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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA No.06 of 2024
1.
Sri Purna Chandra Debnath,
DOB 30.10.1974
S/o Late Amardhan Nath.
2.
Sri Ajit Debnath,
S/o Late Amardhan Nath,
Both are resident of Vill North Deocharra (near Ramnagar
Bazar), P.S. Panisagar, District North Tripura.
……… Principal Defendants/Appellant(s)
–Versus–
1.
Sri Matilal Sinha,
S/o Late Gour Chand Sinha, of North Deocharra, P.S.
Panisagar, Dist North Tripura.
…….. Principal Plaintiff/Respondent(s)
2.
Smt. Surjakala Sinha,
W/o Late Kalicharan Sinha.
3.
Smt. Manashi Sinha,
D/o Late Kalicharan Sinha.
4.
Sri Banobir Sinha,
S/o Late Kalicharan Sinha.
All are resident of Vill North Deocharra (near Ramnagar
Bazar), P.S. Panisagar, Dist North Tripura.
5.
Smt. Manika Sinha,
D/o Late Kalicharan Sinha & W/o Sri Kiran Sinha, of
Patharkandi, Rajargaon, P.S. Patharkandi, Dist. Karimganj
Assam.
6.
Smt. Sabita Sinha,
D/o Late Kalicharan Sinha & W/o Sri Monimay Sinha, Village
West Masauli, P.O. Masauli, P.S. Kumarghat, Dist. Unakoti.
7.
The State of Tripura,
Represented by the D.M. & Collector, Dharmanagar, North
Tripura.
…….. Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. B.N. Majumder, Senior Advocate.
Mr. K. Deb, Advocate.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, Senior Advocate.
Ms. Ankita Pal, Advocate.
Date of hearing &
delivery of judgment :
Whether fit for reporting:
15th July, 2024.
YES
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.D. PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. B.N. Majumder, learned senior counsel
assisted by Mr. K. Deb, learned counsel for the appellants. Also
heard Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel assisted by
Ms. Ankita Pal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent.
[2]
The
plaintiff-respondent
(hereinafter
referred
as
plaintiff) filed Title Suit No.26 of 2017 in the Court of learned Civil
Judge (Senior Division), North Tripura, Dharmanagar against the
present appellants (hereinafter referred as principal defendants)
and other proforma respondents/defendants seeking mandatory
injunction to remove obstruction by the principal defendants from
a path mentioned in schedule ‘B’ of the plaint and also for
perpetual
injunction
restraining
them
and
their
men
from
disturbing the peaceful use and enjoyment of said path by the
plaintiff. It was stated in her plaint that the plaintiff and proforma
defendants have their immovable property of 0.93 acre under
different plot numbers wherein they had been residing after
constructing respective houses and for the purpose of access to
their said homestead land, they were required to use the path as
mentioned in the ‘B’ schedule of the plaint which, according to the
plaintiff, the principal defendants have gradually encroached and
finally made construction in such encroached portion in the year
2014 whereby the access-way of the plaintiff through said path
has been obstructed. Admittedly, said path is recorded in the
name of the Government in the related ROR with classification of
the same as a path. According to the principal defendants, said ‘B’
schedule land actually is not a path and as per the demarcation
report of the Revenue Authority, the defendant No.1 is residing in
the said land with his family members by constructing dwelling
house therein beyond the period of prescriptions and therefore,
the plaintiff was not entitled to get any such relief in respect of ‘B’
schedule land.
[3]
Learned trial court as well as learned First Appellate
Court both granted decree in favour of the plaintiff by issuing
mandatory injunction to remove the obstruction from the said
path coming to the conclusion that it was a public pathway and
therefore, the plaintiff had his independent right to seek such
redresses before the Court.
[4]
It is submitted by Mr. B.N. Majumder, learned senior
counsel for the principal defendants that in the trial court, the
State of Tripura was made party at the instance of the plaintiff but
no notice under Section 80 CPC was served upon the State
rendering the suit not maintainable but both the Courts below lost
sight of the same.
[5]
It is also submitted by Mr. Majumder, learned senior
counsel that before the First Appellate Court, the principal
defendants filed petition for adducing additional evidence for
taking some documents into evidence on their behalf which was
illegally rejected by the learned First Appellate Court.
[6]
Last point on which Mr. Nandi Majumder, learned senior
counsel argues is that the impugned judgment of the trial court
itself reflects that the appointed Survey Commissioner during field
enquiry did not find any road or path existant in ‘B’ schedule land
but ignoring said fact, the learned trial court granted decree in the
suit
which
was
affirmed
by
learned
First
Appellate
Court.
According to Mr. Nandi Majumder, learned senior counsel, all the
above said three points constitute substantial questions of law to
be formulated for admission of the second appeal.
[7]
Mr. Nandi Majumder, learned senior counsel lastly
relies on a decision of Apex Court in the case of State of A.P. and
others vs. Pioneer Builders, A.P., (2006) 12 SCC 119 wherein
considering the factual foundation of that case, it was observed
that Section 80 CPC imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation
upon the court and in absence of compliance with Section 80, the
suit is not maintainable. The Apex Court further observed that the
service of notice under Section 80 is, thus, a condition precedent
for institution of a suit against the Government or a public officer
and the legislative intent of the section is to give the Government
sufficient notice of the suit, which is proposed to be filed against
it, so that it may reconsider the decision and decide for itself
whether the claim made could be accepted or not. Learned senior
counsel, however, admitted that in that case the Government was
not a mere formal party against which no relief was sought for.
