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GAHC010164372019
2026:GAU-AS:11051
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT AT GUWAHATI
(The High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh)
Principal Seat at Guwahati
RFA No. 73/2019.
Sri Chandra Mohan Jha,
S/o Sri Hari Dev Jha,
R/o Modrina Mansion, Shillong.
…… Appellant/Defendant.
-VersusSri Alok Ghosh,
S/o Sri Khetramohan Ghosh,
R/o Sreenagar Path, Lalganesh, Guwahati – 34, Assam.
…… Respondent/Plaintiff.
With
RFA No. 111/2019.
Sri Alok Ghosh,
S/o Sri Khetramohan Ghosh,
R/o Sreenagar Path, Lalganesh, Guwahati – 34, Assam.
…… Appellant/Plaintiff.
-VersusSri Chandra Mohan Jha,
S/o Sri Hari Dev Jha,
R/o Modrina Mansion, Shillong.
…… Respondent/Defendant.
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
Advocate for the appellant in RFA No. 73/2019
Advocate for the respondent in RFA No. 73/2019
::-
Mr. A. Singh.
Mr. I.S. Mazumdar.
Advocate for the appellant in RFA No. 111/2019
Advocate for the respondent in RFA No. 111/2019
::-
Mr. I.S. Mazumdar.
Mr. A. Singh.
Date of Hearing
:-
11.06.2026.
Date on which judgment is reserved
Date of pronouncement of judgment
::-
11.06.2026.
07.08.2026.
Whether the pronouncement is of the
operative part of the judgment?
:-
N/A
Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced?
:-
Yes
JUDGEMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. A. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant in RFA
No. 73/2019, and respondent in RFA No. 111/2019. Also heard Mr.
I.S. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the respondent in RFA No.
73/2019, and appellant in RFA No. 111/2019.
2.
In these appeals, under Section 96 of the CPC, the
appellant/respondent has put to challenge the correctness or
otherwise of the judgment and decree, dated 12.06.2019, passed by
the learned Civil Judge No. 2, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati (trial court
hereinafter), in Title Suit No. 205/2014.
3.
As both the appeals are arising out of the same judgment and
decree and the parties involved are also same and as agreed upon
by learned counsel for both the parties, it is proposed to dispose of
both the appeals by a common judgment and order.
4.
For the sake of convenience and also to avoid confusion, the
parties herein after will be referred to by their original status in the
Title Suit No.205/2014.
Background Facts:5.
The background facts, leading to filing of the present appeals,
are adumbrated herein below:“The defendant is the absolute owner and possessor of a plot
of land, measuring 1 Katha 17 Lechas, covered by Dag No. 200
of KP No. 87 of revenue village Khanapara, under Beltola
Mouza, in the district of Kamrup (M) at Guwahati and he had
constructed one G+3 storied RCC building, over the said plot of
land, but he could not complete the same.
Thereafter, in the month of September, 2013, the
defendant had approached the plaintiff with a request to sell
the suit property. Then, on 10.10.2013, the plaintiff and the
defendant had entered into an agreement for sale of the
aforesaid property, fixing the price at Rs. 1,00,00,000/-(Rupees
One Crore). The plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs. 90,00,000/Page 3 of 31
(Rupees Ninety Lacs) to the defendant on the date of
execution of the agreement for sale and then, the defendant
had handed over the possession of the property to the plaintiff.
As per stipulation, made in the agreement, the defendant
had to take necessary sale permission from the authority for
execution of sale deed. But, on various pretext he avoided to
obtain the same. Thereafter, on 06.01.2014, when the plaintiff
had approached the defendant, the defendant assured the
plaintiff that the sale permission would be obtained shortly and
the sale deed will be executed. But, in fact he never made any
attempt to obtain the sale permission. When the plaintiff had
inquired at the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (M)
at
Guwahati
(DC
hereinafter)
and
Guwahati
Municipal
Development Authority (GMDA herein after), he found that the
defendant had not applied for any sale permission. Then,
seeing the conduct of the defendant and being left with no
option, the plaintiff had filed a title suit, being Title Suit
No.205/2014, before the learned trial court, for specific
performance of contract and also for decree for execution of
the sale deed or for recovery of Rs. 90,00,000/(Rupees Ninety
Lacs).
Thereafter, summon was issued to the defendant and the
defendant had entered appearance and filed his written
statement cum counter claim, wherein the defendant, amongst
others, had taken a plea that the suit is not maintainable and
there is no cause of action for the suit and also that the suit is
barred by limitation.
