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Civil

Sri Amal Kumar Banerjee vs Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust)

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Court
Tripura High Court
Date
15 February 2022
Case No.
RSA 40/2019
Result
Allowed
Bench
Arindam Lodh
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18. 04.2019 respectively, passed by learned first appellate court in TA 21 of 2018 stand set aside and quashed. The judgment and decree dated

24. 09.2018 and 05.10.2018, passed by learned civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court no.1, Kailashahar, Unakoti, Tripura in TS 25 of 2017 are restored.

42. In the conspectus as aforesaid, this second appeal is allowed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed. Prepare the decree accordingly. Send down the LCRs.

Filed under

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Section 68, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Section 3, Indian Evidence Act, 1872

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Full Judgment Text

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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AGARTALA RSA 40 OF 2019 Sri Amal Kumar Banerjee, S/o Lt. Umapada Banerjee, resident of East Gobindapur, PS Kailashahar, Dist. Unakoti Tripura. ---- Appellant. Versus Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust), Respresented by Sri Arun Kumar Banerjee, Founder Chairman, A-6 Sarmila Apartments near Jagadishnagar, HSG-SOC, Ganeshkind Road, Aundh, Pune-7, Maharashtra. ---Respondent. For Appellant(s) : Mrs. S. Deb (Gupta), Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. D.R.Chowdhury, Sr.Advocate. Mr. S. Sarkar, Advocate. Date of hearing & delivery of Judgment and order : 15.02.2022 Whether fit for reporting : Yes HON’BLE MR JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH Judgment & Order (Oral) This is a second appeal preferred by the original plaintiff Sri Amal Kumar Banerjee challenging the judgment and decree dated 17.04.2019 and 18.04.2019 respectively, passed in Title Appeal No.21 of 2018 whereby and whereunder learned District Judge, Unakoti District, Kailashahar allowed the appeal and dismissed the judgment and decree dated 24.09.2018 and 05.10.2018 passed by learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court No.1, Kailashahar, Unakoti, Tripura in TS 25 of 2017. 2. The dispute is concerned to a Will executed on 06.03.2014 [Exbt.2] and registered on 10.03.2014 relating to the plot of land described in second schedule of the plaint. The appellant-plaintiff [here-in-after referred to as the plaintiff] instituted the suit for declaration that the Will dated 10.03.2014 bearing No. 111-00012 was illegal, ineffective and not binding upon him as well as for declaration that the plaintiff has right, title and interest over the suit land in first schedule of the plaint which was transferred in favour of him by dint of the Will No.III-06 dated 14.02.2006. One late Anurupa Chakraborty, wife of Binode Bihari Chakraborty was the sole owner having right, title and interest over the land described in first schedule of the plaint, which includes second schedule. It is the case of the plaintiff that he being one of the nephews of late Anurupa Chakraborty used to look after her during her life time and being satisfied with his service, she transferred the land described in first schedule of the plaint in favour of him by a registered Will No.III-06 dated 14.02.2006. The testator, Anurupa Chakraborty died on 25.03.2014 in her residence at Govindapur and the plaintiff performed funeral works and other rituals. After her death he tried to enter his name in the record-ofright under the TLR and LR Act in regard to the suit land which he received by dint of the registered Will dated 14.02.2006. At that time, from the office of the Tehsil, he came to learn on 30.12.2016 about the existence of another Will executed on 10.03.2014. Thereafter, he applied for certified copy of the said Will and obtained the same on 10.01.2017 wherefrom he came to learn that the Will was executed in favour of the defendant, which, according to the plaintiff, was executed secretly and fraudulently. The plaintiff has specifically stated that the testator, Anurupa Chakraborty was a literate lady and till death she had the ability to read and write. 3. The defendant, Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust) represented by Sri Arun Kumar Banerjee contested the suit by filing written statement. It is pleaded that the testator, Anurupa Chakraborty always intended to donate the land of Schedule ‘A’ to develop an educational institution. It was also the wishes of her deceased husband and to fulfill the wishes and desires of both of them she executed the Will dated 10.03.2014 in favour of Umabel Educational Foundation (trust). It is further pleaded that since she was suffering from illness, she could not put her signature, but, put her left thumb impression in the Will as the testator. The defendant further pleaded that the registration was made through Commissioner as she was not physically fit for movement, though, she was quite able to understand her surroundings and to manage her own affairs. The testator was also mentally fit and conscious about her judgment and decision. It is also averred that advocate Sri S. Chattopadhyay had drafted the Will and there were two attesting witnesses, namely, Bimalendu Dutta and Ashit Ranjan Das. 4. After exchange of pleadings, having heard and considered the materials on record, learned trial court framed the following issues:(i) Whether the suit is maintainable? (ii) Whether the registered Will bearing No.III-00012 dated 10.03.2014 is ineffective, null void and not binding being executed by exercise of fraud, undue influence, misrepresentation, collision and false personation? (iii)Whether the suit land in the possession of plaintiff or defendant? (iv)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for and/or any other relief/reliefs? 