suit land to the village committee members and there
one amicable settlement was done at the intervention of the village committee
members and it was resolved that the respondent should purchase the suit
land from the father of the appellants as he had demanded. An agreement was
also signed between the parties and Neidingliana Darlong had received
Rs.12,000/- from the respondent and other villagers with condition that he
would have no further claim in the land. It is also stated by the respondent that
one church is also situated within the claimed land of the appellant and the
authority of that church was also one of the payee of said Rs.12,000/- and
when the church was constructed, there was no objection from the side of the
appellants or their predecessor. Therefore, according to the respondent, the
appellants are not entitled to get a decree of recovery of possession.
[8]
In the trial, from the side of the appellants total 5[five] witnesses
were examined and the respondents also examined total 5[five] witnesses.
Both sides also proved certain documents into evidence. Finally, the learned
trial Court i.e. the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court No.1,
Dhalai, Ambassa dismissed the suit.
[9]
Challenging the said judgment, the appeal was filed by the
appellants and the same is also disposed of in the line as extracted earlier.
[10]
Mr. D. Bhattacharya, learned senior counsel seriously challenges
the correctness of the findings of the learned first appellate court on the
ground of over exercise of jurisdiction. Learned senior counsel submits that the
appellants filed the suit for declaration of their right, title and interest in the suit
land and for recovery of possession thereof, but the learned first appellate
court travelling beyond its jurisdiction granted decree of specific performance
of contract in favour of the respondent directing the appellants to execute a
fresh sale deed in favour of the respondent in respect of the suit land and to
get the same registered within 3[three] months from the date of decree.
Simultaneously, the learned first appellate court also dismissed the appeal of
the appellants. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee therefore prays for
setting aside the judgment of the learned first appellate court.
[11]
Mr. B. N. Majumder, learned senior counsel for the respondents,
submits that the genealogy of the appellants’ title was not described in the
plaint. Moreover, it is the appellants’ claim that the respondent has been
possessing the suit land as permissive possessor from 1952 and on the other
hand, the respondents’ claim is that he or his predecessor are in possession of
the suit land from 1952, but on the basis of their own strength and not as a
permissive possessor. So, the possession of the respondent or his
predecessor in the suit land from 1952 is established. Learned senior counsel
referring to the evidences of the appellant Lura Darlong (PW.1), submits that
PW-1 himself had stated that he was aged about 62 years as on the date of
his deposition recorded on 03.09.2019. Therefore, it is clearly established that
in the year 1952 he was not even born and therefore, he cannot have any
personal knowledge of what had happened in the year 1952, and thus his
evidence is liable to be discarded. According to the learned senior counsel,
PW-2 is also not the person connected with the affairs between the parties and
PW.3 and PW-4 were also not born during the relevant period. PW.5 is also an
official witness. Therefore, the evidences adduced by them are not acceptable
at all.
[12]
According to learned senior counsel, Mr. Majumder, the appellant
neither could satisfactorily prove their title in the suit land nor could be able to
prove the story of permissive possession of the respondent in the suit land.
Rather, by claiming the respondent to be permissive possessors, they
themselves have admitted that the respondent has been in possession of the
suit land uninterruptedly for a long period. The judgments passed by Ld. Trial
Court and as affirmed by Ld. 1st Appellate Court, Mr. Majumber submits, are
well reasoned and proper.
[13]
Learned senior counsel, Mr. Majumder, further submits that in the
year 1992, when the father of the plaintiffs claimed the suit land again, there
was a settlement in a village meeting organized by the Village Committee
Members and as per that settlement, the villagers who were possessing the
land of the predecessor of the appellants jointly paid Rs.12,000/- to the father
of the present appellant and a document was also executed in this regard
which has been proved in the evidence and surprisingly, it is seen that the
requisite stamp for the said deed of settlement was purchased by PW- 1
himself. Therefore, he has full knowledge of the affairs between the parties.
[14]
The Court has appreciated the submissions of the parties. The
second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law(i)
Whether the judgment of First Appellate Court is perverse
in Law for granting relief in the nature of specific performance of
contract etc. to the defendant without any such relief claimed by
him through any separate suit or counterclaim.
(ii)
Whether the judgment of First Appellate Court is perverse
on the ground of wrong application of provision of Section 53 (A) of
Transfer of Property Act.