The defendant had also taken the plea that he is the
absolute owner of the suit property as stated in the plaint, but
he denied that he had ever approached the plaintiff for sale of
the suit property and also denied entering into any agreement
for sale of the suit property with the plaintiff on 10.10.2013,
and also denied that he had received a sum of Rs. 90,00,000/
(Rupees Ninety Thousand)- as an advance from the plaintiff,
and also denied handing over the possession of the suit land to
the plaintiff. The defendant had also stated that as there was
no agreement for sale of the suit property between him and
the plaintiff, the question of obtaining sale permission from the
concerned authority does not arise.
The defendant had also taken a plea that he had
purchased the suit schedule property from one Upendra
Choudhury, by paying a sum of Rs. 25,90,000/-(Rupees
Twenty Five Lacs and Ninty Thousand), who was the original
owner of the suit land, by executing a sale deed, bearing No.
1930, dated 05.03.2012 and since then, he was enjoying the
peaceful possession of the suit property till dispossession by
the plaintiff.
The defendant had also stated that as he was frequently
away from Guwahati, he entrusted one Bhawananda Jha and
Anil Mishra to take care of the suit property and Anil Mishra
had also acted as a Manager of him and he looked after the
construction
work.
Then,
on
12.05.2014,
the
plaintiff,
accompanied by some other antisocialist, had forcefully
entered into the suit property by breaking the lock of the main
gate and drove out all the workers from the suit property by
threatening them and since then, the plaintiff has illegally been
possessing the suit property till date.
The defendant had also taken the plea that at the relevant
time, he was in the judicial custody in connection with some
other cases and one Bhawananda Jha, on his behalf, had filed
one FIR against the plaintiff, upon which Dispur PS Case No.
1060/2014, under Section 447/427/506/34 of the IPC read with
Section 5 of the Assam Land Grabbing (P) Act, was registered.
The defendant had also taken the plea that the plaintiff has no
right, title and interest over the suit land and that he is a mere
trespasser.
In the counter claim, the defendant had prayed for a
decree, declaring his right, title and interest over the schedule
property and also declaring that the sale agreement, dated
10.10.2013, between the plaintiff and the defendant is forged
and manufactured one and the same is not binding upon him
and also for recovery of khas possession.
Thereafter, the plaintiff had filed a written statement
against the counter claim of the defendant, wherein the
plaintiff had stated that the counter claim is not maintainable
and he denied all the averments and statements made by the
defendant in the counter claim and he prayed for dismissing
the same.
Upon the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the learned
trial court had framed following issues:1.
Whether there is cause of action for the
suit?
2.
Whether the suit is maintainable?
3.
Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
4.
Whether the defendant has entered into an
agreement on 10.10.2013, with the plaintiff
for sale of suit land to the plaintiff?
5.
Whether the defendant has obtained Rs.
90,00,000/- from the plaintiff as earnest?
6.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to enforce
specific performance of agreement as prayed
for?
7.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the
decree and/or relief as prayed for?
8.
Whether there is cause of action for counter
claim?
9.
Whether the counter claim is maintainable?
10. Whether the defendant/counter claimant is
entitled to the decree and/or relief as
prayed for?
11. To what other relief or reliefs parties are
entitled?
Thereafter, discussing the evidence adduced by both the
parties and also considering the documents, so exhibited
before it and also hearing arguments of learned counsel for
both the parties, the learned trial court, vide impugned
judgment and decree dated 12.06.2019, had dismissed the suit
of the plaintiff and partly allowed the counter claim filed by the
defendant, by holding that the sale agreement dated
10.10.2013, is void and is not binding upon the defendant.
However, the learned trial court did not grant any relief to the
plaintiff in respect of his right, title and interest over the suit
property.”
6.
Then being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and
decree, so passed by the learned trial court, the defendant has
preferred the appeal bearing RFA No. 73/2019, on the following
grounds that :I.
The impugned judgment and decree is bad in law and
is against the judicially recognized principles of law and
equity.
II.
The impugned judgment and decree suffers from vices,
incongruities and is failed to reason with the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
III.
The impugned judgment and decree is bad in the eyes
of law to the extent that it upsets the otherwise clear,
absolute and well recognized title of the appellant.
IV.
The
impugned
judgment
and
decree
is
highly
impracticable for the reason that it goes on to the
extent of adjudicating upon the issue, which need not
be an issue, when the respondent himself recognizes
the right of the appellant as right-in-rem.
