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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
B.A.No.70 of 2024
Sri Mantosh Ranjan Biswas,
son of Late Monoranjan Biswas,
resident of Office Lane, P.O.HPO,
P.S. West Agartala, District-West Tripura,
Pin-799001
----Petitioner(s)
For and on behalf of :
Rabin Biswas,
son of Sri Mantosh Ranjan Biswas,
resident of Office Lane, P.O.HPO,
P.S. West Agartala, District-West Tripura,
Pin-799001
----Applicant(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura
----Respondent(s)
_________________________________________________________
For Applicant(s)
:
Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Sreekanta Bal, Adv.
Mr. E.L. Darlong, Adv.
Mr. Jyotishmay Das, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.
Mr. S. Ghosh, Addl. P.P.
_________________________________________________________
[---
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
18/11/2024
This application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. is filed for releasing
of the accused in custody namely Sri Rabin Biswas who is lodging in jail in
connection with GRPS Case No.07/2022 under Section 21(c)/29 of NDPS Act.
Heard Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, Learned senior counsel assisted by
Mr. Sreekanta Bal, Learned counsel, Mr. E.L. Darlong, Learned counsel, Mr.
Jyotishmay Das, Learned counsel appearing for the accused in custody and
(2)
also heard Mr. Raju Datta, Learned P.P. assisted by Mr. S. Ghosh, Learned
Addl. P.P. appearing for the State-respondent.
Taking part in the hearing, Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, Learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the accused in custody drawn the attention of
the Court that the accused was arrested by the police in connection with the
aforesaid case on 19.03.2024 and since then, he is lodging in jail. Learned
senior counsel further submitted that the statutory period of detention was
over on 15.09.2024 but the investigating agency filed a petition under Section
36A(4) of NDPS Act for extending the period of detention, despite non-filing of
charge sheet within the statutory period on 13.09.2024. But on that day, no
order was passed in absence of regular presiding officer and thereafter, by
order dated 18.09.2024 the concerned Learned Special Judge by the said order
allowed the prayer of the prosecution beyond the statutory period in view of
the provision provided under Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act without any
jurisdiction as the prayer of the prosecution order was not a “report” as
required by law.
Learned senior counsel further submitted that he sought default
bail within time on 15.09.2024 for failing to submit charge sheet by the IO and
he also referred the copy of receipt sent through courier. Learned senior
counsel also submitted that on 13.09.2024, all though Learned Addl. P.P.
submitted prayer for extending the period under Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act
and on that day the IO also submitted a similar prayer before the Court and
the subject matter of both the petitions were almost same. Learned senior
counsel also submitted that the petition filed by the prosecution appears to be
non-application of mind beyond the principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court. He also drawn the attention of the Court the aforesaid provision of
the NDPS Act and in support of his contention Learned senior counsel drawn
the attention of the Court of para No.23 of the citation of Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others versus State of
(3)
Maharashtra and Others reported in 1994 4 SCC 602 wherein the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the said para observed as under :
“23. We may at this stage, also on a plain reading of clause (bb)
of sub-section (4) of Section 20, point out that the Legislature
has provided for seeking extension of time for completion of
investigation on a report of the public prosecutor. The
Legislature did not purposely leave it to an investigating officer
to make an application for seeking extension of time from the
court. This provision is in tune with the legislative intent to have
the investigations completed expeditiously and not to allow an
accused to be kept in continued detention during unnecessary
prolonged investigation at the whims of the police. The
Legislature expects that the investigation must be completed
with utmost promptitude but where it becomes necessary to
seek some more time for completion of the investigation, the
investigating agency must submit itself to the scrutiny of the
public prosecutor in the first instance and satisfy him about the
progress of the investigation and furnish reasons for seeking
further custody of an accused. A public prosecutor is an
important officer of the State Government and is appointed by
the State under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not a part
of the investigating agency. He is an independent statutory
authority. The public prosecutor is expected to independently
apply his mind to the request of the investigating agency before
Submitting a report to the court for extension of time with a
view to enable the investigating agency to complete the
investigation. He is not merely a post office or a forwarding
agency. A public prosecutor may or may not agree with the
reasons given by the investigating officer for seeking extension
of time and may find that the investigation had not progressed in
the proper manner or that there has been unnecessary,
deliberate or avoidable delay in completing the investigation. In
that event, he may not submit any report to the court under
clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus, for seeking
extension of time under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after
an independent application of his mind to the request of the
investigating agency is required to make a report to the
Designated Court indicating therein the progress of the
investigation and disclosing justification for keeping the accused
in further custody to enable the investigating agency to complete
the investigation. The public prosecutor may attach the request
of the investigating officer along with his request or application
and report, but his report, as envisaged under clause (bb), must
disclose on the face of it that he has applied his mind and was
satisfied with the progress of the investigation and considered
grant of further time to complete the investigation necessary.
