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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RFA No.19 of 2024
1. Sri Tapan Chandra Shib, Age- 50
2. Sri Jatan Shib, Age- 48
Both are sons of Late Harendra Nath Shib and
residents of West Bank of Jagannath Dighi,
Udaipur Town, PS & PO: Radhakishorepur-799120
District-Gomati, Tripura
------ Plaintiffs-appellants
Versus
1. Sri Dinesh Chandra Shib,
2. Sri Paresh Chandra Shib,
Both are sons of Late Harendra Nath shib and
residents of West Bank of Jagannath Dighi,
Udaipur Town, PS & PO: Radhakishorepur-799120,
District-Gomati, Tripura.
------ Defendants-respondents
3. Smt. Ashalata Shib
Wife of Late Harendra Nath Shib,
resident of West Bank of Jagannath Dighi,
Udaipur Town, PS & PO: Radhakishorepur-799120,
District-Gomati, Tripura
------ Proforma Defendant-Respondent
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Dilip Kumar Das Chowdhury, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Sankar Kumar Deb, Sr. Adv,
Mr. Saugat Datta, Adv.
Date of hearing
:
14.07.2025
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order
:
25.07.2025
Whether fit for
reporting
:
YES
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
This appeal is preferred under Section 96 of CPC read with
Order XLI of CPC challenging the judgment dated 29.07.2024 and
decree dated 02.08.2024 delivered by Learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Court No.2, Gomati District, Udaipur in connection with case
No.T.S. No.5 of 2015. By the said judgment and decree, Learned Trial
Court has been pleased to dismiss the suit preferred by the present
appellant-plaintiffs.
2.
Heard Learned Counsel Mr. Dilip Kumar Das Chowdhury
appearing on behalf of appellant-plaintiffs and also heard Learned
Senior Counsel Mr. Sankar Kumar Deb assisted by Learned Counsel
Mr. Saugat Datta appearing on behalf of the contesting respondentdefendants.
3.
The brief facts of the case are as follows:
The appellant-plaintiffs filed one suit for declaration of
right, title and interest and for recovery of vacant possession of the
suit path along with perpetual injunction restraining the defendants
from raising any illegal construction or encroaching upon the suit land
or creating any obstruction in free movement. Their case was that one
Harendra Nath Shib(since dead) was the original owner in possession
of the suit land which is a pathway fully described under schedule-A of
the plaint(suit path). Said Harendra Nath Shib expired on 13.07.1996
leaving behind his wife i.e. respondent-defendant No.3, his sons i.e.
the appellant-plaintiffs and respondent-defendants No.1 and 2 of the
main suit and deceased son Swapan Chandra Shib and two daughters.
According to the appellant-plaintiffs prior to the death of Harendra
Nath Shib he had trusted his elder son i.e. defendant No.1 with
respect to his family affairs and after his death all other family
members also trusted upon him. The said respondent-defendant No.1
in connivance with respondent-defendant No.2 taking advantage of
the trust of the rest other family members managed to execute a
WILL by Harendra Nath Shib when he was in death bed condition
beyond the knowledge of the appellant-plaintiffs and other family
members on 08.07.1996 and in this manner the respondentdefendants managed to divide the family properties amongst the
brothers keeping to themselves better and larger chunks of the land
while the less valuable and useless lands were given to the appellantplaintiffs and the land was accordingly recorded in the name of the
appellant-plantiffs and the respondent-defendants.
The contents of the Will revealed in the year 2006 when
the defendants No.1 and 2 i.e. the respondents No.1 and 2 herein
raised their pucca construction on their homestead land encroaching
upon the land under the suit path. The appellant-plaintiffs became
aware of the contents of the Will by taking a certified copy of the
same in the month of July, 2014 and as per the contents of the WILL,
registered vide No.III-57 dated 10.07.1996 whereby the original
owner bequeathed his land to his five sons specifying the area of land
for each beneficiary and kept the joint land for suit path and another
plot of land for extended second path for ingress and egress for all the
respondent-defendants and appellant-plaintiffs. According to the
appellant-plaintiffs the suit path as per Will was 6 feet in breadth
situated on the northern side of the plots allotted to the respondentdefendants No.1 and 2 starting from the main road in the east and
met with the extended second path in the west. That the extended
path was 6 feet in breadth on the eastern side of the plots allotted to
the appellant-plaintiffs and proforma respondent-defendant No.3
connecting the western end of the suit path running towards north to
the northern end of the land of the appellant-plaintiffs and prorespondent-defendant No.3 and the extended path is now described in
schedule-B of the suit land.
The appellant-plaintiffs were not satisfied with the
manner of execution of the WILL but owing to huge lapse of time they
had no other option but to accept the terms and conditions of the
WILL and as per recitals of the Will all the legatees could move along
with the suit path but no one could raise any objection/obstruction.
The respondent-defendants No.1 and 2 were the executors of the Will
and at the time of mutation both the suit path as mentioned in
schedule-A and schedule-B was mutated in the name of the appellantplaintiffs and the respondent-defendants in equal shares in separate
khatians and since then all the parties had been occupying the suit
path continuously and the suit path was the only path of the
appellant-plaintiffs and the pro-respondent-defendant No.3 for ingress
and egress from their respective dwelling houses to the main road i.e.
west bank of Jagannath Dighi.
The respondent-defendants No.1 and 2 procured the
signature
of
the
appellant-plaintiffs
under
influence
upon
the
unregistered notarized agreement dated 26.09.2011 regarding the
shift of the location of the suit path from the northern side to the
southern side of the homestead land of the respondent-defendants
No.1 and 2 increasing the breadth from 6 feet to 10 feet. The
appellant-plaintiffs herein and the proforma respondent-defendant
No.3 having bonafide faith upon the respondent-defendants No.1 and
2 and without going through the contents of the agreement and also
without understanding the legal implications had blindly put their
signature on the said agreement which was not tenable in the eyes of
law on the ground that as per the recitals of the WILL no obstruction
could be placed on the said suit path and secondly there is a huge
difference in the valuation of land sought to be exchanged for the suit
path by the dint of the unregistered deed and for that reason the said
agreement dated 26.09.2011 is invalid and void ab initio and hence is
liable to be declared as void against the appellant-plaintiffs and the
pro-respondent-defendant No.3.
The
respondent-defendants
No.1
and
started
construction crossing the northern boundary of their homestead land
encroaching upon the major portion of the land under the suit path
and the respondent-defendant No.1 started construction without any
sanction upon plot No.877 to which was objected to by the appellantplaintiffs but the respondent-defendants did not pay any heed. That
the appellant-plaintiff had informed the matter about the illegal
construction to the Chairperson, Udaipur Municipal Council, DM &
Collector, O/C R.K. Pur, and Chief Executive Officer, Udaipur Municipal
Council and on the basis of the complaint one Misc case bearing
No.377/14 was also initiated and in the said proceeding
the
respondent-defendants No.1 and 2 produced the agreement dated
26.09.2011 and only then the appellant-plaintiffs could know that the
said document is adverse to their interest. However, due to
intervention of Udaipur Municipal Council, the respondent-defendants
had suspended their construction work for the time being but are
constantly making attempts for resuming the work violating the terms
of the WILL.