V.
The impugned judgment and decree on one account
having rendered the suit for specific performance of
the agreement to sell devoid of merit, illegal,
recognizes the disability of the respondent qua the suit
property,
on
the
other
hand,
delegitimizes
the
ownership of the appellant over the suit property, by
adjudicating on the issue of title in negative, it ought
not to have gone into the question of title, especially in
the given facts and circumstances.
VI.
The impugned judgment and decree ought to have
been passed in the manner of adjudicating only to the
extent of issues encircling the specific performance of
the contract qua respondent.
VII.
The impugned judgment and decree has made the
right of possession of the respondent absolute in
nature. Consequently, the appellant has been stripped
off his ownership right over the suit property which
even the respondent had recognized.
VIII.
The appellant ought not to have been conditioned to
lead evidence qua proving his title and declaring the
same to be absolute and free from any interest,
whatsoever. The impugned order without recognizing
the settled position of law that title unless comes under
the cloud, cannot be adjudicated upon.
IX.
Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Annaimuthu
Thevar vs. Alagammal, reported in (2005) 6 SCC
202, held that the averments regarding title are absent
in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title,
the court will not investigate or examine or render a
finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction.
Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if
the matter involves complicated questions of fact and
law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties
to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for
declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a
suit for mere injunction. This recognizes the judicially
affirmed approach that title and its adjudication is
highly impracticable in absence of any competing
interest or claim.
X.
The impugned judgment and decree upsets the order
passed by the court to maintain the status quo of the
suit property, as it made absolute the possession right
of the respondent. It brushes aside the implication that
it would cast on the title, right and interest on the suit
property of the appellant.
XI.
The impugned judgment and decree dilutes the
ownership rights of the appellant since it legitimizes the
illegal and unauthorized construction made by the
respondent over the suit property.
XII.
The impugned judgment and decree overlooked the
acknowledgment of the respondent qua the absolute
title and ownership of the Appellant over the suit
property in respect of which the respondent was
seeking specific performance.
7.
It also appears that the plaintiff had preferred the RFA No.
111/2019, challenging the same judgment and decree, dated
12.06.2019, passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 2, Kamrup (M) at
Guwahati (trial court hereinafter), in Title Suit No. 205/2014, on the
following grounds, that :-
I.
The impugned judgment and decree dated.12.06.2019
is bad in law and facts and as such liable to be set
aside.
II.
The impugned judgment and decree is non-speaking,
cryptic, devoid of reasons, based upon non-application
of judicial mind, and based upon pick and choose
policy.
III.
The learned Trial Court had failed to consider the
provisions of Specific Relief Act and the Indian Contract
Act, and also the provisions of Evidence Act.
IV.
The learned trial court, while deciding the Issue No. 4,
had
wrongly
shifted
the
burden
upon
the
appellant/plaintiff, as the initial burden of proof under
Section 101 of the Evidence Act lies upon a party who
desires the court to give judgment in his favour as to
any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of
facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts
exist and the Appellant/Plaintiff had discharged his
burden of proof by producing the original Agreement of
Sale, dated 10.10.2013, and the learned trial court had
failed to consider the law in respect of burden of proof,
so laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Anil
Rishi Vs. Gurbaksh Singh reported in (2006) 5
SCC, 558.
V.
The learned trial court had failed to consider, though
the counterclaim was partly decreed, the concerned
document was never exhibited by the counter claimant.
VI.
While deciding the Issue No.8 & 9, the learned trial
failed to consider that in absence of any material facts
supported by concrete evidence, the counter claim filed
by the respondent was not maintainable and was liable
to be rejected.
VII.
There is no observation in the impugned judgment as
to whether the counter claim is within the period of
limitation, or not.
VIII.
The learned Trial Court had failed to consider that
under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, the burden of
proof in regard to matter of law, is constant, but
burden of pleading, in the sense of adducing evidence
shifts from time to time, does the question with regard
to
genuineness
of
Agreement
of
Sale
dated
10.10.2013, is not a burden which is dependent upon
law, but the burden is to be discharged, by adducing
evidence, in the present case, no steps was taken in
the suit and counter claim to prove that the aforesaid
document is fraudulent in nature.
IX.
The learned Trial Court had failed to consider the
burden of proof in respect of the suit and counter claim
are not one and the same, and even shifted the burden
in respect of the counter claim upon the plaintiff, which
amounts to exercising jurisdiction not vested.
