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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA No.36 of 2024
1. Sri Badal Chandra Das, aged 57 years
S/O Lt. Chandi Charan Das,
2. Sri Subhash Chandra Das, aged 62 years
S/O Lt. Chandi Charan Das,
Both residents of Ambassa Ward no.9,
Near Pramila Guest House, P.O.-Ambassa,
District- Dhalai Tripura, Pin-799289.
------ Plaintiff-Appellants
Versus
Sri Babul Deb,
S/O Lt. Binod Deb,
Resident of Ambassa Ward No.9, K P Colony,
Near Gita Bajaj, P.O. & P.S. Ambassa,
District- Dhalai, Tripura, Pin-799289.
------ Defendant-Respondents
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Dipak Deb, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
None.
Date of hearing &
delivery of
Judgment & Order
:
22.04.2025
Whether fit for
reporting
:
YES
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order (Oral)
This appeal under Section 100 of CPC is preferred challenging
the judgment dated 15.06.2024 delivered by Learned Additional
District Judge, Dhalai, Ambassa in connection with case No.TA No.10
of 2023 which was dismissed on dismissal of Civil Misc(condonation)
No.5 of 2023 (arising out of TA No.10 of 2023) filed for condonation
of delay of 247 days in preferring the appeal against the judgment &
decree dated 24.11.2022 delivered by Learned Civil Judge(Junior
Division), Dhalai, Ambassa, Court No.1 in connection with case
No.T.S. No.2 of 2021.
Along with memo of appeal, another application was filed
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning delay of 14 days
in preferring the second appeal before this Court. Despite service of
notice, the respondent did not appear before the Court, so, by order
dated 31.01.2025, a co-ordinate bench of this High Court allowed the
application for condonation of delay fixing the main case for hearing
on admission.
2.
Heard Learned Counsel Mr. Dipak Deb appearing on behalf of
the appellant-plaintiffs. But despite service of notice, none appeared
on behalf of the respondent.
3.
This present appeal has been preferred by the original
plaintiffs who filed a suit for declaration of right, title, and interest
over the suit land, eviction and recovery of possession and for
perpetual injunction. Learned Trial Court vide judgment dated
24.11.2022 in connection with case No.T.S. No.2 of 2021 dismissed
the
suit
of
the
present
appellant-plaintiffs
and
accordingly,
consequential decree was passed.
Challenging that judgment and decree, the appellant-plaintiffs
preferred an appeal under Section 96 of CPC before the Court of
Learned
District
Judge,
Dhalai
District,
Ambassa
which
was
transferred to the Court of Learned Additional District Judge, Dhalai,
Ambassa along with a separate application for condonation of delay
which was numbered as Civil Misc.(condonation) No.5 of 2023 (arising
out of TA No.10 of 2023). After hearing the appellant-plaintiffs by
order dated 15.06.2024, Learned Additional District Judge, Dhalai,
Ambassa dismissed the application for condonation of delay of 247
days in preferring the appeal and by order dated 15.06.2024 also
dismissed the main case which was numbered as TA No.10 of 2023.
4.
In course of hearing, Learned Counsel for the appellants
submitted that in the original suit, the judgment was delivered by the
Learned Trial Court on 24.11.2022. The Advocate’s clerk of the
appointed advocate of the plaintiffs applied for certified copy of the
judgment on 30.11.2022 and on 07.12.2022, the certified copy was
collected and after receipt of the certified copy, it came to the
knowledge of the appellants that the suit was dismissed and after
that, the appellant-plaintiffs tried to contact with his lawyer for next
course of action but could not contact with him and on 13.12.2021,
the appellant-plaintiffs came to Agartala and met with their Advocate
and discussed about the next course of action when the Learned
Counsel advised to prefer appeal and accordingly, some time was
consumed to prefer the appeal and on 28.12.2022, the plaintiff No.1
met with the Learned Counsel when Learned Counsel informed him
that the appeal memo was not prepared and he was further advised
to met with the lawyer on 13.01.2023 but the Learned Counsel also
failed to prepare the memo of appeal within that time. Being
dissatisfied, he took back the file from the engaged counsel and after
that, he returned back to Ambassa where he met with three
advocates. They also could not give any proper advice to him and due
to his financial inability, he could not engage proper lawyer and
finally, he met with Advocate Abhijit Sengupta on 25.08.2023 who
drafted the memo of appeal and the same was filed. Thus, a total
period of 247 days was consumed in preferring the appeal.