5. Thereafter, evidences were recorded. Both the plaintiff and the defendant had adduced evidence along with their respective witnesses. Plaintiff had adduced two witnesses including him. The defendant also had adduced three witnesses including him. 6. After completion of recording evidence and having heard the arguments advanced by the parties, the learned trial court came to a finding that the Will dated 10.03.2014 executed in favour of the defendant was not believable as it suffered from suspicious circumstances which the defendant had failed to remove. Accordingly, decree had been passed declaring the Will dated 10.03.2014, executed in favour of the defendant as void abinitio and not binding upon the plaintiff and declared plaintiff’s right, title and interest over the suit land described in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint. 7. The defendant being aggrieved preferred first appeal before the court of learned District Judge who reversed the finding of learned trial court holding that the Will dated 10.03.2014 did not suffer from any infirmity and there was no suspicious circumstances. Accordingly, he dismissed the judgment and decree passed by learned trial court in favour of the plaintiff. 8. Challenging the said reversal judgment and decree passed by learned first appellate court, the plaintiff has preferred the instant appeal before this court. At the time of admission of the second appeal, this court formulated the following substantial question of law:“Whether the evidence of DW-3 has established execution of the said Will dated 06.03.2014 (Exbt.G) or the findings as returned by the appellate court in respect of the proper execution of the Will is perverse in nature”? 9. I have heard Mrs. S. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff as well as Mr. D.R. Chowdhury, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 10. Mrs. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has pointed out various suspicious circumstances as are reflected in the judgment passed by learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Kailashahar. Learned counsel has submitted that the findings arrived at by learned first appellate court are based on no evidence and misconstrued the legal position. She further submits that the defendant has failed to establish the existence of the Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust) itself. She has emphasized on various irregularities surfaced in the execution and registration of the Will dated 10.03.2014 (Exbt.G). She has also argued that the scribe of the Will dated 10.03.2014 has not adduced evidence as witness and thus, the contents of the Will cannot be said to be proved. Ultimately, Mrs. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has urged to restore the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division setting aside the judgment and decree passed by learned first appellate court. 11. Opposing the submissions of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, Mr. Chowdhury, learned senior counsel for the defendant [the respondent here-in] has submitted that the contents of the Will have been proved. Learned senior counsel has further argued that there is no bar in law that the owner of a land cannot execute any subsequent Will. Mr. Chowdhury, learned senior counsel has tried to persuade this court that one of the attesting witnesses, namely, Bimalendu Datta appeared before the court and deposed that in front of him the testator, Anurupa Chakraborty had put her thumb impressions. Said Bimalendu Dutta also identified his signature in the Will. Regarding the contents of the Will, learned senior counsel has emphatically submitted that said Dutta being one of the attesting witnesses had sworn affidavit before the Notary Public, Kailashahar where he proved the contents mentioned in the “affidavit” in proof of the contents of the Will. Mr. Chowdhury, learned senior counsel has submitted a written argument today before this court. According to learned senior counsel, the Will dated 10.03.2014 does not suffer from any infirmity or suspicious circumstances and he prays for upholding the judgment and decree passed by learned first appellate court. 12. I have gone through the judgments of both the courts below. Learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court No.1, Kailashahar having considered the evidence and materials on record came across the following suspicious circumstances which are reproduced hereunder, in extenso, for convenience:“18. In this case, I find, the second disputed WILL is not believable due to the following suspicious circumstances which could not be removed by the defendant-propounder of the WILL :a) The attesting witness of the WILL namely Sri Bimalendu Datta as DW.3 merely deposed that the disputed second WILL marked Ext.G is exhibited by executant Anurupa Chakraborty and identified his signature as attesting witness marked Ext.G/1 and also identified the thumb impression of testator marked Ext.G/2 series which are taken by him and his signature below the thumb impression is marked as Ext.G/3 and he identified executant at the time of registration and his signature is marked as Ext.G/4 and also deposed that the disputed WILL was executed on 06.03.2014 being drafted by Advocate Siddhartha Chatterjee and also identified the signature of Advocate marked Ext.G/5. Thus, I find, the attesting witness did not depose anything about the fact that the contents of the disputed second