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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA 40 OF 2019
Sri Amal Kumar Banerjee,
S/o Lt. Umapada Banerjee, resident of East Gobindapur,
PS Kailashahar, Dist. Unakoti Tripura.
---- Appellant.
Versus
Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust),
Respresented by Sri Arun Kumar Banerjee,
Founder Chairman,
A-6 Sarmila Apartments near Jagadishnagar,
HSG-SOC, Ganeshkind Road, Aundh, Pune-7, Maharashtra.
---Respondent.
For Appellant(s)
: Mrs. S. Deb (Gupta), Advocate.
For Respondent(s)
: Mr. D.R.Chowdhury, Sr.Advocate.
Mr. S. Sarkar, Advocate.
Date of hearing &
delivery of Judgment and order : 15.02.2022
Whether fit for reporting
: Yes
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
Judgment & Order (Oral)
This is a second appeal preferred by the original plaintiff Sri
Amal Kumar Banerjee challenging the judgment and decree dated
17.04.2019 and 18.04.2019 respectively, passed in Title Appeal No.21 of
2018 whereby and whereunder learned District Judge, Unakoti District,
Kailashahar allowed the appeal and dismissed the judgment and decree
dated 24.09.2018 and 05.10.2018 passed by learned Civil Judge, Sr.
Division, Court No.1, Kailashahar, Unakoti, Tripura in TS 25 of 2017.
2.
The dispute is concerned to a Will executed on 06.03.2014
[Exbt.2] and registered on 10.03.2014 relating to the plot of land described
in second schedule of the plaint. The appellant-plaintiff [here-in-after
referred to as the plaintiff] instituted the suit for declaration that the Will
dated 10.03.2014 bearing No. 111-00012 was illegal, ineffective and not
binding upon him as well as for declaration that the plaintiff has right, title
and interest over the suit land in first schedule of the plaint which was
transferred in favour of him by dint of the Will No.III-06 dated
14.02.2006.
One late Anurupa Chakraborty, wife of Binode Bihari
Chakraborty was the sole owner having right, title and interest over the
land described in first schedule of the plaint, which includes second
schedule. It is the case of the plaintiff that he being one of the nephews of
late Anurupa Chakraborty used to look after her during her life time and
being satisfied with his service, she transferred the land described in first
schedule of the plaint in favour of him by a registered Will No.III-06 dated
14.02.2006. The testator, Anurupa Chakraborty died on 25.03.2014 in her
residence at Govindapur and the plaintiff performed funeral works and
other rituals. After her death he tried to enter his name in the record-ofright under the TLR and LR Act in regard to the suit land which he
received by dint of the registered Will dated 14.02.2006. At that time, from
the office of the Tehsil, he came to learn on 30.12.2016 about the existence
of another Will executed on 10.03.2014. Thereafter, he applied for
certified copy of the said Will and obtained the same on 10.01.2017
wherefrom he came to learn that the Will was executed in favour of the
defendant, which, according to the plaintiff, was executed secretly and
fraudulently. The plaintiff has specifically stated that the testator, Anurupa
Chakraborty was a literate lady and till death she had the ability to read
and write.
3.
The defendant, Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust)
represented by Sri Arun Kumar Banerjee contested the suit by filing
written statement. It is pleaded that the testator, Anurupa Chakraborty
always intended to donate the land of Schedule ‘A’ to develop an
educational institution. It was also the wishes of her deceased husband and
to fulfill the wishes and desires of both of them she executed the Will
dated 10.03.2014 in favour of Umabel Educational Foundation (trust). It is
further pleaded that since she was suffering from illness, she could not put
her signature, but, put her left thumb impression in the Will as the testator.
The defendant further pleaded that the registration was made through
Commissioner as she was not physically fit for movement, though, she was
quite able to understand her surroundings and to manage her own affairs.
The testator was also mentally fit and conscious about her judgment and
decision. It is also averred that advocate Sri S. Chattopadhyay had drafted
the Will and there were two attesting witnesses, namely, Bimalendu Dutta
and Ashit Ranjan Das.
4.
After exchange of pleadings, having heard and considered the
materials on record, learned trial court framed the following issues:(i) Whether the suit is maintainable?
(ii) Whether the registered Will bearing No.III-00012 dated
10.03.2014 is ineffective, null void and not binding being executed by
exercise of fraud, undue influence, misrepresentation, collision and
false personation?
(iii)Whether the suit land in the possession of plaintiff or defendant?
(iv)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for and/or
any other relief/reliefs?
5.
Thereafter, evidences were recorded. Both the plaintiff and
the defendant had adduced evidence along with their respective witnesses.
Plaintiff had adduced two witnesses including him. The defendant also had
adduced three witnesses including him.
6.
