Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page No.# 1/22
GAHC010255242025
2026:GAU-AS:12579
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/6671/2025
SRI BUDDHA KATAKY
SON OF LATE ASWINI KATAKY, RESIDENT OF J.B. ROAD, AMOLAPATTY,
P.O. NAGAON, P.S. NAGAON SADAR, DISTRICT NAGAON, ASSAM. PIN
782001
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS.
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM,
SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI -781006
2:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY CUM INQUIRY OFFICER TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM
DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION
ASSAM
DISPUR
GUWAHATI - 781006
3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY CUM INQUIRY OFFICER TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION
ASSAM
DISPUR
GUWAHATI - 781006
4:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION
ASSAM
KAHILIPARA
GUWAHATI -781019
5:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
Page No.# 2/22
RAJ BHAWAN
UZANBAZAR
P.O. UZANBAZAR
P.S. LATASIL
GUWAHATI-01
DIST- KAMRUP METRO
ASSA
Advocate for the Petitioner
: M K BORAH, MS. P KASHYAP
Advocate for the Respondent : , SC, ELEM. EDU
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR
ORDER
Date : 31.08.2026
Heard Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Also
heard Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel, Dept. of Elementary
Education, Assam.
2.
The Petitioner, in the present Writ Petition, has presented a
challenge to an order dated 22.07.2025, issued by his Disciplinary
Authority, imposing a penalty of dismissal from service, on conclusion
of the departmental proceeding instituted against him in the matter.
3.
The facts in brief requisite for adjudication of the issues
arising in the present Writ Petition, is noticed as under.
3.1
The Petitioner, while serving as a Deputy Inspector of
Schools in Kamrup (M) district, was placed under arrest on
04.03.2023, in connection with Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) P.S Case
Page No.# 3/22
No. 10/2023, registered under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, (as amended in 2018), on an allegation of
having demanded and received illegal gratification. The Petitioner,
having remained under detention for more than 48 (Forty-Eight)
hours, the Disciplinary Authority of the Petitioner, vide an order dated
06.03.2023, proceeded to place the Petitioner under suspension. The
Petitioner was enlarged on bail by the Court of the learned Special
Judge, Assam, vide an order dated 06.04.2023.
3.2
Thereafter, a disciplinary proceeding was instituted against
the Petitioner, vide issuance of a show-cause notice dated 07.07.2023.
The allegation leveled against the Petitioner in the said show-cause
notice, was to the effect that he had mentally tortured one Sri. Pranjit
Chandra Saud, Head-Teacher of Dr. Maheshwar Neog Academic
School, Guwahati and had demanded an amount of Rs. 10,000/(Rupees Ten Thousand) from him. It was further alleged, therein, that
basing on a complaint lodged by said Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud,
criminal proceedings came to be instituted against the Petitioner.
Accordingly, the Petitioner was charged of having committed breach
of trust and having acted in a manner unbecoming of a responsible
Government Servant.
3.3
The
Petitioner,
after
having
inspected
the
relevant
Page No.# 4/22
documents, had submitted his show-cause reply on 04.08.2023. The
contentions raised by the Petitioner in his show-cause reply, not being
found to be satisfactory, the Disciplinary Authority of the Petitioner
directed for conduct of an enquiry in the matter and for the purpose,
an Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer came to be appointed.
3.4
On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted
his Enquiry Report on 07.07.2023. A copy of the said Enquiry Report
was forwarded to the Petitioner, vide a communication dated
20.11.2023. The Petitioner, in his representation against the said
Enquiry Report, had raised a grievance, with regard to the denial to
him of a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the departmental
witnesses deposing in the enquiry held against him and also of being
not permitted to adduce evidence on his part. Accordingly, the
disciplinary authority of the Petitioner, noticing the said grievances
raised by the Petitioner, vide order dated 30.10.2024, proceeded to
direct for a de novo enquiry in the matter and to allow the Petitioner,
an opportunity to cross-examine, as well as, adduce evidences in his
defense. Accordingly, the de novo enquiry was initiated and the
Petitioner is found to have participated, therein.
