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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
_A_G_A_R_T_A_L_A_
WA No.180 of 2022
Sri Basanta Sen,
Son of Late Priyabandhu Sen,
Resident of Village- Ramnagar Road No.8,
Nivedita Palli, P.O.- Agartala,
P.S.- West Agartala, Sub-Division-Agartala,
District- West Tripura, Pin-799002
...... Petitioner-Appellant(s)
VERSUS
1. The State of Tripura,
Represented by the Secretary & Commissioner
To the Department of Finance, Government of Tripura,
Having his office at New Secretariat Complex,
Gurkhabasti, Agartala,
P.O.- Kinjaban, P.S.- New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division- Sadar, District- West Tripura.
2. The Secretary & Commissioner,
Department of Finance, Government of Tripura,
Having his office at New Secretariat Complex,
Gurkhabasti, Agartala,
P.O.- Kunjaban, P.S.-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division- Sadar, District- West Tripura.
3. The Secretary & Commissioner,
Panchayat Department, Government of Tripura,
Having its office at New Secretariat Complex,
Gurkhabasti, Agartala,
P.O.- Kunjaban, P.S.- New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division- Sadar, District- West Tripura.
In compliance with the Hon‟ble Court‟s order dated 07.01.2026
Respondent No.4 has been impleaded as follows:
4. Tripura Public Service Commission, Agartala.
..…. Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Somik Deb, Sr. Advocate
Ms. Adwitiya Chakraborty, Advocate
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Mangal Debbarma, Addl. GA.
Mr. Kundan Pandey, Advocate
Date of hearing and
delivery of judgment
:
28.01.2026
Whether fit for reporting :
Yes
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
(M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)
1)
This Writ Appeal is preferred against the judgment dt.01.08.2022
of the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.634 of 2021.
The background facts:
2)
The undisputed facts are that by an appointment order
dt.14.09.1989 the appellant was appointed to the post of Panchayat Extension
Officer in the office of the Directorate of Panchayat on purely temporary and
on ad hoc basis subject to
confirmation by the Tripura Public Service
Commission ( for short „TPSC‟) on appearance by the appellant before it for
necessary examination on call.
3)
According to letter dt.18.10.2010 (Annexure R-10) filed by the
respondents, on the basis of the requisition from the Directorate of Panchayat,
the TPSC had issued advertisement in 1997 inviting applications from eligible
candidates for selection against 28 vacancies to the post of Panchayat
Extension Officer. The said letter recorded that the appellant was also asked to
submit application to the TPSC to appear in the examination for selection to
the post of Panchayat Extension Officer, that the appellant did apply and also
sat for the examination conducted by the TPSC. The said letter also states that
it was ascertained that the appellant‟s name was not indicated in the select list.
4)
But in spite of the same, the appellant continued to serve as
Panchayat Extension Officer till he retired from the said post on 31.08.2017.
5)
The appellant gave certain representations to the respondents
praying for regularization of his service along with pensionary benefits and
pension but did not succeed in the same.
WP(C) No.604/2019:
6)
Therefore, he filed WP(C) No.604/2019 in this High Court and
on 11.07.2019 this court disposed of the Writ Petition directing the
respondents to consider his case for regularization and also for payment of
pension and other retiral benefits. Liberty was given to the appellant to file an
exhaustive representation to the Director of Panchayat and Secretary to the
Department of Panchayat, Government of Tripura within 15 days.
7)
The appellant made a representation on 14.11.2019 to the
Director of Panchayat, Government of Tripura praying for consideration of
regularization of his service and for grant of pension and other retiral benefits.
8)
Thereafter, the Additional Director of Panchayat, Government of
Tripura prepared a note ( Annexure R- 15 ) opining that the appellant shall be
deemed to have become permanent for serving the Government for a long
period of 27 years and he should be treated as a permanent employee entitled
to pensionary benefits. This was forwarded to the Chief Minister‟s Secretariat
by the Additional Director of Panchayat.