After completion of recording evidence and having heard the
arguments advanced by the parties, the learned trial court came to a finding
that the Will dated 10.03.2014 executed in favour of the defendant was not
believable as it suffered from suspicious circumstances which the
defendant had failed to remove. Accordingly, decree had been passed
declaring the Will dated 10.03.2014, executed in favour of the defendant
as void abinitio and not binding upon the plaintiff and declared plaintiff’s
right, title and interest over the suit land described in Schedule ‘A’ of the
plaint.
7.
The defendant being aggrieved preferred first appeal before
the court of learned District Judge who reversed the finding of learned trial
court holding that the Will dated 10.03.2014 did not suffer from any
infirmity and there was no suspicious circumstances. Accordingly, he
dismissed the judgment and decree passed by learned trial court in favour
of the plaintiff.
8.
Challenging the said reversal judgment and decree passed by
learned first appellate court, the plaintiff has preferred the instant appeal
before this court. At the time of admission of the second appeal, this court
formulated the following substantial question of law:“Whether the evidence of DW-3 has established
execution of the said Will dated 06.03.2014 (Exbt.G) or the
findings as returned by the appellate court in respect of the
proper execution of the Will is perverse in nature”?
9.
I have heard Mrs. S. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel appearing
for the plaintiff as well as Mr. D.R. Chowdhury, learned Sr. counsel
assisted by Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
10.
Mrs. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
plaintiff has pointed out various suspicious circumstances as are reflected
in the judgment passed by learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Kailashahar.
Learned counsel has submitted that the findings arrived at by learned first
appellate court are based on no evidence and misconstrued the legal
position. She further submits that the defendant has failed to establish the
existence of the Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust) itself. She has
emphasized on various irregularities surfaced in the execution and
registration of the Will dated 10.03.2014 (Exbt.G). She has also argued
that the scribe of the Will dated 10.03.2014 has not adduced evidence as
witness and thus, the contents of the Will cannot be said to be proved.
Ultimately, Mrs. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
plaintiff has urged to restore the judgment and decree passed by learned
Civil Judge, Sr. Division setting aside the judgment and decree passed by
learned first appellate court.
11.
Opposing the submissions of learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the plaintiff, Mr. Chowdhury, learned senior counsel for the
defendant [the respondent here-in] has submitted that the contents of the
Will have been proved. Learned senior counsel has further argued that
there is no bar in law that the owner of a land cannot execute any
subsequent Will. Mr. Chowdhury, learned senior counsel has tried to
persuade this court that one of the attesting witnesses, namely, Bimalendu
Datta appeared before the court and deposed that in front of him the
testator, Anurupa Chakraborty had put her thumb impressions. Said
Bimalendu Dutta also identified his signature in the Will. Regarding the
contents of the Will, learned senior counsel has emphatically submitted
that said Dutta being one of the attesting witnesses had sworn affidavit
before the Notary Public, Kailashahar where he proved the contents
mentioned in the “affidavit” in proof of the contents of the Will. Mr.
Chowdhury, learned senior counsel has submitted a written argument
today before this court. According to learned senior counsel, the Will dated
10.03.2014 does not suffer from any infirmity or suspicious circumstances
and he prays for upholding the judgment and decree passed by learned first
appellate court.
12.
I have gone through the judgments of both the courts below.
Learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court No.1, Kailashahar having
considered the evidence and materials on record came across the following
suspicious circumstances which are reproduced hereunder, in extenso, for
convenience:“18. In this case, I find, the second disputed WILL is not
believable due to the following suspicious circumstances which could
not be removed by the defendant-propounder of the WILL :a) The attesting witness of the WILL namely Sri
Bimalendu Datta as DW.3 merely deposed that the disputed second
WILL marked Ext.G is exhibited by executant Anurupa Chakraborty
and identified his signature as attesting witness marked Ext.G/1 and
also identified the thumb impression of testator marked Ext.G/2 series
which are taken by him and his signature below the thumb impression
is marked as Ext.G/3 and he identified executant at the time of
registration and his signature is marked as Ext.G/4 and also deposed
that the disputed WILL was executed on 06.03.2014 being drafted by
Advocate Siddhartha Chatterjee and also identified the signature of
Advocate marked Ext.G/5.
