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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA 39 of 2018
Sri Sudhangshu Sarkar
S/o Lt. Akhil Chandra Sarkar,
resident of Kariamura, South Badharghat,
P.S. - Amtali, Dist. - Tripura West.
-----Appellant(s)
Versus
1. Smt Anju Rani Sarkar
W/o. Sri Ajamil Sarkar,
resident of Matripally, P.O. - A.D. Nagar,
P.S. - Amtali, Dist. - West Tripura, Pin - 799003.
2. Smt Manju Sarkar
W/o. Sri Gopal Sarkar,
resident of arjan Ban, Masterpara,
P.S. - Melaghar, P.O.- Melaghar,
Dist.- Sepahijala, Tripura, Pin3. Smt. Ranju Sarkar
W/o. Sri Harendra Sarkar,
resident of Jamini Tiall, South Badharghat,
P.S. - Amtali, P.O. - A.D. Nagar, Dist. –
West Tripura, Pin - 799003.
4. Smt. Sanju Sarkar
W/o. Sri Manik Sarkar,
resident of Sabroom Town,
P.S. - Sabroom, P.O. - Sabroom,
Dist. - South Tripura, Pin - 799145.
5. Sri Himanshu Sarkar
S/o. Late Akhil Chandra Sarkar,
resident of Kariamura, South Badharghat,
P.S. - Amtali, P.O. - A.D. Nagar,
Dist. - West Tripura, Pin - 799003.
For Appellant(s)
For Respondent(s)
Date of hearing
Date of pronouncement
Whether fit for reporting
-----Respondent(s)
: Mr. S. M. Chakraborty, Sr. Adv.
Mr. S. Saha, Adv.
: Mr. T. D Majumder, Sr. Adv.
Mr. G. S. Bhattacharjee, Adv.
: 08.02.2022
: 10.02.2022
: Yes
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
Judgment & Order
This is an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC 1908 from
the judgment and decree dated 03.12.2016 passed in case no. Title
Appeal 65 of 2013 by the Additional District Judge, Court No.3, West
Tripura,
Agartala
dismissing
the
appeal
preferred
against
the
judgment dated 27.09.2004 passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Division
(Court No.2), West Triprua, Agartala in TS (Part) 78 of 2003.
[2]
At the outset, the controversy that led to filing of the suit
may briefly be introduced. The respondents (herein after referred to as
plaintiff-respondents) as Plaintiffs instituted the Title Suit (P) 78 of
2003 in the Court of Ld. Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court No.2, West
Tripura, Agartala against the appellant (herein after referred to as the
defendant-appellant) for partition of their joint properties in 1/7th
share as described under schedule 1 and 2 of the plaint.
[3]
In a nutshell the case of the plaintiff-respondents was that
the suit land described under Schedule-1 of the plaint is the land
inherited by the plaintiff-respondents and defendant-appellant from
their predecessor-in-interest namely Akhil Chandra Sarkar and also
the suit land described under Schedule-2 is jointly purchased by them.
The plaintiff-respondents wanted for partition of the said land
purchased by them. Their predecessor-in-interest Lt. Akhil Ch. Sarkar
owned and possessed the land described under schedule-1 of the
plaint and the plaintiff-respondents and defendant-appellant are the
owner in possession of the 2nd schedule land and after the death of
their predecessor-in-interest they have been jointly possession the
said lands. It is a also asserted in the plaint that the plaintiffrespondents recently noticed that the defendant-appellant has been
trying very vigorously to get and utilize all the benefits of the land
depriving them taking the advantage of their faith and trust reposed
on him when the plaintiff-respondents requested the defendantappellant for amicable partition to overcome to said situation he
turnaround and lastly refused the proposal on 9.7.03.
[4]
The plaintiff-respondents herein filed the suit in the trial
court for partition of their joint properties in 1/7th share as described
under schedule 1 and 2 of the plaint
Schedule-1
District-West Tripura, Sub-Registry office-Sadar, TeshilBadharghat,
Revenue
Circle-Dukli,
Sub-Division
Bishalgarh, Mouja- Badharghat, PS. Amtalli, Khatian No.
