Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
-1HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:49624-DB
WA No. 2006 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010817932025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT APPEAL NO.2006 OF 2025 (SCST)
BETWEEN:
SRI LOKESH NAIKA
S/O LATE SRI BHAVA NAIKA
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
R/O KADARANAHALLI VILLAGE,
CHANNAGIRI TALUK,
DAVANAGERE DISTRICT.
…APPELLANT
(BY SRI. N.S. BHAT, ADVOCATE)
AND:
MAHALAKSHMI B M
Location: High Court
of Karnataka
1.
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
DAVANAGERE DISTRICT,
DAVANAGERE-577002.
2.
THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
DAVANAGERE SUB DIVISION,
DAVANAGERE-577002.
3.
SRI RAMU .B
S/O LATE SRI B.N. MUCHAL RAO,
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS,
4.
SRI KRISHNA .B
S/O LATE SRI B.N. MUCHAL RAO,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
-2HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:49624-DB
WA No. 2006 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010817932025
5.
SMT. SUBBALAKSHMI,
W/O LATE SRI B.N. MUCHAL RAO,
AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS,
RESPONDENT NOS.3 TO 5 ARE
R/O KABBALA VILLAGE,
BASAVAPATNA HOBLI,
TALUK: CHANNAGIRI,
DISTRICT: DAVANAGERE-577544.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K.S. HARISH, GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR R-1 & R-2)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER DATED 24.05.2023 IN W.P.NO.18183/2021 (SC/ST) PASSED
BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE AND CONSEQUENTLY TO
ALLOW THE WRIT PETITION NO.18183/2021 (SC/ST) AS PRAYED
FOR BY CONFIRMING THE ORDER DATED 24.09.2021 PASSED BY
THE R1/DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND THE ORDER DATED
06.08.2018 PASSED BY THE R2/ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND
TO GRANT SUCH OTHER SUITABLE RELIEFS AS THE HON'BLE
HIGH COURT MAY DEEM FIT TO GRANT IN THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
AND EQUITY.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING,
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
-3HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:49624-DB
WA No. 2006 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010817932025
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA)
1.
The
appellant,
who
was
respondent
No.3
in
W.P.No.18183/2021 [SC ST], has preferred this intra-Court appeal
assailing the order dated 24.05.2023 passed by the learned Single
Judge. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge allowed
the writ petition filed by respondent Nos.3 to 5 herein and set aside
the order dated 06.08.2018 passed by the Assistant Commissioner,
Davanagere Sub-Division, Davanagere, directing restoration of the
subject land in favour of the appellant, as well as the order dated
24.09.2021 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Davanagere
District, Davanagere, confirming the same.
2.
The facts necessary for consideration of the present appeal
are that Sy.No.42/H.P.1-P2 (42) measuring 2.20 acres situated at
Kabbala
Village,
Basavapatna
Hobli,
Channagiri
Taluk,
Davanagere District [the subject land] was granted to Smt. Gangli
Bai, the grandmother of the appellant, on 02.06.1972. The original
grantee alienated the subject land under two separate sale deeds
dated 14.06.1989 and 08.02.1992. During her lifetime, the original
-4HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:49624-DB
WA No. 2006 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010817932025
grantee neither questioned the said alienations nor initiated any
proceedings seeking resumption of the subject land on the ground
that the transfers were in contravention of Section 4 of the
Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of
Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 [the PTCL Act]. It was only in
the year 2015 that the appellant, claiming to be the grandson of the
original grantee, initiated proceedings seeking resumption and
restoration of the subject land. The Assistant Commissioner
allowed the application and directed restoration, which order was
then affirmed by the Deputy Commissioner.
3.
The learned Single Judge, relying upon the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State
of Karnataka and Another1, Chhedi Lal v. Hari Kishore Yadav2
and Ningappa v. Deputy Commissioner and Others3, held that,
even where a statute does not prescribe any period of limitation,
the power conferred thereunder is required to be invoked within a
reasonable time. The learned Single Judge noticed that, in the
present case, the proceedings for restoration had been initiated
(2020) 14 SCC 232
((2018) 12 SCC 527
(2020) 14 SCC 236
-5HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:49624-DB
WA No. 2006 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010817932025
after an inordinate delay of about 26 years from the first alienation.
It was accordingly held that the Assistant Commissioner was not
justified in entertaining the application and that the authorities had
failed to consider the effect of such gross delay and laches. The
learned Single Judge also noticed that the third party rights had
intervened in the meantime and, consequently, set aside the orders
passed by the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner.
4.
The present appeal is also accompanied by an application-
I.A.No.1/2025 seeking condonation of delay of 902 days in filing the
appeal. In the affidavit filed in support of the application, the
appellant stated that, on account of economic and financial
difficulties, he could not take steps to prefer the appeal within time
and that, after arranging financial assistance, he approached his
counsel in December 2025, resulting in the delay.
5.
We are unable to accept the explanation as constituting
sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The explanation offered
is thus insufficient to condone the inordinate delay.
6.