Thus, I find, the attesting witness did not depose anything
about the fact that the contents of the disputed second WILL was read
over and explained to the testator. It is also not deposed that testator
put thumb impression in the WILL after knowing and understanding
the contents of the WILL. It is also not deposed that the testator
signed in the WILL in presence of two attesting witnesses and the two
attesting witnesses also signed in presence of testator.
b) As submitted by Ld counsel Mr. M Rahaman
appearing for the plaintiff, I find, in this case, the Advocate who
drafted the WILL has not been examined as a witness. The Advocate
who drafted the WILL is the best person to say that he drafted the
WILL as per say or dictation of testator or anyone else. Even there is
no evidence at all that disputed second WILL was drafted as per say
of the testator and testator signed the second WILL being satisfied
with its contents. Another attesting witness and Sub-Registrars are
also not examined and no explanation is given or brought on record
for their non examination.
c) The disputed second WILL is a computer typed
document and no evidence is adduced as to the fact that how, where
and who typed the said WILL and has taken print out. It is not clear
whether Ld Advocate who drafted the WILL has drafted any draft
copy by handwriting and thereafter it was typed in computer and
taken print out. As the second disputed WILL is not handwritten
WILL it is not natural that the same was typed in computer in the
house of testator as per say of testator unless specifically pleaded and
proved. Thus, I find, the manner of drafting, typing and place of its
preparation are not clear before the court.
d) In the disputed second WILL there is mentioning that
the WILL was executed at the premises of Sub-registry office,
Kailashahar on the 6th day of March, 2014 by testator voluntarily
and while in sound state of mind. In my view, the above mentioned
contention is not believable as the WILL was registered through
commission being the testator is suffering from illness. Where the
testator has been suffering from illness and the WILL is registered
through commission it is very hard to believe that the testator would
come in the office of sub-registry office and execute the WILL in the
sub-registry office. Thus, the above mentioned suspicious
circumstances also goes against the defendantpropounder of the
WILL.
e) The propounder of the WILL, the defendant as DW1
deposed in cross-examination that the last WILL was executed on
10.03.2014 and initially he was not aware about the last WILL but his
sister informed him about the same but he admitted his signature on
the WILL(Ext.G) and his signature is marked as Ext.G(1) and
deposed that he has given the above mentioned signature in the Bar
Library.
As submitted by the Ld counsel for the plaintiff Mr.
Rahaman, I find, the evidence of DW.1 that initially he was not aware
about the WILL is not believable for in the WILL there is his
signature and he himself produced the said WILL before the
subregistry office for registration on 10.03.2014. That apart, in cross
examination DW.1 deposed that before giving any property to any
trust permission of the trust is necessary and they have taken
permission of the trust for giving the suit land in favour of trust. Thus,
I find, the propounder defendant had prior information about the
giving of suit land in favour of defendant trust and even the defendant
himself deposed that they have taken permission for giving the suit
land in favour of trust. Hence, it is not believable that the defendant
was not aware about the WILL initially.
Thus, the evidence of DW.1 is not credit-worthy.
f) In this case, the propounder defendant has taken active
part in the execution of the WILL as it appears from the said WILL
that defendant himself produced the said WILL for registration and
the defendant himself deposed in cross examination that they have
taken permission of the trust for giving the suit land in favour of the
trust. Thus, I find, the defendant with his initiative himself took
permission of trust for giving the suit land in favour of the trust.
Hence, it can be said that the defendant-trust, the beneficiary of the
WILL has taken active part in the execution of the WILL and, thus,
WILL is suspicious.
g) As submitted by Ld counsel for the plaintiff Mr.
Rahaman, I find, from Ext.Q, the letter seeking permission of trust
that testator sought for permission but there is no seal or signature of
the defendant trust institution to show that the said letter was
received by defendant institution and acted upon. As admitted by
DW.1 in cross-examination no such permission of the trust has been
submitted before this court. Thus, the execution of the second WILL
following the letter seeking permission marked Ext.Q after getting
permission is not cogent.
From Ext.Q, I find, the testator stated that her husband
was social worker and for the memory of her husband she wanted to
gift or execute the WILL in respect of her property for the use and
name of “Binod Bihari Memorial Siksha Niketan” but on the
contrary, in the WILL marked Ext.G, it is mentioned that both
executant and her husband decided earlier to donate their property
for the purpose of education and education related activities as per
the deed of trust resolution. In the letter seeking permission there is
not mentioning that it was also the desire of the husband of the
testator to donate the property. If it is true that it was decided by
testator and her husband during the lifetime of her husband to donate
the property for the purpose of education there was no necessity and
requirement for execution of the first WILL in favour of plaintiff by
testator negating the decision of testator and her husband taken
during the lifetime of her husband to donate the property for the
purpose of education and education related activities.
Execution of the first WILL negates the contention that
testator and her husband earlier decided to donate the property in
favour of education and education related activities. Thus, I find, the
purpose of execution of WILL as mentioned in the WILL is not
convincing.
h) The second WILL executed by putting thumb
impression whereas the first WILL was executed by giving signature
and the testator dies after 19/20 days of the execution of the alleged
second WILL and as there is no evidence adduced about the
voluntariness and free consent of the testator and that the testator
signed the WILL, after the contents being read over and explained to
the testator, knowing the contents of it, the same makes the second
WILL doubtful and suspicious.
