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RSA No. 2069 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 2069 OF 2025 (RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI PRAKASH KUMAR
DEAD BY HIS LRS,
Digitally
signed by B
LAVANYA
Location:
HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
1.
SMT.SUNANDA,
W/O LATE.PRAKASH KUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
2.
KUMARI.PRADEEPTHI,
D/O LATE. PRAKASH KUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
3.
KUMARI PRASHASTHI
D/O LATE PRAKASH KUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS,
ALL ARE RESIDENTS OF
JAIN TEMPLE ROAD, CHICKPET,
TUMKUR CITY - 572101.
… APPELLANTS
(BY
SRI.
BHARATH.B.
N.,ADVOCATES)
YADAV
FOR
MS.
NIVEDITHA
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RSA No. 2069 of 2025
HC-KAR
AND:
SMT LEELAVATHI
DEAD BY LR,
SRI.JAYAPRAKASH,
S/O LATE. SRINIVAS SHETTY,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT NO.161,
SRI. RANGANATHA KRUPA,
3RD CROSS, SIDDAGANGA EXTENSION,
TUMKUR-572 102.
… RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.BALAGANGADHARA G.S..,ADVOCATE)
THIS RSA IS FILED U/S 100 OF CPC AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
20.09.2025, PASSED IN RA
NO. 122/2024 ON THE FILE OF THE PRL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE
AND
CJM,
TUMAKURU,
DISMISSING
THE
APPEAL
AND
CONFIRMING THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 15.10.2024
PASSED IN OS NO. 256/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE III
ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, TUMAKURU, TRIAL
COURT DECREED THE SUIT APPELLATE COURT DISMISSED THE
APPEAL THE SUIT FOR EVICTION.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR
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RSA No. 2069 of 2025
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ORAL JUDGMENT
Heard learned counsel for the appellants.
2.
This appeal is filed by the appellants/defendants
questioning the judgment and decree rendered by the
Principal
Senior
Civil
Judge
CJM,
Tumakuru,
in
RA.No.122/2024
dated
20.09.2025,
confirming
the
15.10.2024
in
judgment
and
decree
dated
O.S.No.256/2019 passed by the III Additional Civil Judge
and JMFC, Tumakuru, whereby the appellants, who are
defendants, are directed to quit and deliver the vacant
possession
of
the
suit
schedule
premises
to
the
respondent/plaintiff within 60 days from the date of the
said judgment.
3.
Parties to the proceedings shall be referred to
as per their status before the trial Court as plaintiff and
defendants for the sake of brevity.
4.
The brief facts of the case are as follows.
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The plaintiff filed the suit against the defendants for
ejectment and to quit and deliver the vacant possession of
the suit schedule premises to the plaintiff and also by
paying the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.100/- per
month from 01.12.2014 till its realization. It is the case of
the plaintiff that the suit schedule property originally
belonged to one Smt.Kamalamma, who was in possession
of the same, and subsequently, Smt.Kamalamma sold the
suit schedule property by way of a registered settlement
deed dated 18.03.1991 in favour of Karnataka Chinmai
Seva Trust, Tumakuru, and that prior to the execution of
the
registered
defendants
had
settlement
approached
deed
and
in
the
year
requested
the
1978,
said
Smt.Kamalamma for the property to be given on rent for
residential purposes. Accordingly, it was rented to the
defendants
by
Smt.Kamalamma.
The
suit
schedule
premises was given on rent to the defendants by Smt.
Kamalamma at the rate of Rs.50/- per month by oral
agreement, and the rental amount was paid to Smt.
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Kamalamma
till
the
sale
deed
was
made
and
the
settlement deed was made in favour of the purchaser i.e.
Karnataka Chinmai Seva Trust.
5.
It is further case of the plaintiff that in
pursuance of the said rental agreement, defendants
continued in the suit schedule premises as a tenant and
stopped paying the rent to the trust. Further defendants
became a chronic defaulter on payment of rent. This being
the state of affairs, the said Karnataka Chinmai Seva Trust
executed a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff
on 01.12.2014 for a valuable sale consideration and
delivered the possession of the suit schedule property in
favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff became the absolute
owner of the suit schedule premises.
6.
It is the case of the plaintiff that immediately
after purchase and becoming the owner of the suit
schedule property, the plaintiff contacted the defendants
personally and sought to quit and deliver the vacant
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possession of the suit schedule property. Defendants
requested to continue as a tenant and agreed to pay a
sum of Rs.100/- per month but the same was not paid.