X.
The learned Trial Court had failed to consider that once
the appellant had discharged his burden of proof in
terms of Section 102 of the Evidence Act, by producing
the original Agreement of Sale, dated 10.10.2013, and
the respondent did not produce any counter evidence
to refute it except a mere statement that the
Agreement of Sale dated 10.10.2013 is a forged
document manufactured by the plaintiff and further
admitted in his cross examination that he did not file
any application to obtain expert opinion to show that
the signature is a fraudulent one, and as such the onus
shifts to the respondent/defendant to prove that the
Agreement of Sale is a fraudulent one".
XI.
The orders, dated 11.10.2018, passed by the learned
trial court permitting production of certified copy of the
money
receipts
and
accordingly
observation
in
paragraph 18 of the impugned judgment, are contrary
to Section 56 and 57 of the Indian Evidence Act, while
deciding the Issue No.5.
XII.
The decision upon issue No.6 & 7, is depended upon
issue Nos. 4 & 5, and as such decision of Issue No.6 &
7 are contrary to law.
XIII.
Decreeing the counter claim partly by the learned Trial
Court is also without any evidence on record and it
amounts to exercising jurisdiction not vested in it.
XIV.
That learned Trial Court had failed to exercise
jurisdiction vested in it by failing to consider Section 73
of the Evidence Act, 1872 wherein the court has power
to compare the signatures and form its opinion,
However, if the court finds it difficult to assess it on
comparison of signatures, then it may take steps to
secure an expert's opinion under Section 45 of the
Evidence Act, but no such exercise was carried out.
XV.
The observation of the learned Trial Court at paragraph
14 of the judgment and decree dated 12.06.2019 that
.........."the plaintiff moreover did not take any step to
send the signature of the defendant in the documents
for expert opinion so as to ascertain whether the
signature in Ext-1 marked as Ext-1(3) and Ext 1(4) are
that of the defendant or not" are contrary to law.
XVI.
That the learned Trial Court had failed to consider the
law laid down that in the case Murarilal v. State
of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1980 SC 531,
wherein, it has been observed in relation to the power
and even the duty of the Court under Section 73 of the
Indian Evidence Act, which provides that"The argument that the court should not
venture to compare writings itself, as it
would thereby assume to itself the role
of an expert is entirely without force.
Section 73 of the Evidence Act expressly
enables the court to compare disputed
writings with admitted or proved writings
to ascertain whether a writing is that of
the person by whom it purports to have
been written. If it is hazardous to do
so, as a sometimes said we are afraid it
is one of the hazard's to which judge and
litigant must expose themselves whenever
it becomes necessary. There may be cases
where both sides call experts and the
voices of science are head. There may by
cases where neither side calls an expert,
being ill able to afford him. In all such
cases it becomes the plain duty of the
court to compare the writings and come to
its own conclusion, the duty cannot be
avoided by recourse to the statement that
the court is not expert. Where there are
expert opinions, they will aid the court
will have to seek guidance from some
authoritative textbook and the Court's
own experience and knowledge",
But, no such exercise was carried out by the learned
Trial Court.
XVII.
The learned Trial Court has failed to consider Section
30 of the CPC, which empowers the Civil Courts to
order
discovery,
inspection
and
production
of
documents etc.
XVIII. The learned Trial Court failed to consider the cross
examination of the defendant's witnesses.
Submissions of learned counsel for the appellant in
RFA No. 73/2019 and respondent in RFA No. 111/2019:
8. Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant in RFA No. 73/2019
and respondent in RFA No. 111/2019, submits that the alleged
agreement, dated 10.10.2013, based upon which the plaintiff has
prayed for specific performance of the contract in the Title Suit No.
205/2014, itself is a forged and manufactured document. Mr. Singh
further submits that the defendant had never agreed to sell the suit
property to the plaintiff and he never entered into the said
agreement and also he had never received the sum of Rs.
90,00,000/- from the plaintiff, as contended.
8.1. Mr. Singh also submits that on account of absence of the
defendant, the plaintiff, along with some anti social elements,
illegally dispossessed the defendant from the suit property and since
then, the plaintiff has been illegally possessing and enjoying the
benefit of the same. Mr. Singh further submits that the alleged
Agreement, dated 10.10.2013, could not be proved in the court and
payment of Rs. 90,00,000/(Rupees Ninety Lacs), also could not be
proved and that the learned trial court has rightly rejected the suit of
the plaintiff. Under such circumstances Mr. Singh has contended to
dismiss the RFA No. 111/2019.