It was further submitted by the Learned Counsel for the
appellants that the appellants being poor, rustic person of the village
did not have sufficient financial means to engage a lawyer at Agartala
to conduct their case properly and the lawyers although initially
retained the file but finally they returned back the file in absence of
sufficient fees for which there was some unintentional delay on the
part of the appellants and lastly, when they met with Advocate Abhijit
Sengupta at Agartala on 25.08.2023 then he assured to file the
appeal and drafted the memo of appeal accordingly and later on, the
same was submitted but the Learned 1st Appellate Court did not
consider the grounds of delay in preferring the appeal by the present
appellants and by the said order, dismissed the appeal and as the
application for condonation of delay was dismissed, so, naturally the
appeal preferred by the appellant was also dismissed.
5.
At the time of hearing before this Court, a question arose
whether this appeal under Section 100 of CPC would be maintainable
or not since the appeal was dismissed without any merit on the
ground that the condonation application was dismissed by the Learned
1st Appellate Court. On this issue, in course of hearing of argument,
Learned Counsel for the appellants relied upon few citations.
A full bench of Calcutta High Court in a case of Manuda
Khateen
and
others
v.
Beniyan
Bibi
and
others
dated
12.08.1976 reported in AIR 1976 CACUTTA 415 wherein in para
Nos.3 and 4 observed as under:
“3. The referring Bench has noted a few conflicting
decisions of this Court. In Sudhansu Bhusan Pandey
v. Majhe Bibi, reported in (1938) 42 Cal WN 72 Mr.
Justice Biswas expressed a tentative view that an
order rejecting the memorandum of appeal would be
a decree.
4. In Rakhal Chandra Ghosh v. Ashutosh Ghosh,
(1913) 17 Cal WN 807 a Division Bench of this Court
held that an order by an appellate Court rejecting an
appeal before it has been admitted, on the ground
that it was presented out of time, is a decree within
the meaning of the definition of sub-section (2) of
Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel for the appellant drawn
the attention of the Court that an order rejecting memo of appeal
would be a decree, so the appeal is maintainable.
He also referred another citation of a full bench of Kerala High
Court in Thambi v. Mathew and another dated 24.10.1987
reported in AIR 1988 KERALA 48 wherein in para No.13B and 14,
Hon’ble Kerala High Court observed as under:
“13B. In the present case there was a delay of 3 days
in presenting the appeal before the lower appellate
court. The cause of the delay is explained in the
affidavit in support of the petition for condonation of
delay as on account of the appellant’s illness. The
appellant was examined as P.W.1. There is no
evidence contra against the case proved by P.W.1.
We therefore find that there was sufficient reason
for the delay in presenting the appeal before the
lower appellate court. We, therefore, allow I.A.
No.758/1980 and condone the delay in filing the
appeal.
14. Since the lower appellate court has not
considered the case on merits, we set aside the
judgment and decree of the court below and remand
the case to that court for fresh disposal of the appeal
on merits and in accordance with law. The parties
will appear before the court below on 23-11-1987.
The second appeal is allowed as indicated above.
There will be no order as to costs.”
Learned Counsel referred another citation of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India reported (2005) 1 SCC 436 [Shyam
Sundar
Sarma
v.
Pannalal
Jaiswal
and
others
dated
04.11.2004] wherein in para Nos.8, 9, 9.1, 11, 12 and 16, Hon’ble
the Apex Court observed as under:
“8. The first question to be considered is whether an
appeal accompanied by an application for condoning
the delay in filing the appeal is an appeal in the eye
of the law, when the application for condoning the
delay in filing the appeal is dismissed and
consequently the appeal is dismissed as being timebarred by limitation, in view of Section 3 of the
Limitation Act. There was conflict of views on this
question before the High Courts. But the Privy
Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra
Dey:(1932) 59 IA 283 held: (AIR p. 167)
"There is no definition of appeal in the Civil
Procedure Code, but Their Lordships have no
doubt that any application by a party to an
appellate court, asking it to set aside or revise
a decision of a subordinate court, is an appeal
within the ordinary acceptation of the term,
and that it is no less an appeal because it is
irregular or incompetent."
9. The specific question involved came to be
considered by this Court in Mela Ram and Sons v.