The appellant-plaintiffs have also filed a criminal case
against
the
respondent-defendants
bearing
No.PRC(SP)/98/2015
wherein the respondent-defendants along with two other persons
were convicted under section 323 IPC and were released on
probation. The appellant-plaintiffs have valid cause of action to file the
suit seeking the reliefs of declaration of joint possession of the
appellant-plaintiffs and the respondent-defendants over the suit plot
in equal shares and for recovery of possession of the suit land by
removing any obstruction therefrom for free movement and for
permanent injunction against the respondent-defendants restraining
them from raising any future construction on the suit path.
The respondent-defendants No.1 and 2 contested the
suit by filing their written statement whereby they challenged the
maintainability of the suit on the ground of law of limitation as well as
estopple, waiver and acquiescence. It was contended that Harendra
Nath Shib during his life time had executed one Registered WILL on
08.07.1996 whereby he bequeathed his properties in favour of the
appellant-plaintiffs and the respondent-defendants and proforma
respondent-defendant No.3 being his sons and said Harendra Nath
died on 13.07.1996 and after his death the appellant-plaintiffs and
respondent-defendants
and proforma
respondent-defendant
No.3
became the owner of their respective shares in possession thereof.
That the parties amicably entered into a settlement for distribution of
the properties and the said oral agreement was reduced into writing
wherein it was mutually decided by all the parties that instead of 6
feet wide road running from east-west from the west bank of
Jagannath Dighi to south-north and the allotted lands of the
appellant-plaintiffs and proforma respondent-defendant No.3 will be
re-allocated and instead of the 6 feet wide road, a 10 feet wide road
shall run from the west bank of Jagannath Dighi till south west corner
of the respondent-defendant No.2 and then the said 10 feet pathway
shall run south-north for common use of all the parties. That all the
share-holder agreed to the same and acting thereon the parties made
their respective construction. The said agreement was notarized on
26.09.2011 in presence of all the stake holders. That the said reallocation was made considering the convenience and in-convenience
of all the parties thereto and the same was also made soon after the
demise of their father Harendra Nath Shib on 13.07.1996. On the
basis of said settlement the 10 feet wide road was also constructed by
the southern side of the properties left by Harendra Nath Shib running
east-west
and
that
the
appellant-plaintiffs
also
accepted
the
realignment of the road and started using the said 10 feet wide road.
The said re-allocation of the 6 feet wide pathway under the registered
WILL of Lt. Harendranath Shib was as per the amicable settlement of
the appellant-plaintiffs and hence they are barred under the principles
of estoppel, acquiescence and waiver. That the notarized deed of
agreement was executed on 26.09.2011 under free and full consent of
all the beneficiaries under the registered WILL and hence the suit is
barred by law of limitation. Accordingly it is submitted by the
respondent-defendants that the suit was filed in suppression of
material facts beyond the period of limitation and hence the same was
not maintainable in its present form and nature.
4.
Upon the pleadings of the parties, Learned Court below
framed the following issues:
Issues
I) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form
and nature?
II) Whether there is any cause of action for filing of
the suit?
III) Whether the parties of this suit have joint right of
ingress and egress through the suit path mention
in the schedule A of the plaint?
IV) Whether the agreement dated 26.09.2011 took
place between the plaintiffs and the defendants is
operative in law or not?
V) Whether the principal defendants are liable to
remove the construction made by them over the
suit path?
VI) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get a decree
as prayed for?
VII) Whether any other relief or reliefs can be granted?
In order to prove the issues both the parties have adduced
oral/documentary evidence on record which are also mentioned herein
below:
(A) Plaintiff's Witnesses :i) PW-1: Sri Jatan Shib.
ii) PW-2: Smt. Ashalata Shib.
iii) PW-3: Md. Mir Hossain.
iv) PW-4: Md. Nasir Uddin.
v) PW-5: Sri Binoy Debbarma.
vi) PW-6: Sri Binoy Debbarma.
(B) Plaintiffs' Exhibits :i) Ext.1 series:- Certified copy of registered
WILL vide NO.III-57 in the year 1996.
ii) Ext.2 & 3:- Certified copy Khatian NO.1065
and 2023 of Mouja Udaipur Town.
iii) Ext.4 series:- True copy of the impugned
agreement dated 26.09.2011 in 3 sheets.
iv) Ext.5 series:- Receipted copy of written joint
objections dated 27.06.2014 in 4 sheets.
v) Ext.6 series:- Receipted copy of written joint
objection dated 04.02.2015 in 3 sheets.
vi) Ext.7 series: Letter dated 02.07.2014 along
with the notices of DM & Collector dated
02.07.2014 in 3 sheets.
vii) Ext.8 series:- Certified copy of order sheet
dated 06.11.2014 passed in Case NO.377 of
2014 under Section 133 Cr.P.C along with the
inquiry report by the Executive Magistrate
Udaipur in 3 sheets.
viii) Ext.9 series:- Copy of the petition addressed
to OC of R. K. Pur PS on 30.01.2015 in 2
sheets.
ix) Ext. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15:- Certified true
copies of RS Khatian NO.2806, 2805, 2804,
2811, 2812 & 103 under Mouja Udaipur.
x) Ext. 16:- Certified copy of RS Map of related
suit plots including adjacent Plots under
Mouja Udaipur Town.
xi) Ext.17:- Letter dated 13.10.2015 issued by
the Junior Scientific Assistant Udaipur
Municipal Council in favour of the Plaintiff
NO.1.
xii) Ext.18 series:- Certified copy of FIR ejahar,
injury report, charge sheet in connection
with R.K. Pur PS case NO.119 of 2016 in 16
sheets.
xiii) Ext.19:- Original receipt copy of written
complaint of Sri Jatan Shib against Sri
Krishna Nanda Bhowmik addressed to the OC
R.K. Pur PS.
xiv) Ext.20 series:Certified copy of the
registered
sale
deed
NO.1-852
dated
16.05.98 in 7 sheets.
xv) Ext.21 series:-Authenticated true copy of
registered Deed NO.1-789 dated 28.03.2001
executed in favour of Dinesh Chandra Shib in
2 sheets.
(C) Defendant's Witnesses :i) DW.1: Sri Dinesh Chandra Shib.
ii) DW.2: Sri Paresh Chandra Shib.
iii) DW.3: Sri Krishnananda Bhowmik.
iv) DW.4: Sri Biswajit Das
v) DW.5: Sri Jhulan Chandra Das
(D) Defendant's Exhibits :i) Ext.D/1:original
26.09.2011.
agreement
dated
ii) Ext.D/2:- proposed construction Plan of the
residential building of Sri Paresh Chandra
Shib dated 15.06.2006.
iii) Ext.D/3:- Cash receipt dated 29.01.2015 of
Udaipur Municipal Council against Building
permission fee.
iv) Ext.D/4:- Original sanction of erection of
building and issue of building permit dated
19.10.2006.
v) Ext.D/5:- Original receipt copy of the
complaint dated 21.08.2016 filed before the
OC R. K. Pur PS.
vi) Ext.D/6:- Certified copy of the PR NO.1134 of
2016 under section 107 Cr.P.C dated
27.08.2016.
vii) Ext.D/7 series:- Certified copy of the printed
copy of FIR NO.2015 RKP 063 dated
25.04.2015 comprising 2 pages.
viii) Ext.D/8 series:- Certified copy of the
complaint filed on 25.04.2015 comprising 3
pages.
ix) Ext.D/9 series:- Certified copy of the hand
sketch map and index in connection with R.K.