The order dt.14.8.2020 impugned in the Writ Petition:
9)
But, on 14.08.2020 the impugned order was passed noting that
the Law Department had recommended that the appellant be given the retiral
benefits, but the Finance Department and the General Administration (P&T)
Department have not agreed to regularizing appellant‟s services and paying
him pension and other retiral benefits on the ground that the appellant had
failed to appear before the TPSC for the selection process which would have
resulted in the regularization of his service.
WP(C) No. 634 of 2021:
10)
Thus, the effort of the appellant did not succeed and therefore, he
was forced to file WP(C) No. 634 of 2021 in this court.
11)
In that Writ Petition, the appellant had sought regularization of
his service from the date of his initial appointment and to grant pension to him
along with arrears thereof, death-cum-retirement gratuity, provident fund,
leave encashment and all other pensionary benefits with penal interest after
setting aside the memorandum dt.14.08.2020 issued by the Director of
Panchayat, Government of Tripura.
12)
The appellant, inter alia, contended in the Writ Petition that the
respondents could not have refused regularization of his service and sought
payment of retiral benefits to him. He also contended that his initial
appointment as a temporary/ad hoc/ contractual government servant was only
irregular and not illegal, and since he continued in service uninterruptedly for
a period of 10 years of service or more without any order of the court, he is
entitled for regularization of service and also for retiral benefits.
13)
Both the Government of Tripura as well as TPSC put up a plea
that the initial appointment of the appellant was made without following the
established procedure, that he later failed to appear before the TPSC for the
selection process and so the Writ Petition should be dismissed.
14)
The learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgment, accepted
the plea of the respondents and held that as appellant did not appear before
the TPSC for examination and the post could only have been filled up by
direct recruitment or by promotion.
He held that the appellant was not
qualified for the post of Panchayat Extension Officer. He also held that the
claim of the appellant is barred by delay and latches.
The instant Writ Appeal:
15)
Challenging the same, this Appeal is filed by the appellant.
16)
Heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as the State
Government and the TPSC.
17)
We may point out that the plea of the respondents before the
learned Single Judge that the appellant did not appear before the TPSC in the
examination conducted by it is a false plea as Annexure R-10 letter
dt.18.10.2001 addressed by the Director of Panchayat, Government of Tripura
to the Secretary, Tripura Public Service Commission, Agartala specifically
states that the appellant applied to the TPSC and also sat for the examination
in 1997.
18)
Though the said letter stated that it could be ascertained from the
select list that the appellant did not figure therein, it is undisputed that even so,
the appellant was allowed to continue to work for 20 more years till he retired
from service on 31.08.2017.
19)
The question is “is it mandatory for the TPSC to approve the
appointment of the appellant in view of the stipulation in the appointment
letter dt.14.9.1989?”
20)
It is not in dispute that the post of Panchayat Extension Officer is
a Class-III, non-selection post and as per the applicable Recruitment Rules,
possession of prescribed qualifications was sufficient, and the said rule
specifically records the Tripura Public Service Commission (Exemption from
Consultation) Regulations, 1973 ( for short „Regulation‟) would apply.
21)
Clause (3) of Art.320 of the Constitution of India states:
“Art.320.
(1)..
(2)…
(3)
The Union Public Service Commission or the State Public
Service Commission, as the case may be, shall be consulted—
(a)on all matters relating to methods of recruitment to civil
services and for civil posts;
(b)on the principles to be followed in making appointments to
civil services and posts and in making promotions and transfers
from one service to another and on the suitability of candidates
for such appointments, promotions or transfers;
(c)on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under
the Government of India or the Government of a State in a civil
capacity, including memorials or petitions relating to such
matters;
….”
22)
As per Regulation 3 of the Tripura Public Service Commission
(Exemption from Consultation) Regulations, 1973 , it was not necessary for
the State Government to consult the Tripura Public Service Commission in
regard to any of the matters mentioned in sub-clause (a) & (b) of Clause-(3) of
Article 320 of the Constitution in the case of services and posts specified in
the schedule for the Regulation (Regulation-3).In the schedule to the said
regulations, serial No.7 mentions all Class-III posts in the Secretariat/
Department and allied offices except certain other posts mentioned therein.
There is no dispute that the post of Panchayat Extension Officer is also a Class
III post. It is not referred to in the exceptions and so, it was not necessary for
the State Government to consult the TPSC regarding appellant‟s appointment.