1821, Jer Khatian No. 1821/1, 1821/2, C.S Plot No.5674,
5675, 5676, 5677, 5678, 5679(P), 5680, 5689, 5690,
5691, 5694, Class of Land Nal, land measuring 1.61
acres or 4 kani as per local measurement Class of land
Nal. Bounded by:
North- Behari Sarkar, Satayendra Biswas,
South –Krishan Das, and Sukumar Dey,
East – Surehs Das, Nabadwip Das, Sudhan Das,
M=Bimal Das,
West – Nishi Sarkar
Schedule –2
District- West Tripura, Sub-Registry Office-Sadar, Teshil,
Badharghart, Revenue Circle – Dukli, Sub-Division –
Bishalgarh,
Mouja-Badharghat,
PS-Amtali,
Khatian
No.5886, C.S. Plot NO. 5579, 5580, 5667, 5668,
5809/14219, land measuring 1.30 acres or 3 kani 5
ganda as per local measurement. Class of land Bastu viti
bounded by
North-Sataya master, Behari Sarkar
South – Self.
East – Self
West – Nishi Sarkar
[5]
The
defendant-appellant
herein
filed
the
written
statement. In the written statement so filed, it has been categorically
stated by the defendant-appellant that the plaintiff-respondents never
made any proposal to the defendant-appellant for amicable partition of
the homestead land nor the respondents are entitled to get 1/7th (One
seventh) share of the schedule property as because the plaintiffrespondents No.2, 3 and 4 are the sisters of defendant-appellant and
said plaintiff-respondents No, 2, 3, and 4 already transferred
their
property in favour of defendant-appellant herein vide Gift Deed No.14702 dated 27.06.81. So, the plaintiff-respondents No.2, 3 and 4 are
not entitled to get any share of schedule property and the defendantappellant is entitled to get share of 1/7th (One seventh) share of
schedule property each. Be it mentioned here that the said gift deed
as mentioned above was executed by the plaintiff-respondents No.2, 3
and 4 willingly and they never claimed anything from the schedule
property during the period.
[6]
On the basis of the rival pleadings, the Civil Judge (Sr.
Div), Court No.2, West Tripura Agartala hereinafter referred to as the
trial judge, framed the following issues:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
[7]
Is the suit maintainable in its present form and
nature?
Whether the predecessor-in-prsent namely Late
Akhil Chandra Sarkar, died leaving behind the
plaintiffs & defendant as his legal heirs?
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get the
decree as prayed for?
To what other relief/reliefs the parties are
entitled?
The trial judge while deciding the issue No. (iii) & (iv) has
observed that plaintiff-respondents and the defendant-appellant are
entitled to have equal share of the suit land as described in the
Schedule -1 and 2 of the plaint. The trial court further observed that
firstly the plaintiff-respondents are entitled to have the declaration
that they are entitled to have 1/7th share of the
sit properties
described under schedule 1 & 2 of the plaint. Secondly the plaintiffrespondents are further entitled to file prayer for appointing a Survey
Commissioner to cause partition of the suit properties in equal share
between the plaintiff-respondents and the defendant-appellant if the
parties to the suit fail to amicable partition the same. Survey
Commissioner will survey the suit land and will demarcate their
respective shares by meets and bounds by causing a partition of the
suit properties in equal 1/7th share upon the parties to the suit.
[8]
The trial judge after having examined all the records so
placed in the plaint and also after examining the written statement
filed by the defendant-appellant, depositions of PWs and DWs in
support of the claim, has observed as herein under:
1. The plaintiffs are entitled to have the declaration that they
are entitled to have 1/7th share of the suit properties as
described under Schedule -1 & 2 of the plaint.
2. The plaintiffs are further entitled to file prayer before this
court for appointment of Survey Commissioner to cause
partition of the suit properties in equal share if the parties
to the suit fail to amicable partition the same.
The Survey Commissioner will survey and demarcate their
respective shares by meets and bounds
by causing
partition of the suit properties in equal shares.
3. The plaintiffs are entitled to have the cost of the suit.
The defendants shall have to bear the cost of the suit.
[9]
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and
decree passed in the original suit, the appellant herein preferred an
appeal being case No. Title Appeal No.65 of 2013 in the court of the
Additional District Judge, (Court No.3), West Tripura, Agartala. The
said court while stating Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 observed that a gift of an immovable property must be effected
by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and
attested by at least two witnesses.
For ready reference, Section 123 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 is extracted here in below:
―For the purpose of making a gift of immoveable
property, the transfer must be affected by a registered
instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and
attested by at least two witnesses. For the purpose of
making a gift of moveable property, the transfer may be
effected either by a registered instrument signed as
aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery may be made in
the same way as goods sold may be delivered.‖
[10]
While perusing the Ext-A, it was stated by the first
appellate court that the only PW-1 and PW2 were examined and both
of them denied the execution of Ext-A. So far the Smt. Manju Sarkar
(one of the sisters of the appellant herein) she has not come to tender
her evidence but she is one of plaintiff-respondents in the Title Suit 78
of 2013. She has duly signed on the plaint where it has been
mentioned that each of the plaintiff-respondents and the defendantappellant will get 1/7th share of the said property being the legal heirs
and successor Late Akhil Chandra Sarkar. So, it is found that Manju
Rani Sarkar though she has not come before the court as a witness
but she has not accepted the contention of the defendant-appellant
that she has also transferred her share in favour of the defendantappellant.