Pur PS case NO.2015 RKP 063 comprising 2
pages.
x) Ext.D/10 series:- Certified copy of deposition
of made by SI Biswajit Das in conncetion
with PRC(SP) 98 of 2015.
xi) Ext.D/11 series:- Certified copy of Judgment
passed in PRC(SP) 48 of 2017.
xii) Ext.D/12 series: Certified copy of Judgment
passed in PRC(SP) 19 of 2017.
xiii) Ext.D/13:- Certified copy of inquiry report
dated 26.09.2024 of Executive Officer.
xiv) Ext.D/14:- Hand sketch map prepared by
DW-4.
xv) Ext.D/15:- Signature of DW 4 on the said
deposition.
xvi) Ext.D/16:- Seal and signature of DW 5 on the
document.
Finally, after conclusion of trial Learned Trial Court below by
the judgment dated 09.07.2024 dismissed the suit filed by the
appellant-plaintiffs without any cost.
Challenging
that
judgment,
the
appellant-plaintiffs
have
preferred this appeal before this Court.
5.
Learned Counsel Mr. D. K. Das Chowdhury appearing on
behalf of the appellant-plaintiffs first of all drawn the attention of the
Court that at the time of framing of issues, Learned Trial Court did not
frame any issue regarding limitation. According to Learned Counsel
while the appellant-plaintiffs were initially dissatisfied with the recitals
of the WILL, they finally agreed upon and on the basis of the WILL,
the respective lands of the legatees i.e. legal heirs of deceased
Harendra Nath Shib was recorded in their respective khatians but the
respondent-defendant No.1 being the elder brother of the family,
arranged to prepare one notarized agreement on 26.09.2011 which
was
unregistered,
keeping
the
appellant-plaintiffs
in
dark
and
deviated from the recitals of the WILL which was not permissible as
per law. Learned Counsel further submitted that since the WILL
attained finality and all the legal heirs of Harendra Nath Shib agreed
upon that, later on there was no scope to change the nature of the
WILL on the basis of an unregistered agreement dated 26.09.2011.
Learned Counsel further submitted that the contesting respondentdefendants playing fraud upon them obtained the signature of the
appellant-plaintiffs on the said agreement dated 26.09.2011 and the
Learned Trial Court relying upon the said agreement dismissed the
suit of the appellant-plaintiffs which was also legally not permissible.
Even the said agreement was also not a deed of exchange and on the
basis of that, no rights have been created upon the parties to the suit.
Furthermore, after preparation of separate khatian as per WILL, the
joint rights of the property seizes and no family arrangement could be
made in respect of those properties without any registration and by
the impugned agreement, the contesting respondents desired to
change their land which is not permissible as per law in absence of
registration and the recital of the agreement was in violation of the
intention of the testator. Learned Counsel further submitted that the
judgment and decree delivered by Learned Trial Court suffers from
infirmities and the proposed 10 feet road has been made only for
interest of respondent-defendant No.1 and in that unregistered
agreement, all the legal heirs of Harendra Nath Shib were not made
parties. So, finally Learned Counsel submitted that as the contesting
respondent-defendants started constructing pucca building on the
original 6 feet suit path way as per WILL, so, by the subsequent
unregistered
agreement
dated
26.09.2011,
the
contesting
respondent-defendants tried to cause loss and suffer to the appellantplaintiffs and obstructed the access of the appellant-plaintiffs to enter
into their land from the main road. Even the respondent-defendant
No.1 also did not take any permission for construction and more
interestingly pro-respondent-defendant No.3 Swapan Shib during his
lifetime did not challenge the plaint filed by the appellant-plaintiffs
and his mother also did not challenge the claim of the appellantplaintiffs but the Learned Trial Court ignored the registered WILL and
relied upon said unregistered agreement dated 26.09.2011 and
ultimately dismissed the suit which cannot be legally sustained and
urged for allowing this appeal by setting aside the judgment and
decree.
6.
On the other hand Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S. K. Deb
assisted by Learned Counsel Mr. Saugat Datta appearing on behalf of
the contesting respondent-defendants first of all drawn the attention
of the Court that the suit was filed on 09.02.2015 which was beyond
the prescribed period of limitation but in this regard nothing was
mentioned in the plaint. It was further submitted that the appellantplaintiffs in their plaint stated that they were not happy with the
recitals of the WILL but surprisingly they did not take any effort for
challenging that WILL to any other forum. Even the daughters of
Harendra Nath Shib were not made parties and as submitted by the
appellant-plaintiffs, the family settlement suffers from necessary
parties and in this regard no evidence was led by the appellantplaintiffs before the Learned Trial Court. Furthermore, before the
Learned Trial Court also, no issue was framed for non-joinder of
parties. The WILL was executed on 08.07.1996 and thereafter
Harendra Nath Shib was expired on 13.07.1996. Learned Senior
Counsel further submitted that in the recital on the body of the WILL
it was clearly mentioned by the testator that he has assigned the
duties to complete the task as per WILL to his elder son and second
son who are respondents No.1 and 2 of this appeal. It was further
submitted that Harendra Nath Shib having died on 13.07.1996 and
the properties under the said WILL fell to the respective share of his
sons i.e. the appellants, the respondents and the pro-respondentdefendants and all his sons became the owners in possession of the
respective shares and soon after the sons became the owners in
possession of the shares of the property, they amicably made a
settlement in the year 1998 and thereafter on 26.09.2011 the said
oral agreement was reduced into a deed of agreement wherein it was
agreed that instead of 6 feet wide road running east from the west
bank of Jagannath Dighi and then south-north and the allocated lands
of the appellant-plaintiffs and the proforma respondent-defendant
No.3 would be re-allocated and accordingly it was settled that instead
of 6 feet road as recited in the WILL, the common pathway would be
10 feet side running from west bank of Jagannath Dighi till the southwest corner of the respondent-defendant No.2 and then the said 10
feet wide road would run south-north for common use of all the
legatees and accordingly all the legatees acted according to the oral
agreement and all of them made their respective construction.
Learned Senior Counsel referring the above submitted that Learned
Trial Court after considering the oral/documentary evidence on record
relied upon the unregistered deed of agreement and dismissed the
suit rightly.
It was further submitted that as per Section 9 of the
Limitation Act, cause of action once started does not stop, it
continues. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in para
No.13 of the examination-in-chief in affidavit the appellant-plaintiff
No.1, Jatan Shib stated that the cause of action of the suit arose on
October, 2006 then why the suit was not filed within time. Learned
Senior Counsel also drawn the attention of the Court referring last
part of para No.15 and submitted that although the said appellantplaintiffs disputed the averments in para Nos.3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 but to
discard the said contentions no contrary evidence was produced by
the appellant-plaintiffs before the Learned Trial Court. Learned Senior
Counsel further submitted that the respondent-defendant No.1 in his
examination-in-chief in affidavit specifically in para Nos.19, 20, 21, 22
and 29 have discussed in detail about the defence case but
surprisingly the appellant-plaintiffs by the style of cross-examination
could not discard the evidence on record of the said witness. Again,
Learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of the Court referring
cross-examination of PW-1, Jatan Shib wherein in para No.3 he stated
that he is a business man having a hotel and is also a contractor and
if this contention is correct then how the appellant-plaintiffs can took
the plea that beyond their back the respondent-defendants obtained
their signature on the unregistered deed of agreement
dated
26.09.2011. So, the plea of the appellant-plaintiffs that without
knowing the consequences they have put their signature is totally
false and concocted and furthermore the contents of the document
were also not challenged by the appellant-plaintiffs. Learned Senior
Counsel also drawn the cross-examination part of DW-1 and by the
style of cross-examination the appellant-plaintiffs also could not
shaken his evidence. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that
the suit was filed on 09.02.2015 and according to the appellantplaintiffs, the cause of action commenced in October, 2006 and as per
Article 58 of the Limitation Act in such a situation, the period of
limitation was 3(three) years but the suit was filed after a long period
although no issue in this regard was framed by the Learned Trial
Court.