Regulation 4 also stated that it was not necessary to consult the Commission
in regard to the selection for appointment to a Class-III post in the State
service.
23)
Counsel for appellant also places reliance on the reports of the
Supreme Court in Ram Gopal Chaturvedi vs. State of Madhya Pradesh1 and
G.S. Lamba & Ors vs. Union of India & Ors2.
24)
In Ram Gopal Chaturvedi (1 supra) it was held that consultation
with the State Public Service Commission though provided in the said Article
is not mandatory for taking disciplinary action though Article 320(3)(c) states
that such consultation “ shall” be necessary; and failure to consult the MPSC
will not vitiate any decision taken in that regard. Reference was made to the
judgment of the Supreme Court in State of UP Vs. Manbodhan Lal
Srivastava3 where similar view was taken and the said judgment was
followed.
25)
In G.S. Lamba & Ors (2 supra), it was reiterated that though the
applicable rule required consultation with the UPSC before quota rules in
promotion were relaxed, such consultation is not mandatory.
1969 (2) SCC 24
(1985 ) 2 SCC 604
AIR 1957 SC 912
“27. It was however contended that it is not permissible to
infer that promotions in excess of quota were given by relaxing
the quota rule because the posts in integrated Grade II and III
were within the purview of the Union Public Service
Commission and the proviso to Rule 29(a) mandates that the
power to relax is hedged in with a condition that it can be done
after consultation with the Commission, and there is nothing to
show that the Commission was ever consulted. Undoubtedly, the
proviso to Rule 29(a) requires that the controlling authority
cannot relax any of the provisions of the rules in respect of
posts which are within the purview of the Union Public Service
Commission unless after consultation with the Commission. It
was submitted that nothing is placed on the record by the
petitioners to show that power to relax the quota rule was
exercised after consultation with the Union Public Service
Commission. Assuming that there was no consultation, would
the exercise of power to relax be vitiated and the appointments
made in relaxation of the mandatory quota rule would be ab
initio invalid?
… … … …Coming home in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal
Srivastav( supra 3)
a Constitution Bench of this Court
specifically held that where consultation with the Public Service
Commission is provided as required by Article 320(3)(c) of the
Constitution such provision is not mandatory and they do not
confer any rights on public servants so that the absence of
consultation or irregularity in consultation does not afford him
a cause of action in a court of law. There are number of
subsequent decisions to which our attention was called
reiterating the same principle. Therefore assuming there was
failure to consult the Union Public Service Commission before
exercising the power to relax the mandatory quota rule and
further assuming that the posts in integrated Grade II and III
were within the purview of the Union Public Service
Commission and accepting for the time being that the
Commission was not consulted before the power to relax the
rule was exercised yet the action taken would not be vitiated nor
would it furnish any help to Union of India which itself cannot
take any advantage of its failure to consult the Commission.
Therefore it can be safely stated that the enormous departure
from the quota rule year to year permits an inference that the
departure was in exercise of the power of relaxing the quota
rule conferred on the controlling authority. Once there is power
to relax the mandatory quota rule, the appointments made in
excess of the quota from any given source would not be illegal
or invalid but would be valid and legal as held by this Court in
N.K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat11. Therefore the promotion
of the promotees was regular and legal both on account of the
fact that it was made to meet the exigencies of service in
relaxation of the mandatory quota rule and to substantive
vacancies in service.”
26)
The above decision relates to sub-clause (a) of Clause (3) of
Art.320 dealing with methods of recruitment to Civil Services and Civil Posts,
and it is thus not necessary to consult the Public Service Commission in that
regard for making appointments or promotions to civil posts.
27)
The counsel from the respondents do not deny that the
recruitment rules make the post of the Panchayat Extension Officer a nonselection post and refer to the TPSC (Exemption from Consultation)
Regulations, 1973 in serial No.13 of the said rule dealing with Panchayat
Extension Officer. They also do not deny that as per Regulation-3 of the said
regulations the post of Panchayat Extension Officer being a Class-III post,
consultation with the Public Service Commission is not necessary.
