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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WA. No. 88/2025
Sri Soumitra Chakma, son of Late Bijal Behari Chakma, aged about 57 years,
resident of Ujan Abhoynagar Bazaar, P.O. Abhoynagar, PS-New Capital
Complex, Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura, Pin-799005;
……….APPELLANT
VERSUS
1) The State Of Tripura, represented by the Special Secretary, General
Administration (AR) Department, Government of Tripura, New Capital
Complex, PO-Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Agartala, District-West
Tripura.
2) The Special Secretary, General Administration (AR) Department,
Government of Tripura, New Capital Complex, PO-Kunjaban, PS-New
Capital Complex, Agartala, District-West Tripura.
3) The Secretary, General Administration (P&T) Department, Government of
Tripura, New Capital Complex, P.O. New Secretariat, P.S. New Capital
Complex, Agartala, District- West Tripura, Pin-799006.
4) The Deputy Secretary, General Administration (P&T) Department,
Government of Tripura, New Capital Complex, P.O. New Secretariat, P.S.
New Capital Complex, Agartala, District- West Tripura, Pin-799006;
5) The Commissioner Of Departmental Inquiries, Pandit Nehru Complex,
Gorkhabasti, P.O. Kunjaban-799006, P.S. New Capital Complex, Agartala,
District- West Tripura, Pin-799006.
6) The Chief Secretary, Government of Tripura, New Capital Complex, POKunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Agartala, District-West Tripura
(Appellate Authority);
7) Tripura Public Service Commission, represented by its Secretary, A.K.
Road, Near Fire Service Chowhmani, PS-West Agartala, District-West
Tripura, Pin-799001.
8. The Secretary, Tripura Public Service Commission, A.K Road, Near Fire
Service Chowmuhani, PS- West Agartala, District- West Tripura, Pin 799001.
……….Respondents.
For the Appellant(s)
:
Mr. S. Lodh, Advocate.
Mr. K. Roy, Advocate.
Mr. S. Majumder, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Date of hearing
Date of delivery
of Judgment & Order
:
Mr. Kohinoor N. Bhattacharyya, G.A.
Mr. K. Pandey, Advocate.
03.02.2026
:
10 .02.2026
Whether fit for reporting :
YES.
BEFORE
HON’BLE JUSTICE DR. T. AMARNATH GOUD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(Dr.T.Amarnath Goud, J)
[1]
Heard Mr. S. Lodh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant.
Also heard Mr. Kohinoor N. Bhattacharyya, learned G.A. appearing for the
respondents-State. Mr. K. Pandey, learned counsel also appears for
respondents-TPSC.
[2]
This present appeal has been filed seeking the following reliefs:“I) Admit this Appeal;
II) Call for the relevant records, pertaining to WP(C) 4 of 2025, disposed of on 06.08.2025, by the
Hon'ble Single Judge;
III) After hearing the parties, in terms of the GROUNDS set forth above, be pleased to quash/set
aside the impugned Judgment and Order dated 06.08.2025, passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge in
WP(C) 4 of 2025, and thereafter, be pleased to allow the appeal in terms of Prayers made in the writ
petition;”
[3]
Facts leading to the present appeal are that a disciplinary
proceeding was initiated against the appellant vide memorandum No.F.11(2)GA (AR)/2022/752-55 dated 02.05.2022
wherein 03 Nos. of Article of
Charges were framed against the appellant by the Principal Secretary to the
Government of Tripura being the Disciplinary Authority in connection with
misconduct and arbitrary decision of the appellant herein. As per the
memorandum, the appellant was asked to submit his reply within 15(fifteen)
days. It was also stated in the memorandum that departmental proceedings
under Rule 14 of CCS( CC&A) Rules 1965 will be carried out against him
based on the charges which were leveled against him.
charges
of
memorandum
Challenging the
No.F.11(2)-GA(AR)/2022/752-55,
Dated
02.05.2022, the Inquiry report vide No. 23/INQ/DP/GA(AR)/2022, Dated
28.03.2024 and the punishment order vide No.F.11(2)-GA(AR)/2022/502-04
Dated 04.06.2024 and the Appellate Order dated 23.09.2024, the appellant
filed a writ petition before this Hon’ble Court and the same was registered
and marked as W.P.(C) No. 04 of 2025. Therefore, after hearing both the
parties, the Learned Single Judge of this Court vide its Judgment and Order
dated 06.08. 2025, dismissed the writ petition citing that the appellant as
Land Acquisition Collector acted beyond his jurisdiction and in the entire
proceeding all opportunities were given to him to defend the charges leveled
against him . But, in the ongoing proceeding he failed to inspire confidence
of the Inquiry Authority to exonerate him from the charges. Being dissatisfied
with the aforesaid order of dismissal, this writ appeal has been filed.
