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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 7th DAY OF OCTOBER 2026
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE H. T. NARENDRA PRASAD
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO. 772 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
RIEMEN SOLUTION PRIVATE LIMITED,
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF COMPANIES ACT, 2013,
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT FLAT
NO.103, TOWER NO. CS-10,
SUPERTECH CAPETOWN, SECTOR-74,
NOIDA, GAUTAM BUDDHA NAGAR,
UTTAR PRADESH-201301
THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES,
MR. DEEPAK GUPTA & MR. DEEPAK SINHA
(JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY).
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI KAPIL MALIK, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI MANJUNATH C, ADVOCATE)
AND
SWIGGY LIMITED,
A PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
INCORPORATED UNDER THE
COMPANIES ACT, 2013,
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
R
NO.55, SY.NO.8-14, GROUND FLOOR,
I & J BLOCK,, EMBASSY TECH VILLAGE,
OUTER RING ROAD,
DEVARBISANAHALLI,
BENGALURU, KARNATAKA, INDIA 560103,
REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI PRAMOD NAIR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI NIKHIL HEGDE, ADVOCATE )
THIS
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION IS FILED
UNDER SECTION 11(6) OF THE ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION ACT 1996, PRAYING
THAT ADVOCATE
ASHOK ANND (REG.D/1420/1995), OR ANY OTHER
PERSON, AS THE SOLE ARBITRATOR SECTION 11(6) OF
THE
ACT
FOR
ADJUDICATION
OF
THE
DISPUTES
BETWEEN THE PARTIES ARISING OUT OF THE CALL
CENTRE SERVICES AGREEMENT DATED: 09.12.2021,
PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A.
THIS
PETITION,
HAVING
BEEN
HEARD
AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 24.9.2026, COMING ON
FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE
THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD
CAV ORDER
This petition is filed under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”),
seeking
appointment
of
a
sole
Arbitrator
for
adjudication of the disputes that have arisen between
the parties under the Call Centre Services Agreement
dated 09.12.2021 (“the Agreement”), in particular
under Clause 14(viii) thereof, produced at AnnexureA.
FACTS
2. The petitioner is a Private Limited Company
registered under the Companies Act, 2013, and the
respondent is a Public Limited Company within the
meaning of the same Act. The parties entered into the
Agreement on 09.12.2021. Disputes subsequently
arose between them in relation to the Agreement.
3. The petitioner first addressed series of e-mail
to the respondent. Being dissatisfied with the reply,
As there was no reply, the petitioner invoked the
arbitration clause in the Agreement and issued a
notice
dated
02.09.2025
(Annexure-F)
to
respondent under Section 21 of the Act.
the
The
respondent replied to the said notice, rejecting the
proposal to refer the dispute to arbitration.
Being
aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has approached
this Court under Section 11(6) of the Act seeking
appointment of a Sole Arbitrator.
SUBMISSIONS
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the clause has all the essential attributes of an
arbitration agreement.
It expressly employs the
words “arbitration”, “sole arbitrator” and “award”;
provides that the award shall be final and binding on
the
parties;
incorporates
the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Act, 1996; and fixes Bengaluru as the
place of arbitration.
5. It is therefore submitted that the intention of
the parties to arbitrate is manifest from a holistic
reading of the clause, and that an unduly technical
construction ought not to defeat that intention.
6. It is further contended that an arbitration
clause need not be drafted in any particular form, and
that the Court must ascertain the intention of the
parties from the clause read as a whole and also
contended that a pragmatic approach should be taken
for interpretation of arbitration clause. The drafting of
such a clause, in view of the intention demonstrated
otherwise, cannot be taken advantage of by any
party. Reliance is placed on
PRODUCTS
PVT.
LTD.
NAGREEKA INDCON
Vs.
CARGOCARE
LOGISTICS (INDIA) PVT. LTD. (2026 SCC Online
SC 630), particularly paragraphs 5.1, 9.3 and 9.4.
7. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent
submits that the expression “if mutually agreed upon
by the parties” qualifies the very submission of the
dispute to arbitration.
8. It is contended that the parties have not
undertaken an unconditional obligation to arbitrate.
Arbitration would arise only if, after the dispute has
arisen and the period for mutual resolution has
expired without success, both parties mutually agree
to submit the dispute to arbitration.
9. According to the respondent, therefore, the
clause is at best an agreement contemplating the
possibility of a future arbitration agreement, and not a
concluded arbitration agreement as contemplated by
Section 7 of the Act.
NAGREEKA
The respondent also relies on
INDCON
PRODUCTS
PVT.
LTD.
(supra) and on JAGDISH CHANDER vs. RAMESH
CHANDER [(2007) 5 SCC 719].
POINT FOR CONSIDERATION
10. In the light of the rival contentions, the
following point arises for consideration:
“Whether the stipulation that the dispute
shall, ‘if mutually agreed upon by the parties’,
be submitted for arbitration constitutes a valid
and
binding
arbitration
agreement
under
Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996?”
ANALYSIS
11. Section 7 of the Act reads as under:
“7. Arbitration agreement.(1) In this Part, arbitration agreement
means an agreement by the parties to submit
to arbitration all or certain disputes which have
arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not.
(2) An arbitration agreement may be in
the form of an arbitration clause in a contract
or in the form of a separate agreement.
(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in
writing.
(4) An arbitration agreement is in writing
if it is contained in(a) a document signed by the parties;
(b)
telegrams
an
exchange
letters,
telex,
other
means
of
including
communication
or
telecommunication,
of
through electronic means, which provide a
record of the agreement; or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim
and defence in which the existence of the
agreement is alleged by one party and not
denied by the other.
(5) The reference in a contract to a
document
containing
an
arbitration
clause
constitutes an arbitration agreement if the
contract is in writing and the reference is such
as to make that arbitration clause part of the
contract.”
12. Section 7(1) of the Act defines an arbitration
agreement as an agreement by the parties "to submit
to arbitration" all or certain disputes which have arisen
or which may arise between them in respect of a
defined legal relationship.
13. The foundation of an arbitration agreement is
therefore consensus ad idem: a concluded agreement
between the parties that disputes falling within its
scope shall be submitted to arbitration.
14. It is well settled that no particular form of
words is indispensable for constituting an arbitration
agreement. Equally, the mere use of expressions such
as "arbitration", "arbitrator" or "award" is not by itself
sufficient. The contractual provision must disclose a
present and binding intention of the parties to submit
their
disputes
to
arbitration,
and
not
merely
contemplate arbitration as a future possibility.
15. The question is substantially covered by the
decision of the Apex Court in JAGDISH CHANDER
(supra). The relevant portion is extracted below:
“8. This Court had occasion to refer to the
attributes
or
essential
elements
of
an
arbitration agreement in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi
[(1998) 3 SCC 573], Bharat Bhushan Bansal v.
U.P. Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. [(1999) 2
SCC 166] and Bihar State Mineral Development
Corpn. v. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd. [(2003) 7
SCC 418]. In State of Orissa v. Damodar Das
[(1996) 2 SCC 216] this Court held that a
clause in a contract can be construed as an
“arbitration agreement” only if an agreement
to refer disputes or differences to arbitration is
expressly or impliedly spelt out from the
clause. We may at this juncture set out the
well-settled
principles
in
regard
to
what
constitutes an arbitration agreement:
(i) The intention of the parties to enter into
an arbitration agreement shall have to be
gathered from the terms of the agreement. If
the terms of the agreement clearly indicate an
intention on the part of the parties to the
agreement to refer their disputes to a private
tribunal for adjudication and a willingness to be
bound by the decision of such tribunal on such
disputes, it is an arbitration agreement. While
there is no specific form of an arbitration
agreement, the words used should disclose a
determination
and
obligation
to
go
to
arbitration and not merely contemplate the
possibility of going for arbitration. Where there
is merely a possibility of the parties agreeing
to arbitration in future, as contrasted from an
obligation to refer disputes to arbitration, there
is no valid and binding arbitration agreement.