3.5
On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted
his Enquiry Report on 20.12.2024. A copy, thereof, was also
Page No.# 5/22
forwarded to the Petitioner and he had submitted his representation,
thereon.
3.6
The Disciplinary Authority of the Petitioner, thereafter, on
considering the Enquiry Report, along with the materials coming on
record in the enquiry, in the light of the representation submitted
against the Enquiry Report by the Petitioner, proceeded, vide order
dated 22.07.2025, to concur with the findings recorded by the Enquiry
Officer and accordingly, imposed upon the Petitioner, the penalty of
dismissal from service. Further, the Petitioner, for the period of
suspension undergone by him, was held to be entitled only to the
subsistence allowance, already paid to him.
3.7
The Petitioner, being aggrieved by the penalty of dismissal
from his service, as imposed upon him, had submitted an appeal in
the matter on 18.09.2025. However, said appeal was not disposed of.
Being aggrieved, the Petitioner has instituted the present Writ
Petition.
4.
Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, submits
that the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer in the Enquiry
Report are not supported by admissible evidences coming on record.
He submits that the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer in his
report towards holding the Petitioner guilty of the allegations leveled
Page No.# 6/22
against him, have been so recorded, basing on surmises and
conjectures, and without a due appreciation of the evidences coming
on record. Accordingly, he submits that the findings recorded by the
Enquiry Officer in the Enquiry Report, would mandate an interference
from this Court.
4.1
By referring to the order dated 22.07.2025, issued by the
Disciplinary Authority, towards imposing upon the Petitioner, the
penalty of dismissal from service, Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for
the Petitioner, submits that the Disciplinary Authority, having only
concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the findings of the
Enquiry Officer, having been already highlighted to be not sustainable,
the basis for the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service
upon the Petitioner, by the Disciplinary Authority, having been
removed, the penalty of dismissal, as imposed upon the Petitioner,
vide the order dated 22.07.2025, would mandate an interference from
this Court.
4.2
Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, further
submits that the Disciplinary Authority had not applied its mind, prior
to imposing upon the Petitioner, the penalty of dismissal from service,
inasmuch as, no reasons have been assigned by the Disciplinary
Authority for imposition of the said penalty, upon the Petitioner.
Page No.# 7/22
4.3
Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner by
reiterating the facts noticed, hereinabove, has submitted that penalty
of dismissal from service, as imposed upon the Petitioner, is
disproportionate to the charges established against him in the
enquiry. Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has
submitted that for allegations of similar nature, persons serving in
other departments of the Government of Assam, were imposed with
much lesser penalty and accordingly, the Petitioner, would also be
required to be imposed with a lower penalty by maintaining parity
with that of the cases of other persons, orders in whose cases, issued
by their disciplinary authorities, have been brought on record.
5.
Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel, Dept. of
Elementary Education, Assam, submits that the earlier Enquiry, held
against the Petitioner, was held to be vitiated by the Disciplinary
Authority, on the ground that the Petitioner was not afforded an
opportunity to cross-examine the Departmental Witnesses, as well as,
to place defence evidence. Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel,
Dept. of Elementary Education, Assam submits that, in the de-novo
enquiry held, the Petitioner was given all due opportunity to crossexamine the Departmental Witnesses and the Petitioner, accordingly,
had cross-examined the Departmental Witnesses.
Page No.# 8/22
5.1
Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel, Dept. of
Elementary Education, Assam, submits that a perusal of the evidence
coming on record during the cross-examination of the departmental
witnesses, by the Petitioner, would go to reveal that the allegations
leveled against the Petitioner, was established in the matter and the
Petitioner
could
not
dislodge
the
depositions
made
by
the
Departmental Witnesses, more particularly, Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud,
who was the complainant in the criminal proceedings, instituted
against the Petitioner, herein.
5.2
Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel, Dept. of
Elementary Education, Assam, submits that the conclusions drawn by
the Enquiry Officer, being so based on admissible evidences coming
on record, this Court would not sit, thereon, as an Appellate Authority
and substitute the same. Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel,
Dept. of Elementary Education, Assam submits that the Petitioner not
having submitted that the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer, to
be perverse, this Court would not proceed further to shift the
evidences coming on record, for the purpose of determining its
sufficiency.