[4]
Learned Counsel Mr. S. Lodh appearing for the appellant at the
time of hearing of argument submitted that the entire proceeding was
unlawful, unjustified and misconceived. The charges leveled against the
appellant herein had no basis because the appellant as per direction of the
Hon’ble Court passed in connection with Case No. WP(C)1381 of 2016 dated
05.01.2021 proceeded with the subject matter constituting a team. Thus, there
was no abuse of power by the appellant and he only acted as per jurisdiction.
Learned Counsel further submitted that since, the entire action was taken in
compliance of the direction of Hon'ble High Court, so, the question of
notification under the LA Act was totally baseless. Learned Counsel at the
time of hearing further drawn the attention of the Court referring Section-23
of the LA Act and submitted that the appellant has complied with the said
provision and furthermore referring the communication of Deputy Secretary,
Government of Tripura dated 22.03.2021 it was informed by the Revenue
Department to D.M. & Collector, Unakoti District, Kailashahar to take
necessary action as per direction of the Hon'ble High Court. Learned Counsel
again referred the inquiry report of SDM, Kailashahar dated 18.03.2021 sent
to L.A. Collector for assessment of loss suffered by M/S Fortuna Agro
Plantation Limited and also referred the report of the S.D.F.O. Kailashahar
Forest Sub-Division addressing to the Land Acquisition Collector dated
19.03.2021 in pursuance of the direction of the High Court. It was further
submitted by the Learned Counsel for the appellant that the said judgment
was not challenged by the State-respondents to any other forum. Thus, the
same has been attained finality. Learned Counsel also submitted that after
receipt of the reports of the constituted team the appellant assessed the
compensation following the mandate of LA Act and passed the award which
was routed through different tables and the same award was countersigned by
one TCS Grade-II, LA Officer and after that the appellant vide
communication dated 25.03.2021 communicated the award to the Deputy
Secretary, Government of Tripura, Revenue Department supplying copy to
D.M. & Collector, Deputy Project Manager, NBCC, M/S Fortuna Agro
Plantation Ltd. and Dilkhusha Tea Co. Ltd. and also the appellant supplied the
copy of award to the Fortuna Agro Plantation Limited as there was clear
direction from the High Court to pass the award within four months. Learned
Counsel further submitted that the inquiring authority without affording full
opportunity and without proper recording the evidence of the appellant made
findings against the appellant which was totally illegal, unjustified and beyond
the principles of natural justice. It was further submitted by Learned Counsel
appearing for the appellant that as alleged by the State-respondents the
appellant did not violate Rule-19 of DFPRT Rules, 2019 and there is also no
evidence on record in this regard. Thereafter, learned counsel referred the
findings of the inquiring authority and submitted that on the basis of the
evidence on record there was no scope on the part of the inquiring authority to
held the appellant to be guilty of charges. Thus, the inquiring authority failed
to appreciate the evidence on record properly and furthermore, the evidence of
the appellant as accused officer was also not properly recorded by the
inquiring authority. Thus, there was gross violation of principles of natural
justice in recording evidence on record. It was also submitted that regarding
Article-III, the Ranibari Tea Estate did not challenge anything regarding
payment of award to a middleman of Nattingcherra Tea Garden. To support
his contention Learned Counsel also referred some other documents and
submitted that appellant never acted beyond jurisdiction and referring the
Office Note No.55 and 56 Learned Counsel submitted that based on
documentary evidence on record award was made in favour of the actual
party. Finally, Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the
proceeding drawn up was misconceived and the inquiring authority failed to
appreciate the evidence on record properly and found the appellant to be
guilty of charges causing serious prejudice to the appellant and on the basis of
misconceived proceeding, the disciplinary authority imposed major penalty
which has been upheld by the appellate authority of the department and the
findings of the appellate authority was nothing but replica of the findings of
the inquiring authority and urged before this Court for setting aside the orders
of the inquiring authority, appellate
authority, and other connected
memorandums.