CIT:1956 SCR 166. This Court held that an appeal
presented out of time is an appeal and an order
dismissing it as time-barred is one passed in an
appeal. This Court referred to and followed the view
taken by the Privy Council and by this Court in the
two respective decisions above-referred to. This
Court quoted with approval the observations of
Chagla, C.J. in K.K. Porbunderwalla v. CIT:(1952) 21
ITR 63(Bom) (ITR p. 66) to the following effect:
(SCR p. 176)
"Although
the
Appellate
Assistant
Commissioner did not hear the appeal on
merits and held that the appeal was barred by
limitation his order was under Section 31 and
the effect of that order was to confirm the
assessment which had been made by the
Income Tax Officer."
9.1. In Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar:AIR 1966
SC 1332 rendered by four learned Judges of this
Court, one of the questions that arose was whether
the dismissal of an appeal from a decree on the
ground that the appeal was barred by limitation was
a decision in the appeal. This Court held: (SCR pp.
308 H-309 B)
"We are therefore of opinion that where a
decision is given on the merits by the trial
court and the matter is taken in appeal and the
appeal is dismissed on some preliminary
ground, like limitation or default in printing, it
must be held that such dismissal when it
confirms the decision of the trial court on the
merits itself amounts to the appeal being
heard and finally decided on the merits
whatever may be the ground for dismissal of
the appeal.”
11. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the
Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in
Mamuda Khateen v. Beniyan Bibi:AIR 1976 Cal 415
to contend that an order rejecting a time-barred
memorandum of appeal consequent upon refusal to
condone the delay in filing that appeal was neither a
decree nor an appealable order. On going through
the said decision it is seen that though the Full Bench
referred to the divergent views on that question in
the Calcutta High Court prior to the rendering of the
decision of this Court in Mela Ram and Sons it had
not considered the decisions of this Court in Raja
Kulkarni:1954 SCR 384 and in Mela Ram and
Sons:1956 SCR 166 in coming to that conclusion. In
fact it is seen that there was no discussion on that
aspect as such, though there was a reference to the
conflict of views in the decisions earlier rendered by
the Calcutta High Court. Since the ratio of that
decision runs counter to the principle laid down by
this Court in Mela Ram and Sons:1956 SCR 166
obviously the same could not be accepted as laying
down a correct law.
12. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision
in Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh:(2001) 1 SCC 469
rendered by two learned Judges of this Court and
pointed out that it was held therein that dismissal of
an application for condonation of delay would not
amount to a decree and, therefore, dismissal of an
appeal as time-barred was also not a decree. That
decision was rendered in the context of Article 136
of the Limitation Act, 1963 and in the light of the
departure made from the previous position obtaining
under Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908. But we
must point out with respect that the decisions of this
Court in Mela Ram and Sons:1956 SCR 166 and
Sheodan Singh:AIR 1966 SC 1332 were not brought
to the notice of Their Lordships. The principle laid
down by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Mela
Ram and Sons:1956 SCR 166 and that stated in
Sheodan Singh:AIR 1966 SC 1332 was, thus, not
noticed and the view expressed by the two-Judge
Bench, cannot be accepted as laying down the
correct law on the question. Of course, Their
Lordships have stated that they were aware that
some decisions of the High Courts have taken the
view that even rejecting an appeal on the ground
that it was presented out of time is a decree within
the definition of a decree obtaining in the Code.
Thereafter, noticing the decision of the Calcutta High
Court
above-referred
to,
Their
Lordships
in
conclusion apparently agree with the decision of the
Calcutta High Court. Though the decision of the Privy
Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra
Dey:(1932) 59 IA 283 was referred to, it was not
applied on the ground that it was based on Article
182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and there was a
departure in the legal position in view of Article 136
of the Limitation Act, 1963. But with respect, we
must point out that the decision really conflicts with
the ratio of the decisions in Mela Ram and Sons:1956
SCR 166 and Sheodan Singh:AIR 1966 SC 1332 and
another decision of this Court rendered by two
learned Judges in Rani Choudhury v. Lt.-Col. Suraj Jit
Choudhury:(1982) 2 SCC 596. In Essar Constructions
v. N.P. Rama Krishna Reddy:(2000) 6 SCC 94 brought
to our notice, two other learned Judges of this Court
left open the question. Hence, reliance placed on that
decision is of no avail to the appellant.
16. Thus, in the case on hand we find that the trial
court, the appellate court and the High Court have
rightly held that petition under Order 9 Rule 13 of
the Code would not lie in view of the filing of an
appeal against the decree by the appellant and the
dismissal of the appeal though for default, since a
dismissal for default or on the ground of it being
barred by limitation cannot be equated with a
withdrawal of the appeal. Consequently, the decision
of the High Court is affirmed and this appeal is
dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we make
no order as to costs.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that the order
passed by Learned 1st Appellate Court tantamounts to decree, as
such, this appeal is maintainable in view of the principle of law laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
6.