(ii) Even if the words “arbitration” and
“Arbitral Tribunal (or arbitrator)” are not used
with reference to the process of settlement or
with reference to the private tribunal which has
to adjudicate upon the disputes, in a clause
relating to settlement of disputes, it does not
detract from the clause being an arbitration
agreement if it has the attributes or elements
of an arbitration agreement. They are: (a) The
agreement should be in writing. (b) The parties
should have agreed to refer any disputes
(present or future) between them to the
decision of a private tribunal. (c) The private
tribunal should be empowered to adjudicate
upon the disputes in an impartial manner,
giving due opportunity to the parties to put
forth their case before it. (d) The parties
should have agreed that the decision of the
private tribunal in respect of the disputes will
be binding on them.
(iii) Where the clause provides that in the
event of disputes arising between the parties,
the disputes shall be referred to arbitration, it
is an arbitration agreement. Where there is a
specific and direct expression of intent to have
the disputes settled by arbitration, it is not
necessary to set out the attributes of an
arbitration agreement to make it an arbitration
agreement. But where the clauses relating to
settlement of disputes, contains words which
specifically exclude any of the attributes of an
arbitration agreement or contains anything
that detracts from an arbitration agreement, it
will not be an arbitration agreement. For
example, where an agreement requires or
permits an authority to decide a claim or
dispute
without
hearing,
or
requires
the
authority to act in the interests of only one of
the parties, or provides that the decision of the
authority will not be final and binding on the
parties, or that if either party is not satisfied
with the decision of the authority, he may file a
civil suit seeking relief, it cannot be termed as
an arbitration agreement.
(iv) But mere use of the word “arbitration”
or “arbitrator” in a clause will not make it an
arbitration
agreement,
if
it
requires
or
contemplates a further or fresh consent of the
parties
for
reference
to
arbitration.
For
example, use of words such as “parties can, if
they
so
desire,
refer
their
disputes
to
arbitration” or “in the event of any dispute, the
parties may also agree to refer the same to
arbitration” or “if any disputes arise between
the parties, they should consider settlement by
arbitration” in a clause relating to settlement of
disputes,
indicate
intended
to
be
that
an
the
clause
arbitration
is
not
agreement.
Similarly, a clause which states that “if the
parties so decide, the disputes shall be referred
to
arbitration”
or
“any
disputes
between
parties, if they so agree, shall be referred to
arbitration” is not an arbitration agreement.
Such clauses merely indicate a desire or hope
to have the disputes settled by arbitration, or a
tentative arrangement to explore arbitration as
a mode of settlement if and when a dispute
arises. Such clauses require the parties to
arrive
at
a
further
agreement
to
go
to
arbitration, as and when the disputes arise.
Any agreement or clause in an agreement
requiring or contemplating a further consent or
consensus before a reference to arbitration, is
not
an
agreement
arbitration
to
agreement,
enter
into
an
but
an
arbitration
agreement in future.”
16.
The
clause
considered
in
JAGDISH
CHANDER (supra) provided, in substance, that
disputes touching the partnership would be mutually
decided by the partners or would be referred to
arbitration "if the parties so determine".
17. The Apex Court held that the words "if the
parties so determine" completely altered the nature of
the provision, as they required the parties to arrive at
a further decision as to whether the dispute should be
referred to arbitration.
18. The Court consequently held that where a
contractual provision requires or contemplates fresh
consent or consensus before a dispute can be referred
to arbitration, it does not amount to an arbitration
agreement. It is merely an arrangement under which
the parties may enter into an arbitration agreement in
future.
19.
The
principle
flowing
from
JAGDISH
CHANDER (supra) is that the words employed by
the
parties
must
disclose
a
determination
and
obligation to go to arbitration, and not merely a
possibility of doing so.