[5]
In support of his argument, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Union of
India And Others versus J. Ahmed, reported in (1979) 2 Supreme Court
Cases 286, wherein in para 9, Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under :“9. The five charges listed above at a glance would convey the impression that the
respondent was not a very efficient officer. Some negligence is being attributed to
him and some lack of qualities expected of an officer of the rank of Deputy
Commissioner are listed as charges. To witness, charges 2 refers to the quality of
lack of leadership and charge 5 enumerates ineptitude, lack of foresight, lack of
firmness and indecisiveness. These are qualities undoubtedly expected of a
superior officer and they may be very relevant well considering whether a person
should be promoted to the higher post or not or having been promoted, whether he
should be retained in the higher post or not, or they may be relevant for deciding
the comptent of the person to hold the post, but they cannot be elevated to the level
of omission or commission as contemplated by Rule 4 of the discipline and Appeal
Rules so as to incur penalty under Rule 3. Competence for the post, capability to
hold the same, efficiency requisite for a post, ability to discharge function attached
to the post, are things different from some act or omission of the holder of the post
which may be styled as misconduct so as to incur the penalty under the rules. The
words 'acts or omission' contemplated by Rule 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules
have to be understood in the context of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules,
1954 conduct Rules for short). The Government has prescribed by Conduct Rules a
code of conduct for the members of All India Services. Rule 3 is of a general nature
which provides that every member of the service shall at all times maintain
absolute integrity and devotion to duty. Lack of integrity, if proved, or undoubtedly
entail penalty. Failure to come up to the highest expectation of an officer holding
responsible post or lack of aptitude or qualities of leadership would not constitute
as failure to maintain devotion to duty. The expression 'devotion to duty' appears to
have been used as something opposed to indifference to duty or easy-going or
light-hearted approach to duty. If Rule 3 were the only rule in the Conduct Rules it
would have been rather difficult to ascertain what constitutes misconduct in a
given situation. But Rules 4 to 18 of the Conduct Rules prescribe code of conduct
for members of service and it can be safely stated that an act or omission contrary
to or in breach of prescribed rules of conduct would consti-tute misconduct for
disciplinary proceedings. This code of conduct being not exhaustive it would not be
prudent to say that only that act or omission would constitute misconduct for the
purpose of Discipline and Appeal Rules which is contrary to the various provisions
in the Conduct Rules. The inhibitions in the Conduct Rules clearly provide that an
act or omission contrary thereto so as to run counter to the expected code of
conduct would certainly constitute misconduct. Some other act or omission may as
well as constitute misconduct. Allegations in the various charges do not specify any
act or omission in derogation of or contrary to Conduct Rules save the general
Rule 3 prescribing devotion to duty. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of
efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of administrative ability while
holding a high post would themselves constitute misconduct. If it is so, every officer
rated average would be guilty of misconduct. Charges in this case as stated earlier
clearly indicate lack of efficiency, lack of foresight and indecisiveness as serious
lapses on the part of the respondent. These deficiencies in personal character or
personal ability would not constitute misconduct for the purpose of disciplinary
pro-ceedings.
[6]
He also relied upon the citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in United Bank of India versus Biswanath Bhattacharjee reported in
(2022) 13
Supreme Court Cases 329
and
Ram Lal versus State of
Rajasthan And Others reported in (2024) 1 Supreme Court Cases 175
wherein in relevant portions of both the judgments, the Hon’ble Apex Court
opined as under:United
Bank of India versus Biswanath Bhattacharjee
reported in (2022) 13 Supreme Court Cases 329
"17. In one of the earliest decisions of Union of India v.H.C. Goel relating to
departmental proceedings, this court observed that where a public servant is
punished for misconduct after a departmental enquiry is conducted, a clear case
where interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is warranted is when there
is no evidence to establish the official's guilt.
"22.... The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some
cases both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the
Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the
Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government
not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides but that does not
mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the
Government, a writ of certiorari will not issue without further proof of mala fides.