WILL was read over and explained to the testator. It is also not deposed that testator put thumb impression in the WILL after knowing and understanding the contents of the WILL. It is also not deposed that the testator signed in the WILL in presence of two attesting witnesses and the two attesting witnesses also signed in presence of testator. b) As submitted by Ld counsel Mr. M Rahaman appearing for the plaintiff, I find, in this case, the Advocate who drafted the WILL has not been examined as a witness. The Advocate who drafted the WILL is the best person to say that he drafted the WILL as per say or dictation of testator or anyone else. Even there is no evidence at all that disputed second WILL was drafted as per say of the testator and testator signed the second WILL being satisfied with its contents. Another attesting witness and Sub-Registrars are also not examined and no explanation is given or brought on record for their non examination. c) The disputed second WILL is a computer typed document and no evidence is adduced as to the fact that how, where and who typed the said WILL and has taken print out. It is not clear whether Ld Advocate who drafted the WILL has drafted any draft copy by handwriting and thereafter it was typed in computer and taken print out. As the second disputed WILL is not handwritten WILL it is not natural that the same was typed in computer in the house of testator as per say of testator unless specifically pleaded and proved. Thus, I find, the manner of drafting, typing and place of its preparation are not clear before the court. d) In the disputed second WILL there is mentioning that the WILL was executed at the premises of Sub-registry office, Kailashahar on the 6th day of March, 2014 by testator voluntarily and while in sound state of mind. In my view, the above mentioned contention is not believable as the WILL was registered through commission being the testator is suffering from illness. Where the testator has been suffering from illness and the WILL is registered through commission it is very hard to believe that the testator would come in the office of sub-registry office and execute the WILL in the sub-registry office. Thus, the above mentioned suspicious circumstances also goes against the defendantpropounder of the WILL. e) The propounder of the WILL, the defendant as DW1 deposed in cross-examination that the last WILL was executed on 10.03.2014 and initially he was not aware about the last WILL but his sister informed him about the same but he admitted his signature on the WILL(Ext.G) and his signature is marked as Ext.G(1) and deposed that he has given the above mentioned signature in the Bar Library. As submitted by the Ld counsel for the plaintiff Mr. Rahaman, I find, the evidence of DW.1 that initially he was not aware about the WILL is not believable for in the WILL there is his signature and he himself produced the said WILL before the subregistry office for registration on 10.03.2014. That apart, in cross examination DW.1 deposed that before giving any property to any trust permission of the trust is necessary and they have taken permission of the trust for giving the suit land in favour of trust. Thus, I find, the propounder defendant had prior information about the giving of suit land in favour of defendant trust and even the defendant himself deposed that they have taken permission for giving the suit land in favour of trust. Hence, it is not believable that the defendant was not aware about the WILL initially. Thus, the evidence of DW.1 is not credit-worthy. f) In this case, the propounder defendant has taken active part in the execution of the WILL as it appears from the said WILL that defendant himself produced the said WILL for registration and the defendant himself deposed in cross examination that they have taken permission of the trust for giving the suit land in favour of the trust. Thus, I find, the defendant with his initiative himself took permission of trust for giving the suit land in favour of the trust. Hence, it can be said that the defendant-trust, the beneficiary of the WILL has taken active part in the execution of the WILL and, thus, WILL is suspicious. g) As submitted by Ld counsel for the plaintiff Mr. Rahaman, I find, from Ext.Q, the letter seeking permission of trust that testator sought for permission but there is no seal or signature of the defendant trust institution to show that the said letter was received by defendant institution and acted upon. As admitted by DW.1 in cross-examination no such permission of the trust has been submitted before this court. Thus, the execution of the second WILL following the letter seeking permission marked Ext.Q after getting permission is not cogent. From Ext.Q, I find, the testator stated that her husband was social worker and for the memory of her husband she wanted to gift or execute the WILL in respect of her property for the use and name of “Binod Bihari Memorial Siksha Niketan” but on the contrary, in the WILL marked Ext.G, it is mentioned that both executant and her husband decided earlier to donate their property for the purpose of education and education related activities as per the deed of trust resolution. In the letter seeking permission there is not mentioning that it was also the desire of the husband of the testator to donate the property. If it is true that it was decided by testator and her husband during the lifetime of her husband to donate the property for the purpose of education there was no necessity and requirement for execution of the first WILL in favour of plaintiff by testator negating the decision of testator and her husband taken during the lifetime of her husband to donate the property for the purpose of education and education related