8.2. Mr. Singh also submits that the plaintiff has, in no uncertain
terms in his plaint stated that the defendant is the absolute owner of
the suit property, and in view of said categorical admission the
learned Trial Court could have very well decreed the counter-claim
filed by the defendant in full, but it had failed to exercise the
jurisdiction vested upon it. Further, Mr. Singh submits that the
defendant had also produced the copy of the Sale Deed dated
05.03.2012, by which he had purchased the suit property from one
Upendra Choudhury, and despite, the learned Trial Court had failed
to consider the same. Further submission of Mr. Singh is that unless
the plaintiff admits the ownership of the defendant over the suit
property, he even cannot maintain the Title Suit for specific
performance of the contract.
8.3. Further contention of Mr. Singh is that the defendant had filed
an application under Order 41 and Rule 27 CPC for allowing him to
produce the e-copy of the Sale Deed dated 05.03.2012, by which he
had purchased the suit property from Upendra Choudhury, and the
same was allowed by this court and that the defendant has also filed
the Certificate, as required by Section 63 of Bharatiya Sakhya
Adhiniyam, (BSA) 2023 by filing an additional affidavit and the
plaintiff has not opposed and disputed the same and on the strength
of the same the defendant has succeeded in establishing his right,
title and interest over the suit property.
8.4. Under the given factual position, Mr. Singh submits that the
learned Trial Court has committed gross illegality in decreeing the
counter-claim partially and therefore, has contended to allow the
RFA No. 73/2019, and to decree the counter claim of the defendant
in full.
Submissions of learned counsel for the appellant in RFA
No. 111/2019 and
respondent in RFA No. 73/2019:-
9. Per contra, Mr. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the respondent in
RFA No. 73/2019, and appellant in RFA No. 111/2019, submits that
on being approached by the defendant to sell the suit property, the
plaintiff had entered into an agreement with him on 10.10.2013,
fixing the sale consideration @ Rs. 1,00,00,000/- and out of which,
the plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs. 90,00,000/- to the defendant on
the same day and then possession of the suit property was handed
over to the plaintiff and since then the plaintiff is in possession of the
same.
9.1. Mr. Mazumdar further submits that as per the said agreement,
the defendant was to obtain the sale permission, but he failed to
obtain the same and also failed to execute the sale deed in favour of
the plaintiff and while the defendant refused to perform his part of
contract, the plaintiff, being left with no option, had filed the title suit
No. 205/2014, before the learned trial court for a decree of specific
performance of the agreement or to refund the sum, which he had
paid to the defendant and any other reliefs, which he is entitled to as
per law and equity. But, the learned trial court has erroneously
dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, instead, partly decreed the counter
claim filed by the defendant.
9.2.
Mr. Mazumdar also submits that the agreement has duly been
proved by the plaintiff by producing the original copy and also the
money receipt in respect of the payment of Rs. 90,00,000/-(Rupees
Ninety Lacs) has also been proved, and that the plaintiff was ever
ready to perform his part of contract, but the defendant had failed to
perform his part of the contract. And therefore, the impugned
judgment and decree, so passed by the learned trial court,
dismissing the suit of the plaintiff, is illegal and the same is liable to
be interfered with.
9.3. Mr. Mazumdar, under the aforesaid facts and circumstances,
has contended to allow the RFA No. 111/2019, by setting aside the
impugned judgment and decree, dated 12.06.2019, and also to
dismiss the RFA No. 73 of 2019, filed by the defendant, as there is
no merit in the same.
Discussion and Analysis:10. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the
parties, this Court has carefully gone through the memo of appeals
as well as the grounds mentioned therein and also gone through the
impugned judgment and order, dated 12.06.2019, passed by the
learned trial court, in Title Suit No. 205/2014.
11. In view of the contention of the parties and the submissions,
so advanced by their engaged counsel, the points which are central
to the lis, and to be decided by this Court, are formulated as
under:I.
Whether the learned trial court has rightly
decided Issue No.4, which is concerning with
the agreement dated 10.10.2013, and specific
performance of which is being sought for by
the plaintiff against the defendant?
II.
Whether the learned trial court has rightly
decided Issue No.5, which is concerning with
payment of sum of Rs. 90,00,000/- by the
plaintiff as earnest money to the defendant?
III.
Whether the learned trial court has committed
illegality in deciding Issue No.10, by not
decreeing the counter-claim of the defendant
in full, inspite of clear admission of
ownership of the defendant over the suit
property by the plaintiff in the plaint
itself?