20. This principle was subsequently reiterated
in MAHANADI COALFIELDS LTD. v. IVRCL AMR
JOINT VENTURE [(2022) 20 SCC 636].
21. The Apex Court, relying upon JAGDISH
CHANDER (supra), the Apex Court reiterated that
the mere use of the word "arbitration" does not create
an
arbitration
agreement
if
the
contractual
arrangement requires the parties to arrive at a further
agreement to proceed to arbitration after the dispute
arises.
22. The existence of a concluded agreement to
arbitrate is therefore indispensable before jurisdiction
under Section 11 can be exercised.
23. More recently, in BGM AND M-RPL-JMCT (JV)
v. EASTERN COALFIELDS LIMITED [2025 INSC
874], the Apex Court once again considered the
principles laid down in JAGDISH CHANDER (supra)
and MAHANADI COALFIELDS (supra).
24. The Apex Court reiterated that a clause
providing that disputes may be referred to arbitration,
or that they shall be referred to arbitration if the
parties subsequently agree, does not constitute an
arbitration agreement within the meaning of Section
7.
25. The decisive consideration remains whether
the
parties
have
already
undertaken
a
binding
obligation to arbitrate or whether a further consensus
is required after the dispute has arisen.
26. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of
NAGREEKA
INDCON
PRODUCTS
PVT.
LTD.
(supra) has held as follows:
“9.
The
sum
and
appellant's
case
is
substance
that
of
the
clause
reproduced (supra) constitutes a binding
arbitration clause. In furtherance of this
position reliance has been placed on various
judgments of this court and also of the High
Court. Let us examine them.
9.1. In BGM and M-RPL-JMCT(JV) v. Eastern
Coalfields Ltd. [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1471] , it
has been observed that section, heading or a
marginal note, can be relied on to clear any
doubt or ambiguity. In that case, interpretation
was regarding a mandatory arbitration clause
but, the dispute was as to upon whom the said
arbitration clause applies. Having regard to the
heading of the section, it was held that the
arbitration clause would apply only to disputes
between
public
sector
enterprises
and
Government departments and would not apply
to any dispute involving a private party. In the
present case, there is no such distinction or
dispute. The heading uses only one word
arbitration but as opposed to the case referred
to (supra), the modal here is “can”, indicating
a choice available to the parties.
9.2. In Babanrao Rajaram Pund v. Samarth
Builders and Developers [(2022) 9 SCC 691;
(2023) 1 SCC (Civ) 481; 2022 SCC OnLine SC
1165] which has been relied upon by the
appellant to submit that a pragmatic approach
should be taken, observes that when an
arbitration agreement, apart from using the
word “arbitration” or “arbitrators” spells out its
clear intention by the use of the word “shall”,
its mandatory nature is clear. It has been also
observed
agreement
that
deficiency
which
of
words
and
otherwise
fortifies
the
intention cannot delegitimize the arbitration
clause. As is obvious, the intention of the
parties is anything but clear in the present
case. This latter aspect will be elucidated with
more clarity in the succeeding paragraphs of
this judgment.
9.3. In Visa International Ltd. v. Continental
Resources (USA) Ltd. [(2009) 2 SCC 55;
(2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 379; 2008 SCC OnLine SC
1802] the dispute resolution clause provided
that any disputes arising between the parties,
if any, shall be settled in accordance with the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act; and did not specifically state as to
whether
the
chosen
method
would
be
arbitration or conciliation. While holding that a
binding arbitration clause did exist, the court
held that one or two words being absent is not
the deciding factor and in fact, it is the whole
clause providing for the settlement of disputes
that are to be seen together to gather the
intention of the parties. There can be no
qualms
with
this
position.
Reading
the
arbitration clause in this case, it can in no way
be said that the intent of the parties is clear.
This is on two counts, one the use of the word
“can” and second, providing for the incomplete
procedure regarding appointment of arbitrators
if at all.