5.3
In the above premises, Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing
Counsel, Dept. of Elementary Education, Assam submits that the
Page No.# 9/22
conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer, would not mandate an
interference from this Court. He further submits that the Disciplinary
Authority, having concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer,
the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service upon the
Petitioner, being proportionate to the allegations established against
him in the matter, the same would not mandate an interference from
this Court.
6.
I have heard the Learned Counsel for the Parties and
perused the materials available on record.
7.
The allegations leveled against the Petitioner and the charges
framed against him, vide the said show-cause notice dated
07.07.2023, being relevant is extracted hereinbelow :
“1.
While you were serving as Deputy Inspector of Schools under
Kamrup (M) District, you were arrested on 04/03/2023 in a trap laid by the
officers and Men of Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Assam in
connection with ACB PS Case No.10/2023, U/S 7(a) of PC Act, 1988 (as
amended in 2018).
2.
It has been alleged that complainant Sri Pranjit Chandra Saud age
about 51 years, son of Bholaram Saud, Mathgaharia, Guwahati, Head Teacher
of Dr. Maheswar Neog Academic School, Guwahati has lodged an FIR stating
that since few days back you mentally tortured him demanding to pay an
amount of Rs.10,000/- from their school fund. You also contacted him with
your Mobile Number 9957439469. Apart from this, when he met you
Page No.# 10/22
physically on 03/03/2023 in your office you asked him to pay Rs.8000/- from
the school fund. The conversation of demanding bribe was recorded by him.
Since he was not willing to pay the demanded bribe to you so he approached
the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Assam for taking lawful
action by submitting FIR along with the recording of bribe demand
conversation. On receipt of complaint Petition, vide GDE No. 89 dtd.
04/03/2023,the same was endorsed to Inspector of Police DV&AC, Assam to
verify the content of the allegation petition. On receipt of verification report
from Inspector Police. DVBAC, Assam, the officer in-charge, ACB PS cum
Superintendent of Police, Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption. Assam,
registered the above case. During the investigation you were arrested on
04/03/2023 in a trap laid by the officers and Men of Directorate of Vigilance
and Anti Corruption, Assam and subsequently you were forwarded to Judicial
custody and the case is still under investigation.
3.
Your act has lowered the credibility as a Government and it amounts
to gross misconduct, breach of trust, and it is unbecoming on the part of a
responsible Government servant. Therefore, you are charged with gross
misconduct with ulterior motive, breach of trust and dereliction of duties,
which is total violation of provision under Rule 3 of the Assam Civil Service
(Conduct) Rules, 1965.”
8.
A perusal of the said show-cause notice dated 07.07.2023
would reveal that the Petitioner was alleged to have mentally
harassed one Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud, and of demanding an amount
of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand), from his School fund. It was
further alleged that the Petitioner had contacted said Sri. Pranjit
Page No.# 11/22
Chandra Saud over mobile and had also met him on 03.03.2023, in
his office, wherein, Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud was asked to pay Rs.
8000/- (Rupees Eight Thousand Only). It was further highlighted in
the show-cause notice that Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud, not willing to
pay the bribe as demanded by the Petitioner, had approached the
Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption for taking lawful action by
submitting an FIR in the matter. It was further projected that the
Petitioner, in terms of the trap laid in the matter, basing on the
complaint lodged by Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud, was arrested on
04.03.2023.
9.
The show-cause reply submitted by the Petitioner, not being
found to be satisfactory, an enquiry was held in the matter. The
Enquiry Report as submitted by the Enquiry Officer was furnished to
the Petitioner. The Petitioner, in his representation, against the said
Enquiry Report, had raised a plea of prejudice being caused to him in
not being permitted to cross-examine the departmental witnesses and
also to adduce defence evidence. Accordingly, the disciplinary
authority of the Petitioner, appreciating the said pleas raised by the
Petitioner, proceeded to direct for holding of a de novo enquiry in the
matter and to provide for the Petitioner, due opportunity to crossexamine the departmental witnesses, as well as to adduce, defence
Page No.# 12/22
evidence.