12. It is to be noted here that the requirements for granting
specific performance of the contract has been well settled in catena
of decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court. Most cited amongst them is
the decision in Kamal Kumar vs. Premlata Joshi, reported in
(2019) 3 SCC 704. In the said case Hon’ble Supreme Court has,
in paragraph Nos. 7 & 8, held as under:“7.
It is a settled principle of law that the grant
of relief
of
specific
performance
is
a
discretionary and equitable relief. The material
questions, which are required to be gone into
for grant of the relief of specific performance,
are:7.1. First, whether there exists a valid and
concluded contract between the parties for
sale/purchase of the suit property.
7.2.
Second, whether the plaintiff has been
ready and willing to perform his part of
contract and whether he is still ready and
willing to perform his part as mentioned
in the contract.
7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact,
performed his part of the contract and, if
so, how and to what extent and in what
manner he has performed and whether such
performance was in conformity with the
terms of the contract;
7.4. Fourth, whether it will be equitable to
grant the relief of specific performance
to the plaintiff against the defendant in
relation to suit property or it will cause
any kind of hardship to the defendant and,
if so, how and in what manner and the
extent if such relief is eventually
granted to the plaintiff;
7.5. Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled
for grant of any other alternative relief,
namely, refund of earnest money, etc. and,
if so, on what grounds.
8.
In
our
opinion,
the
aforementioned
questions are part of the statutory
requirements [See Sections 16(c), 20, 21,
22, 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
and Forms 47/48 of Appendices A to C of
the Code of Civil Procedure]. These
requirements have to be properly pleaded
by
the
parties
in
their
respective
pleadings and proved with the aid of
evidence in accordance with law. It is
only then the Court is entitled to
exercise its discretion and accordingly
grant or refuse the relief of specific
performance depending upon the case made
out by the parties on facts.”
13. The learned Trial Court, while deciding Issue No. 4, had
recorded a categorical finding to the effect that the plaintiff had
failed to discharge the initial onus that the agreement, Exhibit -1,
was executed by the defendant. In arriving at such a finding, the
learned trial court had considered the Exhibit - 1, and also it had
relied upon a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Rishi
(supra).
13.1. The learned trial court had also recorded a finding that
Exhibit – 1 was not executed in presence of the plaintiff as the same
was already signed by the defendant prior to handing over the same
to him.
14. This Court has carefully considered the finding so recorded by
the learned trial court in the light of the evidence on the record. And
it appears that though in his evidence, the plaintiff as PW-1 had
supported the statements and averments made in the plaint, yet,
the defendant had denied his signature on the Exhibit -1, rather the
defendant, as DW-1, has testified that the plaintiff on 12.05.2014,
along with some anti socialist, forcefully entered the suit premises by
breaking the lock of the main gate and drove out the workers of the
defendant and illegally took possession of the same and in respect of
the same, one FIR was also lodged on 02.06.2012, by one
Bhawananda Jha, and upon said FIR, Dispur PS Case No. 1060/2014,
under Section 447/427/506/34 of the IPC read with Section 5 of the
Assam Land Grabbing (P) Act, was registered and the same has been
exhibited before the learned Trial Court during trial as Exhibit-C by
the defendant annexed with the memorandum of appeal in RFA No.
73 as Annexure – 3.
14.1. It also appears that the plaintiff had examined one Pritom
Hazarika as PW2, but he testified that he is not aware of who else
signed on the Exhibit – 1. PW-1 and PW-2, both admitted having not
seen the defendant by putting his signature over the Exhibit -1.
14.2. Since, the defendant had categorically denied execution of
Exhibit – 1, and putting his signature over the same, and since the
plaintiff and his witnesses had failed to prove the signature of the
defendant over Exhibit – 1, this Court is of the view that the plaintiff
has failed to discharge his burden of proving that there existed a
valid agreement between him and the defendant, which is a basic
requirement in the suit for specific performance, as held by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case Kamal Kumar (supra).
14.3. It is worth noting here in this context that in view of the
decision
of
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
in
the
case
of
Anil
Rishi(supra), the initial burden is always upon the plaintiff to first
establish his case.
14.4.
In the instant case, the plaintiff had failed to discharge the
burden of proof and that the learned trial court had rightly arrived at
a finding to that effect. And this Court finds no infirmity or illegality
in the finding so recorded by the learned Trial Court requiring any
interference of this Court.