That apart, defendant-propounder pleaded and deposed
that that due hand tremor the testator was unable to sign but no such
fact of hand tremor is spell-out in the WILL. In the WILL it is merely
mentioned that testator is an old woman aged about 73 years and to
her advanced age she has been keeping indifferent health for past 6/7
months and she cannot put her signature due to her disease. Thus, I
find, putting of thumb impression in the WILL instead of signature of
testator goes against the defendant-propounder of the WILL.
i) The first WILL was executed in the year 2006 in favour
of the plaintiff but the second WILL is executed just 19/20 days before
the death of testator and there is no cogent reason showing change of
circumstances leading to execution of second WILL. The reason
mentioned in the second WILL as to the fact that testator and her
husband decided to donate the property is not believable as discussed
earlier. Thus, I find, no reason leading to the circumstances making
execution of second WILL probable just before 19/20 days of death of
testator at the age of 73 years.
j) In the letter seeking permission it is mentioned that
testator wanted to donate the property for the nomenclature of Binod
Bihari Memorial Siksha Niketan and for the benefit of public but from
the cross-examination of PW.1 it can be found that the name of the
defendant trust 'Umabel Educational Foundation Trust, is for the
name of father and mother of plaintiff and defendant and in no way
the execution of the WILL in favour of defendant trust it can be said
that the nomenclature of the name of husband of the testator namely
Binod Bihari Memorial Siksha Niketan would be served.
19. In this case, the defendant failed to remove the above
mentioned suspicious circumstances and as the disputed WILL is
surrounded by the above mentioned suspicious circumstances and as
the defendant-propounder of the WILL failed to remove the above
mentioned suspicious circumstances to satisfy the conscience of this
court that the disputed second WILL is executed voluntarily with free
consent and the testator put thumb impression after the contents
being read over and explained and knowing the contents and,
therefore, it is impossible for this court to say that the second WILL is
valid as the defendant-propounder failed to give proper explanation
of suspicious circumstances by cogent and convincing evidence……”
13.
Rejecting the aforesaid findings, learned first appellate court
while deciding the issues came to a finding that Bimalendu Dutta, DW-3
being one of the attesting witnesses had adduced evidence and through an
affidavit sworn in before the Notary Public, Kailashahar had proved the
contents of the Will. According to learned first appellate court, in front of
DW-3, the testator, Anurupa Chakraborty had put her thumb impressions.
The Will dated 10.03.2014 was drafted by advocate namely, Sri S.
Chattopadhyay and it cannot be doubted. Learned first appellate court has
heavily relied upon the fact that DW-3, Bimalendu Dutta one of the
attesting witnesses of the Will dated 10.03.2014 was also as a scribe of the
previous Will executed by Smt. Anurupa Chakraborty on 14.02.2006 in his
efforts to prove the reliability of DW-3. Learned first appellate court also
observed that the learned trial court went beyond the pleadings to declare
the Will dated 10.03.2014 as void abinitio and decreeing the suit in favour
of the plaintiff. In this regard, learned first appellate court held that the
plaintiff did not plead anything in his plaint regarding the suspicious
circumstances which they asserted in the case and it was the burden upon
the plaintiff to raise those suspicious circumstances in his plaint and
thereafter, to prove those suspicious circumstances. On the aforesaid
grounds, learned first appellate court dismissed the judgment and decree
passed by learned trial court.
14.
I have given my conscious thought to the findings recorded by
both the courts below. In my opinion, learned first appellate court was
totally misdirected himself from the very beginning to accurately
appreciate the evidence let in to prove the Will in question. I have gone
through the evidence as adduced by DW-1, the propounder i.e. the
beneficiary of the Will. DW-1 Arun Kumar Banerjee asserted that he and
his wife were the members of the Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust)
being it registered at Pune, in the State of Maharashtra, but, I find no such
document regarding the existence or formation of the trust. However,
question is, how the testator, Anurupa Chakraborty came to know about
the existence of the said trust being resided at Kailashahar, Unakoti
District, Tripura. If we believe the statements of the defendant (DW-1) and
DW-3, Bimalendu Dutta, one of the attesting witnesses, then, it would give
an impression that the testator intended to donate the land belonging to
first Schedule of the plaint in favour of the defendant for developing an
educational institution in memory of her husband Binode Bihari Banerjee
under the nomenclature “Binode Behari Memorial Educational Institute”
which surfaced at para 11(e) of the written statement itself. But, it
transpires that the land was practically donated in favour of Umabel
Educational Foundation (Trust) raising serious doubt about the genuinity
of the Will in question. In my opinion, the defendant being the beneficiary
of the Will has failed to remove the cloud under which circumstances the
testator had executed the Will intending to donate the land in favour of
Umabel Educational Foundation (Trust).