9.4. In Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon
GmbH [(2014) 5 SCC 1; (2014) 3 SCC (Civ)
59; 2014 SCC OnLine SC 129] the question
involved amongst others, not relevant to the
present dispute, was regarding an arbitration
clause being rendered unworkable on account
of the fact that it did not provide for the
manner in which the third arbitrator was to be
appointed. It only provided that each party to
the arbitration would appoint one arbitrator of
their choice. This court observed that the
intent to appoint an arbitrator cannot be
frustrated on account of the fact that the
clause is unworkable. There was no dispute as
to arbitration being the chosen mechanism to
resolve
conflict.
In
the
facts
and
circumstances, it was read into the clause that
the two arbitrators so appointed by each party
would then appoint the third arbitrator. In
doing so, it was observed that the approach
taken to construe an arbitration clause should
not be pedantic but pragmatic. The crucial
distinction with the present facts is that the
intent to arbitrate was clear. It is not the case
before us as one party says that the arbitration
clause is binding and the other does not even
consider the clause to be an arbitration clause
to begin with.
9.5. In Zhejiang Bonly Elevator Guide Rail
Manufacture
Co.
Ltd.
v.
Jade
Elevator
Components [(2018) 9 SCC 774; (2018) 4 SCC
(Civ) 574; 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1503] the
opposing contentions of the parties were that
when the clause for dispute settlement says
arbitration or the court, which one would
prevail. The court here held that an option was
available to the parties and the one who
invoked the dispute settlement process chose
to go for arbitration, as such, with that being
an option available to him, no-fault could be
found with that choice. The word used in the
clause was “should”, which is consistent with
the fact that an option had been provided to
the parties. The facts of this case, as it appears
to us, are in no way similar to the present case
and as such the same would not be of any aid
to the appellant.
9.6. In Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading
Corporation [(2021) 2 SCC 1; (2021) 1 SCC
(Civ) 549; 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1018] the
court observed that when there is a doubt, the
matter be referred to arbitration. It has also
been
observed
that
in
matters
of purely
commercial nature, a liberal approach should
be adopted as a one-stop dispute resolution
process would be favourable. Once again,
these observations are such that no question
can be raised against them. The doubt referred
to here arises in the construction of the
arbitration clause when it is vaguely worded or
the
like.
The
question
of
construction,
however, only arise when the parties are ad
idem as to arbitration. Despite the dispute
before us being purely of a commercial nature,
it is the parties themselves that cannot agree
on arbitration being the chosen medium. When
that is the case, it is not for a court to
compulsorily send such parties before the
jurisdiction that they have not chosen.
10. The appellant's reliance on Panasonic
India P. Ltd. v. Shah Aircon [2022 SCC OnLine
Del 3288] is misplaced for the learned single
judge therein observed that the word “can”
featuring in the subject arbitration clause was
not qua arbitration itself but was in reference
to the ability resting with either party to invoke
arbitration. Here, the situation is different.
11. In light of the above discussion, it is
also to be noted that principles of contractual
interpretation are now well settled. The words
chosen by the parties are the most reliable
manifestation of the intent. The meaning of the
words used in contract is not found in strict
etymological propriety or popular usage of
word(s) as in the subject, occasion or context
in which they are used, within the contractual
realm. The Latin maxim “Ex praecedentibus et
consequentibus
optima
fit
interpretatio”
signifies this statement. (See : Union of India
v. Raman Iron Foundry [(1974) 2 SCC 231;
1974 SCC OnLine SC 95] Provash Chandra
Dalui v. Biswanath Banerjee [1989 Supp (1)
SCC 487]. The written word is, therefore, the
foundation of legal obligation. To disregard or
to impute an obligation or meaning which was
not
intended
would
compromise
taken
due
party
autonomy.
12.
Having
note
of
the
interpretation of the word ‘can’ as also wellestablished
principles
interpretation,
we
now
of
move
contractual
to
consider
whether Clause 25 actually constitutes an
arbitration clause. Sujata Manohar J., in K.K.