14.5.
It is however a fact that the plaintiff had produced and
exhibited the original agreement as Exhibit-1. But, mere production
of the original agreement is not sufficient. Due execution of the same
has to be proved. In the instant case the plaintiff and his own
witness, being P.W.1 and 2 have admitted having not seen the
defendant signing the Exhibit-1. When due execution of the Exhibit-1
could not be proved even if the learned Trial Court had carried out
the exercise under Section 73 of the Evidence Act, it could have been
a futile exercise as the plaintiff, upon whom the initial burden lies,
had failed to discharge the same. In that view of the matter the
decision referred by the plaintiff in Murarilal (supra) would not
come into his assistance.
14.6.
And in view of above discussion and finding, the Point No. I,
so formulated herein these appeals, for determination, has to be
decided in affirmative and accordingly the same stands answered.
15. Moving forward to the point No. II, this Court finds that the
learned trial court had held that the plaintiff had failed to prove
payment of Rs. 90,00,000/-(Rupees Ninety Lacs) to the defendant.
15.1.
It appears that though the plaintiff, as PW-1, had deposed
having paid a sum of Rs. 90,00,000/-/(Rupees Ninety Lacs), to the
defendant on 10.10.2013, he did not exhibit any money receipt in
support of the said contention, rather in his cross-examination, he
stated that on the day, when he signed Exhibit – 1, only part
payment was made and he was not aware of the exact amount.
Subsequently, he stated that he paid a sum of Rs. 90,00,000/- to the
defendant by arranging the same from his family members, i.e. from
his sister, namely, Swati Ghosh and his friend, namely, Abhijit Roy.
But, he failed to exhibit his bank statement or the bank statement of
Swati Ghosh and Abhijit Roy to prove that the transaction was truly
made.
15.2. It also appears from the evidence of PW-1 that he had lodged
one FIR against the defendant on 15.05.2014 and the said FIR was
exhibited by the defendant as Exhibit – A and it appears that with
the said FIR, the plaintiff had also enclosed two numbers of Money
Receipts and upon the same, the learned trial court had taken
judicial notice that the certified copy of two money receipts were of
dated 12.01.2013 and 21.03.2013 and in the money receipts, one of
the witness, namely, Pritom Hazarika, PW -2, put his signature as
witness No. 1. But in his cross-examination, PW-2 deposed that he
heard that the plaintiff had issued money receipts, but he was silent
that he had put his signature as witness in the said money receipts.
15.3. Further, the certified copies of the money receipts reveal that
those money receipts were of dated 12.01.2013 and 21.03.2013,
whereas as per the deposition of PW1, the agreement for sale was
executed on 10.10.2013. As such, the evidence of PW1 and the
statements and averments made by him in the plaint, that he had
paid a sum of Rs. 90,00,000/- to the defendant on 10.10.2013, on
which date the agreement was executed and possession was handed
over to him, fails to inspire confidence.
15.4. And as such, the learned trial court had rightly returned the
finding in respect of Issue No. 5 as negative. And this Court finds no
ground to interfere with the same.
15.5.
In view of above discussion and finding, the point No. II for
determination in theses appeals has to be answered in affirmative
and accordingly, the same stands answered.
16. Moving forward to the point No. III, it appears that the learned
trial court had dealt with the same under Issue No. 10 of the
impugned judgment and decree. The learned Trial Court has held
that though the defendant, as DW-1, had testified that he is the
owner of the suit land and he had purchased the same on
05.03.2012, from one Upendra Choudhury by paying a sum of Rs.
25,90,000/-, by executing a Sale Deed No. 1930, dated 05.03.2012,
but the defendant did not exhibit the same or any other land
documents or copy of the jamabandi to show his title over the suit
land.
16.1. Thereafter, the learned trial court had held that in absence of
any evidence to show that the defendant is the owner of the suit
land, it cannot be said that he has any right over the same and as
such, right, title and interest of the defendant over the suit land
cannot be declared. This finding of the learned Trial Court, while
examined in the light of the facts and circumstances on the record,
and also in the light of settled legal position this Court finds that the
same suffers from serious infirmity.