That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney General's
argument that since no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present
case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent.
23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of
the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved,
is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney General has stressed before us that
in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is
acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the
view taken by the appellant is a reasonably possible view this Court should not sit
in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have
taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only
test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's
case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the
respondent that Charge 3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction
under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question
about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion.
That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals
with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is
any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if
the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the
conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the
respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the
evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the
impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to
hold that the respondent's grievance is well founded, because, in our
opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the
respondent that Charge 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence."
18. Apart from cases of "no evidence", this court has also indicated that
judicial review can be resorted to. However, the scope of judicial review in
such cases is limited: In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India: a three-judge
bench of this court ruled that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a
review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal
in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority; it does not reappreciate the evidence. The court held that:
"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in
which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an enquiry is
conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is
concerned to determine whether the enquiry was held by a competent officer or
whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or
conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to
hold enquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or
conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical
rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply
to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power
of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence
and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal
may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent
officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding
reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the
Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the
relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
`13.The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is
`presented, `the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of
legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of
evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel (supra) this Court held at P.728
that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the
disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the
record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
19. Other decisions have ruled that being a proceeding before a domestic tribunal,
strict rules of evidence, or adherence to the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872
are inessential. However, the procedure has to be fair and reasonable, and the
charged employee has to be given reasonable opportunity to defend himself (ref:
Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana: a decision followed later in Punjab &
Sind Bank v. Daya Singh: (2010) 11 SCC 233). In Moni Shankar v. Union of India:
(2008) 3 SCC 484 this court outlined what judicial review entails in respect of
orders made by disciplinary authorities:
"17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions
of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural
justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial
review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission
misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been
taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom.
Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal
principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the
premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face
value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof,
namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidence, the test of the doctrine
of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to
interfere."
20. This court struck a similar note, in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi
Chand Nalwaya: (2011) 4 SCC 584, where it was observed that:
"7....If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on
evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded
departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or
where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a
tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the
material on record".
21. The bank is correct, when it contends that an appellate review of the materials
and findings cannot ordinarily be undertaken, in proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution. Yet, from H.C. Goel onwards, this court has consistently ruled
that where the findings of the disciplinary authority are not based on evidence, or
based on a consideration of irrelevant material, or ignoring relevant material, are
mala fide, or where the findings are perverse or such that they could not have been
rendered by any reasonable person placed in like circumstances, the remedies
under Article 226 of the Constitution are available, and intervention, warranted.
For any court to ascertain if any findings were beyond the record (i.e., no
evidence) or based on any irrelevant or extraneous factors, or by ignoring material
evidence, necessarily some amount of scrutiny is necessary. A finding of "no
evidence" or perversity, cannot be rendered sans such basic scrutiny of the
materials, and the findings of the disciplinary authority. However, the margin of
appreciation of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution would be different;
it is not appellate in character."
Ram Lal versus State of Rajasthan And Others reported in (2024) 1
Supreme Court Cases 175
"32. This issue need not detain us any further because it is not the case of
department that the appellant sought employment based on 10th standard
marksheet. It is their positive case that the appellant sought employment on the
basis of his 8th standard marksheet. Shravan Lal, PW-4 in the departmental
enquiry had also furnished the 10th standard marksheet procured from the
Secondary Education Board, Ajmer. In cross-examination, on being asked, he
admitted that the appellant was recruited on the basis of 8th standard marksheet,
and he admitted that there was no alteration in the 8th standard marksheet.
34. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the D.B. Special Appeal (Writ)
No.484/2011 dated 05.09.2018. We direct that the appellant shall be reinstated
with all consequential benefits including seniority, notional promotions, fitment of
salary and all other benefits. As far as backwages are concerned, we are inclined
to award the appellant 50% of the backwages. The directions be complied with
within a period of four weeks from today."
Referring those citations Learned Counsel Mr. Lodh urged for
allowing this writ appeal by setting aside the impugned order mentioned in the
prayer portion of the writ appeal.