7.
Finally, in support of his contention Learned Senior Counsel
relied upon one citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Kale
and Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others
reported in (1976) 3 SCC 119 wherein in para No.2, 9, 10, 18, 19,
20, 24 and 42, Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed as under:
“2. The case had a rather chequered career and the
disputes between the parties were sometimes
settled and sometimes reopened. In order, however
to understand the point involved in the present
appeal, it may be necessary to enter into the domain
of the contending claims of the respective parties put
forward before the revenue courts from time to time.
To begin with the admitted position is that one
Lachman the last propositor was the tenant and the
tenure holder of the property in dispute which
consists of 19.73 acres of land contained in khatas
Nos. 5 and 90 and 19.24 acres of land comprising
khatas Nos. 53 and 204. Lachman died in the year
1948 leaving behind three daughters, namely,
Musamat Tikia, Musamat Har Pyari and Musamat
Ram Pyari. Musamat Tikia was married during the
lifetime of Lachman and the appellant No. 1 Kale is
the son of Musamat Tikia. Thus it would appear that
after the death of Lachman the family consisted of
his two unmarried daughters Har Pyari and Ram
Pyari and his married daughter's son Kale. Under the
U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 which applied to the parties
only unmarried daughters inherit the property. The
first round of dispute appears to have arisen soon
after the death of Lachman in the year 1949 when
panchayat adalat of the village was asked to decide
the dispute between Prem Pal nephew of Lachman
and the appellant Kale regarding inheritance to the
property left by Lachman. Har Pyari and Ram Pyari
appear to have been parties to that dispute and the
panchayat adalat after making local enquiries held
that Har Pyari having been married had lost her right
in the estate and Ram Pyari was also an heir so long
as she was not married and after her marriage the
legal heir to the property of Lachman would be the
appellant Kale. In the year 1952 the U. P. Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 was made
applicable to the tenure holders also. This Act was
further amended on October 10, 1954 by Act 20 of
1954 by which, amongst the list of heirs enumerated
under the statute, "unmarried daughter" was
substituted by "daughter" only. According to the
appellant in this Court as also in the High Court Ram
Pyari respondent No. 5 was married on February 25,
1955 and thereafter the appellant filed a petition
before the Naib Tahsildar, Hasanpur, for expunging
the names of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 from the
disputed khatas because both of the daughters
having been married ceased to have any interest in
the property. It was therefore prayed that as the
appellant was the sole heir to the estate of Lachman
under Section 36 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, he
alone should be mutated in respect of the property of
Lachman. By order dated December 5, 1955 the Naib
Tahsildar, Hasanpur, accepted the contention of the
appellant and expunged the names of respondents
Nos. 4 and 5 from the khatas in dispute and
substituted the name of the appellant Kale. Soon
thereafter on January 11, 1956, respondents Nos. 4
and 5, i.e. Musamat Har Pyari and Ram Pyari
daughters of Lachman, filed an application before the
Naib Tahsildar for setting aside his order dated
December 5, 1955 which had been passed behind
their back and without their knowledge. While this
application of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 was pending
adjudication, the revenue court was informed that
talk of compromise was going on between the
parties which ultimately culminated in a compromise
or a family arrangement under which the appellant
Kale was allotted khatas Nos. 5 and 90 whereas
respondents Nos. 4 and 5 were allotted Khatas Nos.
53 and 204 as between them. A petition was filed on
August 7, 1956 before the revenue court informing it
that a compromise had been arrived at and in
pursuance thereof the names of the parties may be
mutated in respect of the khatas which had been
allotted to them. This petition was signed by both
the
parties
and
ultimately
the
Assistant
Commissioner, I Class, passed an order dated March
31, 1957 mutating the name of the appellant Kale in
respect of khatas Nos. 5 and 90 and the names of
respondents Nos. 4 and 5 in respect of khatas Nos.
53 and 204. Thereafter it is not disputed that the
parties remained in possession of the properties
allotted to them and paid land revenue to the
Government. Thus it would appear that the dispute
between the parties was finally settled and both the
parties accepted the same and took benefit
thereunder. This state of affairs continued until the
year 1964 when proceedings for revision of the
records under Section 8 of the U. P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953 were started in the village
Hasanpur where the properties were situated in the
course of which respondents Nos. 4 and 5 were
entered in Form C.H. 5 as persons claiming co-tenure
holders to the extent of two-third share with the
appellant Kale who was entered in the said form as
having one-third share in all the khatas. In view of
this sudden change of the entries which were
obviously contrary to the mutation made in
pursuance of the family arrangement entered into
between the parties in 1956, the appellant Kale filed
his objections before the Assistant Consolidation
Officer for changing the entries in respect of those
khatas. As the Assistant Consolidation Officer found
that the dispute was a complicated one he by his
order dated May 7, 1964 referred the matter to the
Consolidation Officer. It might be mentioned here
that when the proceedings for revision of the records
were started, while the appellant filed his objections,
respondents Nos. 4 and 5 seem to have kept quiet
and filed no objections at all. In fact under Section
9(2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953,
the respondents could have filed their objections, if
they were aggrieved by the entries made on the
basis of the compromise. Sub-section (2) of Section
9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act runs
thus:
Any person to whom a notice under subsection (1) has been sent, or any other person
interested may, within 21 days of the receipt
of notice, or of the publication under subsection (1), as the case may be, file, before
the Assistant Consolidation Officer, objections
in respect thereof disputing the correctness or
nature of the entries in the records or in the
extracts furnished therefrom, or in the
Statement of Principles, or the need for
partition.
This is a very important circumstance which speaks
volumes against the conduct of the respondents
which will be referred to in detail in a later part of
our judgment and seems to have been completely
brushed aside by all the courts.
9. Before dealing with the respective contentions put
forward by the parties, we would like to discuss in
general the effect and value of family arrangements
entered into between the parties with a view to
resolving disputes once for all. By virtue of a family
settlement or arrangement members of a family
descending from a common ancestor or a near
relation seek to sink their differences and disputes,
settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed
titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and
bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the
family. The family arrangements are governed by a
special equity peculiar to themselves and would be
enforced if honestly made. In this connection, Kerr in
his valuable treatise Kerr on Fraud at p. 364 makes
the following pertinent observations regarding the
nature of the family arrangement which may be
extracted thus:
The principles which apply to the case of
ordinary compromise between strangers do
not equally apply to the case of compromises
in the nature of family arrangements. Family
arrangements are governed by a special equity
peculiar to themselves, and will be enforced if
honestly made, although they have not been
meant as a compromise, but have proceeded
from an error of all parties, originating in
mistake or ignorance of fact as to what their
rights actually are, or of the points on which
their rights actually depend.