The use of the expression "on the report of the public prosecutor
indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific
reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period"
as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-section (2) of Section 167 as
amended by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of the
legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody unreasonably
and to grant extension only on the report of the public
prosecutor. The report of the public prosecutor, therefore, is not
merely a formality but a very vital report, because the
consequence of its acceptance affects the liberty of an accused
and it must, therefore, strictly comply with the requirements as
contained in clause (bb). The request of an investigating officer
for extension of time is no substitute for the report of the public
prosecutor. Where either no report as is envisaged by clause
(bb) is filed or the report filed by the public prosecutor is not
accepted by the Designated Court, since the grant of extension
of time under clause (bb) is neither a formality nor automatic,
the necessary corollary would be that an accused would be
entitled to seek bail and the court 'shall' release hi on bail if he
furnishes bail as required by the Designated Court. It is not
merely the question of form in which the request for extension
under clause (bb) is made but one of substance. The contents of
(4)
the report to be submitted by the public prosecutor, after proper
application of his mind, are designed to assist the Designated
Court to independently decide whether or not extension should
be granted in a given case. Keeping in view the consequences of
the grant of extension i.e. keeping an accused in further custody,
the Designated Court must be satisfied for the Justification, from
the report of the public prosecutor, to grant extension of time to
complete the investigation. Where the Designated Court declines
to grant such an extension, the right to be released on bail on
account of the 'default' of the prosecution becomes indefeasible
and cannot be defeated by reasons other than those
contemplated by sub-section (4) of Section 20 as discussed in
the earlier part of this judgment. We are unable to agree with Mr
Madhava Reddy or the Additional Solicitor General Mr Tulsi that
even if the public prosecutor 'presents' the request of the
investigating officer to the court or 'forwards' the request of the
investigating officer to the court, it should be construed to be the
report of the public prosecutor. There is no scope for such a
construction when we are dealing with the liberty of a citizen.
The courts are expected to zealously safeguard his liberty.
Clause (bb) has to be read and interpreted on its plain language
without addition or substitution of any expression in it. We have
already dealt with the importance of the report of the public
prosecutor and emphasised that he is neither a 'post office' of
the investigating agency nor its 'forwarding agency' but is
charged with a statutory duty. He must apply his mind to the
facts and circumstances of the case and his report must disclose
on the face of it that he had applied his mind to the twin
conditions contained in clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section
20. Since the law requires him to submit the report as envisaged
by the section, he must act in the manner as provided by the
section and in no other manner. A Designated Court which
overlooks and ignores the requirements of a valid report falls in
the performance of one of its essential duties and renders its
order under clause (bb) vulnerable. Whether the public
prosecutor labels his report as a report or as an application for
extension, would not be of much consequence so long as it
demonstrates on the face of it that he has applied his mind and
is satisfied with the progress of the investigation and the
genuineness of the reasons for grant of extension to keep an
accused in further custody as envisaged by clause (bb) (supra).
Even the mere reproduction of the application or request of the
investigating officer by the public prosecutor in his report,
without demonstration of the application of his mind and
recording his own satisfaction, would not render his report as
the one envisaged by clause (bb) and it would not be a proper
report to seek extension of time. In the absence of an
appropriate report the Designated Court would have no
jurisdiction to deny to an accused his Indefeasible right to be
released on bail on account of the default of the prosecution to
file the challan within the prescribed time if an accused seeks
and is prepared to furnish the bail bonds as directed by the
court. Moreover, no extension can be granted to keep an accused
in custody beyond the prescribed period except to enable the
investigation to be completed and as already stated before any
extension is granted under clause (bb), the accused must be put
on notice and permitted to have his say so as to be able to object
to the grant of extension.”
He further drawn the attention of this Court referring another
citation in Sanjay Kumar Kedia alias Sanjay Kedia versus Intelligence
Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau and Another reported in 2009 17 SCC
(5)
631 wherein para Nos.12, 15 & 16 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as
under :
“12. The maximum period of 90 days fixed under Section 167 (2)
of the Code has been increased to 180 days for several
categories of offences under the Act but the proviso authorizes a
yet further period of detention which may in total go upto one
year, provided the stringent conditions provided therein are
satisfied and are complied with. The conditions provided are:
(1) a report of the public prosecutor,
(2) which indicates the progress of the investigation, and
(3) specifies the compelling reasons for seeking the detention of
the accused beyond the period of 180 days, and
(4) after notice to the accused.