Hence, legal notice was issued to the defendant on
24.01.2015 by way of registered post, which was accepted
and
replied
by
the
defendant.
Reply
notice
dated
03.02.2015 denying the averments and also the ownership
of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property. In view of
the fact that the defendants did not vacate and hand over
the possession, plaintiff was constrained to file a suit for
eviction
and
for
realization
of
the
rental
amount.
Accordingly, a suit came to be filed.
7.
Upon
summons
being
served,
defendants
appeared before the trial Court, filed the written statement
and based on the pleadings, the trial Court framed the
following issues for consideration.
1. Whether the plaintiff proves that, there exist
a relationship of land lord and plaintiff and
defendants?
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2.Whether the plaintiff proves that, the tenancy
of defendants is legally terminated?
3.Whether the
defendants are
01.12.2014?
plaintiff proves that, the
in arrears of rent from
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the reliefs
as sought for?
5. What Order or Decree?
8.
In order to establish and prove the case,
plaintiff examined herself as PW1. Plaintiff during the
course
of
suit
proceedings
died,
and
her
legal
representative was brought on record, and he examined
himself as PW1 and filed the affidavit and marked the
documents as Ex.P1 to Ex.P6. Defendant No.1(a) was
examined herself as DW1 and marked the documents as
Ex.D1 to Ex.D12 and closed the side.
9.
The trial Court, upon hearing the arguments
and taking into consideration the materials placed on
record, both oral and documentary, after consideration of
the issues, did not find favour with the defendants and
consequently agreed with the contentions put forth by the
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plaintiff, decreed the suit of the plaintiff, and directed the
defendants
to
quit,
vacate
and
deliver
the
vacant
possession of the suit schedule premises within 60 days
from the date of the judgment and also directed the
defendants to pay arrears of rent of Rs.100/- along with
interest at the rate of 5% from 01.12.2014 and the
consequential order was passed, but the defendants did
not vacate the suit schedule premises.
10.
Aggrieved
by
the
judgment
and
decree
rendered by the trial Court, the defendants filed an appeal
before the first appellate Court in RA.No.122/2024. Upon
the summons being served to the respondent/plaintiff
therein and upon appearance and after hearing the
arguments, the first appellate Court, after reconsideration
and re-analyzing the entire materials placed on record,
including the impugned judgment of the trial Court and the
submissions
of
learned
counsel
for
both
formulated the following points for consideration.
parties,
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1.
Whether the appellants have make out a
grounds to interfere in the judgment and decree
passed by the trial court in O.S.No.256/2019?
2.
Whether the appellant has made out a
grounds to allow the appeal and set-aside the
judgment and decree passed in O.S.256/2019, dated
15.10.2024 by III Additional Civil Judge and JMFC.,
Tumakuru?
3.
11.
Upon
What order?
reconsideration
and
re-analysing
the
entire materials on record both oral and documentary and
the submissions of learned counsel for the plaintiff and the
defendants, the first appellate Court did not find favour
with the defendants. Nevertheless, having taken into
consideration the contentions put forth and the documents
relied and the judgment of the trial Court, did not agree
with the defendants and consequently dismissed the
appeal and confirmed the judgment rendered by the trial
Court by its order dated 20.09.2025.
12.
It is vehemently contended by the learned
counsel for the appellant that the judgment rendered by
the trial Court and the first appellate Court is perverse,
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arbitrary, illegal, as the trial Court and the first appellate
Court have not considered the materials placed on record
both oral and documentary and no proper application of
mind has been done by both the Courts, totally ignored
the appreciation of the evidence and the contentions with
regard
to
the
affirmative
statement
made
in
the
settlement deed to not transfer the property in favour of
third party without there being any permission obtained
from the relevant authority and not considered all these
aspects and passed the impugned order.
13.
counsel
It is also vehemently contended by learned
for
the
appellant/defendants
that
there
is
absolutely no relationship of landlord and tenant between
the plaintiff and the defendants. The trial Court has
misconstrued itself with regard to the facts and the law on
the point and have rendered
ill legal perverse judgment
which requires to be set aside. It is also contented by
learned counsel for the appellant/defendant that the
defendant has perfected his title by way of adverse
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possession which has also not been considered by the trial
Court and the first appellate Court as pleaded by him in
the written statement, which he seeks is a substantial
question
of
law
to
be
framed
by
this
Court
for
consideration.
14.