Modi (supra) spelt out the requirements of
such a clause in the following terms:
“17. Among the attributes which must be
present for an agreement to be considered
as an arbitration agreement are:
(1) The arbitration agreement must
contemplate that the decision of the
tribunal will be binding on the parties to the
agreement.
(2) That the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
to decide the rights of parties must derive
either from the consent of the parties or
from an order of the court or from a
statute, the terms of which make it clear
that the process is to be an arbitration.
(3) The agreement must contemplate
that substantive rights of parties will be
determined by the agreed Tribunal.
(4) That the Tribunal will determine the
rights of the parties in an impartial and
judicial manner with the tribunal owing an
equal obligation of fairness towards both
sides.
(5) That the agreement of the parties to
refer their disputes to the decision of the
Tribunal
must
be
intended
to
be
enforceable in law and lastly,
(6) The agreement must contemplate
that the Tribunal will make a decision upon
a dispute which is already formulated at the
time when a reference is made to the
tribunal.”
These
requirements
have
been
repeatedly restated. [See: Encon Builders (I)
(P) Ltd (supra) ;Alchemist Hospitals Ltd. v. ICT
Health Technology Services India (P) Ltd.22
and M.P. Rajya Tilhan Utpadak Sahakari Sangh
Maryadit v. Modi Transport Service23]. In
Jagdish Chander (supra), recently followed in
BGM and M-RPL-JMCT(JV) (supra) the Court
set
out
what
constitutes
an
arbitration
agreement. Raveendran J., writing for the
Court,
held
that
the
words
used
in
the
agreement should disclose a determination and
obligation to go for arbitration and not only
provide
for
the
possibility
of
going
to
arbitration. When the word provides only a
possibility, the same does not constitute a
valid arbitration agreement.
13. Turning to the words used in Clause
25, we find it to stipulate to the effect that if
there is any dispute between the parties, they
can settle the same by arbitration. In view of
Jagdish Chander (supra) which holds as under:
“(iv) But mere use of the word
“arbitration” or “arbitrator” in a clause will
not make it an arbitration agreement, if it
requires or contemplates a further or fresh
consent of the parties for reference to
arbitration. For example, use of words such
as “parties can, if they so desire, refer their
disputes to arbitration” or “in the event of
any dispute, the parties may also agree to
refer the same to arbitration” or “if any
disputes arise between the parties, they
should consider settlement by arbitration”
in a clause relating to settlement of
disputes, indicate that the clause is not
intended to be an arbitration agreement.
Similarly, a clause which states that “if the
parties so decide, the disputes shall be
referred to arbitration” or “any disputes
between parties, if they so agree, shall be
referred to arbitration” is not an arbitration
agreement. Such clauses merely indicate a
desire or hope to have the disputes settled
by arbitration, or a tentative arrangement
to explore arbitration as a mode of
settlement if and when a dispute arises.
Such clauses require the parties to arrive at
a further agreement to go to arbitration, as
and when the disputes arise. Any
agreement or clause in an agreement
requiring or contemplating a further
consent or consensus before a reference to
arbitration, is not an arbitration agreement,
but an agreement to enter into an
arbitration agreement in future.”
The clause subject matter of dispute in
this
appeal
indicates
merely
the
future
possibility of referring disputes to arbitration
and as such, it cannot be said to be a binding
arbitration agreement. In other words, the
possibility of arbitration being used to settle
disputes is open however, for the disputes to
be settled by arbitration, further agreement
between the parties would be required and
needless to add, such an agreement can
only come into existence when both parties
agree to the same. In that view of the matter,
we are of the considered view that this appeal
is bereft of merit. It is accordingly dismissed.”
27. The clause considered in that case stated
that any difference of opinion or dispute "can be
settled by arbitration".
28. The Apex Court held that such language
merely indicated the future possibility of referring the
disputes to arbitration, i.e., for arbitration actually to
take place, a further agreement between the parties
was necessary.