15. Mr. Lalit, has further contended that the two applications for
extension of time could not, by any stretch of imagination, be
said to be reports of the public prosecutor as envisaged
under Section 36A (4) and has again referred us to the case
ibidem: Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra reported
in (1994) 4 SCC 602
“23. …….A public prosecutor is an important officer
of the State Government and is appointed by the
State under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He is
not a part of the investigating agency. He is an
independent
statutory
authority.
The
public
prosecutor is expected to independently apply his
mind to the request of the investigating agency
before submitting a report to the court for extension
of time with a view to enable the investigating
agency to complete the investigation. He is not
merely a post office or a forwarding agency. A public
prosecutor may or may not agree with the reasons
given by the investigating officer for seeking
extension of time and may find that the
investigation had not progressed in the proper
manner or that there has been unnecessary,
deliberate or avoidable delay in completing the
investigation. In that event, he may not submit any
report to the court under clause (bb) to seek
extension of time. Thus, for seeking extension of
time under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after
an independent application of his mind to the
request of the investigating agency is required to
make a report to the Designated Court indicating
therein the progress of the investigation and
disclosing justification for keeping the accused in
further custody to enable the investigating agency
to complete the investigation. The public prosecutor
may attach the request of the investigating officer
along with this request or application and report,
but his report, as envisaged under clause (bb), must
disclose on the face of it that he has applied his
mind and was satisfied with the progress of the
investigation and considered grant of further time to
complete the investigation necessary. The use of the
expression "on the report of the public prosecutor
indicating the progress of the investigation and the
specific reasons for the detention of the accused
beyond the said period" as occurring in clause (bb)
in sub- section (2) of Section 167 as amended
by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of the
legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody
unreasonably and to grant extension only on the
report of the public prosecutor. The report of the
public prosecutor, therefore, is not merely a
formality but a very vital report, because the
(6)
consequence of its acceptance affects the liberty of
an accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply
with the requirements as contained in clause (bb).
The request of an investigating officer for extension
of time is no substitute for the report of the public
prosecutor.
16. The court further went on to say that even if the application
for extension of time was either rooted through the public
prosecutor or supported by him would not make the said
application a report of the public prosecutor. Mr. Bhattacharjee
has, however, pointed out that the applications for extension
filed by the public prosecutor Section 36A (4) of the Act did
satisfy the aforesaid conditions and merely because an
independent report had not been tendered would not change the
nature of the application.”
Learned senior counsel also referred other citations of the Hon’ble
Punjab & Harayana High Court in Parmod Kumar versus State of Haryana
dated 16.01.2024 and Ravinder @ Bhola versus State of Haryana dated
03.11.2023 and another order dated 29.02.2020 delivered by this High Court
in connection with Case No.B.A.20/20 [Subhadra Debbarma on behalf of
Accd. Rupan Miah versus State of Tripura].
Referring the aforesaid principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court and other High Courts Learned senior counsel finally submitted that
the prayer of the prosecution was nothing but a mechanical petition contrary to
the provision of Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act. So, Learned senior counsel lastly
submitted that since the accused is lodging in jail for a period of almost eight
months so considering the facts and circumstances of the case, he may be
released on bail in any condition.
On the other hand, Mr. Raju Datta, Learned P.P. appearing on
behalf of the State-respondent strongly opposed the bail application submitted
by the accused in custody and submitted that as referred by Learned senior
counsel the charge sheet is submitted by the IO. However, prior to the
statutory period the prosecution has submitted application for extension of
period of detention beyond the statutory period which was within time and by
order dated 18.09.2024 the Learned Special Judge has allowed the said
application of the prosecution and also rejected the bail application of the
accused. So, considering the materials on record at this stage there is no scope
to release the accused on bail as alleged by the accused in custody. Learned
(7)
P.P. also relied upon two citations of the Hon’ble Apex Court of India. In M.
Ravindran
versus
Intelligence
Officer,
Directorate
of
Revenue
Intelligence reported in (2021) 2 SCC 485 the Hon’ble Apex Court in para
Nos.20 & 20.1 has observed as under :
“20. There also appears to be some controversy on account of
the opinion expressed in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur versus State of
Maharashtra : (1994) 4 SCC 602 that the Public Prosecutor may
resist grant of default bail by filing a report seeking extension of
time for investigation. The Court held that:
“30…It is, however, permissible for the public
prosecutor to resist the grant of bail by seeking
an extension under clause (bb) by filing a report
for the purpose before the court. However, no
extension shall be granted by the court without
notice to an accused to have his say regarding the
prayer for grant of extension under clause (bb).
