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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA No.3 of 2021
1. Sri Raghubir Debbarma,
S/O.- Late Satish Ch. Debbarma,
(A Group–D employee of Agartala
Municipal Corporation),
Resident of Ward No.13,
Agartala Municipal Corporation,
Near Haradhan Sangha,
P.S.-West Agartala, P.O.-Agartala,
Distt.-West Tripura.
2. Sri Napu Ranjan Debbarma,
S/O.- Lt. Gyan Chandra Debbarma,
Resident of Natun Tablabari,
P.S.-Khowai, Distt.-Khowai, Tripura.
….Defendant-Appellant(s)
Versus
Sri Prasanta Debbarma,
S/O.-Lt. Sambhu Debbarma,
Resident of Thakurpalli Road,
P.O.-Agartala, P.S.-West Agartala,
Distt.-West Tripura.
….Plaintiff-Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s)
:
Mr. D. Bhattacharya, Sr. Advocate
Mr. S. Saha, Advocate
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, Sr. Advocate
Ms. A. Pal, Advocate
Date of hearing and delivery
of judgment and order
:
27.03.2023
Whether fit for reporting
:
Yes
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
Judgment and Order (Oral)
27/03/2023
This is a second appeal filed against the judgment dated
12.05.2020 and decree dated 26.05.2020 passed by learned First
Appellate Court in Title Appeal No.30 of 2016 whereby and whereunder
the learned First Appellate Court reversed the judgment dated 18.03.2016
and decree dated 02.04.2016, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior
Division, West Tripura, Agartala in TS 27 of 2012.
2.
The facts of the case, as projected by learned trial Court below are
as under:
“1.
The specific performance of unregistered agreement for sale,
dated 06.02.2009 in respect of a land measuring 0.0240 acres
comprised in Khatian No.26960, appertaining to old plot
No.6019/4783, corresponding new plot No.2127, herein-after
referred as the suit land, sought to be enforced herein in
cancellation of the registered sale deed bearing No.1-4527, dated
04.08.2010 executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of defendant
No.2 during subsistence of the agreement for sale.
2.
The defendant No.1 in need of money proposed the plaintiff
to sell the suit land in consideration of ₹ 4,37,000/-. Accordingly,
the plaintiff accepted the proposal of the defendant No.1 and as
such the defendant No.1 executed an unregistered agreement for
sale dated 06.02.2009. The Plaintiff, having friendly relation with
the defendant No.1 has made payment of most of the consideration
money i.e., ₹ 4,00,000/- as earnest money by taking loan from his
friends and relatives on the request of defendant No.1 being in need
of money for the purpose of treatment of his wife. The period
stipulated for execution of the sale deed as three years which was
to be expired on 05.02.2012. Accordingly, the plaintiff since May,
2011 started requesting the defendant No.1 to execute the sale deed
on receipt of rest of the consideration money of Rs. 37,000/-, but on
several dates the defendant No.1 inspite of having agreed to
execute the sale deed and to hand over the possession of the suit
land started causing delay in doing so with some flimsy grounds
though the plaintiff was/is ready to make payment of rest of the
consideration money. When the plaintiff realised that the defendant
No.1was avoiding him to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff issued
an Advocate’s Notice, dated 06.06.2011 demanding execution of
the registered sale deed within 15 days, else he would take shelter
in the Court. The defendant No.1 on receipt of the Advocate’s
Notice assured to execute the sale deed and sought two months as
he had to go outside Tripura for treatment of his wife. The Plaintiff
stated to have waited for the defendant for more than a month, but
the defendant No.1 did nothing and hence the plaintiff again issued
a reminder to the defendant through his learned Advocate.
Subsequently, the plaintiff came to know that the defendant No.1
had sold the suit land to the defendant No.2 on the Strength of
registered sale deed bearing No.1-4572, dated 04.08.2010. Hence,
this suit for Specific Performance of Agreement Sale, dated
06.02.2009 in cancellation of the sale deed executed in favour of
defendant No.2.
3.
The defendant No.1 through his written statement has denied
all the allegations laid by the Plaintiff. The defendant No.1 also
denied to have executed the alleged agreement for sale. It is stated,
inter alia, that defendant no.1 has discovered the case to be a
handiwork of one Md. Mujaffar Alam Sekendar, better known as
Sekendar, who is well known in the Town for his muscle powers.