28)
They also are unable to refute the legal position in the judgments
cited by the counsel for the appellant referred to above.
29)
So as per the regulations and also the above decisions, it was not
necessary for the State to consult the TPSC in regard to appointment of
appellant for the class III post of Panchayat Extension Officer.
30)
When the statutory Rule permits making of the recruitment to
post of Panchayat Extension officer on basis of possession of qualifications
prescribed therein and do not mention about the appointee appearing for any
test conducted by the TPSC, it was not permissible for the respondents to
mention in the appellant‟s appointment order the condition that the appellant
should appear before the TPSC for necessary examination on call. A
requirement not mentioned in the Rules could not have been introduced by the
respondents in the letter of appointment dt.14.9.1989 issued to the
respondents.
31)
Though the appellant did sit for the exam conducted by the TPSC
and did not find mention in the select list, the respondents did not terminate
his appointment in 1997 probably for the above said reason and allowed him
to continue in the post for 20 more years till he retired on 31.8.2017. Even
confirmation of his appointment by TPSC was not insisted by the respondents
for the same reason. Moreover it is not as if the respondents at any point of
time found that he did not perform his services as Panchayat extension Officer
to their satisfaction during this period.
32)
Therefore, it has to be held that the mention of the requirement of
the appellant‟s appointment on 14.09.1989 being subject to confirmation by
the TPSC, and the TPSC not confirming his appointment cannot deprive the
appellant of the benefit of regularization of the service after he has rendered
almost 28 years of service.
33)
Also it may be that the appointment order dt.14.09.1989 of the
appellant states that he was appointed to the post of Panchayat Extension
Officer in the office of the Directorate of Panchayat on purely temporary and
on ad hoc basis. This was not changed till he retired from service on
31.8.2017 i.e for almost 28 years.
34)
Having appointed the appellant to the post of Panchayat
Extension Officer on 14.09.1989 and having continued till 31.08.2017, for
almost 28 years, it is not permissible for the respondents to contend that the
appellant‟s appointment as Panchayat Extension Officer is only temporary or
ad hoc.
35)
As held by the Supreme Court in Rudra Kumar Sain & Ors. Vs.
Union of India & Ors4., , a person, who possesses the requisite qualification
for being appointed a particular post and continues in the post for a fairly long
period, cannot be held to be holder of an ad hoc post. So the respondents are
precluded from contending that the appellant‟s appointment was only
temporary or ad hoc and so he was not entitled to get regularized.
36)
In State of Gujrat & Ors. Vs.
Talsibhai Dhanjibhai Patel5
[SLP(C) 1109 of 2022] the Supreme Court held as under:“It is unfortunate that the State continued to take the
services of the respondent as an ad-hoc for 30 years and
thereafter now to content that as the services rendered by the
respondent are ad-hok, he is not entitled to pension/pensionary
(2000) 8 SCC 25
2022 SCC ONLINE SC 2004
benefit. The State cannot be permitted to take the benefit of its
own wrong. To take that the Services continuously for 30 years
and thereafter to content that an employee who has rendered 30
years continues service shall not be eligible for pension is
nothing but unreasonable. As a welfare State, the State as such
ought not to have taken such a stand.
In the present case, the High court has not committed any
error in directing the State to pay pensionary benefits to the
respondent who has retired after rendering more than 30 years
service.”
37)
Thus, the Supreme Court found fault with the State for taking the
services of the respondent therein as an ad hoc employee for thirty years and
then denying to the said respondent pensionary benefits. It held that the State
cannot be permitted to take benefit of its own wrong. The same logic applies
in the instant case as well.
38)
Similarly, in Union of India Rep by Government of Puducherry
& Anr. Vs. K Velajagan & Ors6. [SLP Civil No.2868 of 2018] dated
04.02.2025, the Supreme Court directed regularization of persons working
from 2005 as lecturers though the UPSC had rejected the request for
regularization. It upheld the decision of the High Court which directed
regularization of the respondents therein without any involvement of the
UPSC.
39)
We respectfully follow the above decisions and hold that the
appellant was entitled to relief of regularization from the date of his
appointment for the limited purpose to enable him to get retirement benefits.