It is further contended by learned counsel that
the trial Court and the first appellate Court had failed to
take into consideration Section 109 of the Transfer of
Property Act and also Section 116 of the Evidence Act
which has conveniently been ignored and not taken into
consideration
the
judgment
relied
by
the
appellants/defendants before the trial Court and the first
appellate Court.
15.
Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants
relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the
case
of
Bismillah
Be
(Dead)
by
Legal
representatives V/s Majeed Shah reported in (2017)
2 Supreme Court Cases, 274 in support of his case and
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learned counsel for the appellants/defendants seeks this
Court to frame substantial questions of law as it warrants
for
interference
and
delve
into
the
contention
matter
further
for
consideration.
16.
It
is
of
counsel
for
the
respondent/plaintiff that the appellants/defendants do not
have any right to question the title of the plaintiff over the
suit schedule property as
it is not in dispute that the
appellants were the tenants of the erstwhile owner of the
suit schedule property viz., Smt. Kamalamma and they
were paying
rent to the original owner of the suit
schedule property. It is further contended that the
appellants have also not disputed the property being
transferred to Karnataka Chinmaya Seva Trust. Therefore,
he contends that the appellants have admitted that they
were tenants of the original owner of the suit schedule
property. It is also contended by the learned counsel for
the respondent that the judgments rendered by the trial
Court and the first appellate Court do not call for
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interference for several reasons. He contends that even in
the defence taken by way of filing the written statement,
the appellants/defendants have not denied the ownership
and title of the suit schedule property initially by Smt.
Kamalamma and thereafter by Chinmaya Seva Trust and
subsequently the property being transferred to the plaintiff
by way of a registered sale deed and such being the case,
the question of the appellants/defendants now trying to
dispute the title would not be sustainable both on facts
and law.
17. It is further contended by the learned counsel for
respondent/plaintiff
took
up
a
plea
that the appellants/defendants also
of
adverse
possession
against
the
respondent/plaintiff in the written statement, but however
having not made any counter-claim and having raised a
plea of adverse possession, the defendants have infact
admitted the title and ownership of the suit schedule
property by the plaintiff. It is also contended by the
learned counsel that once such a plea is taken at the initial
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stage in the written statement itself and it is not retracted
or continued even in this appeal by seeking to frame a
substantial
question
of
law
to
the
effect
that
the
defendants have perfected their right by way of adverse
possession, the same runs contrary to the argument
advanced that the defendants denied the ownership and
title of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property. It is
further
contended
by
the
learned
counsel
that
the
defendants are trying to blow hot and cold at the same
time and deliberately trying to protract
the proceedings
and has also not paid a single penny of rent to the plaintiff
till date.
18. It is further contended by the learned counsel
for the respondent/plaintiff
that the judgments relied
upon by the defendants would not support the case of the
defendants
rather
respondent/plaintiff.
they
support
the
case
of
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19. Learned counsel for respondent/plaintiff relies
upon the following judgments in support of his case:
1. Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of
this Court in the case of Silva Uddin -vs- Sri
Nagaraju
in
HRRP
no.557/2003
dated
3rd
September 2004.
2. Judgment passed by the Madhya Pradesh High
Court in the case of Manakchand -vs- Pawan
Kumar (dead) through legal representatives Smt. Manish Goyal & others.
3. Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta -vs Vishvanath
Bhkaji Mogul and others - (1997)5 SCC 329
4. Ambica Prasad
-vs-
Mohd Alam - (2015)13
SCC 13.
20. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants
and learned counsel for respondents, the points that would
arise for consideration in this appeal are:
i)
Whether the appellants/defendants have
made out
any
case
for framing any
substantial question of law ?
ii)
If so, what order ?
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21. It is not in dispute that originally the suit
schedule premises was owned by one Smt. Kamalamma
and during her ownership, defendants have taken the suit
schedule premises on rental basis for residential purpose
from the said owner - Smt. Kamalamma on a monthly rent
of Rs.50/- by way of an oral agreement. Thereafter Smt.
Kamalamma, the original owner executed a registered
settlement deed dated 18.3.1991 in favour of Karnataka
Chinmaya
Seva Trust.
Thereafter, the defendants
continued to remain in possession and occupation of the
suit schedule property on the basis of permission granted
by the Head of the Chinmaya Seva Trust, during which
time the defendants stopped paying the rent to the Trust
and became chronic defaulters.