The defendant No.1 has further stated that he had a dispute with
his brother on a plot of land which his brother was trying to grab
illegally. At that time said Sekendar came forward to help the
defendant No.1 to get the dispute resolved in his favour. The
defendant No.1 who is working in Municipality as a Grade-IV
employee in a simpleton and has to be guarded by his wife against
idiotic acts. Sometimes in 2009 said Sekendar approached the
defendant No.1 to propose to purchase the land which he freed
from the dispute. The wife of the defendant was ailing and said
Sekendar proposed to lend some money gratuitously for the
treatment of his wife with an open offer to repay the loan
conveniently. Thus, a loan of ₹ 25,000/- was taken. The defendant
No.1 further stated that it was actually a trap which the defendant
could not understand. Later, by a clever ploy a signed cheque was
obtained from the defendant no.1 after having obtained a cheque
book from the bank at the initiative of Sekendar himself sometimes
in May, 2009. Sekendar also got some papers signed by the
defendant No.1. All such things alleged to have been done in the
absence of his wife as it would be difficult for anyone to be-fool her
as has been done with the defendant No.1. Allegedly, said loan was
paid back in quick installments, but cheque was not returned and
was utilised by Sekendar in a case under section 138 of N.I. Act
which is still pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First
Class, Agartala(Case No. N.I. 130 of 2011). The defendant No.1
further stated that the signed blank papers which was taken from
the defendant No.1 by said Sekendar is presumably utilised now by
the plaintiff. Otherwise, no document was ever signed by the
defendant knowing it to be a sale agreement. The defendant No.1,
therefore, stated that it is a case of fraud and misrepresentation
collusively done with Sekendar with a definite aim of pressurising
the defendant No.1 and to compel him to transfer the suit land
without any true consideration. In fine, the defendant No.1 prays
for dismissal of the suit.”
3.
After exchange of pleadings, the trial Court had framed the
following issues:
“1. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and nature?
2. Has the Plaintiff cause of action to file this suit?
3. Has the Plaintiff entered into an agreement for sale with the
defendant No.1 to purchase the suit land?
4. Are the averments in respect of readiness and willingness to
perform the contract according to its true construction sufficient to
enforce Specific Performance, as prayed for?
5. Is the registered sale deed bearing No.1-4527, dated 04.08.2010
void as against the Plaintiff, if so, is the sale deed liable to be
cancelled and delivered up?
6. Is the Plaintiff entitled to a decree, as prayed for?
7. To what other relief/reliefs the Plaintiff is entitled?”
4.
Evidences were adduced by both the plaintiff and the defendants.
The deed of agreement is exhibited as Exbt.-3. This Exbt.-3 is the basic
document to institute the present suit for Specific Performance of
Contract and this is the document which led the plaintiff to declare the
sale deed executed and registered in favour of one Sri Napu Ranjan
Debbarma, the defendant no.2. What has come to the light of this Court
during the course of hearing is that the defendant no.1 was the original
owner of the suit land. All on a sudden his wife suffered illness and for
her treatment he approached to the plaintiff for money. It is the case of
the plaintiff that both the plaintiff and the defendant on mutual
understanding had entered into an agreement that the defendant no.1
would sell the suit land to the plaintiff on consideration of Rs.4,37,000/-.
At the time of entering into the agreement, it is the case of the plaintiff
that he paid Rs.4,00,000/- and the balance Rs.37,000/- would be paid
after 3(three) years from the date of the agreement vide Exbt.-3, which
fact is denied by the defendant no.1 in his written statement.
5.
It is the case of defendant no.1 that he never entered into any
agreement with the plaintiff/respondent, but, transferred the suit land by
executing a registered sale deed dated 04.08.2010 in favour of defendant
no.2, i.e., Sri Napu Ranjan Debbarma. The case of defendant no.1 is that
the agreement under Exbt.-3 is a concocted, afterthought, fabricated and
manufactured only with the intention to grab the suit land by the plaintiff
and his men and agents.