15.
Secondly, from the above stated factual matrix three relevant
issues have to be determined by this court, (i) whether the Will has been
proved in accordance with the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act
and Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, (ii) whether the affidavit
sworn in by DW-3, one of the attesting witnesses before the Notary Public
can be said to be “evidence” or it is a mere “document” within the ambit
of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, (iii) whether the defendant has been able
to remove the suspicious circumstances.
16.
For better understanding of issue nos. (i) and (ii), it is
expedient for this court to extract the provisions of Section 68 and the
relevant interpretation clause to be used for the purpose of deciding the
present appeal as embodied under Section 3 of the Evidence Act and
Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, which are as under:“68. Proof of execution of document required by law to
be attested.—If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall
not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been
called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting
witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of
giving evidence:
[Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an
attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being
a Will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions
of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution
by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is
specifically denied].”
3. Interpretation clause. —In this Act the following words and
expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary
intention appears from the context:—
***
***
“Document”. —“Document” means any matter expressed or
described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks,
or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which
may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter…..
“Evidence” .— “ Evidence” means and includes—
(1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made
before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry;
such statements are called oral evidence;
(2) all documents [including electronic records] produced for the
inspection of the Court;
such documents are called documentary evidence.
“63. Execution of unprivileged Wills. —Every testator, not being a
soldier employed in an expedition or engaged in actual
warfare, 12 [or an airman so employed or engaged,] or a mariner at
sea, shall execute his Will according to the following rules:—
(a) The testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the Will, or it
shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his
direction.
(b) The signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the
person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it
was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a Will.
(c) The Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of
whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has
seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the
direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal
acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or the signature of such
other person; and each of the witnesses shall sign the Will in the
presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than
one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of
attestation shall be necessary.”
17.
On careful reading of the above provisions, neither the
contents of the Will nor the execution of the Will, according to me, have
been proved. In the present case, ordinarily, the party relying upon an
original document in the form of primary evidence calls the scribe or any
person who knows the scribe (if the scribe is not alive or not traceable) to
prove the contents of the Will). There is no explanation as to why the
scribe i.e. the Advocate who drafted the Will has not come forward to
adduce evidence to prove the contents. The defendant has also failed to
bring Sri Ashit Ranjan Das, one of the attesting witnesses to the Will.
18.
The defendant had not taken the recourse of issuing summons
as provided under Order XVI Rule 1, Rule 1(a) read with Rule 7(a) of
CPC. From this conduct of the defendant, the court can draw an adverse
inference about the circumstances under which the Will was executed. It is
noticed that the Will had been signed by two attesting witnesses, namely,
(1) Sri Ashit Ranjan Das and (2) Sri Bimalendu Datta. The defendant has
also failed to bring Ashit Ranjan Das. It is true that a Will can be proved
by producing at least one attesting witness as provided under proviso of
Section 65 and 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act. As such, it is important
to discuss the nature of evidence adduced by said Bimalendu.
19.
To determine the point as sought for here-in-above, as to
whether the affidavit sworn in by Bimalendu Dutta, DW-3 before the
Notary Public can be said to be ‘evidence’ or not. It is a mere document
under Section 23 of the Evidence Act. Both the learned courts have treated
this affidavit sworn in before the Notary Public as ‘evidence’ deposed by
DW-3. Only difference is that learned trial court disbelieved the evidence
of DW-3 as deposed by him while the first appellate court had believed
such evidence.
20.
Order 18 of CPC lays down the procedures for examination of
witnesses. Under Order 18 Rule 1, the plaintiff has the right to begin
unless the defendant admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff and contends
that either in point of law or on some additional facts alleged by the
defendant, the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the relief which he
seeks, in which case the defendant has the right to begin. In the context of
the case, there is no doubt that the plaintiff has the right to begin.
Rule 2 stipulates that on the day fixed for the hearing of the
suit or on any other day to which the hearing is adjourned, the party having
the right to begin shall state his case and produce his evidence in support
of the issues which he is bound to prove.
Sub-rule(2) of Rule 2 stipulates that the other party shall then
state his case and produce his evidence(if any) and may then address the
Court generally on the whole case.
21.
Order 18, Rule 4 may be reproduced as under:“4. Recording of evidence.—(1) In every case, the
examination-in-chief of a witness shall be on affidavit and copies
therefore shall be supplied to the opposite party by the party who
calls him for evidence:
Provided that where documents are filed and the parties
rely upon the documents, the proof and admissibility of such
documents which are filed alongwith affidavit shall be subject to the
orders of the Court.