10.
In the de novo enquiry so held, this Court finds that the
Petitioner had cross-examined the witnesses, including the said Sri.
Pranjit Chandra Saud. From the cross-examination of the said
witnesses, i.e. Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud, as extracted by the Enquiry
Officer in his Enquiry Report dated 20.12.2024, this Court finds that
the allegations of the Petitioner, having caused mental harassment to
the said person, stood established. Further, the demand made by the
Petitioner for a bribe was also established. The Petitioner, during the
cross-examination of the Departmental Witnesses, could not dislodge
their statements, rather the cross-examination had the effect
affirming the allegations leveled against the Petitioner, herein.
11.
Basing on the said materials coming on record, the Enquiry
Officer, in his report dated 20.12.2024, had proceeded to hold, that
the allegations leveled against the Petitioner in the show case notice
dated 07.07.2023, stood established. The allegations leveled against
the Petitioner of having threatened said Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud and
also of having demanded bribe from him was also held to have been
established. The disciplinary authority, thereafter, on a perusal of the
findings of the Enquiry Officer, as well as, the materials coming on
record in the enquiry, proceeded, vide order dated 22.07.2025, to
Page No.# 13/22
concur with the findings of the Enquiry Officer recorded in his Enquiry
Report and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service upon the
Petitioner.
12.
This Court, at the outset, would consider the submissions
made by the Petitioner that the Disciplinary Authority having not given
any reason for the purpose of imposition of the penalty of dismissal
from service upon the Petitioner, and such penalty being so imposed,
only by concurring with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the penalty
as imposed stood vitiated. This Court finds that the Disciplinary
Authority had accepted the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer
and had imposed upon the Petitioner, the penalty of dismissal from
service.
13.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Boloram
Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank & Others reported in (2021) 3
SCC 806, in this connection, had drawn the following conclusions :
“11. … Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary authority accepts the
findings recorded by the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed
reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. The
punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report,
as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be given by the
disciplinary authority. ...”
14.
Accordingly, in the light of the decisions of the Hon’ble
Page No.# 14/22
Supreme Court in the case of Boloram Bordoloi (Supra), this Court
holds that the disciplinary authority, in drawing satisfaction from the
findings of the Enquiry Officer in the Enquiry Report, for the purpose
of imposing the penalty of dismissal from service upon the Petitioner,
had not committed any error. Accordingly, the contention raised by
the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that the order of disciplinary
authority not having assigned any reason for imposing upon the
Petitioner, the penalty of dismissal from service, would not be
maintainable, stands rejected.
15.
The scope of examination and interference, under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, in a case like the present nature, was
considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao reported in AIR
(1963) SC 1723 and had drawn the following conclusions :
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of
the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding
a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and
according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the
authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a
Page No.# 15/22
writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent
finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the
departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in
a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have
disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar
grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise
properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on
which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence
is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court
in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
16.
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. Chitra Venkata Rao reported
in (1975) 2 SCC 557, had drawn the following conclusions :
“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has
come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in
State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723 (1964) 3 SCR 25 (1964)
2 LLD 150). First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether
a public officer, is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed
in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If
that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a
Page No.# 16/22
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the
order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High
Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court
is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second,
where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to
hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support
the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the
function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the
departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in
a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have
disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the
sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings
can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter
which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226. XXX
23.
The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a
supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The
Page No.# 17/22
findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the
appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.
An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected
by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In
regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is
shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused
to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of
law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded
by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and
material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to
sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964
SC 477: (1964) 5 SCR 64].
24.
The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and
came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart
from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the
ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the
present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the
High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would
justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the
journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for
the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these
conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence
and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the
Page No.# 18/22
High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do.
XXX
26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was wrong in
setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and Teassessing the evidence.
The appeal is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Parties
will pay and bear their own costs.
17.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of
India v. S.K. Sharma reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 had drawn
the following conclusions :
28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural
justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v.