In this view of the matter, it is immaterial
whether the application for bail on ground of
„default‟ under Section 20(4) is filed first or the
report as envisaged by clause (bb) is filed by the
public prosecutor first so long as both are
considered while granting or refusing bail. If the
period prescribed by clause (b) of Section
20(4) has expired and the court does not grant an
extension on the report of the public prosecutor
made under clause (bb), the court shall release
the accused on bail as it would be an indefeasible
right of the accused to be so released. Even
where the court grants an extension under clause
(bb) but the chargesheet is not filed within the
extended period, the court shall have no option
but to release the accused on bail if he seeks it
and is prepared to furnish the bail as directed by
the court...”
(emphasis supplied)
This was affirmed by the Constitution Bench in Sanjay
Dutt versus State : (1994) 5 SCC 410, wherein it was held that
the grant of default bail is subject to refusal of the prayer for
extension of time, if such a prayer is made. This seems to have
given rise to the misconception that Sanjay Dutt (supra)
endorses the view that the prosecution may seek extension of
time (as provided for under the relevant special statute) for
completing the investigation or file a final report at any time
before the accused is released on bail, notwithstanding the fact
that a bail application on ground of default has already been
filed.
20.1 The observations made in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra)
and Sanjay Dutt (supra) to the effect that the application for
default bail and any application for extension of time made by
the Public Prosecutor must be considered together are, in our
opinion, only applicable in situations where the Public
Prosecutor files a report seeking extension of time prior to the
filing of the application for default bail by the accused. In such a
situation, notwithstanding the fact that the period for completion
of investigation has expired, both applications would have to be
considered together. However, where the accused has already
applied for default bail, the Prosecutor cannot defeat the
enforcement of his indefeasible right by subsequently filing a
final report, additional complaint or report seeking extension of
time.”
(8)
Learned P.P. further referred another citation of High Court of
Calcutta in Subhas Yadav versus State of West Bengal reported in 2023
SCC OnLine Cal 313 wherein para No.31 the said High Court observed as
under :
31. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the issues are answered
as follows:“1. Right of an accused to statutory bail upon expiry of the
period of detention prescribed under section 36A(4) of NDPS Act
is an inchoate one till he avails of his right by seeking statutory
bail either by way of an application or even orally. Hence, he
cannot be released automatically on statutory bail on the mere
expiry of 180 days even if the prosecutor has failed to submit
report seeking extension of detention in terms of the proviso to
section 36A(4) of the Act before expiry of the said period;
2. Order extending the period of detention under proviso to
section 36A(4) of NDPS Act on a report of the Public Prosecutor
submitted after expiry of 180 days but prior to the accused
availing of his right does not envisage retrospective operation
but the total period of detention under the aforesaid provision
cannot exceed one year in the whole;
3. As per Para 25.3 of M. Ravindran (supra) the right to statutory
bail stands extinguished once the report of the Public Prosecutor
seeking extension is filed. Hence, remand of the accused till the
prayer of the prosecutor is disposed of is traceable to section
167 (2) Cr. P.C. read with section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act. In the
event, the application for extension is dismissed or an order
extending detention is set aside by a superior court right to
statutory bail revives in favour of the accused;
4. Upon expiry of 180 days of detention, Special Court as a
cautionary measure ought to inform the accused (particularly if
he is from an underprivileged section of society and is
unrepresented by a counsel) of his right to statutory bail.
However, failure to intimate the accused of his right by itself
would not entitle him to statutory bail unless he avails of such
relief;
5. Prayer for extension of period of detention must be on the
basis of a report of Public Prosecutor which must record
progress of investigation and spell out specific reasons to justify
further detention beyond 180 days pending investigation;
6. Special Court on the basis of the report of Public Prosecutor
and materials in support of such plea must be satisfied of the
twin requirements, l.e., (a) there is appreciable progress in the
investigation and (b) there are specific/compelling reasons to
justify further detention pending investigation. Each case has to
be decided on its own merits. For example, failure to complete
investigation solely on the score of non-submission of FSL report
of the samples drawn from the contraband is an institutional
shortcoming. This by itself may not justify further detention
pending completion of investigation. But if the aforesaid fact
situation is coupled with compelling circumstances like
complexities in investigation in an organized crime racket or
inter- state/trans-border trafficking, criminal antecedents of the
accused giving rise to possibility of recidivism, abscondence of
co-accused, etc., constituting 'specific reasons' justifying further
detention, the Court may be inclined to extend the period of
detention and deny liberty;
7. Prayer for extension of period of detention must be decided at
the earliest without undue delay preferably within 7 days from
(9)
making such application. Reasons for adjournment must be
specifically stated;
8. No written notice or copy of report of Public Prosecutor
requires to be served upon the accused or his counsel but the
accused or his counsel must be present personally or through
video linkage at the time of consideration of the application.