The object of the arrangement is to protect the
family from long-drawn litigation or perpetual strifes
which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and
create hatred and bad blood between the various
members of the family. Today when we are striving
to build up an egalitarian society and are trying for a
complete reconstruction of the society, to maintain
and uphold the unity and homogeneity of the family
which ultimately results in the unification of the
society and, therefore, of the entire country, is the
prime need of the hour. A family arrangement by
which the property is equitably divided between the
various contenders so as to achieve an equal
distribution of wealth instead of concentrating the
same in the hands of a few is undoubtedly a
milestone in the administration of social justice. That
is why the term “family” has to be understood in a
wider sense so as to include within its fold not only
close relations or legal heirs but even those persons
who may have some sort of antecedent title, a
semblance of a claim or even if they have a spes
successionis so that future disputes are sealed for
ever and the family instead of fighting claims inter se
and wasting time, money and energy on such
fruitless or futile litigation is able to devote its
attention to more constructive work in the larger
interest of the country. The courts have, therefore,
leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement
instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial
grounds. Where the courts find that the family
arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal
defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into service and
is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a
party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a
settled dispute and claims to revoke the family
arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed
some material benefits. The law in England on this
point is almost the same. In Halsbury's Laws of
England, Vol. 17, Third Edition, at pp. 215-216, the
following apt observations regarding the essentials
of the family settlement and the principles governing
the existence of the same are made:
A family arrangement is an agreement
between members of the same family,
intended to be generally and reasonably for
the
benefit
of
the
family
either
by
compromising doubtful or disputed rights or
by preserving the family property or the peace
and security of the family by avoiding
litigation or by saving its honour.
The agreement may be implied from a long
course of dealing, but it is more usual to
embody or to effectuate the agreement in a
deed to which the term "family arrangement"
is applied.
Family
arrangements
are
governed
by
principles which are not applicable to dealings
between strangers. The court, when deciding
the
rights
of
parties
under
family
arrangements or claims to upset such
arrangements, considers what in the broadest
view of the matter is most for the interest of
families, and has regard to considerations
which, in dealing with transactions between
persons not members of the same family,
would not be taken into account. Matters
which would be fatal to the validity of similar
transactions between strangers are not
objections to the binding effect of family
arrangements.
10. In other words to put the binding effect and the
essentials of a family settlement in a concretised
form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the
following propositions:
(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide
one so as to resolve family disputes and rival
claims by a fair and equitable division or
allotment of properties between the various
members of the family;
(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and
should not be induced by fraud, coercion or
undue influence;
(3) The family arrangement may be even oral
in which case no registration is necessary;
(4) It is well-settled that registration would be
necessary only if the terms of the family
arrangement are reduced into writing. Here
also, a distinction should be made between a
document containing the terms and recitals of
a family arrangement made under the
document and a mere memorandum prepared
after the family arrangement had already been
made either for the purpose of the record or
for information of the court for making
necessary mutation. In such a case the
memorandum itself does not create or
extinguish any rights in immovable properties
and therefore does not fall within the mischief
of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is,
therefore, not compulsorily registrable:
(5) The members who may be parties to the
family
arrangement
must
have
some
antecedent title, claim or interest even a
possible claim in the property which is
acknowledged
by
the
parties
to
the
settlement. Even if one of the parties to the
settlement has no title but under the
arrangement the other party relinquishes all
its claims or titles in favour of such a person
and acknowledges him to be the sole owner,
then the antecedent title must be assumed
and the family arrangement will be upheld and
the courts will find no difficulty in giving
assent to the same;
(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or
possible, which may not involve legal claims
are settled by a bona fide family arrangement
which is fair and equitable the family
arrangement is final and binding on the parties
to the settlement.
18. In the recent decision of this Court in S.
Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai:(1973) 2
SCC 312 the entire case law was discussed and this
Court observed as follows: [pp. 319. 321-322. paras
12, 24-25]
If in the interest of the family properties or
family peace the close relations had settled
their disputes amicably, this Court will be
reluctant to disturb the same. The courts
generally
lean
in
favour
of
family
arrangements.
*
*
*
*
Now
turning
to
the
plea
of
family
arrangement, as observed by this Court in
Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram
(supra) the courts lean strongly in favour of
family arrangements that bring about harmony
in a family and do justice to its various
members and avoid, in anticipation, future
disputes which might ruin them all. As
observed in that case the family arrangement
can as a matter of law be inferred from a long
course of dealings between the parties.
In Maturi Pullaiah v. Maturi Narasimham
(supra) this Court held that although conflict
of legal claims in praesenti or in future is
generally a condition for the validity of family
arrangements, it is not necessarily so. Even
bona fide disputes present or possible, which
may not involve legal claims would be
sufficient. Members of a joint Hindu family
may to maintain peace or to bring about
harmony in the family, enter into such a family
arrangement. If such an agreement is entered
into bona fide and the terms thereto are fair in
the circumstances of a particular case, the
courts would more readily give assent to such
an agreement than to avoid it.
19. Thus it would appear from a review of the
decisions analysed above that the courts have taken
a very liberal and broad view of the validity of the
family settlement and have always tried to uphold it
and maintain it. The central idea in the approach
made by the courts is that if by consent of parties a
matter has been settled, it should not be allowed to
be reopened by the parties to the agreement on
frivolous or untenable grounds.
20. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
Ramgopal v. Tulshi Ram:AIR 1928 All 649 has also
taken the view that a family arrangement could be
oral and if it is followed by a petition in court
containing a reference regarding the arrangement,
no registration was necessary. In this connection the
Full
Bench
adumbrated
the
the
following
propositions in answering the reference:
We would, therefore, return the reference with
a
statement
of
the
following
general
propositions:
With reference to the first question:
(1) A family arrangement can be made
orally.
(2) If made orally, there being no
document, no question of registration
arises.
With reference to the second question:
(3) If though it could have been made
orally, it was in fact reduced to the form
of a "document", registration (when the
value is Rs.100 and upwards) is
necessary.
(4) Whether the terms have been
"reduced to the form of a document” is
a question of fact in each case to be
determined upon a consideration of the
nature and phraseology of the writing
and the circumstances in which and the
purpose with which it was written.
(5) If the terms were not "reduced to
the form of a document", registration
was not necessary (even though the
value is Rs.100 or upwards); and while
the writing cannot be used as a piece of
evidence for what it may be worth, e.g.
as corroborative of other evidence or as
an admission of the transaction or as
showing or explaining conduct.
(6) If the terms were "reduced to the
form of a document" and, though the
value was Rs.100 or upwards, it was not
registered, the absence of registration
makes the document inadmissible in
evidence and is fatal to proof of the
arrangement
embodied
in
the
document.
24. This Court has also clearly laid down that a
family arrangement being binding on the parties to
the arrangement clearly operates as an estoppel so
as to preclude any of the parties who have taken
advantage under the agreement from revoking or
challenging the same. We shall deal with this point a
little later when we consider the arguments of the
respondents on the question of the estoppel. In the
light of the decisions indicated above, we shall now
try to apply the principles laid down by this Court
and the other courts to the facts of the present case.
42. Finally in a recent decision of this Court in S.
Shanmugam Pillai’s case (supra) after an exhaustive
consideration of the authorities on the subject it was
observed as follows:
Equitable principles such as estoppel, election,
family settlement, etc. are not mere technical
rules of evidence. They have an important
purpose to serve in the administration of
justice. The ultimate aim of the law is to
secure justice. In the recent times in order to
render justice between the parties, courts
have been liberally relying on those principles.
We would hesitate to narrow down their
scope.”