activities. Execution of the first WILL negates the contention that testator and her husband earlier decided to donate the property in favour of education and education related activities. Thus, I find, the purpose of execution of WILL as mentioned in the WILL is not convincing. h) The second WILL executed by putting thumb impression whereas the first WILL was executed by giving signature and the testator dies after 19/20 days of the execution of the alleged second WILL and as there is no evidence adduced about the voluntariness and free consent of the testator and that the testator signed the WILL, after the contents being read over and explained to the testator, knowing the contents of it, the same makes the second WILL doubtful and suspicious. That apart, defendant-propounder pleaded and deposed that that due hand tremor the testator was unable to sign but no such fact of hand tremor is spell-out in the WILL. In the WILL it is merely mentioned that testator is an old woman aged about 73 years and to her advanced age she has been keeping indifferent health for past 6/7 months and she cannot put her signature due to her disease. Thus, I find, putting of thumb impression in the WILL instead of signature of testator goes against the defendant-propounder of the WILL. i) The first WILL was executed in the year 2006 in favour of the plaintiff but the second WILL is executed just 19/20 days before the death of testator and there is no cogent reason showing change of circumstances leading to execution of second WILL. The reason mentioned in the second WILL as to the fact that testator and her husband decided to donate the property is not believable as discussed earlier. Thus, I find, no reason leading to the circumstances making execution of second WILL probable just before 19/20 days of death of testator at the age of 73 years. j) In the letter seeking permission it is mentioned that testator wanted to donate the property for the nomenclature of Binod Bihari Memorial Siksha Niketan and for the benefit of public but from the cross-examination of PW.1 it can be found that the name of the defendant trust 'Umabel Educational Foundation Trust, is for the name of father and mother of plaintiff and defendant and in no way the execution of the WILL in favour of defendant trust it can be said that the nomenclature of the name of husband of the testator namely Binod Bihari Memorial Siksha Niketan would be served. 19. In this case, the defendant failed to remove the above mentioned suspicious circumstances and as the disputed WILL is surrounded by the above mentioned suspicious circumstances and as the defendant-propounder of the WILL failed to remove the above mentioned suspicious circumstances to satisfy the conscience of this court that the disputed second WILL is executed voluntarily with free consent and the testator put thumb impression after the contents being read over and explained and knowing the contents and, therefore, it is impossible for this court to say that the second WILL is valid as the defendant-propounder failed to give proper explanation of suspicious circumstances by cogent and convincing evidence……” 13. Rejecting the aforesaid findings, learned first appellate court while deciding the issues came to a finding that Bimalendu Dutta, DW-3 being one of the attesting witnesses had adduced evidence and through an affidavit sworn in before the Notary Public, Kailashahar had proved the contents of the Will. According to learned first appellate court, in front of DW-3, the testator, Anurupa Chakraborty had put her thumb impressions. The Will dated 10.03.2014 was drafted by advocate namely, Sri S. Chattopadhyay and it cannot be doubted. Learned first appellate court has heavily relied upon the fact that DW-3, Bimalendu Dutta one of the attesting witnesses of the Will dated 10.03.2014 was also as a scribe of the previous Will executed by Smt. Anurupa Chakraborty on 14.02.2006 in his efforts to prove the reliability of DW-3. Learned first appellate court also observed that the learned trial court went beyond the pleadings to declare the Will dated 10.03.2014 as void abinitio and decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff. In this regard, learned first appellate court held that the plaintiff did not plead anything in his plaint regarding the suspicious circumstances which they asserted in the case and it was the burden upon the plaintiff to raise those suspicious circumstances in his plaint and thereafter, to prove those suspicious circumstances. On the aforesaid grounds, learned first appellate court dismissed the judgment and decree passed by learned trial court. 14. I have given my conscious thought to the findings recorded by both the courts below. In my opinion, learned first appellate court was totally misdirected himself from the very beginning to accurately appreciate the evidence let in to prove the Will in question. I have gone through the evidence as adduced by DW-1, the propounder i.e. the beneficiary of the Will. DW-1 Arun Kumar Banerjee asserted that he and his wife were the members of the Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust) being it registered at Pune, in the State of Maharashtra, but, I find no such document regarding the existence or formation of the trust. However, question is, how the testator, Anurupa Chakraborty came to know about the existence of the said trust being resided at Kailashahar, Unakoti District, Tripura. If we believe the statements of the defendant (DW-1) and DW-3, Bimalendu Dutta, one of the attesting witnesses, then, it would give an impression that the testator intended to donate the land belonging to first Schedule of the plaint in favour of the defendant for developing an educational institution in memory of her husband Binode Bihari Banerjee under the nomenclature “Binode Behari Memorial Educational Institute” which surfaced at para 11(e) of the written statement itself. But, it transpires that the land was practically donated in favour of Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust) raising serious doubt about the genuinity of the Will in question. In my opinion, the defendant being the beneficiary of the Will has failed to remove the cloud under which circumstances the testator had executed the Will intending to donate the land in favour of Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust). 