[11]
It was further established that execution of Ext.A has been
disputed by the donors of Ext.A and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 was therefore referred by the first appellate court.
―68. Proof of execution of document required by
law to be attested.—If a document is required by law to
be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one
attesting witness at least has been called for the
purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting
witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court
and capable of giving evidence.
[Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an
attesting witness in proof of the execution of any
document, not being a Will, which has been registered in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Indian
Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution
by the person by whom it purports to have been
executed is specifically denied.]
[12]
The first appellate court while appreciating the above
pleadings of the plaintiff-respondents clearly stated that defendantappellant has been unable to prove Ex.A and also takes two
contradictory stands in his defence. Accordingly, I find no ground to
interfere in the findings of the learned trial court and come to the
conclusion that trial court has rightly decided the remaining issues in
favour of the plaintiff-respondents.
[13]
Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the
first appellate court dated 03.12.2016, the appellant herein has
preferred this instant appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. At the time
of admitting this appeal, the following substantial question of law was
framed by this court by the order dated 05.12.2019.
―Whether the findings of the Courts below, rejecting the
execution of the gift deed, is perverse or not?‖
[14]
The main contention of the appellant counsel is that the
appellant being elder brother has performed marriages and also
provided education and took care for betterment of his sisters and in
pursuance thereof they have executed the gift deed way back in the
year 1981. The sisters who are the defendants in the suit denied the
very execution of the gift deed in favour of the appellant herein and
accordingly prayed that their shares should not be transferred to the
appellant herein and they wanted the respective share to be decided in
their favour.
[15]
Since the total share are seven, each member would get
their respective share and accordingly to the appellant, the three
sisters who have executed the gift deed in favour of the appellant, in
addition the appellant’s share is the fourth share as the appellant is
praying for as a matter of right and the remaining share to the rest of
the family members. This argument cannot be accepted since the
parties to the gift deed are denying the very execution of the gift
deed. The gift deed according to the respondents came into light after
twenty three years of its execution in favour of the appellant.
[16]
The appellant has not challenged before any court with
regard to the action of the sisters in denying the gift which they have
executed. Since the subject matter runs around sharing of the shares
in partition suit the issue relating to taking cognizance of the gift and
deciding the share is not just and proper. Moreover, unless their
specific share of each family members is decided and more particularly
with metes and bounds are decided, the question of gifting would lead
to dispute. That, under law since undivided share is also permissible
for the purpose of alienation either by way of sale or gift, this is only
possible when donor or the vendor accept the document which they
have executed in favour of the beneficiaries.
[17]
Now in the present case, since the gift deed has been
denied by the donors in favour of the appellant/brother, this court is
not inclined to give any finding in favour of the appellant with regard
to the execution of the gift deed by his sisters in favour of the brotherappellant. The brother in his entire pleadings has not indicated as to
his source of income and the amount of money he spent for
marriages, education and the expenditure he incurred in the process
of fulfillment of his responsibilities which made his sisters to execute
the gift deed by them in his favour.. In view of so many gaps, it is not
for this court at the stage of second appeal to allow the filling up of
gaps by the appellant during the course of argument when the said
contention are not found in the pleadings all through and no document
is marked to that effect.
[18]
Counsel for the appellant has cited the following judgment.
(i) Hazara Singh and another vs. Faqiria (D) by L.R. and others
reported in AIR 2004 Punjab and Haryana 353, where the court has
held as under:
―17. In my opinion, the gift of a specific portion in the
joint holding or the sale of a specific portion in a joint
holdings does not stand on different footing. By virtue of
the gift of a Specific portion, the predecessors-ininterest of the defendant became co-sharers in the
khewat. They cannot be denied the status of the coowners in the joint Khewat merely because in the
revenue record, they have been shown as co-owners
being donees in the column of cultivation. A transferee
under Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act gets
right of the transferor to joint possession and to enforce
a partition of the same whether the property sold is
fractional share or specified portion. The first Appellate
Court has totally ignored this aspect of the matter and
drawn a wrong conclusion that the defendants or their
predecessors-in-interest were not the co-owners in the
joint khewat, merely because they have been shown in
the column of cultivation and not in the column of
ownership.