I have heard Learned Counsel for the appellants at length and
perused the aforesaid judgments. In addition to that, some exercise is
also been carried out which are also referred herein below.
Hon’ble
High
Court
of
Cuttack
in
judgment
dated
10.12.2018 in Jitendra Naik vs. Radhyashyam Naik and others
reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Ori 432 in para Nos.5, 6 observed as
under:
“5. The subject-matter of dispute is no more res
integra.
An
identical
matter
came
up
for
consideration before this Court in the case of Fakira
Mishra v. Biswanath Mishra, 2015 (II) CLR 599. This
Court held as follows:
“3. A Full Bench of this Court, in the case of
Ainthu Charan Parida v. Sitaram Jayanarayan
Firm represented by Ramnibas, 58 (1984) CLT
248 (F.B), held that an order rejecting a
memorandum of appeal or dismissing an appeal
following the rejection of an application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of
delay in preferring the appeal is not a decree
within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code of
Civil Procedure. But then, the apex Court, in the
case of Shyam Sunder Sarma v. Pannalal Jaiswal,
(2005) 1 SCC 436 : AIR 2005 SC 226, held that an
appeal filed along with an application for
condoning the delay in filing that appeal when
dismissed on the refusal to condone the delay is
nevertheless a decision in the appeal.
4. In Shyam Sunder Sarma (supra), the view of
the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in the
case of Mamuda Khateen v. Beniyan Bibi, AIR
1976 Calcutta 415, that an order rejecting a time
barred memorandum of appeal consequent upon
refusal to condone the delay in filing that appeal
was neither a decree nor an appellable order, was
held to be not laying down a correct law.
5. Further, the Full Bench decision of the Kerala
High Court, in the case of Thambi v. Mathew,
1987 (2) KLT 848, that an appeal presented out of
time was nevertheless an appeal in the eye of law
for all purposes and an order dismissing the
appeal was a decree that could be the subject of a
second appeal, was approved by the apex Court.
Be it noted that the aforesaid decision of the
Calcutta High Court was approved by the Full
Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of
Ainthu Charan Parida (supra).
6. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of
the apex Court in the case of Shyam Sunder
Sarma (supra), the Full Bench decision of this
Court in the case of Ainthu Charan Parida (supra)
has been impliedly overruled, the same being
contrary to the enunciation of law laid down by
the apex Court.
7. Thus the logical sequitur of the analysis made
in the preceding paragraphs is that an appeal
filed along with an application for condonation of
delay in filing that appeal when dismissed on
refusal to condone the delay is a decree within
the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil
Procedure.”
6. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of this
Court in the case of Fakira Mishra (supra), the
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is not
maintainable. It is open to the petitioner to file the
second appeal.”
Hon’ble
Allahabad
High
Court
in
a
judgment
dated
16.10.2019 in Som Datt Srivastava v. Smt. Sobha in connection
with Misc Single No.2761 of 2014 in para Nos.7, 15, 16, and 17
observed as under:
7. Regarding the aforesaid proposition of law,
Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shyam
Sunder Sarma(supra) has held has follows:
“10. The question was considered in extenso by a
Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Thambi v.
Mathew ((1987) 2 KLT 848 (FB)). Therein, after
referring to the relevant decisions on the question
it was held that an appeal presented out of time
was nevertheless an appeal in the eye of the law
for all purposes and an order dismissing the
appeal was a decree that could be the subject of a
second appeal. It was also held that Rule 3-A of
Order 41 introduced by Amendment Act 104 of
1976 to the Code, did not in any way affect that
principle. An appeal registered under Rule 9 of
Order 41 of the Code had to be disposed of
according to law and a dismissal of an appeal for
the reason of delay in its presentation, after the
dismissal of an application for condoning the
delay, is in substance and effect a confirmation of
the decree appealed against. Thus, the position
that emerges on a survey of the authorities is that
an appeal filed along with an application for
condoning the delay in filing that appeal when
dismissed on the refusal to condone the delay is
nevertheless a decision in the appeal.”