15. Secondly, from the above stated factual matrix three relevant issues have to be determined by this court, (i) whether the Will has been proved in accordance with the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, (ii) whether the affidavit sworn in by DW-3, one of the attesting witnesses before the Notary Public can be said to be “evidence” or it is a mere “document” within the ambit of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, (iii) whether the defendant has been able to remove the suspicious circumstances. 16. For better understanding of issue nos. (i) and (ii), it is expedient for this court to extract the provisions of Section 68 and the relevant interpretation clause to be used for the purpose of deciding the present appeal as embodied under Section 3 of the Evidence Act and Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, which are as under:“68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested.—If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence: [Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a Will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied].” 3. Interpretation clause. —In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context:— *** *** “Document”. —“Document” means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter….. “Evidence” .— “ Evidence” means and includes— (1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence; (2) all documents [including electronic records] produced for the inspection of the Court; such documents are called documentary evidence. “63. Execution of unprivileged Wills. —Every testator, not being a soldier employed in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare, 12 [or an airman so employed or engaged,] or a mariner at sea, shall execute his Will according to the following rules:— (a) The testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the Will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction. (b) The signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a Will. (c) The Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or the signature of such other person; and each of the witnesses shall sign the Will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.” 17. On careful reading of the above provisions, neither the contents of the Will nor the execution of the Will, according to me, have been proved. In the present case, ordinarily, the party relying upon an original document in the form of primary evidence calls the scribe or any person who knows the scribe (if the scribe is not alive or not traceable) to prove the contents of the Will). There is no explanation as to why the scribe i.e. the Advocate who drafted the Will has not come forward to adduce evidence to prove the contents. The defendant has also failed to bring Sri Ashit Ranjan Das, one of the attesting witnesses to the Will. 18. The defendant had not taken the recourse of issuing summons as provided under Order XVI Rule 1, Rule 1(a) read with Rule 7(a) of CPC. From this conduct of the defendant, the court can draw an adverse inference about the circumstances under which the Will was executed. It is noticed that the Will had been signed by two attesting witnesses, namely, (1) Sri Ashit Ranjan Das and (2) Sri Bimalendu Datta. The defendant has also failed to bring Ashit Ranjan Das. It is true that a Will can be proved by producing at least one attesting witness as provided under proviso of Section 65 and 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act. As such, it is important to discuss the nature of evidence adduced by said Bimalendu. 19. To determine the point as sought for here-in-above, as to whether the affidavit sworn in by Bimalendu Dutta, DW-3 before the Notary Public can be said to be ‘evidence’ or not. It is a mere document under Section 23 of the Evidence Act. Both the learned courts have treated this affidavit sworn in before the Notary Public as ‘evidence’ deposed by DW-3. Only difference is that learned trial court disbelieved the evidence of DW-3 as deposed by him while the first appellate court had believed such evidence. 20. Order 18 of CPC lays down the procedures for examination of witnesses. Under Order 18 Rule 1, the plaintiff has the right to begin unless the defendant admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff and contends that either in point of law or on some additional facts alleged by the defendant, the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the relief which he seeks, in which case the defendant has the right to begin. In the context of the case, there is no doubt that the plaintiff has the right to begin. Rule 2 stipulates that on the day fixed for the hearing of the suit or on any other day to which the hearing is adjourned, the party having the right to begin shall state his case and produce his evidence in support of the issues which he is bound to prove. Sub-rule(2) of Rule 2 stipulates that the other party shall then state his case and produce his evidence(if any) and may then address the Court generally on the whole case. 21. Order 18, Rule 4 may be reproduced as under:“4. Recording of evidence.