*
*
*
*
As observed by this Court in T. V. R. Subbu
Chetty’s Family Charities’ case(supra), that if a
person having full knowledge of his right as a
possible reversioner enters into a transaction
which settles his claim as well as the claim of
the opponents at the relevant time, he cannot
be permitted to go back on that agreement
when reversion actually falls open.
In these circumstances there can be no doubt that
even if the family settlement was not registered it
would operate as a complete estoppel against
respondents Nos.4 and 5. Respondent No.1 as also
the High Court, therefore, committed substantial
error of law in not giving effect to the doctrine of
estoppel as spelt out by this Court in so many cases.
The learned Counsel for the respondents placed
reliance upon a number of authorities in Rachbha v.
Mt. Mendha:AIR 1947 All 177; Chief Controlling
Revenue Authority v. Smt. Satyawati Sood:AIR 1972
Delhi 171 and some other authorities, which, in our
opinion have no bearing on the issues to be decided
in this case and it is therefore not necessary for us to
refer to the same.”
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that in
view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid citation, there is no
scope
to
disbelieve
the
unregistered
written
agreement
dated
27.09.2011 and as such Learned Trial Court rightly delivered the
judgment.
8.
Learned Senior Counsel also referred another citation in S.
Saktivel(Dead) by LRS. Vs. M. Venugopal Pillai and others
reported in (2000) 7 SCC 104 wherein in para Nos.5 and 6, Hon’ble
the Apex Court observed as under:
“5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant
urged that the view taken by the High Court in
decreeing the suit of the plaintiff was erroneous
inasmuch as the settlees under Ext. A-1 got the suit
property and by the subsequent oral arrangement,
they agreed to work out their rights without varying
or substituting the terms of Ext. A-1 and, therefore,
the High Court was not right in not considering the
oral arrangement as pleaded by the defendantappellant. It is not disputed that disposition under
Ext. A-1 in the present case is by way of grant and
under the said disposition all the sons of
Muthuswamy Pillai acquired rights. It is also not
disputed that the settlement deed is a registered
document and by virtue of alleged subsequent oral
arrangement, the other sons of Muthuswamy Pillai
were divested of the rights which they acquired
under
the
settlement
deed.
Under
such
circumstances
the
question
that
arises
for
consideration is as to whether any parol evidence
can be let in to substantiate subsequent oral
arrangement rescinding or modifying the terms of
the document which, under law, is required to be in
writing or is a registered document, namely, Ext. A1. Section 92 of the Evidence Act reads as thus:
“92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.When the terms of any such contract, grant or
other disposition of property, or any matter
required by law to be reduced to the form of a
document, have been proved according to the
last section, no evidence of any oral
agreement or statement shall be admitted, as
between the parties to any such instrument or
their representatives in interest, for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to,
or subtracting from, its terms:
*
*
*
*
Proviso (4). The existence of any distinct
subsequent oral agreement to rescind or
modify any such contract, grant or disposition
of property, may be proved, except in cases in
which such contract, grant or disposition of
property is by law required to be in writing, or
has been registered according to the law in
force for the time being as to the registration
of documents."
A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that what
Section 92 provides is that when the terms of any
contract, grant or other disposition of property, or
any matter required by law to be reduced in the form
of a document, have been proved, no evidence of any
oral agreement or statement is permissible for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding or
subtracting from the said written document.
However this provision is subject to provisos (1) to
(6) but we are not concerned with other provisos
except proviso (4), which is relevant in the present
case. The question then is whether the defendantappellant can derive any benefit out of proviso (4) to
Section 92 for setting up oral arrangement arrived at
in the year 1941 which has the effect of modifying
the written and registered disposition. Proviso (4) to
Section 92 contemplates three situations, whereby:
(i) The existence of any distinct subsequent
oral agreement to rescind or modify any
earlier contract, grant or disposition of
property can be proved.
(ii) However, this is not permissible where the
contract, grant or disposition of property is by
law required to be in writing.
(iii) No parol evidence can be let in to
substantiate any subsequent oral arrangement
which has the effect of rescinding a contract
or disposition of property which is registered
according to the law in force for the time being
as to the registration of documents.”
Relying upon the same, Learned Senior Counsel further
submitted that since from the evidence of the appellant, it appears
that he is an educated person and is a contractor and business man
by profession, so, the plea taken by the appellant that without
knowing the contents of the document he had put his signature on the
said unregistered notarized document cannot be accepted and
furthermore, the appellants have not challenged the WILL as stated
earlier and there is also no evidence on record from the side of the
appellants to disbelieve the said unregistered document. So, the
judgment delivered by Learned Trial Court was good in law and there
is no materials on record to interfere with the judgment and urged for
dismissal of this appeal.
9.
Learned Senior Counsel at the time of hearing of argument
also referred the provision of Order VI Rule 4 of CPC and submitted
that in the case at hand the appellant could not prove any fraud
played by the respondent-defandants and in this regard, Learned
Senior Counsel also relied upon another citation of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Placido Francisco Pinto (D) by Lrs and Another Vs. Jose
Francisco Pinto and Another reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC
842 wherein in para No.15, 19, 23 and 29, Hon’ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
“15. It is an admitted fact that consequent to the
amendment in the plaint and in the written
statement, no evidence was led. Mr. Dhruv Mehta,
learned senior counsel for the respondents stated
that the evidence was already on record in respect of
misrepresentation leading to fraud, therefore, the
pleadings were amended so as to support the
evidence.
19. We have heard the learned counsels for the
parties and find that the findings of the First
Appellate Court as affirmed by the High Court are
clearly erroneous. Respondent No. 1 in the written
statement has admitted payment of Rs. 12,000/- to
his creditors by the appellant No. 1. It is also
admitted by him that his and his wife's signatures
were obtained outside the Municipal Office and also
before the Officers in the Municipal Building when
there were about 10-12 people in the office.
23. Order VI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 is to the effect that every pleading shall
contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise
form of the material facts on which the party
pleading relies upon for his claim or defence as the
case may be, but not the evidence by which they are
supposed to be proved. Appellant No. 1 has relied
upon the sale deed which contains the recital of
payment of Rs. 3,000/- as the sale consideration.
The evidence in support of such sale deed was not
required to be pleaded in the plaint filed by the
appellant. Still further, in terms of Order VI Rule 4 of
the Code, in all cases in which the party pleading
relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, or undue
influence shall state in the pleadings the particulars
with dates and items in the pleadings. The extract
from the written statement or the plaint does not
show that there is any pleading of misrepresentation
or fraud. The evidence led by the respondents is not
indicative
of
any
instance
of
fraud
or
misrepresentation as well. Respondent No. 1 was
candid enough to admit that there were debts of Rs.
12,000/-which were paid off by appellant No. 1. He
also admits that he was taken to the Municipal Office
and signed once outside the Municipal Office and
once inside the Municipal Office. His wife had
accompanied him. With such facts on record, we find
that the findings recorded by the Courts below that
the
sale
deed
was
result
of
fraud
or
misrepresentation are clearly not sustainable.
29. The respondents were free to prove fraud in
execution of the sale deed. However, factually, the
respondents have not alleged any fraud in their suit
or in the written statement in the suit filed by
appellant No. 1. The feigned ignorance about the
nature of document cannot be said to be an instance
of fraud. In the absence of any plea or proof of fraud,
respondent No. 1 is bound by the written document
on which he admitted his signatures and of his wife.