29.
The
Court
reiterated
the
principle
in
JAGDISH CHANDER (supra) that an arbitration
clause must disclose a determination and obligation to
go to arbitration, rather than merely provide the
possibility of arbitration.
30.
Significantly,
the
Supreme
Court
emphasized party autonomy and held that where the
parties themselves have not agreed that arbitration
would mandatorily be the chosen mode of dispute
resolution, it is not open for the Court to compel them
to submit to a jurisdiction which they have not
chosen.
31. The Court further held that the written words
employed by the contracting parties are the most
reliable manifestation of their intention, and that an
obligation which the parties did not undertake cannot
be imputed to them in the guise of interpretation.
32. The relevant Clause of the Agreement herein
reads thus:
“In the event of any dispute arising
between the parties touching the meaning and
construction
of
the
covenants
under
this
Agreement or any claim or controversy arising
out of this Agreement, the parties shall be
mutually resolved and if the same is not
resolved within 30 days from the date of
receipt by one party of a written notice from
the other party of the existence of the dispute,
then the matter shall, if mutually agreed upon
by the parties be submitted for arbitration in
accordance
with
the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Act, 1996 before the sole arbitrator
appointed mutually by the parties hereto. The
award passed by the Arbitrator shall be final
and binding upon the parties hereto. The
construction
and
interpretation
of
this
Agreement and any award passed in pursuance
of
the
Arbitration
proceedings
shall
be
governed by the laws of India, without regard
to its conflicts of law to give effectual discharge
of
the
arbitral
proceedings
shall
award.
All
arbitration
be
at
Bangalore,
held
Karnataka, India in English language.”
33.
The
Agreement
further
provides
that
disputes arising out of such arbitration shall be subject
to the jurisdiction of the Courts at Bengaluru, India.
34. It is evident from the above clause that the
parties first contemplated an attempt at mutual
resolution of their disputes.
If the dispute remained
unresolved for thirty days after receipt of written
notice, the next stage stipulated by the Agreement is
that:
“the matter shall, if mutually agreed upon by the
parties be submitted for arbitration…”
35. The legal effect of the words “if mutually
agreed upon by the parties” assumes significance in
determining whether the clause itself constitutes a
presently binding arbitration agreement, or whether it
merely contemplates the possibility of the parties
entering into an agreement to arbitrate after a dispute
has arisen.
36. Applying the above principles to the clause at
hand, the words:
"the matter shall, if mutually agreed upon by the
Parties be submitted for arbitration"
cannot be ignored or rendered otiose.
37. Had the clause merely stated "the matter
shall be submitted for arbitration", there could have
been
little
difficulty
in
holding
that
a
binding
arbitration agreement existed.
38. However, the parties consciously inserted
the qualifying expression "if mutually agreed upon by
the Parties".
39. The qualification occurs between the words
"shall" and "be submitted for arbitration". Therefore,
grammatically
as
well
as
contextually,
the
requirement of mutual agreement attaches to the very
submission of the dispute to arbitration.
40. In other words, the clause does not provide
that "the dispute shall be submitted to arbitration and
the Arbitrator shall be mutually appointed".
41.
Had
that
been
the
formulation,
the
requirement of mutual consent could reasonably have
been construed as relating only to the appointment
procedure.
42. Instead, the present clause makes the
submission
itself
conditional
upon
the
words
"if
mutually agreed upon by the Parties".
43. The Court can neither delete these words
from the Agreement, nor rewrite the bargain between
the parties by converting a conditional reference to
arbitration into an unconditional one.
44. The position therefore falls squarely within
the principle laid down in JAGDISH CHANDER
(supra) and subsequently reiterated in MAHANADI
COALFIELDS (supra) BGM AND M-RPL-JMCT (JV)
(supra) and NAGREEKA INDCON PRODUCTS PVT.
LTD. (supra).