Duke of Norfolk [[1949] 1 All ER 109: 65 TLR 225] way back in 1949, these
principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the
context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh
Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405: (1978) 2 SCR 272]) The
objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights
are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271:
1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1
SCC 664].) As pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India
[(1969) 2 SCC 262], the dividing line between quasi-judicial function and
administrative function (affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin
and almost indistinguishable a fact also emphasised by House of Lords in
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [[1984] 3 All ER
935: [1984] 3 WLR 1174: [1985] A.C. 374, HL] where the principles of natural
justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it
is from the standpoint of fair hearing applying the test of prejudice, as it may
Page No.# 19/22
be called that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram
partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where
observance of the requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat the very
proceeding which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It is for this
reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with
natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v.
Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465]. There may also be cases where the public
interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar considerations
may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether
[as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the
proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular
action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations
which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the
principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following
terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries a distinction ought to
be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram
partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words,
distinction is between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no adequate hearing" or
to put it in different words, "no opportunity" and "no adequate opportunity".
To illustrate take a case where the person is dismissed from service without
hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin [[1964] A.C. 40: [1963] 2 All
ER 66: [1963] 2 WLR 935]). It would be a case falling under the first category
and the order of dismissal would be invalid or void, if one chooses to use that
expression (Calvin v. Carr [[1980] A.C. 574: [1979] 2 All ER 440 [1979] 2 WLR
755, PC]). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without
supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report (Managing Director, ECIL
v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC
704]) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness
Page No.# 20/22
(K.L. Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC 43: 1984 SCC (L&S) 62]) it would be a case
falling in the latter category violation of a facet of the said rule of natural
justice in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the
touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or
did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct in the light of the above
decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or
of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and
ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach
and test adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184:
(1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint is not that
there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of
not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation
of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint
should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid."
18.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Bharti
Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra reported in (2024) 6 SCC
418 had drawn the following conclusions :
“29.
As regards the power of the High Court to reappraise the facts, it
cannot be said that the same is completely impermissible under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution. However, there must be a level of infirmity
greater than ordinary in a tribunal's order, which is facing judicial scrutiny
before the High Court, to justify interference. We do not think such a situation
prevailed in the present facts. Further, the ratio of the judgments relied upon
by the respondent in support of his contentions, would not apply in the facts
at hand.”
19.
A perusal of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
Page No.# 21/22
would bring to the forefront that the legal position is well settled that
the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is
confined to the decision making process. This Court does not sit in
judgment on the merits of the decision. Further it is not open to this
Court to re-appreciate and re-appraise the evidences laid before the
Enquiry Officer and examine the findings recorded by the Enquiry
Officer, as a Court of appeal and reach its own conclusions. The scope
of the judicial review, is limited to the deficiency in the decision
making process and not the decision itself.
20.
In the light of the settled position, with regard to the power
of this Court, while examining the penalty imposed upon a delinquent,
this Court would now examine the findings of the Enquiry Officer, as
recorded in the Enquiry Report.
21.
This Court on a consideration of the Enquiry Report dated
20.12.2024, finds that the Petitioner, during the de-novo enquiry, was
granted all due opportunity to cross-examine the departmental
witnesses and also to adduce evidence. The Petitioner is found to
have cross-examined the witnesses and as noticed, hereinabove,
during such cross-examination, the allegations forming the basis of
the show-cause notice dated 07.07.2023, stood affirmed against the
Petitioner. This Court further finds that the conclusions, drawn by the
Page No.# 22/22
Enquiry Officer, were so drawn basing on admissible evidences coming
on record. The Petitioner, in the present proceedings, has not been
able to demonstrate that the conclusions, drawn by the Enquiry
Officer, were perverse and or not based on any evidences coming on
record. The allegations leveled against the Petitioner, being found to
have been established in the enquiry, this Court is of the view that the
penalty, as imposed upon the Petitioner, is commensurating to the
charges established against him in the enquiry. Accordingly, the order
dated 22.07.2025, passed by the disciplinary authority of the
Petitioner, would not warrant an interference from this Court.
22.
In view of the above discussions, the present Writ Petition is
found to be devoid of any merit and accordingly, the same stands
dismissed. However, there would be no order as to costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review