20. On the other hand, the stand taken by the defendants
was that the possession of the plaintiffs was permissive
and it never became adverse. The first Appellant Court
held the possession of the plaintiffs as adverse on the
basis of the Jamabandi for the year 1961-62 (Ex.P-7)
and the Khasra Girdawaris pertaining to Kharif 1968 till
Rabi1979 (Ex.P-1 to P-4). In these revenue records, the
possession of the plaintiffs has been recorded as 'Gair
Marnssi Bashrara Malkan Bila Lagan Kabja Jabardasti'
Prior to the Jamabandi for the year 1961-62 i.e. in the
Jamabandi for the year 1958-59 (Ex.P-8), the possession
of the plaintiffs was recorded as Gair Marussi. There is
another evidence available on the record which has been
totally ignored by the first Appellate Court. This evidence
is Ex. D-8 and D-9. Vide Ex.D-8, when the land from the
joint holding was acquired by the Government in village
Kaimbwala, compensation was paid to the defendants.
Vide Ex.D-9, in lieu of the acquisition of the land gifted
to the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants in
village Kaimbwala, 7 kanals 5 marlas of land was given
to them in village Manimajra. These facts clearly
establish that the plaintiffs (donors) never asserted their
title by way of adverse possession when the
compensation was paid and the land in lieu of the
acquired land was allotted to defendant Nos. l and 2.
This fact clearly establishes that the plaintiffs never
objected to the title of the defendants. The law with
regard to the claim of adverse possession by a co-owner
is well settled. The possession of a co-sharer is the
possession for all the co-sharers. It cannot be adverse to
them unless there is a denial of their right to their
knowledge by the person in possession, and exclusion
and ouster following thereon for the statutory period
(Mohd. Bagarv. Naim-Un-Nisa Bibi,2 A.I.R. 1956 S.C.
548). Mere mutation in the revenue record in favour of
one co-sharer does not amount to ouster unless there is
a clear declaration denying title of the other co-sharer. If
a co-sharer is in possession of the entire property, his
possession cannot be deemed to be adverse from the
other co-sharer. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Darshan Singh v. Gujjar Singh AIR 2002 SC 606
that possession of a property belonging to several cosharers by one co-sharer shall be deemed that he
possesses the property on behalf of the other co-sharers
unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title
of the other co-sharers; the mutation in there venue
records in the name of one co-sharer would not amount
to ouster unless there is clear declaration that title of the
co-sharers was denied.‖
(ii) Smt. Lalita James and others vs. Ajit Kumar and others
reported in AIR 1991 Madhya Pradesh 15, where the court has held
as under:
―4. It, at once, appears to this Court that a purchaser
from a co-owner of a portion of undivided property is not
entitled to possession of any particular part of the joint
property. His right, if any, would be to joint ownership or
co-ownership and not to the exclusive ownership of any
particular part of the joint property. Even if it was to be
assumed that the shares of two sisters of Shri P. S.
Chouhan, namely, Mrs. Dayabai Lak-shmanan and Mrs.
Grace Pritabai Morris were half and half in the property,
each of them would have the right of enjoyment and
possession equal to the other. But as long as the
property is not divided, neither of them would be
entitled to any particular part of the property. A
transferee from such a co-owner would not be in a better
position than the co-owner himself and hence he would
also not be entitled to claim exclusive possession of any
particular part of the joint property. Section 44 of the
Transfer of Property Act gives legislative sanction to this
principle and provides that "where one of two or more
co-owners of immovable property legally competent in
that behalf transfers his share of such property or any
interest therein, the transferee acquires, as to such
share or interest, and so far as is necessary to give
effect to the transfer, the transferor's right to joint
possession or other common or part enjoyment of the
property, and to enforce a partition of the same, but
subject to the conditions and liabilities accepting, at the
date of the transfer, the share or interest so
transferred". This sanction, therefore, assures the
transferee the right to joint possession or common
enjoyment of the property but does not confer on the
transferee any right to exclusive possession. Since this is
not a case where a co-owner was in exclusive possession
of the suit property by some arrangement between
them, other details of this principle need not be
considered. Suffice it to say, that the respondentsplaintiffs would, in the context of the facts and
circumstances of the case, be only entitled to enforce a
partition of the joint estate and nothing more. In the
context of this legal principle, the sale in favour of the
respondents-plaintiffs cannot be accepted to be the sale
of the particular property. It would, at the most, be
recognized as the sale of the joint property giving the
plaintiffs' right to obtain its separate possession, if
possible, by filing the suit for partition. Since the
respondents-plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit
property they cannot be joint in possession of the suit
property or any other joint property even during the
pendency of the partition suit on the principle stated by
this Court in Full Bench decision, in Ramdayal v.