[7]
On the other hand, Learned G.A. Mr. Kohinoor N. Bhattacharya
appearing on behalf of the State-respondents drawn the attention of the Court
referring the entire proceedings and submitted that if the entire proceeding is
meticulously examined it would be clear that in the entire proceeding the
appellant was given all opportunities to support his defence not only that he
was
given
the
opportunity
to
defend
the
charges
by
adducing
oral/documentary evidence on record. So, the finding of the inquiring
authority was justified, rational and based on oral and documentary evidence
on record. The appellant in this writ appeal according to Learned G.A. could
not raise any ground to interfere with the findings of the disciplinary authority
as well as the appellate authority. It was further submitted that admittedly
there was direction from the side of the Hon'ble High Court in WP(C)No.1381
of 2016 dated 05.01.2021. But the appellant acted beyond the direction of the
Hon'ble High Court and violated the notification issued under the LA Act
dated 30.08.2005 and by the said notification only 24.08 acres of land were
shown to be acquired out of that jote land was 19.14 acres and khas land was
4.94 acres. Learned G.A further submitted that
inquiring authority
in
departmental proceeding recorded the evidence on record of the witnesses
properly and after elaborate discussions of the evidence on record observed
that the Article of charges leveled against the appellant were proved beyond
doubt and accordingly found the appellant to be guilty. It was further
submitted that the appellant as LA Collector ignoring the report of SDM and
violating and ignoring the Office Note No.55 illegally made payment to a
middleman of Nattingcherra Tea Estate and ignoring the notification dated
30.08.2005 proceeded to make payment of award/compensation for land
measuring 225.80 acres. It was also submitted by Learned G.A. that there is
very least scope to re-appreciate the evidence on record and the present
appellant in the entire proceeding failed to show any procedural irregularities
or lapses to be interfered with. It was further submitted that the appellant
awarded compensation for 225.80 acres of land whereas only 24.08 was
actually acquired as per notification dated 30.08.2005 of the Revenue
Department
and furthermore the appellant acted beyond jurisdiction and
misinterpreted the direction of the High Court and violating the financial rules
of the Government sent requisition for an amount of Rs.235 crores to NBCC
without obtaining prior approval of the State Government and not only that
the appellant also violated the Revenue Department's notification dated
13.03.1991 and 05.10.2010. Further, the appellant also made payment of Rs.
58,28, 476/- to the Sunshine Tea Co. Ltd. processing Private Limited who
were claiming the lawful occupiers of the land but there was dispute regarding
the ownership and the SDM Kumarghat also recommended verification of the
2009 NOC produced by Sunshine Tea. Furthermore, the appellant also
ignored the Official Note No.55 and proceeded for payment based on
unverified and unregistered documents. Thus, according to Learned G.A. the
appellant acted in violation of Rule 3 of the TCS (Conduct) Rules, 1988 which
shows non-judicious and imprudent use of statutory power. Learned G.A. also
submitted that Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India wrote a letter
to the State Government on 15.07.2021 expressing their dissatisfaction over
the excessive award and also intimated the Government that such
compensation may set a dangerous precedent across India in other border
fencing projects. Further Learned G.A. submitted that although office note
was prepared by the other staff but the entire responsibility lies upon the
appellant as LA Collector because it was his duty to verify ownership, obey
financial rules and ensure reasonableness in making award and to obtain the
approval of the State-authority. It was further submitted that the findings of
the appellate authority also was justified which shows that the appellant
proceeded despite several red flags and the appellant proceeded to make
award based on selective and unverified materials. Finally, Learned GA
submitted that the entire process of disciplinary proceeding
was fair,
reasonable and there was sufficient evidence against the appellant with the
alleged imputation as such the punishment imposed by the authority was
lawful, proportionate and based on the seriousness of misconduct, financial
irregularity and breach of public duty.
[8]
Learned G.A. in support of his contention submitted that there is
no scope on the part of this Court at this stage to reassess/appreciate the
evidence on record. In support of his contention he relied upon citations of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Pravin Kumar vs. Union of India and
Others reported in (2020) 9 SCC 471, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur
versus Nemi Chand Nalwaya reported in (2011) 4 Supreme Court Cases 584
and lastly on, State of Andhra Pradesh versus S. Sree Rama Rao, reported
in (1963) AIR .