22. It is also not in dispute that Karnataka Chinmaya
Seva Trust sold the suit schedule property on 01.02.2014
by way of a registered sale deed to the plaintiff herein for
a valuable sale consideration. The plaintiff after becoming
the owner of the suit schedule property, made attempt to
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secure the rent with regard to the suit schedule property
from the defendants, which was refused. Hence, left with
no alternative,
plaintiff got issued legal notice and
ultimately on receiving the reply, filed the suit for eviction
against the defendants. All these aspects are not in
dispute.
23. It is also relevant to mention that plaintiff had in
fact initiated certain proceedings against the original
owner - Smt. Kamalamma and another person seeking the
relief of permanent injunction, wherein the defendants
claimed to be tenants and obtained a decree of permanent
injunction. Upon careful analysation of the materials on
record, both of the trial Court as well as the first appellate
Court, it can be easily concluded that both the Courts have
dealt with the matter elaborately taking into consideration
the contentions putforth by both parties, adjudicated the
same and has arrived at conclusion that the plaintiff has
made out a valid case for grant of a decree and
accordingly decreed the suit against the defendants.
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24. Upon reconsideration, the first appellate Court
having considered the materials once again and after
having a re-look upon the documents and the impugned
judgment of the trial Court, did not find favour with the
appellants/defendants
and
has
rightly
dismissed
the
appeal preferred by the defendants and confirmed the
judgment of the trial Court.
25. I do not find any good ground made out or
muchless any valid ground to admit the appeal by framing
substantial question of law as no such questions of law
exist for consideration in view of both courts adjudicating
and deciding the same in a proper manner.
26.
Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 reads as under.
109. Rights of lessor’s transferee.—If the
lessor transfers the property leased, or any
part thereof, or any part of his interest
therein, the transferee, in the absence of a
contract to the contrary, shall possess all the
rights and, if the lessee so elects, be subject
to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the
property or part transferred so long as he is
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the owner of it; but the lessor shall not, by
reason only of such transfer, cease to be
subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon
him by the lease, unless the lessee elects to
treat the transferee as the person liable to
him:
Provided that the transferee is not entitled
to arrears of rent due before the transfer,
and that, if the lessee, not having reason to
believe that such transfer has been made,
pays rent to the lessor, the lessee shall not
be liable to pay such rent over again to the
transferee.
The lessor, the transferee and the lessee
may determine what proportion of the
premium or rent reserved by the lease is
payable in respect of the part so transferred,
and,
in
case
they
disagree,
such
determination may be made by any Court
having jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the
possession of the property leased.
27. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as
under:
"116. Estoppel of tenants and of licensee
of person in possession. –– No tenant of
immovable property, or person claiming
through such tenant, shall, during the
continuance of the tenancy, be permitted
to deny that the landlord of such tenant
had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a
title to such immovable property; and no
person who came upon any immovable
property by the licence of the person in
possession there of shall be permitted to
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deny that such person had a title to such
possession at the time when such licence
was given."
28. At this stage, it is also relevant to say a few
words
about
the
appellants/tenants.
Once
the
appellants/defendants have admitted their tenancy against
the original owner of the suit schedule property, having
paid the rent, accepted her ownership and title over the
suit schedule property, they cannot turn around and say
that they do not admit the title and ownership of either
the original owner or the subsequent purchaser, who
purchased the suit schedule property from the original
owner by a valid registered deed.
29. The citations relied upon by the learned counsel
for respondent is pertinent to the facts of the present
case.
30. In the case of Silva Uddin -vs- Sri Nagaraju
in HRRP No.557/2003 decided on 3rd September 2004, this
Court observed at paragraph-7 as under:
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7. In view of transfer of ownership of the
premises to the respondent by the previous
lessor, the respondent becomes the lessor and
becomes entitled to receive rent in terms of the
lease by operation of Section 109 of the T.P. Act.
It is relevant to state that in India no attornment
of tenancy is necessary in law as Section 109 of
the T.P. Act creates a statutory attornment. The
section does not insist that transfer of the
lessor's rights can take effect only if the tenant
attorns.
Attornment
by
the
tenant
is
unnecessary to confer validity to the transfer of
the lessor's rights. However, the section protects
payment of rent by the tenant to the transferor
without notice of the transfer. The transfer of
ownership of the premises to the respondent by
the previous lessor has resulted in statutory
attornment by the tenant in favour of the
lessor's transferee i.e. the respondent herein
and consequently jural relationship of landlord
and tenant.
31. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Ambica Prasad -vs- Mohd. Alam and
another reported in (2015) 13 SCC 13
is also fairly
applicable to the present case. In the said judgment, it is
held at paragraph-15 as under:
15. On the question of tenancy, both the trial
court and the High Court have not considered
the provision of Section 109 of the Transfer of
Property Act.
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“109. Rights of lessor's transferee.—
If the lessor transfers the property
leased, or any part thereof, or any part
of his interest therein, the transferee, in
the absence of a contract to the
contrary, shall possess all the rights,
and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to
all the liabilities of the lessor as to the
property or part transferred so long as
he is the owner of it; but the lessor shall
not, by reason only of such transfer
cease to be subject to any of the
liabilities imposed upon him by the
lease, unless the lessee elects to treat
the transferee as the person liable to
him:
Provided that the transferee is not
entitled to arrears of rent due before the
transfer, and that, if the lessee, not
having reason to believe that such
transfer has been made, pays rent to
the lessor, the lessee shall not be liable
to pay such rent over again to the
transferee.
The lessor, the transferee and the
lessee may determine what proportion
of the premium or rent reserved by the
lease is payable in respect of the part so
transferred, and, in case they disagree,
such determination may be made by any
court having jurisdiction to entertain a
suit for the possession of the property
leased.”
From a perusal of the aforesaid section, it
is manifest that after the transfer of
lessor's right in favour of the transferee,
the latter gets all rights and liabilities of
the lessor in respect of subsisting tenancy.
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The section does not insist that transfer
will take effect only when the tenant
attorns. It is well settled that a transferee
of the landlord's rights steps into the
shoes of the landlord with all the rights
and liabilities of the transferor landlord in
respect of the subsisting tenancy. The
section does not require that the transfer
of the right of the landlord can take effect
only if the tenant attorns to him.
Attornment by the tenant is not necessary
to confer validity of the transfer of the
landlord's rights. Since attornment by the
tenant is not required, a notice under
Section 106 in terms of the old terms of
lease by the transferor (sic transferee)
landlord would be proper and so also the
suit for ejectment.
32. At this stage, it is relevant to state that Section
100 of CPC deals with the Scope and
powers of the
Appellate Court. It is a no more res integra to state that
the powers as contemplated under Section 100 CPC are
very narrow and limited. This Court, in several catena of
judgments, has held that the Appellate Court sitting in the
second appeal is not required to appreciate the evidence
on
record
unless
there
is
perversity
shown
in
the
judgments rendered by the trial Court as well as the first
Appellate
Court.
When
two
Courts
have
already
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considered the question of fact and the question of law to
a large extent in detail, even if this Court finds third
opinion on the opinions already expressed concurrently by
both Courts, it is a general Rule that this Court should
refrain from imposing its third opinion merely for the sake
of interference when there is no cogent material placed on
record.
33. The question of framing of substantial questions
of law would depend upon if there is any illegality or
perversity in the judgments rendered by the trial Court as
well as the first appellate Court.
Having considered the
submissions of learned counsels for the parties and having
perused the impugned judgments of both the Courts and
having gone through the records, I do not find any
perversity or illegality in the judgments rendered by both
the Courts.
34. In view of the above discussion, I am of the
opinion that the trial Court as well as the first appellate
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Court have considered all the aspects elaborately, both on
facts and law and have come to a right conclusion by
decreeing the suit of the plaintiff, which does not call for
interference.
Having
heard
the
counsel
for
the
appellants/defendants, I do not find any case made out by
them to frame substantial question of law for further
consideration of the appeal, as none exists. Accordingly, I
pass the following Order.
ORDER
i.
The appeal is dismissed at the stage of
admission itself, as there does not exist
any substantial question of law to be
framed. Ordered accordingly.
ii.
In view of the fact that the learned counsel
for the appellant makes a submission after
dictating the judgment that there is a
marriage ceremony in the house of the
appellant/defendant. He files a memo to
that
effect
along
with
the
marriage
certificate, which is taken on record. He
requests
the
court
for
a
direction
respondent/plaintiff
to
postpone
to
the
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execution and operation of the Judgment
and Decree by three weeks, as it would
cause
irreparable
embrassment
if
injury,
hardship
and
executed
during
the
favourably,
the
marriage period.
iii.
Considering
Executing
the
same
Court and the Decree Holder
shall not precipitate execution proceedings
for three weeks from today.
Sd/(PRADEEP SINGH YERUR)
JUDGE
paras 1 to 15 .. RCK
16 to 33 .. GSS
34 to end .. RCK
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 24
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