—(1) In every case, the examination-in-chief of a witness shall be on affidavit and copies therefore shall be supplied to the opposite party by the party who calls him for evidence: Provided that where documents are filed and the parties rely upon the documents, the proof and admissibility of such documents which are filed alongwith affidavit shall be subject to the orders of the Court. (2) The evidence (cross-examination and re-examination) of the witness in attendance, whose evidence (examination-in-chief) by affidavit has been furnished to the Court shall be taken either by the Court or by the Commissioner appointed by it: (3) *** *** (4) *** *** (5) *** *** (6) *** *** (7) *** *** (8) *** ***” Provided that the Court may, while appointing a commission under this sub-rule, consider taking into account such relevant factors as it thinks fit: 22. An overview of the above provisions, it becomes crystal clear that in normal circumstances the plaintiff will lead the evidence first. To lead such evidence he will file examination-in-chief in the form of an affidavit supplying copies of such examination-in-chief to the opposite party. He may produce witnesses on his behalf and such evidence also has to be led by way of filing examination-in-chief supported by affidavit and the plaintiff shall supply copies of such affidavit to the opposite parties. The party may furnish any documents they rely upon. However, the proof and admissibility of such documents shall be subject to the orders of the court. The plaintiff had filed examination-in-chief in the form of an affidavit addressing to the court. On examination of LC records, it is found in the order dated 11.07.2018 passed by learned civil judge, Sr. Division that learned counsel on behalf of the defendant had filed examination-inchief of the defendant i.e. Arun Kumar Banerjee in the form of an affidavit addressing to the court. It further reveals that learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant had sought for accommodation for submitting another examination-in-chief on behalf of the defendant which was allowed by the learned court. It is surfaced from the order dated 17.07.2018 that the defendant had not furnished any examination-in-chief on behalf of his witnesses and on the prayer of the defendant learned court had passed on order to examine Sri Bimalendu Datta through Advocate Commissioner. Accordingly, on 23.10.2017 Bimalendu Datta had been examined as DW-3 by the appointed Commissioner. On the date of his examination by the Commissioner, DW-3 deposed thus:“This is one affidavit sworn before the Notary Public, Kailashahar, on 23.10.2017 by me and I put my signature in the said affidavit [Exbt.R]. This affidavit was written and typed as per my dictation and explained to me in Bengali by my Advocate Sri Shakti Pada Datta Purakayastha and explained to me in Bengali by said Advocate and admitted it to be correct. I put my signature in the said affidavit. This is my signature marked as R/1 series.” 23. What has been garnered from the order dated 11.07.2018 and 17.07.2018 that no examination-in-chief had been submitted by the defendant supplying copy to the opposite party i.e. the plaintiff here-in. It is noticed that the affidavit sworn in before the Notary Public on 23.10.2017 was much before the order passed by learned trial court directing the defendant to adduce evidence on his behalf. In compliance of such direction the defendant, as I said earlier, had submitted his examination-in-chief in the form of an affidavit which was addressed to the court itself. 24. On examination of the said examination-in-chief furnished by the defendant in the form of an affidavit, the oath was administered on 03.05.2018 by the Notary Public, Kailashahar. On further examination of records, it reveals that DW-2 and DW-3 did not furnish any examinationin-chief in the form of affidavit addressing to the court. The defendant side while producing DW-2 had submitted an affidavit sworn in before the Notary Public which was addressed to the Notary Public itself. DW-3, Bimalendu Dutta had produced an affidavit which was also sworn in before the Notary Public addressing the Notary Public itself, but, not to the court. It has also come to light that both these affidavits of DW-2 and DW3 were sworn on 23.10.2017. On examination of records, I find that the learned trial court had never passed any such direction to submit any such affidavit on behalf of the defendant by his witnesses as a matter of treating the same as examination-in-chief to be a part of evidence and using the same for the purpose of cross-examination as provided under Order XIX Rule 1 of CPC which reads as under:“19. Power to get statements recorded on commission.Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the Court may, instead of examining witnesses in open Court, direct their statements to be recorded on commission under rule 4A of Order XXVI. 1. Power to order any point to be proved by affidavit. - Any Court may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing, on such conditions as the Court thinks reasonable : Provided that where it appears to the Court that either party bona fide desires the production of a witness for cross-examination, and that such witness can be produced, an order shall not be made authorizing the evidence of such witness to be given by affidavit.” 25. To clarify, in terms of Order XIX Rule 1 of CPC, the court may at any stage permit a party to adduce evidence by way of affidavit assigning sufficient or cogent reasons. 