There is no oral evidence which could prove fraud,
intimidation, illegality or failure of consideration to
permit the respondents to lead oral evidence to
dispute the sale deed dated 14.9.1970. Therefore,
the judgments referred to by Mr. Mehta are of no
help to support his arguments. Thus, the findings
recorded by the First Appellate Court as affirmed by
the High Court are clearly erroneous in law and are,
thus, set aside.”
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel again submitted
that in the plaint there were no specific assertions in this regard. So,
the plea taken by the appellant cannot be accepted.
10.
Regarding limitation, Learned Senior also referred another
citation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Thankamma George
vs. Lilly Thomas and Another reported in (2024) 8 SCC 351
wherein in para No.19, the Hon’ble Apex Court further observed as
under:
19. We examine the plea of limitation raised by the
respondents. The respondents’ case is that the suit
was filed on 11-5-2011, and in effect, the suit seeks
to set aside the sale deed dated 16-4-2008 (Ext.A-5).
The suit was filed beyond the limitation period and
should have been dismissed. Limitation is a question
of law and fact. The period of limitation and the time
from which the period begins to run, depend on the
article in the schedule appended to the Limitation
Act of 1963. The case falls under “Part III- Suits
Relating to Declarations”. Article 58 reads thus:
Description of suit
Period
of
limitation
To
obtain
any
other declaration
Three years
Time from which
period begins to
run
When the right
to
sue
first
accrues.
Referring the same, he submitted that the same was also
barred by law of limitation and before the Learned Trial Court the suit
was also not maintainable although no such specific issue was framed
by the Learned Trial Court in this regard.
11.
To counter the reply made by Learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents, Learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon one
citation of Orissa High Court in Cheti Balakrishnamma alias
Balakrishna Vs. Chetti Chandrasekhar Rao and others reported
in AIR 1991 Ori 332 wherein Hon’ble Orissa High Court came to the
observation
that
based
upon
unreasoned
unregistered
family
arrangement no decree can be passed and in this regard, Learned
Counsel referred para Nos.10, 11 and 12, wherein Hon’ble the Orissa
High Court observed as under:
“10. So far as the third point is concerned,
admittedly the property being the self-acquired
property of Venkataswamy as held by us earlier, and
said Venkataswamy having executed a will indicating
the manner of disposition of the property, the
successors of Venkataswamy cannot by way of a
family arrangement change the devolution or mode
of succession. In other words, the heirs of
Venkataswamy had no right to meddle with the
property in any manner contrary to the wishes of the
testator who had acquired the property in question
and who had indicated the manner of disposition of
his property. The express desire of the testator as
reflected in the will cannot be deviated and,
therefore, the so-called family arrangement must be
held to be invalid and inoperative and cannot in any
manner override the will (Ext. 43). In this view of
the matter, even though the plaintiff's parents are
signatories to the family arrangement of the year
1961 under Ext. 4, the plaintiff will not be bound in
any manner and the disposition of the property
under Ext. A is invalid and inoperative.
11. So far as the fourth point for consideration is
concerned, we really fail to understand as to why
instead of granting the relief of partition as claimed
by the plaintiff, the Subordinate Judge directed that
the said remedy should be worked out by filing a
separate suit for partition. If the plaintiff succeeds in
establishing
that
it
was
the
property
of
Venkataswamy and Venkataswamy had indicated a
particular way of disposition of that property under
the will, and in view of our conclusion with regard to
the validity of the will as well as with regard to the
invalidity of Ext. A, there is absolutely no
justification for driving the plaintiff to work out his
remedy by filing a separate suit for partition. We
would, therefore, held that the plaintiff's right under
the will may be worked out by partitioning the
property and the plaintiff's interest as per the will
may be carved out. It may, however, be indicated
that since the so-called family arrangement has been
given effect to, in carving out the interest of the
plaintiff under the will, care should be taken to see
as far as practicable that the property that had been
sold by plaintiff's parents on the basis of Ext. A
should be allotted to the share of the plaintiff so that
the bona fide transferees will not suffer in any
manner.
12. So far as the cross-appeal is concerned, it is also
necessary to examine whether the decision of the
trial Court that the will executed by Venkataswamy
would be valid to the extent of one-third of his
interest is correct or not. In our considered opinion,
the said decision is wholly contrary to law. If the
property is the property of Venkataswamy and in
view of our conclusion that it was his self-acquired
property, Venkataswamy must be held to have full
power of disposing of the same in any manner he
liked and the property being in the nature of the
property of a joint acquirer, the heirs of
Venkataswamy cannot claim any interest in the same
by birth. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court that
the will was valid only to the extent of one-third
interest of Venkataswamy is wholly unsustainable
and the same is accordingly set aside. On the other
hand, it must be held that the will is valid so far as
the entire property of Venkataswamy is concerned
and not to the extent of only his one-third interest as
held by the Subordinate Judge. In this view of the
matter the cross-appeal must succeed.”
Relying upon the same, Learned Counsel submitted that the
judgment delivered by Learned Trial Court cannot be sustained in the
eye of law as the Learned Trial Court without appreciation of the
evidence on record relied upon that said unregistered notarized
agreement treating the same to be as family arrangements and urged
for allowing this appeal by setting aside the judgment.
12.
After hearing both the sides at length, it appears to this Court
that the entire arguments of both the sides rest upon the said
unregistered notarized agreement i.e. Exbt.-D/1 which was relied
upon by the respondent-defendants and the same document was also
relied upon by the appellant-plaintiff as Exbt.-4 series(3 sheets).
Admittedly, there is no dispute on record in this case regarding the
registered WILL vide No.III-57 executed in the year 1996(Exbt.-1
series) although it was asserted by the appellant-plaintiffs that they
were not happy with the execution of the WILL but at the time of
hearing of argument, Learned Counsel relied upon said Exbt.-1 series
and submitted that on the basis of Exbt.1 series, khatians were
opened in the name of the respective legal heirs of the deceased.
Now,
regarding
execution
of
unregistered
notarized
agreement dated 26.09.2011, it was the case of the appellantplaintiffs that as the respondent-defendant No.1 was the elder
brother of the family so he obtained the signature of appellantplaintiffs keeping them in dark which could not be acted upon and the
Learned Trial Court relied upon the said document and dismissed the
suit. According to learned Counsel for the appellants as the registered
deed of WILL i.e. Exbt.-1 series contained everything including the
suit path measuring 6 feet as such, by the mutual family settlement
of the year 1998 there was no scope to execute any further
document i.e. Exbt.-D/1.
13.
Now, here in this appeal we are to see:-
“Whether the judgment and decree delivered by the
Learned Trial Court suffers from any infirmity to be interfered
with?”
To prove the said contention both the parties have placed
their elaborate arguments.
Examined the evidence on record
14.
On perusal of Exbt.-D/1 i.e. the notarized agreement it
appears that all the parties to the suit have appended their signature
on the body of the same and there is verification made by the
interested parties that the contents of the same were read over to
them and the said Exbt.-D/1 was duly proved by the respondentdefendants before the Learned Trial Court. The appellant-plaintiffs did
not dispute their signatures on the said document. Learned Trial Court
came to the observation that all the beneficiaries/legatees to the WILL
after the death of their testator were allotted their respective share
and they became the absolute owners in possession of the said
property and thereafter all the co-sharers of the suit path had
mutually made an agreement for re-allocation of the suit path by dint
of a written document as a mutual family arrangement. Furthermore,
the said document i.e. Exbt.-D/1 dated 26.09.2011 was executed by
all the parties mutually giving their assent to such re-allocation and
pursuant there to all the parties have been acting upon it for years
together which is apparent from the face of record.