(2) The evidence (cross-examination and re-examination) of the
witness in attendance, whose evidence (examination-in-chief) by
affidavit has been furnished to the Court shall be taken either by the
Court or by the Commissioner appointed by it:
(3)
***
***
(4) ***
***
(5) ***
***
(6) ***
***
(7) ***
***
(8) ***
***”
Provided that the Court may, while appointing a commission under
this sub-rule, consider taking into account such relevant factors as it
thinks fit:
22.
An overview of the above provisions, it becomes crystal clear
that in normal circumstances the plaintiff will lead the evidence first. To
lead such evidence he will file examination-in-chief in the form of an
affidavit supplying copies of such examination-in-chief to the opposite
party. He may produce witnesses on his behalf and such evidence also has
to be led by way of filing examination-in-chief supported by affidavit and
the plaintiff shall supply copies of such affidavit to the opposite parties.
The party may furnish any documents they rely upon. However, the proof
and admissibility of such documents shall be subject to the orders of the
court. The plaintiff had filed examination-in-chief in the form of an
affidavit addressing to the court. On examination of LC records, it is found
in the order dated 11.07.2018 passed by learned civil judge, Sr. Division
that learned counsel on behalf of the defendant had filed examination-inchief of the defendant i.e. Arun Kumar Banerjee in the form of an affidavit
addressing to the court. It further reveals that learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the defendant had sought for accommodation for submitting
another examination-in-chief on behalf of the defendant which was
allowed by the learned court. It is surfaced from the order dated
17.07.2018 that the defendant had not furnished any examination-in-chief
on behalf of his witnesses and on the prayer of the defendant learned court
had passed on order to examine Sri Bimalendu Datta through Advocate
Commissioner. Accordingly, on 23.10.2017 Bimalendu Datta had been
examined as DW-3 by the appointed Commissioner. On the date of his
examination by the Commissioner, DW-3 deposed thus:“This is one affidavit sworn before the Notary Public, Kailashahar,
on 23.10.2017 by me and I put my signature in the said affidavit
[Exbt.R]. This affidavit was written and typed as per my dictation
and explained to me in Bengali by my Advocate Sri Shakti Pada
Datta Purakayastha and explained to me in Bengali by said
Advocate and admitted it to be correct. I put my signature in the
said affidavit. This is my signature marked as R/1 series.”
23.
What has been garnered from the order dated 11.07.2018 and
17.07.2018 that no examination-in-chief had been submitted by the
defendant supplying copy to the opposite party i.e. the plaintiff here-in. It
is noticed that the affidavit sworn in before the Notary Public on
23.10.2017 was much before the order passed by learned trial court
directing the defendant to adduce evidence on his behalf. In compliance of
such direction the defendant, as I said earlier, had submitted his
examination-in-chief in the form of an affidavit which was addressed to
the court itself.
24.
On examination of the said examination-in-chief furnished by
the defendant in the form of an affidavit, the oath was administered on
03.05.2018 by the Notary Public, Kailashahar. On further examination of
records, it reveals that DW-2 and DW-3 did not furnish any examinationin-chief in the form of affidavit addressing to the court. The defendant side
while producing DW-2 had submitted an affidavit sworn in before the
Notary Public which was addressed to the Notary Public itself. DW-3,
Bimalendu Dutta had produced an affidavit which was also sworn in
before the Notary Public addressing the Notary Public itself, but, not to the
court. It has also come to light that both these affidavits of DW-2 and DW3 were sworn on 23.10.2017. On examination of records, I find that the
learned trial court had never passed any such direction to submit any such
affidavit on behalf of the defendant by his witnesses as a matter of treating
the same as examination-in-chief to be a part of evidence and using the
same for the purpose of cross-examination as provided under Order XIX
Rule 1 of CPC which reads as under:“19. Power to get statements recorded on commission.Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the Court may,
instead of examining witnesses in open Court, direct their statements to
be recorded on commission under rule 4A of Order XXVI.
1. Power to order any point to be proved by affidavit. - Any
Court may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular
fact or facts may be proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of any
witness may be read at the hearing, on such conditions as the Court
thinks reasonable :
Provided that where it appears to the Court that either party
bona fide desires the production of a witness for cross-examination, and
that such witness can be produced, an order shall not be made
authorizing the evidence of such witness to be given by affidavit.”
25.
To clarify, in terms of Order XIX Rule 1 of CPC, the court
may at any stage permit a party to adduce evidence by way of affidavit
assigning sufficient or cogent reasons.
26.