26. In my opinion, the affidavits sworn in before the Notary Public by DW-2 and DW-3, i.e. the Exbt. P and Exbt. R, are mere documents where some write-ups or expressions of the declarant exist. In other words, the contentions made in the affidavits are mere statements of the author of the affidavits for the reason that firstly, those affidavits [Exbt.P and Exbt.R] were not made under the direction or authority of the court; secondly, those were sworn much before the date of adducing evidence of the plaintiff which is contrary to Order 18 Rule 1 of CPC; thirdly, both Exbt.P and Exbt.R were addressed to the Notary itself, but, not to the court; fourthly, no copies of such affidavits were supplied to the opposite party, the plaintiff, here-in as embodied under sub-rule(1) of Rule 4 of Order 18 CPC; fifthly and most importantly on bare perusal of subrule(2) of Rule 4 contemplates that Commissioner is appointed only for the purpose of cross-examination and re-examination of a witness on the basis of the evidence [examination-in-chief] by way of affidavit furnished to the court and here, no examination-in-chief by way of affidavit had been furnished to the court on the basis of which cross-examination would be taken by the Commissioner. 27. That apart, the statements made by DW-3 before the Commissioner were made in proof of the contents of the affidavit sworn by him and he identified his signature as declarant of the said contents of the affidavit. As such, the affidavit sworn in before the Notary Public cannot be treated as evidence [examination-in-chief], by way of affidavit as contemplated under Order 18 of CPC. It is a mere affidavit regarding some facts which the deponent wants to swear and declare such facts by way of affidavit before the Notary Public. 28. An argument may be made that under Section 139 of CPC, an affidavit can be sworn before the Notary Public. At this juncture, it is necessary to refer the provisions of Section 139 of CPC which reads thus:- “139. Oath on affidavit by whom to be administered.--In the case of any affidavit under this Code(a) any Court or Magistrate, or [(aa) any notary appointed under the Notaries Act, 1952 (53 of 1952); or] (b) any officer or other person whom a High Court may appoint in this behalf, or (c) any officer appointed by any other Court which the State Government has generally or specially empowered in this behalf, may administer the oath to the deponent.” 29. A bare perusal of clause (aa) it makes it clear that any Notary appointed under the Notaries Act, 1952 is authorized to administer oath of affidavit. In other words, Section 139 is being amended to include a specific provision permitting the swearing of affidavit before the Notary. 30. In the light of clause (aa) of Section 139 of CPC, in the opinion of this court, the said clause (aa) of Section 139 should be read with Order 18 Rule 4(1) of CPC. For further clarification, such affidavit should be in the form of examination-in-chief and to be addressed to the concerned court as contemplated under Order 18, Rule 4(1) of CPC and the Notary appointed under the Notaries Act has the power to administer the oath of the deponent regarding the truthfulness of the statements made in examination-in-chief. 31. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, in my opinion, the affidavit sworn in before the Notary in the context of the case, does not constitute a piece of evidence. It is a mere document containing some statements of the maker and it cannot be said to be a part of evidence. Noticeably, from the examination-in-chief of DW-1, it appears that it was filed in consonance with the provisions contemplated under Order 18 Rule 1 of CPC. Here, I find that it was furnished by way of examination-in-chief addressed to the court and oath of the deponent was administered by the Notary. 32. On careful consideration of the statements made by DW-3 before the Commissioner as reproduced here-in-above, it is noticed that DW-3 has not stated anything that the testator had expressed her wishes and intentions to the Advocate on the basis of which the concerned Advocate i.e. the scribe had drafted the Will. It becomes apparent that the DW-3 himself has not identified his signature as attesting witness in the said Will. Furthermore, taking note of notarized affidavit, it comes to light that DW-3 had stated that late Anurupa Chakraborty, testator of the said Will [Exbt.G] has given four right thumb impressions, but, on close scrutiny of the Will itself, it comes to fore that late Anurupa Chakraborty has given left thumb impressions which provides enough space to doubt the honesty and integrity of DW-3. 33. In view of the aforesaid legal propositions and variable factors, it seems to be very difficult for this court to give credence to the testimony of DW-3 apart from the fact that the affidavit cannot be treated as evidence. 34. It is noticed that the defendant had furnished the affidavit sworn by DW-2 on 23.10.2017 before the Notary Public as document, which was marked as Exbt. P and there is no evidence that the affidavit [Exbt. R] sworn in by DW-3 on 23.10.2017 before the Notary Public was ever produced before the court prior to the furnishing of the same before the commissioner, to say the least, that the court has ever permitted the defendant or DW-3 to treat the statements made in the affidavit [Exbt.R] as evidence in proof of the Will to bring it within the purview of the definition of “evidence” and thus the “Will” [Exbt.G] and the “affidavit” [Exbt.R] come within the purview of the definition of “Document” as embodied under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, which went unnoticed by both the courts below perhaps out of inadvertence . In summation of what has been discussed here-in-above, the defendant had failed to produce any evidence in proof of the Will either by the scribe or by any of the two attesting witnesses. At best, under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, DW-3 has proved the contents of the affidavit and his signature thereon, which has no bearing on the subject Will. 35. Another significant feature necessary to be stated herein is that such affidavit inconsistent to the requirement of Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC being only a piece of document is inadmissible in evidence in proof of the Will (Exbt.G) and objection against such inadmissible evidence can be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even at the stage of second appeal. 