The defendant no.1 has admitted that he took a loan for Rs.25,000/(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) for the treatment of his wife as the
plaintiff/respondent gratuitiously offered the said amount of money with
further assurance that the defendant no.1 would repay the said money at
his convenience. On that mutual understanding, the defendant no.1 put his
signature in the stamp paper, but, at that time no contents were therein
and neither the witnesses nor the plaintiff or the scribe of Exbt.-3 had put
their signatures in the said blank stamp paper. Defendant no.1 has further
stated that he repaid the said loan amount within a very short period. It is
pertinent to mention herein that the plaintiff/respondent also obtained his
signature in a blank cheque on the understanding that as soon as the said
loan amount would be repaid to him, he would return back the said
cheque as well as the stamp paper but, despite his request, the
plaintiff/respondent had never returned the said cheque and stamp paper.
It is submitted that a cheque bounce case is also going on in a criminal
Court under the Negotiable Instrument Act.
6.
It is the case of the plaintiff that according to Exbt.-3 deed he
approached the defendant no.1 to execute the sale deed in favour of him
as per the terms and conditions under Exbt.-3, to which the defendant
no.1 denied forcing him to serve a notice upon the defendant no.1 through
his learned counsel. But despite receipt of notice the defendant no.1 did
not come forward to specifically perform the Deed of Agreement (Ext.-3)
by way of executing the sale deed, which, compelled the plaintiff to
institute the present suit against the defendants.
7.
In the aforesaid context, I have heard Mr. D. Bhattacharya, learned
senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant (the original defendant no.1) and Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned
senior counsel assisted by Ms. A. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent.
8.
At the time of admission of this appeal following substantial
question of law has been formulated:
―i) Whether, without making any further inquiry in the fact, the
defendant No.2 had transferred the suit land by way of gift deed to
Satsang Vihar, the first appellate court was justified in directing the
defendants No.1 and 2 to transfer the land as described in the agreement
of sale to the plaintiff?”
None of the learned counsel in course of argument of the present
second appeal has urged for formulating any other substantial question of
law. As such, this Court has proceeded to hear this appeal on the basis of
aforesaid substantial question of law.
9.
Mr. Bhattacharya, learned senior counsel has urged this Court to go
through the findings of learned trial Court indicating his strong suspicion
as regard the execution of the agreement (Exbt.-3) is concerned. Relevant
portion of the finding as urged by learned senior counsel is reproduced
here-in-below:
“It is apparent on the case of the plaintiff that the defendant No.1
was in urgent need of money for the purpose of treatment of his wife. It,
therefore, leads us to draw presumption that the alleged proposal to sell
the suit land was made on urgent basis and accordingly the plaintiff has
managed ₹ 4,00,000/- also on urgent basis within a short period. In this
circumstances, I find it inappropriate to believe the story of the plaintiff
who managed an amount of ₹ 4,00,000/- on urgent basis within a short
period, but agreed to pay rest of the amount of ₹ 37,000/- only within a
period of three years on the reasoning that a prudent man would not
believe the circumstances as to payment of balance amount as included in
the agreement for sale and as such these circumstances cast a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the Court as to execution of the agreement for sale.
That apart, on careful perusal of the agreement for sale and the
manuscripts of Pw.3 therein it would be apparent that the entire contents
of the agreement for sale was written surrounding the signature of the
defendant No.1 which clearly indicates that the signature was obtained
first in the stamp paper and the contents therein was written at a later
stage. In this view of the matter, I find it appropriate to hold that the
preponderance of probability in respect of execution/non-execution of the
agreement for sale goes in favour of the defendant No.1.
I, therefore, find and hold that the agreement for sale (Exbt.3)
placed on record cannot be acted upon. Accordingly, Issue No.3 stands
answered in negative.”
10.
In view of the above finding, I have felt it necessary to scrutinize
Exbt.-3, i.e., the Deed of Agreement itself. On bare perusal of the
contents of the deed, it comes to fore that two different inks were used in
writing the name of the recipient of the sale deed and the vendor of the
deed of agreement for sale. The writing style of the contents is also found
to be different. The pattern of writing the name of ‗Sri Prasanta
Debbarma‘, etc. in the first paragraph of the agreement and the pattern of
writing the next part commencing from ‗Sri Raghubir Debbarma‘ is
found to be different. I am also agreeable to the finding of the learned
trial Court that the entire contents of the agreement for sale was written
surrounding the signature of defendant no.1, which ordinarily is not done.
11.
True it is, the witnesses to the deed deposed in favour of the deed
of agreement for sale. But, as I find, on careful scrutiny of the document
as well as the evidences of the plaintiff and the defendant coupled with
the surrounding circumstances, I cannot justify myself to comprehend
that the deed of agreement for sale (Exbt.-3) was fairly executed.