[8]
Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel for the
plaintiff has contended that in the instant case, there is no
substantial question of law involved and therefore, the second
appeal
is
not
maintainable
and
cannot
be
admitted.
Mr.
Chakraborty, learned senior counsel further submitted that no
relief was claimed by the plaintiff against the State of Tripura and
as such the State Government was a mere formal party and
therefore, there was no necessity to serve notice under Section 80
CPC to the proforma defendant No.9, the State.
[9]
Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel also relies on a
decision of the then Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench in case of
Sri Ashim Chakraborty vs. Sri Ashok Chakraborty and
others [RSA No.12 of 2009 decided on 18.01.2012] wherein
the Court held that when no relief was sought against Agartala
Municipal Council in relation to the involved cause of action,
therefore, the trial court as well as the First Appellate Court
committed no wrong by entertaining and deciding the issues in
absence of service of notice under Section 271 of the Tripura
Municipal Act, 1994 on the Municipal Authority.
[10]
This
Court
has
given
due
consideration
to
the
submissions of both sides and the materials placed in the record.
[11]
So far the question of non service of notice under
Section 80 CPC is concerned, in the instant case, admittedly, no
relief was sought for against the State of Tripura. It is a private
dispute on Govt. land and allegation is of encroachment of public
pathway by the principal defendants creating obstruction in the
passage of the plaintiff for going out from his house. Section 80
CPC provides that
no
suit
shall
be instituted
against
the
Government or against a public officer in respect of any act
purporting to be done by such public officer in his official
capacity (emphasis laid), until the expiration of two months next
after notice in writing has been served. Here, in the instant suit,
there is no cause of action against the State of Tripura alleged by
the plaintiff in respect of any act purportedly done by any public
officer or any illegal omission in terms of Section 3(2) of General
Clauses Act, 1897, committed by any such officer acting in his
official capacity.
[12]
Gauhati High Court in Gauri Shankar Agarwalla vs.
Madanlal Agarwalla and others, 2010 Legal Eagle (GAU)
557, held that when the plaintiff did not seek any relief against
the State or the Municipality, there is no requirement of issuing
statutory notice upon them. Full Bench of Bombay High Court in
Chandrakant
Govind
Deshmukh
vs.
The
State
of
Maharashtra through Collector Amravati and another, 1966
SCC Online Bom 04, also expressed similar view. Bombay High
Court in that case gained support of
another decision of Privy
Council in case of Revati Mohan vs. Jatindra Mohan, AIR 1934
PC 96.
[13]
This Court also expresses similar view that when there
is no cause of action against the Government or any of its public
officer in relation to any act or illegal omission in terms of Section
3 of General Clauses Act, 1897, purporting to be done or omitted
by any such public officer and when no relief is claimed against
the State or any such officer, there is no requirement to serve
notice under Section 80(1) CPC. This matter therefore does not
require further deliberation.
[14]
Regarding the grievance of the principal defendants, it
is submitted that their petition for adducing evidence was illegally
rejected by the learned First Appellate Court vide order dated
01.04.2023. Copy of said order is also placed on record wherein
descriptions of some documents are found to be given by the
learned First Appellate Court, in respect of which petition for
adducing additional evidence was submitted. On query by this
Court, Mr. Nandi Majumder, learned senior counsel fairly admitted
that there was no reference of any facts in the written statement
of the principal defendants in relation to those documents and no
petition was also submitted by the principal defendants for
amendment of their written statement, before they had pressed
for adducing additional evidence. It is well settled that no evidence
can be permitted to be adduced by any party going beyond the
pleading. The order of First Appellate Court in this regard is also
well discussed. Therefore, said point as raised in this appeal does
not bear much force.
[15]
So far the matter of challenge regarding Survey
Commissioner’s report is concerned, it is also reflected in the
judgment of the learned trial court that the last report of Survey
Commissioner was accepted by both the parties without raising
any objection in this regard. Therefore, neither of the party can
now be permitted to question said document. Even, in this second
appeal also, no specific ground of challenge has been made in the
memo of appeal on this issue. Learned trial court observed that
though the survey commissioner did not find any road in the
practical field (emphasis laid by learned senior counsel Mr. Nandi
Majumder on that portion of the sentence) but the witness
categorically stated that it was a Govt. road and the principal
defendants were possessing the same. Any way, it is purely a
question of re-appreciation of facts and the second appeal cannot
be made bedrock for third court of trial on facts. In Gurdev Kaur
and others vs. Kaki and others, (2007) 1 SCC 546, it has
been categorically observed by the Apex Court that after the 1976
amendment, the scope of Section 100 CPC has been drastically
curtailed and narrowed down and the High Courts would have
jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 CPC only in a case
where substantial questions of law are involved and those
questions are clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal.
[16]
In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan
Gujar and others, (1999) 3 SCC 722, it has also been held by
the Apex Court that the High Court cannot substitute its opinion
for the opinion of the First Appellate Court unless it is found that
the conclusions
drawn by the lower
Appellate Court
were
erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law
applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements
made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible
evidence or arrived at without evidence. In the instant appeal, the
appellants could not satisfy the Court that any such ground exists
in this case to warrant its admission.
[17]
In view of above discussions, this Court does not find
any substantial question of law involved in this second appeal
requiring its admission for final hearing. Consequently, the second
appeal is not admitted.
Registry is to communicate copy of this order to both
learned trial court and learned First Appellate Court.
Appeal is accordingly disposed of.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed
of.
JUDGE
Rudradeep
RUDRADEEP BANERJEE
Date: 2024.07.23 12:11:12 +05'30'
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