In my opinion, the affidavits sworn in before the Notary
Public by DW-2 and DW-3, i.e. the Exbt. P and Exbt. R, are mere
documents where some write-ups or expressions of the declarant exist. In
other words, the contentions made in the affidavits are mere statements of
the author of the affidavits for the reason that firstly, those affidavits
[Exbt.P and Exbt.R] were not made under the direction or authority of the
court; secondly, those were sworn much before the date of adducing
evidence of the plaintiff which is contrary to Order 18 Rule 1 of CPC;
thirdly, both Exbt.P and Exbt.R were addressed to the Notary itself, but,
not to the court; fourthly, no copies of such affidavits were supplied to the
opposite party, the plaintiff, here-in as embodied under sub-rule(1) of Rule
4 of Order 18 CPC; fifthly and most importantly on bare perusal of subrule(2) of Rule 4 contemplates that Commissioner is appointed only for the
purpose of cross-examination and re-examination of a witness on the basis
of the evidence [examination-in-chief] by way of affidavit furnished to the
court and here, no examination-in-chief by way of affidavit had been
furnished to the court on the basis of which cross-examination would be
taken by the Commissioner.
27.
That apart, the statements made by DW-3 before the
Commissioner were made in proof of the contents of the affidavit sworn
by him and he identified his signature as declarant of the said contents of
the affidavit. As such, the affidavit sworn in before the Notary Public
cannot be treated as evidence [examination-in-chief], by way of affidavit
as contemplated under Order 18 of CPC. It is a mere affidavit regarding
some facts which the deponent wants to swear and declare such facts by
way of affidavit before the Notary Public.
28.
An argument may be made that under Section 139 of CPC, an
affidavit can be sworn before the Notary Public. At this juncture, it is
necessary to refer the provisions of Section 139 of CPC which reads thus:-
“139. Oath on affidavit by whom to be administered.--In
the case of any affidavit under this Code(a) any Court or Magistrate, or
[(aa) any notary appointed under the Notaries Act, 1952
(53 of 1952); or]
(b) any officer or other person whom a High Court may appoint
in this behalf, or
(c) any officer appointed by any other Court which the State
Government has generally or specially empowered in this
behalf, may administer the oath to the deponent.”
29.
A bare perusal of clause (aa) it makes it clear that any Notary
appointed under the Notaries Act, 1952 is authorized to administer oath of
affidavit. In other words, Section 139 is being amended to include a
specific provision permitting the swearing of affidavit before the Notary.
30.
In the light of clause (aa) of Section 139 of CPC, in the
opinion of this court, the said clause (aa) of Section 139 should be read
with Order 18 Rule 4(1) of CPC. For further clarification, such affidavit
should be in the form of examination-in-chief and to be addressed to the
concerned court as contemplated under Order 18, Rule 4(1) of CPC and
the Notary appointed under the Notaries Act has the power to administer
the oath of the deponent regarding the truthfulness of the statements made
in examination-in-chief.
31.
Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, in my opinion, the
affidavit sworn in before the Notary in the context of the case, does not
constitute a piece of evidence. It is a mere document containing some
statements of the maker and it cannot be said to be a part of evidence.
Noticeably, from the examination-in-chief of DW-1, it appears that it was
filed in consonance with the provisions contemplated under Order 18 Rule
1 of CPC. Here, I find that it was furnished by way of examination-in-chief
addressed to the court and oath of the deponent was administered by the
Notary.
32.
On careful consideration of the statements made by DW-3
before the Commissioner as reproduced here-in-above, it is noticed that
DW-3 has not stated anything that the testator had expressed her wishes
and intentions to the Advocate on the basis of which the concerned
Advocate i.e. the scribe had drafted the Will. It becomes apparent that the
DW-3 himself has not identified his signature as attesting witness in the
said Will. Furthermore, taking note of notarized affidavit, it comes to light
that DW-3 had stated that late Anurupa Chakraborty, testator of the said
Will [Exbt.G] has given four right thumb impressions, but, on close
scrutiny of the Will itself, it comes to fore that late Anurupa Chakraborty
has given left thumb impressions which provides enough space to doubt
the honesty and integrity of DW-3.
33.
In view of the aforesaid legal propositions and variable
factors, it seems to be very difficult for this court to give credence to the
testimony of DW-3 apart from the fact that the affidavit cannot be treated
as evidence.
34.
It is noticed that the defendant had furnished the affidavit
sworn by DW-2 on 23.10.2017 before the Notary Public as document,
which was marked as Exbt. P and there is no evidence that the affidavit
[Exbt. R] sworn in by DW-3 on 23.10.2017 before the Notary Public was
ever produced before the court prior to the furnishing of the same before
the commissioner, to say the least, that the court has ever permitted the
defendant or DW-3 to treat the statements made in the affidavit [Exbt.R] as
evidence in proof of the Will to bring it within the purview of the
definition of “evidence” and thus the “Will” [Exbt.G] and the “affidavit”
[Exbt.R] come within the purview of the definition of “Document” as
embodied under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, which went unnoticed by
both the courts below perhaps out of inadvertence . In summation of what
has been discussed here-in-above, the defendant had failed to produce any
evidence in proof of the Will either by the scribe or by any of the two
attesting witnesses. At best, under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, DW-3
has proved the contents of the affidavit and his signature thereon, which
has no bearing on the subject Will.