Referring those citations Learned G.A. drawn the attention of the
Court that the principles of said citations are very much relevant for decision
of this appeal because there is no scope on the part of this Court at this stage
to act as a judicial review and to re-appreciate the evidence on record and
further more according to learned G.A. since the appellant in course of
hearing of argument failed to satisfy the Court by showing any cogent grounds
to interfere with the findings of the disciplinary authority as well as the
appellate authority. So, learned G.A. urged for dismissal of this writ appeal.
[9]
Mr. K. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the
TPSC-
respondents submitted that the role of TPSC was very limited. TPSC acted as
consulting authority for imposition of punishment upon the appellant.
[10]
Heard and perused the evidence on record.
[11]
It is seen from the record that Articles of Charges framed in the
memorandum dated 02.05.2022 along with the enclosures were communicated
to the appellant asking him to submit his written statement within a period of
15 days. It is also seen in the Articles of Charges that the appellant during the
period of his incumbency from 11.08.2020 to 30.06. 2021 as L.A Collector,
Unakoti District failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty as
he made arbitrary and unreasonable assessment for compensation of the land
and also for compensation of the damaged cost of trees which was found to be
highly excessive not in conformity with the LA Act and by a judgment dated
05.01.2021 of this High Court in WP(C)1381 of 2016, the appellant was
asked to make correct assessment of the damage because total land measuring
24.08 acres of land were acquired for construction of IBB fencing of
Murticherra mouja under Kailashahar Sub-Division by
notification
No.F.9(5)-REV/ACQ/II/2005 dated 30.08.2005 and out of total land
measuring 24.08 acres jote land was 19.14 acres and khas land was 4.94 acres
but the appellant as LA Collector submitted assessment cost for compensation
of land measuring 225.80 acre covering the entire land from zero line to IBB
fencing beyond the area of acquisition which was only 24.08 acres but the
appellant proposed compensation of damaged cost of trees fallen within said
225.80 acres. Further as a LA Collector the appellant failed to exercise his
statutory power to cause survey by technically sound person to determine the
land which has been severed for construction of IBB fencing and proposed
compensation for excessive amount contrary to the prevailing settled norms of
the LA Act and further the appellant was charged with sending requisition of
Rs.235 crore to NBCC without
taking any approval of the Government
authority for making payment of compensation in LA Case No.7/Kai/2005
against the award passed in compliance of the judgment and order dated
05.01.2021 in WP(C)No.1381 of 2016 filed by M/S Fortuna Agro Plantation
Ltd. violating Rule 19 of DFPRT Rules, 2019. Thus, the appellant violated the
provision of Rule 3 of the TCS (Conduct) Rules, 1988. It was further alleged
that as a LA Collector the appellant
illegally made payment of a
compensation amounting to Rs.58,28,476/-to a middleman of Natingcherra
Tea Garden in defiance of all settled norms violating Rule 3 of the TCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1988. The appellant denied the charges filed against him as
per Articles of charge No. I, II and III. Since, the disciplinary authority was
not convinced by the defence submitted by the appellant so disciplinary
proceeding was continued against him. The Commissioner of Departmental
Inquiries was appointed to conduct the inquiry after conducting full-fledged
inquiry submitted report on the basis of oral and documentary evidence
adduced on behalf of contesting parties and held that the charges were proved
against the appellant-accused Officer and the inquiring authority hold that the
prosecution successfully established the charges against the appellant.
[12]
This Court finds force in the Judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court
which are titled as State of Andhra Pradesh vs. S. Sree Rama Rao reported in
1963 AIR 1723, the relevant portion is extracted as under:“There is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering
whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied,
and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Art, 226 of the
Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Art. 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: iris concerned
to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf,
and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority
entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent Officer is guilty of the
charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Art.
226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.
The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities
have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the
rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of
enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the
case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or;
where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious
that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar
grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly
held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their
findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter
which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for
a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Titled as State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur versus Nemi Chand
Nalwaya, reported in (2011) 4 Supreme Court Cases 584, the relevant
portions are as under :The respondent was employed as a clerk in Kalindri Branch of the appellant Bank.