Even otherwise, we find no grounds to interfere with the
impugned order on merits. The question whether the proceedings
-6HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:49624-DB
WA No. 2006 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010817932025
for restoration under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act can be
initiated after an inordinate delay is no longer res integra. In
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra) and Vivek M. Hinduja v. M.
Aswatha4, the Supreme Court has held that, notwithstanding the
absence of prescribed period of limitation, the proceedings seeking
restoration of granted land allegedly alienated in violation of the
PTCL Act are required to be initiated within a reasonable time and
cannot be entertained after an inordinate delay. The learned Single
Judge has rightly applied precisely this principle. It is also relevant
that Section 5 of the PTCL Act was subsequently amended by Act
No.30 of 2023 by insertion of clauses (c) and (d). The effect of the
said
amendment
has
been
considered
by
this
Court
in
Smt.Gouramma @ Gangamma v. The Deputy Commissioner
and Others5 and observed as under:
"3.***********
(c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for
the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the
provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses
(c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the said Section and therefore,
the concept of “limitation and delay” has to remain miles
away. These new clauses read as under:
(2019) 1 Kant LJ 819 SC
2024:KHC:D:10666-DB
-7HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:49624-DB
WA No. 2006 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010817932025
“(c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there
shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this
Act.
(d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases
pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts
of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.”
It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time, the
1978 Act prescribed any period of limitation for moving
application for the resumption of granted land after it is
alienated.
(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with
retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal
position. Such duplication happened even in English
legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The
question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute
is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to
Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the
statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what
the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation
period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no
limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now
too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains
to the Domain of Equity.
(e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of “limitation period” at
all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time between
alienation of granted land and the filing of claim for its
resumption. Observations occurring in para 8 of the
decision lend support to this view:
“8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms
of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person
to make an application for having the transfer annulled as
void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not
prescribe any period within which such an application can
be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which
suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of
Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs.,
(2017) 6 Scale 459 and also in the case of Ningappa v. Dy.
Commissioner (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on
-8HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:49624-DB
WA No. 2006 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010817932025
14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether
Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the
Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held
that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo
motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. This relief
was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River
which make agricultural operations impossible. An
application for restoration was made after 24 years and was
allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it
was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in
upholding that the present application for restoration of land
made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an
unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on
that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka
High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa v. Deputy Commissioner,
(2000) 1 Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa v. State
of Karnataka, (2006) 4 Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G.
Maregouda v. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga
District, Chitradurga, (2000) 2 Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that
there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and,
therefore, an application can be made at any time, are
overruled. …..”
(emphasis is ours)
Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in the
above case has not been altered by the subject
amendment, even in the least.
(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have
taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in
Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the
Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the
contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate
the law declared by the highest court of the country which it
did after considering all aspects of the matter including the
sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to
silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a
different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is
decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by
law, whereas “laches” is decided keeping in view a host of
factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay
-9HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:49624-DB
WA No. 2006 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010817932025
and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227
of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.
(g) There is a marked difference between ‘delay & laches’
that operate in equity and ‘limitation & delay’ that obtain in
law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union
of India v. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25] make out this
point:
“Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many
occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and
distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to
which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly,
laches might be called a genus to a species by name
acquiescence. However, there may be a case where
acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles
are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify
that these principles find place in various statutes which
restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration
of condonation in certain circumstances.… The underlying
principle governing these concepts would be one of
estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important
issue to be taken note of by the court.
21. The word “laches” is derived from the French
language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus
involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a
claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to
the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an
act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore,
must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of
the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As
stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the
party approaching the court apart from the change in
position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be
unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a
party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a
waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other
- 10 HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:49624-DB
WA No. 2006 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010817932025
party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be
unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court.
Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not
expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.”
7.
The Special Leave Petition [the SLP] preferred against the
said decision, being SLP(C) Diary No.19020/2025, was dismissed
by the Supreme Court on 09.05.2025. Likewise, a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in Smt. M. Manjula and Others v. The Deputy
Commissioner and Others6, after considering the amendment to
Section 5 of the PTCL Act and the decision in Gouramma (supra),
reiterated the same proposition. The challenge before the Supreme
Court to the said decision in SLP(C) No(s).8421/2025 was also
dismissed by order dated 01.04.2025.
8.
In the present facts, the factual position is undisputed. The
first alienation was made on 14.06.1989 and the second on
08.02.1992, whereas, the proceedings for restoration were initiated
only in 2015. Thus, the appellant permitted the alienations to
remain unconstrained for more than two decades. The original
grantee herself never questioned the alienations during her lifetime.
In Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), the Supreme Court interfered
2024: KHC: 51015-DB
- 11 HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:49624-DB
WA No. 2006 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010817932025
with restoration proceedings initiated after about 25 years. The
delay in the present case is 26 years from the first alienation.
Therefore, we find no infirmity in the conclusion of the learned
Single
Judge
warranting
any
interference
by
this
Court.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed both on the ground of delay
as well as on merits.
9.
Pending interlocutory application stands disposed of.
Sd/(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/(K.S. HEMALEKHA)
JUDGE
AT
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 6
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review