12.
Situated thus, I find force in the findings of learned trial Judge
suspecting the integrity of the agreement for sale (Exbt.—3), where
3(three) years‘ time was stipulated to make payment of balance
consideration of money of only Rs.37,000/- (Rupees Thirty Seven
Thousand only) after payment of almost entire amount, i.e. Rs.4,00,000/(out of Rs.4,37,000/-), and that too, at the time of entering into the alleged
written agreement under Exbt.-3.
13.
I further find that though the plaintiff had challenged the sale deed,
but that sale deed was not exhibited before the trial Court. So, a document
being not brought on record in accordance with law cannot be said to be a
proved document, to say the least, any decree be passed in absence of
proof of such sale deed declaring the same as void ab initio and liable to
be cancelled. So, the questioned sale deed executed in favour of
defendant/appellant no.2 by defendant/appellant no.1 being not ‗proved‘
becomes non-existent to declare the same as void ab initio and liable to be
cancelled.
14.
That apart, most interestingly, the defendant no.1 had produced one
witness who deposed as DW.3 and stated in evidence that Sri Napu
Ranjan Debbarma, the defendant no.2 had transferred the suit land by
way of gift deed to an organization, i.e. Satsang Vihar, Krishnanagar,
Agartala. Said Sri Napu Ranjan Debbarma had obtained prior permission
from the Collector to transfer the suit land in favour of Satsang Vihar
before execution of the gift deed in favour of the Satsang Vihar. It comes
to fore that inspite of this fact being disclosed by the defendants, the
plaintiff despite opportunity did not make any attempt to make any crossexamination as regards the date of the gift deed i.e. the execution and
registration dates of the gift deed in favour of Satsang Vihar.
15.
Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel would emphatically
contend that the gift deed was transacted during the pendency of the suit
primarily to suggest that it is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. Learned
senior counsel drawing my attention to the written statement has tried to
persuade this Court that had the defendant no.1 would have pleaded this
fact, then, the plaintiff would have got an opportunity to amend the plaint
challenging the said Gift deed. So, according to learned senior counsel the
fact of Gift deed as surfaced from the deposition of PW.3 is beyond
pleadings, and in that case, there would be no difficulty to execute the
decree passed by the learned first appellate Court keeping in view the
provision embodied in Rule 102 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
16.
I have given my thoughtful consideration to the said submission of
learned senior counsel.
17.
In the opinion of this Court, to claim a transfer of a property is hit
by doctrine of lis pendens, the plaintiff must prove firstly that the
judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the
suit.
In my opinion, when there was specific evidence let in by
defendant nos.1 and 2 during the course of trial that the suit land was
transferred by way of gift to the organisation of DW.3, then, duty cast
upon the plaintiff either to put a question to the witness as to the date of
the execution of the gift deed or to put a question whether the gift deed
was executed after the institution of the suit. But, from going through the
evidence of DW.3, I find no cross-examination in this regard.
18.
Yet another aspect, which comes to fore that the plaintiff could
also avail the remedy as provided under Order XI Rule 12 of CPC. Order
XI Rule 12 provides that any party may without filing any affidavit, apply
to the Court for an order directing any other party to the suit to make
discovery on oath of the document/s which is/are or have in his
possession or power, which is directly related to the question or
controversy raised in the suit.
19.
Besides, that was not the end of all remedies available to the
plaintiff. Failure to cross-examine the witness for disclosing the fact of
transaction did not ipso facto shut the door of the plaintiff to avail other
remedies under the law. Here, it is pertinent to take note of Section 30 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ―CPC‖) read with Order XI
Rule 1 and 2 of CPC, which are reproduced here-in-below, for
convenience, in extenso:
Section 30 reads as under:
“30. Power to order discovery and the like.–Subject to such
conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, at
any time, either of its own motion or on the application of any
party,(a) make such orders as may be necessary or reasonable in all matters
relating to the delivery and answering of interrogatories, the
admission of documents and facts, and the discovery, inspection,
production, impounding and return of documents or other material
objects producible as evidence;
(b) issue summonses to persons whose attendance is required either to
give evidence or to produce documents or such other objects as
aforesaid;
(c) order any fact to be proved by affidavit.”