35.
Another significant feature necessary to be stated herein is
that such affidavit inconsistent to the requirement of Order 18 Rule 4 of
CPC being only a piece of document is inadmissible in evidence in proof
of the Will (Exbt.G) and objection against such inadmissible evidence can
be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even at the stage of second
appeal.
36.
It is important to notice that examination-in-chief by way of
affidavit if furnished to the court by a party (witness) as permitted by the
court for adducing evidence on his behalf is never marked as “Exhibit”,
and if the party (witness) filing such examination-in-chief by affidavit is
subjected to cross-examination, only then, it will constitute evidence
within the ambit of the definition of Section 3 of the Evidence Act and
meets the essential requirements of Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC.
37.
Again, apart from the suspicious circumstances which have
been mentioned in the judgment of the learned trial court, I have noticed
that DW-1 being the beneficiary of the Will dated 10.03.2014 has deposed
that he was not aware of the execution or registration of the said Will and
it was handed over to him after the death of the Testator, Anurupa
Chakraborty by his sister, but, on examination of the original Will
(Exbt.G), it is found that he himself presented the Will before the SubRegistrar, Kailashahar on 10.03.2014 at 12:00 hours. Furthermore, his
signature is apparent in the Will itself, which being identified by defendant
himself was marked as Exbt.G(i).Question naturally arises why he tried to
mislead the learned courts when he being the propounder himself
presented the Will before the Sub-Registrar? This, in my opinion, raises a
serious doubt as to whether the questioned Will was executed according to
the wishes and desires of the testator. This suspicious circumstance the
propounder i.e. the DW-1 has failed to remove.
38.
Yet another factor, in the context of the case, necessary to be
considered that DW-2 in his cross-examination stated that he had no idea
or knowledge about the depositions which he made in his affidavit, though
such affidavit is admissible in evidence as it is not in accordance with
statutory prescriptions as envisaged under Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC. That
gives rise to this court a definite impression that he had no knowledge
about the contents and execution of Will. DW-2 also has not stated about
the presence of DW-3 at the time of execution of Will. It would be useful
to extract hereunder the relevant excerpt apparent in his crossexamination:“I cannot read and write in English but I can merely put
my signature in Bengali. I cannot say what is written in English in my
examination in chief. I cannot say the same (sic ‘name’) of the lawyer
who has prepared my examination in chief……”
39.
Furthermore, I find inconsistency in the statements made by
the defendant in his written statement and the depositions he furnished
before the court in his examination-in-chief. At paragraph 11(e) of his
written statement, the defendant has stated that Anurupa Chakraborty
(testator) had written –“a request letter dated 15.11.2013 to this defendant
trust institution requesting for necessary approval or consent from this
institution so that her husband’s name in the shape and nomenclature of
‘Binode Bihari Memorial Educational Institute’ would take effect by way
of executing gift deed or Will.” But, I find that the land in question has
been directly donated in favour of the “Umabel Educational Foundation
(Trust)” without any mention of “Binode Bihari Memorial Educationkal
Institute”.
This
inconsistency
in
his
written
statement
and
contents/expressions of Will also has raised doubt about the genuine
reflections of the wishes and desires of the testator.
40.
In the light of the aforesaid discussions, considering the law
on the subject, I totally endorse the findings arrived at by learned Civil
Judge, Sr. Division, Court No.1, Kailashahar except his reliance upon
affidavit [Exbt.R] and I find it very difficult to approve the views taken by
the learned first appellate court. The findings of the learned first appellate
court regarding the process of execution of Will dated 10.03.2014 badly
suffers from misconception of law. He erroneously held that contents of
the Will had been proved by DW-3 on the strength of the affidavit which
was sworn before the Notary Public, in the opinion of this court, was per
se inconsistent with Section 3 of the Evidence Act and contrary to the
requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act qua Section 68 of
the Evidence Act. Further, Learned first appellate court has totally
misconstrued the suspicious circumstances as are encapsulated in the
judgment of the learned trial court. As such, I have no option but to hold
that the findings recorded by learned first appellate court are perverse and
hence, not tenable in law and liable to be set aside.
41.
Accordingly, the judgment and decree dated 17.04.2019 and
18.04.2019 respectively, passed by learned first appellate court in TA 21
of 2018 stand set aside and quashed. The judgment and decree dated
24.09.2018 and 05.10.2018, passed by learned civil Judge, Sr. Division,
Court no.1, Kailashahar, Unakoti, Tripura in TS 25 of 2017 are restored.
42.
In the conspectus as aforesaid, this second appeal is allowed.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed. Prepare the decree
accordingly.
Send down the LCRs.
JUDGE
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