45. It is true that the latter portion of the clause
provides for:
(a) arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996;
(b) a sole Arbitrator;
(c) mutual appointment of such Arbitrator;
(d) the final and binding nature of the award;
(e) the applicability of Indian law;
(f) Bengaluru, Karnataka, India as the place of
arbitration; and
(g) English as the language of the arbitral
proceedings.
46. These stipulations undoubtedly demonstrate
that the parties had contemplated the procedural
framework which would govern an arbitration if they
subsequently agreed mutually to submit their dispute
to arbitration.
47. However, these provisions cannot override
the antecedent condition expressly imposed by the
parties regarding the very submission of the dispute
to arbitration.
48. There is a material distinction between
agreeing presently and unconditionally to arbitrate,
while leaving the appointment of the Arbitrator to
future mutual consent; and agreeing that the dispute
itself would be submitted to arbitration only if the
parties mutually agree to do so in future.
49. The present Agreement falls within the
second category.
50. The decision in BABANRAO (supra) does
not alter the above conclusion.
51. In BABANRAO (supra), the contractual
provision manifested a clear intention that disputes
were to be referred to arbitration. The controversy
concerned whether certain deficiencies in drafting,
including
the
absence
of
particular
terminology
regarding the binding nature of the decision, defeated
the arbitration agreement.
52. The Apex Court held that Section 7 does not
prescribe a particular form, and that a deficiency of
words should not defeat a clause which otherwise
manifests a clear intention to arbitrate.
53. The present case does not concern a mere
deficiency or imperfect drafting. The clause contains
an
express
substantive
qualification
making
submission to arbitration dependent upon further
mutual agreement.
54. Giving effect to those words is not adopting a
pedantic construction. It is giving effect to the bargain
actually recorded by the parties.
55. It is equally true that the jurisdiction of the
referral Court under Section 11 is confined to a prima
facie examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement, and that ordinarily disputed questions
falling within the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal
are ordinarily to be left open.
56. However, the limited nature of the enquiry
under
Section
foundational
does
not
requirement
dispense
that
an
with
the
arbitration
agreement must exist.
57. The distinction between deciding the merits
of a dispute and determining whether the parties ever
entered
into
maintained.
an
arbitration
agreement
must
be
58. In the present case, no elaborate evidentiary
enquiry is necessary. The issue emerges from the
language of the contractual provision itself.
59. The recent decision in NAGREEKA INDCON
PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. (supra) also makes it clear
that the limited jurisdiction of a referral Court cannot
be used to compel a party to undergo arbitration
where the contractual clause does not disclose a
binding agreement to arbitrate.
CONCLUSION
60. On a plain and holistic reading of the clause,
this Court is of the considered view that the parties
contemplated two distinct stages.
(i) First, disputes were to be mutually resolved
within thirty days of receipt of written notice.
(ii) Secondly, upon failure of such resolution,
arbitration could follow only "if mutually agreed upon
by the Parties".
61. Thus, failure of the first stage did not
automatically trigger arbitration. A further consensus
between the parties was expressly contemplated as a
condition precedent to the submission of the dispute
to arbitration.
62. There being no material to establish such
subsequent
mutual
agreement,
the
unilateral
invocation of the clause by the petitioner cannot
transform the conditional provision into a binding
arbitration agreement.
63. The fact that the Agreement specifies the
procedure, seat/place, language, governing law and
binding nature of a possible arbitral award does not
eliminate
the
agreement
for
arbitration.
express
requirement
submission
of
the
of
mutual
dispute
to
64. Consequently, this Court holds that the
clause in question does not constitute a presently
binding arbitration agreement within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
65. In the absence of an arbitration agreement,
the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 11 of the
Act cannot be invoked for the appointment of an
Arbitrator.
66. The point formulated for consideration is
accordingly answered in the NEGATIVE.
ORDER
The Civil Miscellaneous Petition filed under
Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 is dismissed.
Sd/(H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD)
JUDGE
CM
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