He was issued a charge-sheet dated 30-8-1988. The two charges against him are
extracted below:
"(i) On 14-10-1987, you disclosed the balance of SB Account No. 1025 of Shri
Dharamchand Nathaji lying in inoperative account to an unidentified person
posing himself as the said account-holder though the person was not having even a
passbook of that account. This disclosure of secrecy led to a fraudulent withdrawal
of ₹6000 from the said account thereby putting the Bank into loss.
(ii) On 14-10-1987, you have advised Shri I.M. Rawal, the counter clerk handling
savings bank ledgers to transfer the balance lying in Account No. 1025 in the name
of Shri Dharamchand Nathaji from the inoperative savings bank ledger to that of
operative ledgers without first obtaining the permission of the Branch Manager
which is a pre-requirement in all such cases. It is further alleged that you have
collected the withdrawal form purported to have been signed by the depositor,
handed over the same to Shri L.M. Rawal, the counter clerk, obtained token and
after it was passed for payment by the Branch Manager, obtained payment from
paying cashier, Shri S.R. Meghwal. The real depositor has subsequently
complained that the signature on withdrawal form was forged and the matter is
now under police investigation."
The charge-sheet followed a preliminary enquiry by one H.S. Sharma, an officer of
the appellant Bank, in which the respondent broadly admitted the facts constituting
the subject-matter of the two charges.
7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and
reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the round that
another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly
and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy
of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not
interfere with findings of fact recorded departmental enquiries, except where such
findings are based on no evidence or were they are clearly perverse. The test to
find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have
arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will
however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural
justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be
arbitrary , capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. Bank of
India v. Degala Suryanarayana³ and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v.
Shashikant S. Patil.)
Titled as Pravin Kumar Versus Union of India & Others,
reported in (2020) 9 Supreme Court Cases 471, the relevant para is quoted
herein below:“28. It is thus well settled that the constitutional courts while exercising their
powers of judicial review would not assume the role of an appellate authority.
Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural
errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Put
differently, judicial review is not analogous to venturing into the merits of a case
like an appellate authority.”
[13]
After perusal of the record, it is observed that undisputedly, writ
petition vide No. 1381 of 2016 was disposed of by an order dated 05.01.2021
and there is no reason why the appellant herein being the LA Collector has
not chosen to challenge the same by filing writ appeal or sought for any
review before the writ court.
[14]
The appellant being the LA Collector was his prima facie duty
in dealing with the Government property and fixing up compensation in a
matter where public money/ State exchequer is involved, was supposed to
be more cautious. It is nowhere indicated from the record that the appellant
has taken all preventive and precautionary steps to ascertain with regard to
the owner ship of the claimants upon the land which is
acquired. This
Court, in earlier matters observed that if land of a lawful owner is acquired
he is obviously entitled for a generous compensation. Since, day by day the
land is getting extinguished and it is utilized for better purpose and benefit
of the society. But, at the same time this Court is of the view that unless it is
decided that the recipient of the claim-amount is holding a valid alienable
title, it cannot be said that he is entitled for claiming the compensation. An
unauthorized person cannot be paid a single rupee from the public
exchequer. Mere entries in the khatian cannot be treated as title deed it is
only a entry in the revenue records and they cannot be equated with the sale
deed / title deed/ ownership documents. There is no cogent reason given
while passing an award showing acquisition of land
measuring 225.80
acres in place of 24.08 acres as per notification dated 30.08.2005 issued by
the Revenue Department, Govt. of Tripura and further it appears that the
appellant LA Collector failed to obtain approval of the authority of the State
Government before sending the requisition to NBCC for an amount of Rs.
235 crores and also the appellant passed an order for making payment to an
unauthorized person
ignoring the norms without confirmation of the
ownership. Once a person claiming compensation for trees on lands, it
cannot
be said that he
is the owner of a tree unless there is any
authorization given to him to occupy the land in the absence of any
authorization to occupy the land any claimant stepping
upon the land
amounts to trespass and a trespassers if he claims that he has raised any
plant and he is the owner of the same, this Court has no hesitation to say
that he is a trespasser and he is not
entitled for any such compensation
either for land or trees. The appellant being responsible officer and as LA
Collector could have been more cautious in dealing with matter and such
casual approach of the appellant cannot be accepted. Thus, as a public
servant, he was found to be guilty of misconduct under Rule-14 of the CCS
(CCA) Rules, 1965 and also violation of Rule -3 of the TSCS ( Conduct)
Rules, 1988.