[15]
Without delving into factual aspects of the case, this Court at the
very outset is constrained to observe that learned first appellant Court has
grossly erred by ignoring the settled principle of law that no relief can be
granted to any party when no such relief is claimed by him. In fact, there was
no counterclaim or cross-suit filed by the respondent seeking relief of specific
performance of contract against the appellants and no issue in this regard was
framed in the suit and no evidence was also led in this respect. Despite the
same, the learned first appellate Court took the venture to create a new case
for the respondent and granted relief of specific performance of contract by
directing the appellants to execute a deed of sale in favour of the respondent
within 3 months, under the guise of Section 151 of C.P.C The first appellate
Court even did not consider whether any such claim could be at all tenable
without examining the question of period of limitation, and also without giving
any opportunity to the appellant to submit their pleading and lead evidences on
that point.
[16]
In fact, the powers under Section 151 of the CPC cannot be
exercised in any manner which would be contrary to or different from the
procedure expressly provided in the CPC. Reference in this regard may be
made to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Padam Sen and
another versus the State of U.P. [1960 Supreme (SC) 229] and the relevant
portion of the paragraph no.8 is reproduced hereunder:
“………..The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the
powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are
complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the
Court is free to exercise them for the purpose mentioned in S. 151 of
the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in
conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against
the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the
inherent powers is not to be exercised in a manner which will be
contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the
Code.”
[17]
Provisions of Rule 4 of Order XX of CPC envisage that judgments
of Courts shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for
determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision. As per
the provisions of Rule 5 of Order XX of CPC, the Court is required to state its
finding or decision on the issues framed in a suit with necessary reasoning. It is
also settled position of law that the Court cannot travel beyond the pleading of
the parties. In Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491, the
followings were held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court:
“23. It is fundamental that in a civil suit, relief to be granted
can be only with reference to the prayers made in the pleadings.
That apart, in civil suits, grant of relief is circumscribed by various
factors like court fee, limitation, parties to the suits, as also
grounds barring relief, like res judicata, estoppel, acquiescence,
non-joinder of causes of action or parties, etc., which require
pleading and proof. Therefore, it would be hazardous to hold that
in a civil suit whatever be the relief that is prayed, the court can on
examination of facts grant any relief as it thinks fit. In a suit for
recovery of rupees one lakh, the court cannot grant a decree for
rupees ten lakhs. In a suit for recovery possession of property „A‟,
court cannot grant possession of property „B‟. In a suit praying for
permanent injunction, court cannot grant a relief of declaration or
possession. The jurisdiction to grant relief in a civil suit
necessarily depends on the pleadings, prayer, court fee paid,
evidence let in, etc.”
[18]
In the case in hand, Learned first appellant Court even remained
unconscious of the fact that the respondent never claimed any relief of specific
performance of contract. Therefore, the exercise of power under Section 151
of CPC in favour of the respondent by issuing direction for the execution of a
sale deed, is a clear abuse of the process of the Court. Consequently, the
substantial question of law as formulated in this appeal is answered
accordingly in favour of the appellant.
[19]
Learned first appellate Court in the impugned judgment relied on
a decision of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Rambhau Namdeo Gajre
versus Narayan Bapuji Dhotra (Dead) through Legal Heirs, AIR 2004 SC
4342 wherein some discussions were made by Hon’ble the Supreme Court
with regard to the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. So
far the present case is concerned, the applicability of Section 53A of the
Transfer of Property Act can be examined by learned first appellate Court
keeping in mind the pleadings and evidences led by the parties.
[20]
In view of above, the instant appeal is allowed. The impugned
judgment dated 06.09.2023 and the related decree thereof, passed in Title
Appeal No.03 of 2023 by the learned Additional District Judge, Dhalai Judicial
District, Ambassa are set aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned
first appellate Court to hear the parties afresh and to decide the matter within
the parameters of law and taking into consideration the pleadings and
evidences presented by the parties in the suit.
The appeal shall preferably be disposed of by the learned first
appellate Court within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this
judgment.
Registry is to issue a certificate for return of the value of the Court
fee filed with memorandum of appeal, to the appellants in view of provisions of
Section 13 of Court Fees Act as force in Tripura.
Return the LC record with copy of this judgment.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
Munna MUNNA SAHA
Date: 2026.05.16 17:16:27 +05'30'
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