Maneklal, 1973 MPLJ 650 : (AIR 1973 Madh Pra 222).
This would, in the opinion of this Court, be sufficient to
dispose of this suit for separate possession of undivided
property.‖
(iii) Mst. Nirashi Bai vs. Ramlal S/o Kajal Ganda & Ors.
reported in AIR 2006 Chhattisgarh 73, where the court has held as
under:
―16. From the aforesaid provision, it is apparent that
undivided shares can validly be transferred and
transferee acquires right of share or interest of the
transferor. The sale in favour of defendant No.
1/appellant by deceased Sadvo for consideration and
that too by a registered instrument, cannot be declared
void for want of partition or for reasons stated in the
impugned judgment. Accordingly, question No. 2 is
answered.‖
(iv) Purna Chandra Mallik vs Smt. Renuka Jena and Ors.
reported in AIR 2007 Orissa, 65, where the court has held as under:
―8. As would be apparent from the aforesaid facts, a
portion of the joint family dwelling house has been sold
by original defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 3 to the
plaintiff who was a stranger to the family. A preliminary
decree has been passed in the suit for partition filed by
the said stranger-purchaser and final decree proceeding
is pending.
There is no law which stipulates that a co-sharer
must sell his or her share to only another co-sharer.
Thus strangers and outsiders can purchase share of a cosharer even in a dwelling house. Section 44 of the
Transfer of Property Act stipulates that the transferee of
a share in a joint family dwelling house if he is not a
member of the said family gets no right to joint
possession or common enjoyment of the portion of the
house so purchased. Thus Section 44 of the Transfer of
Property Act adequately protects the members of the
joint family against intrusion of an outsider into joint
family dwelling house. The only manner in which an
outsider can get possession of the property purchased
by him/her is by filing of a suit for separation of his/her
share and pray for delivery of possession. Only after
such a step is taken that the provisions of Section 4 of
the Partition Act will come into play. Excepting Section 4
of the Partition Act there is no other law which provides
right to a co-sharer to re-purchase the property sold to a
stranger/outsider. Thus before the right of pre-emption
under Section 4 of the Partition Act is claimed, the
conditions laid down therein have to be satisfied. One of
the said conditions is that the outsider must file a suit
for partition. Section 4 does not provide a right to the
co-sharer
to
claim
preemption
where
a
stranger/outsider does nothing after purchasing the
property in question. In other words, Section 4 of the
Partition Act does not vest right on a co-sharer to claim
pre-emption and to re-purchase the property unless the
stranger-purchaser comes to the Court and files a suit
for partition and for handing over possession. See
Gautam Paul v. Debi Rani Paul AIR 2001 SC 61.
9. In the case of Ghantesher Ghose v. Madan Mohan
Ghosh, AIR 1997 SC 471, it has been held that before
Section 4 of the Partition Act can be invoked the
following conditions must be fulfilled:
(1) A co-owner having undivided share in the family
dwelling house should effect transfer of his undivided
interest therein;
(2) The transferee of such undividual interest of the coowner should be an outsider or stranger to the family;
(3) Such transferee must sue for partition and separate
possession of the undivided share transferred to him by
the co-owner concerned.
(4) As against such a claim of the stranger transferee,
any member of the family having undivided share in the
dwelling house should put forward his claim of preemption by undertaking to buy out the share of such
transferee; and
(5) While accepting such a claim for preemption by the
existing co-owner of the dwelling house belonging to the
undivided family, the Court should make a valuation of
the transferred share belonging to the stranger
transferee and make the claimant co-owner pay the
value of the share of the transferee so as to enable the
claimant co-owner to purchase by way of pre-emption
the said transferred share of the stranger transferee in
the dwelling house belonging to the undivided family so
that the stranger transferee can have no more claim left
for partition and separate possession of his share in the
dwelling house and accordingly can be effectively denied
entry in any part of such family dwelling house.‖
[19]
On the strength of Section 44 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 counsel for the appellant he has argued that the gift
executed by the sisters in favour of the appellant-brother needs to be
upheld as the transfer is permissible. This court has no hesitation to
say that an undivided portion of the property is permissible for
alienation but when the said alienation is disputed, the said document
cannot be given any credence. The above judgments have no
relevance to the facts of the case.
In view of the above, this appeal is dismissed confirming
the orders of the lower appellate court dated 03.12.2016 and the trial
court dated 27.09.2004.
JUDGE
Dipak
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