2025 SCC ONLINE SC 837
40)
It appears to us that the learned Single Judge was swayed by the
false allegation leveled by the respondents against the appellant that he did not
appear before the TPSC for examination.
41)
The Single Judge also erred in holding that the appellant is not
qualified for the post of Panchayat Extension Officer when there is no such
pleading by the respondents in their counter affidavit.
42)
In our opinion, it was not permissible for the respondents to
continue the appellant for almost 28 years in service without regularizing the
service only as an excuse to deny the pension and other pensionary benefits.
The injustice done to the appellant at least as regards the denial of pensionary
benefits requires this Court to reject the false and technical submissions of the
respondents since he has moved the Court in 2019 first and then again in 2021
after his claim for pension and pensionary benefits was turned down.
43)
The ground of laches mentioned in the order of learned Single
Judge, in our opinion, is also not sustainable because only when his
pensionary benefits were denied, he sought regularization to claim them after
his retirement in 31.8.2017.
44)
Also laches it is not always a ground to deny relief to a litigant
particularly when the State had acted unconscionably and arbitrarily.
45)
In Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of H.P7.
the Supreme Court
explained in the following manner:
“18. … This Court in a much earlier case — Maharashtra
SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service8, held : (AIR pp.
335-36, para 11)
(2022) 7 SCC 508
AIR 1969 SC 329
“11. … „Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity
is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party
has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay
of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations,
the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important
in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy‟.”
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in a
clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit
disbursal of compensation as required by law, only to those for
which it was specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to
all those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which is also
violative of the appellants‟ prevailing Article 31 right (at the
time of cause of action), undoubtedly warranted consideration,
and intervention by the High Court, under its Article 226
jurisdiction.”
In Basanti Prasad v. Bihar School Examination Board9 it
46)
was held:
“21. In Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India6 it was
observed: (SCC p. 368, para 9)
“9. … While there are different periods of limitation prescribed
for the institution of different kinds of suits by the Limitation
Act, 1963, there is no such period prescribed by law in respect
of petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Whether
relief should be granted to a petitioner under Article 226 of the
Constitution where the cause of action had arisen in the remote
past is a matter of sound judicial discretion governed by the
doctrine of laches. Where a petitioner who could have availed
of the alternative remedy by way of suit approaches the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is appropriate
ordinarily to construe any unexplained delay in the filing of the
writ petition after the expiry of the period of limitation
prescribed for filing a suit as unreasonable. This rule, however,
cannot be a rigid formula. There may be cases where even a
delay of a shorter period may be considered to be sufficient to
refuse relief in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
There may also be cases where there may be circumstances
which may persuade the court to grant relief even though the
petition may have been filed beyond the period of limitation
prescribed for a suit. Each case has to be judged on its own
facts and circumstances touching the conduct of the parties, the
change in situation, the prejudice which is likely to be caused to
the opposite party or to the general public, etc.”
22. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with
reference to various decisions of this Court, where it has been
emphasised time and again, that, where there is inordinate and
unexplained delay and third-party rights are created in the
(2009) 6 SCC 791
intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere.
However, if the delay is properly explained, and if the thirdparty rights are not going to be affected, the High Court may
entertain the petition and consider the case of the aggrieved
person on merits.”
47)
Therefore, the judgment dt. 01.08.2022 of the learned Single
Judge in WP(C) No.634 of 2021 is set aside; the Writ Petition [WP(C)
No.634 of 2021] is allowed; the memorandum dt. 14.08.2020 issued by the
Director of Panchayat, Government of Tripura is set aside; and the
respondents are directed to regularize the services of the appellant forthwith
from the date of his appointment and pay him pension and all other retiral
benefits claimed w.e.f 31.8.2017 with interest at 7% pa from the said date till
the date of actual payment. This exercise shall be completed within three
months from today.
48)
The
Writ
Appeal
accordingly
stands
allowed.
Pending
application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(BISWAJIT PALIT, J)
(M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ)
signed by SATABDI DUTTA
SATABDI DUTTA Digitally
Date: 2026.02.03 16:38:49 +05'30'
Satabdi
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