The relevant portion of the Rule -3 of the TSCS (Conduct) Rules,
1988 is quoted hereunder :3. General
(3) Every Government Employee shall at all times(i) maintain absolute integrity;
(ii) maintain devotion to duty; and
(iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government employee.
(2) (i) Every Government employee holding a supervisory post shall take all
possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all Government
employees for the time being under his control and authority;
(ii) No Government employee shall, in the performance of his official duties, or in
the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best Judgement
except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior;
(iii) The direction of the official superior shall ordinarily be in writing. Oral
direction to subordinates shall be avoided. Where the issue of oral direction
becomes unavoidable, the official superior shall confirm it in writing immediately
thereafter;
(iv) A Government employee who has received oral direction from his official
superior shall seek confirmation of the same in writing as early as possible,
whereupon it shall be the duty of the official superior to confirm the direction in
writing….”
[15]
This Court also of the view that the appellant at the time of
making of award violated the provision of Rule -19 of DFPRT Rules, 2019.
Accordingly, the relevant paras are quoted as under:19. PAYMENT OF DECRETAL DUES:
The Administrative Department shall have full powers to sanction expenditure for
payment of any decretal amount in pursuance of any Court's orders provided:
(i) The Administrative Department has made a thorough scrutiny of the judgment,
consulted the Finance Department and Law Department, and has obtained the
concrete and specific advice that there is no merit for filing petitions for
review/revision/appeal in the appropriate legal forum.
(ii) If during the scrutiny of the case by the Administrative Department or by the
Law Department or by the Finance Department or by any other authority, the
negligence of any officer is found in conducting the case, the Administrative
Department shall take appropriate disciplinary measure against the negligent
officers under intimation to the Administrative Reforms Department. Copies of
notes of the Administrative Department, the Law Department, or Finance
Department or any other authority pointing out lapses on the part of the officers
should be sent invariably to the Administrative Reforms Department. The
Administrative Department shall issue guidelines to their subordinate offices
pointing out the nature of the lapses and advising them to guard against such
lapses.
(iii) The Administrative Department in consultation with the Law Department &
Finance Department comes to the conclusion that the implementation of the order
would not attract claims for analogous financial benefits from other persons
belonging to the same category or placed on the same footing. If, however, the
contrary opinion is established, the Department should take appropriate action to
contest the case for the modification of the order.
(iv) There is necessary budget provision for making the payment.
[16]
Though, said provision deals with the payment of money for
decreetal amount under the Court, the entire process of paying amount under
land acquisition compensation is under a Statute. This Court feels for a
moment that since there is no specific provision in the said Delegation of
Financial Power Rules, Tripura, 2019 and in a broader sense if this rule 19 is
considered, and said amount of compensation which is under Statute is an
award if treated as Court decreetal amount then the appellant could have
followed the same and it is failure on the part of the appellant for not taking
proper care in dealing with such huge amounts. It is also appears to this
Court that the inquiry authority came to the observation that during the
relevant period as LA Collector, the appellant illegally made payment of huge
amount of Rs. 58,28,476/-
as LA compensation
to a middleman of
Nottingcherra Tea Garden being defiance of all the settled norms.
The
misconduct according to the respondents which the appellant has committed
under rule 3 of Tripura State Civil Services ( Conduct) Rules, 1988 has to be
viewed seriously because of the position the appellant is holding and it is not
any ministerial job the appellant is performing .
[17]
In view of the above reason, this Court is of the view that the
original order of dismissal dated 04.06.2024 and the appellate order dated
23.09.2024 need no interference as the same have been passed in accordance
with law. Therefore, we find no infirmity in the order of learned Single Judge
in WP(C) No. 04 of 2025 dated 06.08.2025 in dismissing the appellant from
the service and accordingly, the same is confirmed.
[18]
Thus, being devoid of merit, this present writ appeal is dismissed.
As a sequel, miscellaneous application(s), pending if any, shall stand closed.
S.DATTA PURKAYASTHA,J
Paritosh
signed by
SABYASAC Digitally
SABYASACHI GHOSH
Date: 2026.02.17
HI GHOSH 17:25:49 +05'30'
DR.T. AMARNATH GOUD,J
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