Accused and/or his counsel must be aware of such consideration
and may raise objection, if any, with regard to compliance of
mandatory requirements of law.”
Referring the aforesaid citations Learned P.P. submits that
considering the materials on record at this stage there is no scope to release
the accused on bail as the allegation against the accused in custody is serious
in nature and there is evidence of possessing contraband items of commercial
quantity. So, he urged for dismissal/rejection of the bail application.
Considered.
I have heard detailed arguments of both the sides and perused
the relevant prosecution papers. In this case, the prosecution was set into
motion on the basis of an FIR laid by Inspector Rajib Saha, Inspector of Police
(Anti Narcotics), Tripura Police Crime Branch, to O/C Agartala GRPS Agartala,
West Tripura alleging inter alia that on 25.04.2022 they received a secret
information that huge quantity of codeine based cough syrup was being
transported
from
Kolkata
to
Agartala
through
Sealdah
to
Agartala
Kanchanjangha Express in the parcel Vans and the bottles of cough syrup were
concealed in cartons of different Rexin bags and jute bags. Accordingly, the
matter was brought to the knowledge of higher authority and on receipt of
permission, they formed a team comprising of the officers and man of anti
narcotic units and after sharing the information with O/C GRPS and entered the
same in Agartala GRPS GD entry No.22 dated 25.04.2022 at about 1635 hrs.
they conducted search in Sealdah Agartala Kanchanjangha Express following
the formalities in presence of Chief Commercial Inspector of parcel bag and in
course of search they could recover and seized huge numbers of escuf syrup
which were ultimately seized by him as per procedure and hence he laid the
FIR and the case was registered and in course of investigation, the present
(10)
accused was arrested and produced before the Court on 19.03.2024 and since
then he is lodging in custody.
I have also seen the prayer of the prosecution dated 13.09.2024
submitted to the Learned Court below and also the prayer of the IO submitted
to the Court under Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act on that date and that petition
was taken up for hearing and order by the Learned Special Judge on
18.09.2024. By the said order Learned Special Judge, Court No.2, West
Tripura, Agartala also allowed the prayer of the prosecution for extension of
the period beyond 180 days. For the sake of convenience I would like to refer
herein below the relevant provision of Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act which
provides as under :
Section 36A(4) in The
Substances Act, 1985
Narcotic
Drugs
And
Psychotropic
(4)In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under
section 19 or section 24 or section 27A or for offences involving
commercial quantity the references in sub-section (2) of section
167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), thereof
to "ninety days", where they occur, shall be construed as
reference to "one hundred and eighty days":
Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the
investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty
days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one
year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the
progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the
detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred
and eighty days.”
We have already received the LCR and from the LCR it appears
that by this time the IO has submitted charge sheet against this present
accused and Others and accordingly, on 18.11.2024 necessary order is passed
and cognizance of offence punishable under Section 21C/29 of the NDPS Act
was
taken by the Learned Special Judge against the accused person in
custody and others. From the relevant prosecution papers and also from the
principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above cases and
also from the prayer submitted by Learned Addl. P.P. on behalf of the
prosecution at this stage I do not find any infirmity in the said “report” of the
prosecution, as such I do not find any material to consider the bail application
of the accused in custody since there is direct allegation against the accused in
(11)
custody showing his involvement with the alleged offence. So, the bail
application filed on behalf of the accused person in custody stands rejected
being devoid of merit. The accused shall remain in jail custody as before.
Learned Court below shall take all steps to dispose of this case given top
priority since the accused persons are lodging in jail. It is ordered that Learned
P.P. shall take up the matter with all the PP’s and Addl. P.P.’s who are posted
at different Courts across the State to ensure that whenever any situation
arises to file any application under Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act for extension of
period beyond the statutory period of detention of any accused in custody, in
that case, at the time of submission of application/report , all the concerned
PP’s and Addl. PP’s shall file their application strictly in accordance with the
provisions contained in the law as mentioned above.
Returned back the CD to IO through Learned PP along with a copy
of this order for information and compliance.
Send back the LCR along with a copy of this order.
With this observation, the bail application stands disposed of.
JUDGE
signed by
SABYASACHI Digitally
SABYASACHI
BHATTACHARJ BHATTACHARJEE
Date: 2024.11.19 13:41:38
EE
+05'30'
Sabyasachi B
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