From the evidence on record further it appears that the family
arrangement was made in the year 1998 amongst the interested
parties. It is also on record that by this time the respondentdefendant No.2 completed his construction in the year 2006. The
appellant-plaintiffs took the plea that their cause of action arose in the
year 2006 when the respondent-defendants started encroaching upon
the suit path but surprisingly inspite of having opportunity no step
was taken by the appellant-plaintiffs. Even if it is taken into
consideration that the cause of action started on and from 26.09.2011
but this suit was filed before the Learned Trial Court on 19.02.2015
which was after the statutory period of limitation. So, although no
specific issue was formulated by the Learned Trial Court in this regard
but there is a clear finding by the Learned Trial Court in para No.51
that the suit was barred by law of limitation. As submitted by Learned
Counsel for the appellant that in view of the recitals of the registered
WILL, there was no scope to make any obstruction over the path way
by dint of mutual family settlement. Since the parties have made
alternative arrangements to use another path way situated to the
southern side wherein the appellant-plaintiffs have also put their
signatures, so, by their action the appellant-plaintiffs were themselves
stopped from raising the plea that the said document i.e. Exbt.D/1
was executed beyond their knowledge and understanding and they
have also approached to the Learned Trial Court after the statutory
period of limitation.
Moreso, from the evidence on record further it appears that
the appellant-plaintiffs could not adduce any convincing evidence on
record before the Learned Trial Court that they were totally ignorant
or in dark about execution of Exbt.-D/1 i.e. the notarized agreement
dated 26.09.2011 since the appellant had the scope and knowledge
being a literate person about the existence of said document.
15.
Learned Trial Court at the time of deciding issue Nos.I, II and
IV discussed the evidence on record elaborately and relying upon the
judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kale(supra) came to the
observation that the agreement dated 26.09.2011 was created
voluntarily and the cause of action to file the suit arose on 26.09.2011
not during November, 2014 or 30.01.2015 as pleaded by the
appellant-plaintiffs since the appellant-plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
Court that they had no previous knowledge about the execution of
document dated 26.09.2011 and finally decided those issue Nos.I, II
and IV against the appellant-plaintiffs.
In deciding issue Nos.III and V Learned Trial Court came to
the observation that as per Will i.e. Exbt.-1 series the legatees of the
WILL were given the right of ingress and egress through the suit path
as described in schedule-A of the plaint but the parties to the suit who
are/were the beneficiaries of the WILL made a family arrangement
vide document dated 26.09.2011 i.e. Exbt.-D/1 by which they have
waived their right to ingress and egress through schedule-A suit path
and all the parties using the 10 feet wide road on the southern side.
Further, according to the Learned Trial Court the WILL was executed
in the year 1996 and subsequent to the death of the testator, the
beneficiaries were allotted to the respective shares as per the recitals
and five brothers became the owner of their respective shares while
the common pathway of 6 feet on the northern side as per the WILL
was made common to all the brothers in equal shares and accordingly
khatian was prepared(Exbt.-2 and Exbt.-3) but in the year 1998
following the convenience and inconvenience the parties made family
settlement and accordingly made some re-allocation for converting
common pathway from being 6 feet to 10 feet in the southern side
and all the parties accordingly agreed to such arrangements and
started using the same and the said family settlement was accepted
by all the parties which was later on notarized on 26.09.2011. More
so, it was not the case of appellant-plaintiffs that they did not put
their signatures on the said document. So, by execution of those
documents the appellant-plaintiffs have waived off their rights.
Further, it appears that the respondent-defendants have raised some
constructions encroaching upon the land of schedule-A and it is also
on record that as per Exbt.-D/13, Exbt.-D/2 and Exbt.-D/4, the
respondent-defendants
have
undertaken
their
construction
with
permission from Udaipur Municipal Council. So, Learned Trial Court
also after discussing the evidence on record rightly decided the issue
Nos.III and V in negative.
In deciding issue Nos.VI and VII, Learned Trial Court came to
the finding that the suit was not maintainable in its form and nature
being barred by law of limitation and also being bad for estoppel,
waiver and acquiescence and ultimately also decided the said issue
No.VI and VII in negative against the appellants of this case.
16.
I have also gone through the citations relied upon by Learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-defendants.
The principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court also in
the aforenoted cases are very much relevant for decision of this case.
It appears that without registration of written document of family
settlement and arrangement a document can be acted upon. In this
regard, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Thulasidhara and another
Vs. Narayanappa and others reported in (2019) 6 SCC 409 in
para No.9.5 observed as under:
“9.5. As held by this Court in Subraya M.N.:(2016) 8
SCC 705 even without registration a written
document of family settlement/family arrangement
can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining
the arrangement made thereunder and conduct of
the parties. In the present case, as observed
hereinabove, even the plaintiff has also categorically
admitted that the oral partition had taken place on
23-4-1971 and he also admitted that 3 to 4
panchayat people were also present. However,
according to him, the same was not reduced in
writing. Therefore, even accepting the case of the
plaintiff that there was an oral partition on 23-41971, the document, Ext. D-4 dated 23-4-1971, to
which he is also the signatory and all other family
members are signatory, can be said to be a list of
properties partitioned. Everybody got right/share as
per the oral partition/partition. Therefore, the same
even can be used as corroborative evidence as
explaining the arrangement made thereunder and
conduct of the parties. Therefore, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court has
committed a grave/manifest error in not looking into
and/or not considering the document Ext. D-4 dated
23-4-1971.”
From the said principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court that in absence of registered document based upon family
arrangement/settlement legal action can be taken and here in this
case at hand since the appellant-plaintiff have failed to cast any doubt
in respect of execution of Exbt.-D/1, so, in my considered view, the
Learned Trial Court rightly relied upon the same and dismissed the
suit and not only that all the issues were thoroughly discussed and
duly ventilated by the Learned Trial Court for which I do not find any
scope to interfere with the judgment delivered by Learned Trial Court.
17.
The citation of the Hon’ble Orissa High Court referred by the
learned Counsel for the appellants appears to be distinguishable in
facts from the facts of the present case. So, the same cannot be
relied upon in deciding this appeal.
18.
So, after going through the records of the Learned Court
below and also after going through the judgment delivered by the
Learned Trial Court it appears that the appellant-plaintiffs have failed
to project their case before the Learned Trial Court for warranting
decree in their favour and as such the Learned Trial Court after
discussing all the issues in detail rightly dismissed the suit and this
Court does not find any scope to interfere with the judgment and
decree of the Learned Trial Court and the same is liable to be
dismissed accordingly.
19.
In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant is hereby
dismissed on contest with costs. The judgment dated 29.07.2024 and
decree dated 02.08.2024 delivered by Learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Court No.2, Gomati District, Udaipur in connection with case
No.T.S. No.5 of 2015 is hereby upheld and the same is accordingly
affirmed. The appellant-plaintiffs are not entitled to get any relief
against
Exbt.-D/1
i.e.
unregistered
notarized
agreement
dated
26.09.2011.
With this observation, this present appeal stands disposed of.
Prepare decree accordingly.
Send down the record(s) of the Learned Court(s) below along
with a copy of this judgment and Order.
Pending applications(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
signed by
MOUMITA Digitally
MOUMITA DATTA
Date: 2025.07.31
DATTA
10:39:53 -07'00'
Deepshikha
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