16.2. Firstly, it appears that in the plaint itself, the plaintiff had
admitted in uncertain term that the defendant is the absolute owner
and possessor of the suit land, along with the incomplete G+3 RCC
storied building, which is standing over the same. The relevant
paragraph of the plaint is extracted herein below for ready
reference:“1. That the defendant is the absolute owner
and possessor of a plot of land measuring 1
katha 17 lechas [4.92 Are] covered by Dag
No.200 of K.P. Patta No.87 of revenue Village
Khanapara under Mouza- Beltola in the district
of Kamrup (Metro), Assam and upon the aforesaid
plot of land the defendant has constructed an
uncompleted G+ 3 storied R.C.C. Building
situated by the side of Ganesh Mandir High
School Bye Lane, Six mile, Khanapara, Guwahati22 with due permission from the Concerned
Authority. The aforesaid land and R.C.C.
building is hereinafter referred to as 'the
suit property' and more fully described in the
schedule to this plaint.”
16.3. It is worth mentioning in this context that Section 58 of the
Evidence Act provides that admitted facts need not be proved. In the
case of Nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatram Ichharam @ Brijram
and Others, reported in AIR 1974 SC 471, Supreme Court
observed that admissions, if true and clear are by far the best proof
of the facts admitted. Judicial admissions (or admissions in
pleadings) admissible under Section 58, stand on a higher footing
than evidentiary admissions. They are binding on the party making
them, constitute a waiver of proof, and can by themselves, form the
foundation of the rights of the parties.
16.4. In the instant case also, in view of the categorical admissions
made by the plaintiff that the defendant is the absolute owner and
possessor of the suit land, the learned trial court ought to have
declared the right, title and interest in favour of the defendant over
the same.
16.5. Secondly, though the defendant had not exhibited the Sale
Deed No. 1930, dated 05.03.2012, yet the copy of the same had
been enclosed with the written statement cum counter claim and
during the pendency of these appeals, the defendant had filed one
application, under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC, for allowing him to
adduce e-copy of the sale deed and after hearing learned counsel for
both the parties, this Court was pleased to allow the said application,
vide order dated 11.06.2026.
16.6. And perusal of the said e-copy also indicates that the
defendant had purchased the suit property from one Upendra
Choudhury on 05.03.2012, by paying a sum of Rs. 25,90,000/-, who
was the original owner of the suit land, by executing a Sale Deed,
bearing No. 1930, dated 05.03.2012.
16.7. The defendant also produced a certificate, as required under
Section 63 of the BSA, 2023. Notably, the certificate was produced
subsequently by filing an additional affidavit on 30.07.2023. It worth
noting in this context that the plaintiff had neither disputed the Sale
Deed bearing No. 1930, dated 05.03.2012, nor the Certificate under
Section 63 of the BSA, 2023.
16.8. It is the categorical contention of Mr. Singh, learned counsel
for the appellant in RFA No. 73/2019 and respondent in RFA No.
111/2019, that the original copy was not available with the
defendant and that the e-copy is admissible in evidence and as such,
there is no question of denying the relief claimed by the defendant in
his counter claim, and that the learned Trial Court has illegally
denied the relief(s) which the defendant is lawfully entitled to.
16.9. Notably, during the course of argument, Mr. I.S. Mazumdar,
the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the original copy
of the Sale Deed No. 1930 dated 05.03.2012 is with the plaintiff.
Then he was directed to produce the same before this Court. But on
the following date Mr. Mazumdar apprised the Court that the same
could not be traced out by the plaintiff.
16.10. There appears to be substance in the submission of Mr.
Singh and accordingly, this Court is inclined to record concurrence
with the submission of Mr. Singh. Thus, the finding of the learned
Trial Court in respect of Issue No. 10 fails to withstand the legal
scrutiny and therefore, the same deserves to be interfered with and
accordingly, the same stands interfered with.
16.11.
Under the given factual and legal matrix the point for
determination No.III has to be answered in affirmative and
accordingly the same stands answered.
17. Accordingly, this Court finds that the plaintiff had failed to
prove the execution of the agreement for sale, dated 10.10.2013.
And it is the first requirement to grant specific performance of
contract as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamal
Kumar (supra).
Conclusion:18. In the result, this Court finds no merit in the RFA No.
111/2019. And accordingly, the same stands dismissed.
19.
However, this Court finds sufficient merit in the RFA No.
73/2019. And accordingly, the same stands allowed. In that view of
the matter, the counter-claim, so filed by the defendant, stands
decreed in full.
20. In view of disposal of these appeals, the Receiver of the suit
property, so appointed by this Court vide order dated 16.06.2026, in
I.A. No. 1830, stands discharged.
21.
Send down the record of the learned Trial Court with a copy of
this judgment and decree, forthwith.
JUDGE
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