15. As can be seen from the definition, 'decree'
would mean a formal expression of adjudication
which conclusively determines the rights of parties
and may either be preliminary or final. It would
deem to include rejection of a plaint. As such, it can
be seen that rejection of application for condonation
of delay would definitely determine the rights of
parties conclusively so far as it regards the court
expressing it. As such, it can be safely held that
rejection of application for condonation of delay in
filing first appeal would definitely amount to a
decree as contemplated under Section 2(2) of the
Code of Civil Procedure even without a separate
order dismissing the appeal.
16. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that against
the order impugned in the present petition, the only
remedy for the petitioner lies in filing a second
appeal and not a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, which would, thus, not be
maintainable.
17. In view of the aforesaid, the petition being
devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed. The
petitioner would be at liberty to avail remedy
available to him in accordance with law.”
Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in second appeal No.24 of
2023 with CA/758/2023 in SA/24/2023 with CA/759/2023 in
SA/24/2023 dated 30.06.2023 wherein in para Nos.14, 15 and 16
observed as under:
“14. The consistent principle laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court from Raja Kulkarni (supra)
till Shyam Sudar Sarma (supra) has been that if, an
application for condonation of delay in filing the
appeal is dismissed, then, such a dismissal amounts
to a judgment in appeal.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that the
dismissal of an application for condonation of delay
in filing the appeal amounts to the affirmation of the
judgment of the trial court on merits. [Sheodan
Singh (supra)] Thus, we hold that the order passed
by the appellate court dismissing the application for
condonation of delay in filing the appeal amounts to
a decree of the appellate court, which is
challengeable under Section 100 of CPC.
15. The law laid down by the 2 judges bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ratansingh
(supra) that if an application for condonation of
delay in filing the appeal is dismissed, the Judgment
of the appellate court does not amount to decree is
specifically negatived in Shyam Sudar Sarma
(supra).
16. Thus, with utmost respect to the esteemed Single
Judge, we hold that the issue referred to us is no
more res integra as it has been pronounced by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that an order rejecting an
application for condonation of delay in filing the
appeal is the Judgment of the appellate court
upholding the Judgment of the trial court on merits
[Sheodan Singh (supra)). The Hon'ble Supreme
Court has reversed the law laid down in the case of
Ratansingh (supra), that such an order does not
amount to a decree within the meaning of Section
2(2) of the CPC (Shyam Sundar Sarma (supra)).
Thus, we hold that such an order/decree of the
appellate court is appealable under Section 100 of
CPC.”
From the aforesaid citations and also the citations referred by
Learned Counsel for the appellants, it appears that although the
Learned 1st Appellate Court in view of the order dated 15.06.2024
passed in Civil Misc (Condonation) No.5 of 2023 dismissed the
application for condonation of delay and consequently, upon the
dismissal of the said condonation application, the Learned 1 st
Appellate Court also dismissed TA No.10 of 2023 which tantamount to
decree and challenging that decree, the second appeal is very much
maintainable.
So, it appears to this Court that the second appeal filed by
the appellants is maintainable.
7.
Now, regarding condonation of delay, it appears to this Court
that the grounds set forth in the application for condonation of delay
were not at all satisfactory. However, since the appellants are rustic
village people and it is on record that they are the inhabitants of
Dhalai District and it had been difficult on their part to engage a good
civil lawyer to defend their case from Agartala by spending huge
amount of money. So, the delay as explained in the application for
condonation of delay could have been allowed by the Learned 1st
Appellate Court but the Learned 1st Appellate Court strictly following
the principles of law dismissed the application for condonation of
delay without affording any opportunity to the appellant which in my
considered
view
was
not
proper
for
the
interest
of
justice.
Accordingly, the order passed by Learned 1st Appellate Court in Civil
Misc(condonation) No.5 of 2023 dated 15.06.2024 is set aside and the
order dated 15.06.2024 delivered by Learned 1st Appellate Court in TA
No.10 of 2023 is accordingly stands set aside.
8.
In the result, the appeal filed by the present appellants is
hereby allowed. The matter is remanded back to the Learned 1st
Appellate Court with a direction to rehear the appeal afresh on merit
and to deliver a fresh judgment in accordance with law.
Prepare decree accordingly.
The appellants be asked to appear before the Learned Trial
Court below either personally or throughout their engaged advocate
on 14.05.2025 positively.
A copy of this judgment accordingly be furnished to Learned
Counsel for the appellants for information and compliance.
With this observation, the appeal stands disposed of.
Pending applications(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
MOUMITA
DATTA
Deepshikha
MOUMITA DATTA
Date: 2025.04.23
18:14:44 -07'00'
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