Order XI Rule 1 reads as under:
"1. Discovery by interrogatories. – In any suit the plaintiff or
defendant by leave of the Court may deliver interrogatories in
writing for the examination of the opposite parties or any one or
more of such parties and such interrogatories when delivered shall
have a note at the foot thereof stating which of such interrogatories
each of such persons is required to answer: Provided that no party
shall deliver more than one set of interrogatories to the same party
without an order for that purpose: Provided also that
interrogatories which do not relate to any matters in question in
the suit shall be deemed irrelevant, notwithstanding that they might
be admissible on the oral cross-examination of a witness.
Order XI Rule 2 reads as under:
2. Particular interrogatories to be submitted. – On an application
for leave to deliver interrogatories, the particular interrogatories
proposed to be delivered shall be submitted to the Court and that
Court shall decide within seven days from the day of filing of the
said application. In deciding upon such application, the Court shall
take into account any offer, which may be made by the party sought
to be interrogated to deliver particulars, or to make admissions, or
to produce documents relating to the matters in question, or any of
them, and leave shall be given as to such only of the interrogatories
submitted as the Court shall consider necessary either for
disposing fairly of the suit or for saving costs.”
On conjoint reading of the above provisions makes it aptly clear
that any of the parties to the suit may take recourse to provisions
embodied in Section 30 of CPC for discovery or production of any
document from the other parties to the suit for proper adjudication of the
dispute/s. Furthermore, the plaintiff-respondent by way of interrogatories
and with the leave of the Court may discover any evidence from the
opposite parties related to any matter which is relevant to determine a
particular fact in issue. To put it simply, interrogatories would contain a
list of questions, in the form of questionnaire which is served upon other
party/parties as portrayed in Appendix C to the CPC.
20.
In the case at hand, the plaintiff/respondent would have filed an
application to deliver interrogatories in writing for examination of the
defendants/appellants in the form of questionnaires to furnish reply as to
the date of execution of the transaction transferring the suit property in
favour of DW.3 by way of Gift. But, the plaintiff has not opted to take
recourse of Section 30 of CPC read with Order XI Rule 1 and 2 of CPC,
for the reasons best known to him.
21.
In the light of above position of law, if we try to make an insight to
the evidence of DW.3, then, we may say that the plaintiff could have
easily applied to the Court seeking an order directing the defendants or
even DW.3 to produce the document, that is, the ‗gift deed‘ under which
the transfer of the suit land was effected by the defendant no.2 to DW.3,
which would definitely throw light whether the said Gift deed was
transacted after the institution of the suit to attract the doctrine of lis
pendens.
22.
Keeping in view of all these circumstances, according to me, even
if the decree is passed in this regard, then also that decree will not be
executable because in the context of the case the plaintiff has to seek
recovery of Khas possession of the land from the subsequent purchasers
i.e. Satsang Bihar and it is settled that a decree which is not executable, is
not a decree at all.
23.
Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has further insisted upon
this Court to take on the point that the contents of the document would be
read as it is appeared from the document itself and more particularly,
when the three witnesses to the document had adduced evidence
confirming their signatures and contents written in the document. There
cannot be any disagreement to the said submission of the learned senior
counsel. At the cost of repetition, I re-iterate that on careful scrutiny of
the document as a whole i.e. Exbt.-3, I find serious suspicious
circumstances arising out of the sale deed which have already been
discussed at the preceding paragraphs. There is no rule or law preventing
the Court from scrutinizing and to test the veracity of a document to find
out its genuinity in the process of due administration of justice.
24.
In my opinion, as held by learned trial Court that when
Rs.4,00,000/- out of total consideration money of Rs.4,37,000/- was paid
to the defendant no.1 as security amount, then, under the agreement it was
stipulated that the balance Rs.37,000/- would be paid within 3(three)
years. It appears to the mind of this Court that this is an unnatural event
which a prudent mind cannot perceive. I am at a loss to understand that a
person willing to purchase a land and paying almost the entire amount of
the total consideration amount, why he will wait for long 3(three) years to
pay the balance consideration of Rs.37,000/-(Rupees Thirty Seven
Thousand) only to get sale deed executed and registered.
25.
In the light of the above discussions, I find that the findings arrived
at by the learned first appellate Court is perverse and not tenable in law
and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court is accordingly
confirmed.
The second appeal preferred by the defendant/appellants stands
dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed.
JUDGE
Snigdha
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