36. It is important to notice that examination-in-chief by way of affidavit if furnished to the court by a party (witness) as permitted by the court for adducing evidence on his behalf is never marked as “Exhibit”, and if the party (witness) filing such examination-in-chief by affidavit is subjected to cross-examination, only then, it will constitute evidence within the ambit of the definition of Section 3 of the Evidence Act and meets the essential requirements of Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC. 37. Again, apart from the suspicious circumstances which have been mentioned in the judgment of the learned trial court, I have noticed that DW-1 being the beneficiary of the Will dated 10.03.2014 has deposed that he was not aware of the execution or registration of the said Will and it was handed over to him after the death of the Testator, Anurupa Chakraborty by his sister, but, on examination of the original Will (Exbt.G), it is found that he himself presented the Will before the SubRegistrar, Kailashahar on 10.03.2014 at 12:00 hours. Furthermore, his signature is apparent in the Will itself, which being identified by defendant himself was marked as Exbt.G(i).Question naturally arises why he tried to mislead the learned courts when he being the propounder himself presented the Will before the Sub-Registrar? This, in my opinion, raises a serious doubt as to whether the questioned Will was executed according to the wishes and desires of the testator. This suspicious circumstance the propounder i.e. the DW-1 has failed to remove. 38. Yet another factor, in the context of the case, necessary to be considered that DW-2 in his cross-examination stated that he had no idea or knowledge about the depositions which he made in his affidavit, though such affidavit is admissible in evidence as it is not in accordance with statutory prescriptions as envisaged under Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC. That gives rise to this court a definite impression that he had no knowledge about the contents and execution of Will. DW-2 also has not stated about the presence of DW-3 at the time of execution of Will. It would be useful to extract hereunder the relevant excerpt apparent in his crossexamination:“I cannot read and write in English but I can merely put my signature in Bengali. I cannot say what is written in English in my examination in chief. I cannot say the same (sic ‘name’) of the lawyer who has prepared my examination in chief……” 39. Furthermore, I find inconsistency in the statements made by the defendant in his written statement and the depositions he furnished before the court in his examination-in-chief. At paragraph 11(e) of his written statement, the defendant has stated that Anurupa Chakraborty (testator) had written –“a request letter dated 15.11.2013 to this defendant trust institution requesting for necessary approval or consent from this institution so that her husband’s name in the shape and nomenclature of ‘Binode Bihari Memorial Educational Institute’ would take effect by way of executing gift deed or Will.” But, I find that the land in question has been directly donated in favour of the “Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust)” without any mention of “Binode Bihari Memorial Educationkal Institute”. This inconsistency in his written statement and contents/expressions of Will also has raised doubt about the genuine reflections of the wishes and desires of the testator. 40. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, considering the law on the subject, I totally endorse the findings arrived at by learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court No.1, Kailashahar except his reliance upon affidavit [Exbt.R] and I find it very difficult to approve the views taken by the learned first appellate court. The findings of the learned first appellate court regarding the process of execution of Will dated 10.03.2014 badly suffers from misconception of law. He erroneously held that contents of the Will had been proved by DW-3 on the strength of the affidavit which was sworn before the Notary Public, in the opinion of this court, was per se inconsistent with Section 3 of the Evidence Act and contrary to the requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act qua Section 68 of the Evidence Act. Further, Learned first appellate court has totally misconstrued the suspicious circumstances as are encapsulated in the judgment of the learned trial court. As such, I have no option but to hold that the findings recorded by learned first appellate court are perverse and hence, not tenable in law and liable to be set aside. 41. Accordingly, the judgment and decree dated 17.04.2019 and 18.04.2019 respectively, passed by learned first appellate court in TA 21 of 2018 stand set aside and quashed. The judgment and decree dated 24.09.2018 and 05.10.2018, passed by learned civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court no.1, Kailashahar, Unakoti, Tripura in TS 25 of 2017 are restored. 42. In the conspectus as aforesaid, this second appeal is allowed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed. Prepare the decree accordingly. Send down the LCRs. JUDGE

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